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NOVEMBER, 1945

[Part 1

THE
JOURNAL
OF THE
GANGANATHA JHA
RESEARCH INSTITUTE



ALLAHABAD

Board of Editors :

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Published by
Mm. Dr. Umesha Mishra,
Ganganatha Jha Research Institute,
Allahabad.

Printed by K. Mittra, at
The Indian Press, Ltd.,
Allahabad.

JOURNAL
OF THE
GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE


NOVEMBER, 1945.

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1. Reliefs depicting *Tuccha Sūkara Jātaka*. From Rajghat, Benares. Circa 60 B.C. to 70 A.D.



3. Relief depicting *Gajāsura-sambhāra-murti*. From Rajghat, Benares. Circa 1200 A.D.



2. Inscribed Pillar mentioning Budha (Gupta), 157 G.E. 476-77 A.D. From Rajghat, Benares.

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SOME SCULPTURES FROM RAJGHAT, BENARES

BY ADRIS BANERJI

IN 1941 in order to facilitate the regirdering of the Dufferin Bridge it was decided to divert the G. T. Road near the Kashi Railway Station of the E. I. Railway over the Rajghat plateau. The demolitions of the E. I. Railway, in 1940 had resulted in the finds of antiquities of various dates, and the subsequent excavations carried out by Mr. S. Mukherji, at the instance of the Director-General of Archæology in India, had yielded interesting results. In order to conserve the ancient relics as far as possible to be unearthed during the conversion of the G. T. Road, Pandit M. S. Vats deputed his Sub-Overseer, Pandit U. C. Sharma to make a proper record of the finds. The work in fact resulted in a good harvest, as commencing from potsherds generally ascribed to Mauryan period (black and grey lustre sherds. Lustre is a personal suggestion of the writer, as many 'people like to call it polished) up to a Muhammadan child's tomb-stone were found. All these have now found a safe refuge in the Bharata Kala Bhavana, Benares City.

• • Earliest of these are two fragments of buff sandstone of Chunar showing a large pig and rows of pigs. This representation of pigs, so far as I know is an unique feature in Indian art. Though the *Matsya* and the *Vāyu*

Purāṇas, no doubt record that in the boar incarnation of Viṣṇu, the divinity may be represented as a full boar, except some late specimens a theriomorphic form is generally found. The earliest of which is the image of Boar at Udaigiri in Gwalior State. The *vajrayāna* goddess Māricī, has a chariot drawn by seven pigs, but this does not explain the occurrence of *gulmas* of pigs and a big pig. According to some in the temples of Vārāhī representations of pigs are found, but no actual representation has so far been met with. Vārāhī, moreover, was a zoomorphic divinity and representation of pigs in her temple is an ambiguity not supported by any texts. We are, therefore, thrown on our resources to find an explanation of these three fragments. The first fragment has the following scene represented :—

(i) Fragment of buff sandstone of Chunar showing a boar of a pig with a collar on its neck, probably to indicate that it was tame : The whole body is covered with dots to indicate the hair on the body. It has long tail. Just below the body and within the rectangle created by four legs are two young pigs with few others climbing rude steps as if from a pit. The two young ones are not sucklings, as the breasts (in case it was she-pig) are not shown, and we shall not be wrong in taking it as a tame pig. Ht. $5\frac{1}{4}$ ins. \times $8\frac{3}{4}$ ins. in breadth, approximately.

(ii) Fragment of a same kind of relief showing three rows of pigs (*Śūkara gulma*): Below these is the fore-part of two pigs which must have been portrayed diagonally looking at an object standing on an elevated ground. Ht. $8\frac{1}{2}$ ins. \times 7 ins. in breadth approximately.

(iii) Fragment of a relief containing the fore-part of a pig with a collar around its neck and head raised : On one corner we find a diminutive full bodied female figure with a child on her lap. Ht. 5 ins. \times $7\frac{1}{2}$ ins. in breadth approximately.

It is quite clear that we cannot ascribe these fragments to any Hindu mythological scene. The same is the case with Jainism. In Buddhism except in the case of Māricī pigs do not accompany any Bodhisattva or past Buddhas. My first clue was the collar on the neck, which showed that it had been domesticated and that it was a pig and not a wild boar. Amongst the *Jātakas* we have a story 'Taccha Śūkara Jātaka' (*Jātaka* No. 492 of Fausboll); and significantly the term used there is 'Śūkara' and not a boar (*varāha*). This, I believe, explains the presence of the big sized pig and not a boar; and the story itself will support the abnormal size given to it in comparison with other diminutive figures. The story runs:—

“In a village called Dvāragrāma, in Vārāṇasī, dwelt a weaver, who while collecting dry woods in the forests came across a young pig in a pit. He took the creature to his home and domesticated it. In course of time it grew abnormally in size and strength that, lest any accident should happen, the weaver left it in the forest. The pig decided to find out a herd which it intended to lead—and he did find out one but every member of it seemed to be in distress. On enquiry he learnt that a tiger living in the neighbourhood daily devoured the strongest amongst them. *Takṣaka* (Pali. Taccha—because, that was the name given to it by the weaver) advised them that unity amongst them will prove the undoing of the tiger. According to his directions they dug two pits with a slight wall between them to allow one pig to stand on it. Then he arranged them in the form of a lotus (*padma-vyūha*). The sucklings were kept at the centre surrounded by their mothers and these in their turn were surrounded by barren she-pigs. These were protected by young pigs whose tusks had recently come out, and on the extreme outer edge encircling all, were the aged pigs. When in the morning the tiger was seen advancing from

the hill, Taccha took his stand on the wall ; and seeing him the fattest and the largest, the tiger jumped on him, while he slid down to a different compartment and later on gored to death the tiger. In this way the tiger was killed, and also the mendicant who used to secure venison of the pigs by the tiger." It is this scene I feel that is portrayed on the reliefs. The horizontal rows of smaller pigs represent *Śūkara gulmas*. The smaller pigs going up the incline possibly represent the attempt at digging pits ; while the large figure diagonally portrayed looking at an elevated object is undoubtedly Taccha ; collar on whose neck suggests domesticity. The fragmentary condition of the reliefs prevents further discussion. It cannot be considered a work of the post-Muhammadan period, as the remains of the Rajghat plateau clearly show that after the sack of Benares by Malik Qutbud-din Aibak, mentioned in *Tāi-ul-M'aasir*, the remains of Rajghat consisting of a lofty temple and other religious and secular buildings, could not have escaped his attention. I am glad to record that in August 1943, during a discussion, Rao Bahadur K. N. Dikshit agreed with the present writer that there was a big temple which probably occupied the site of the late Muslim tombs and E. I. Railway offices. In 1940 when the railway excavations exhumed, the Rajghat copper plate of Govindachandra deva V. S. 1187, a stone drain was found projecting from the bottom of the mound. This site continued to be occupied by them, till the advent of the Hon'ble East India Company. Moreover, pigs were *hārām* to the Muhammadans, therefore, their ascription to any period between 1195 A.D. to 1800 A.D. is ruled out. The reliefs by their technique and style indicate a higher antiquity. There is power in the representation and modelling has gathered in volume by experience. The reliefs may be primitive, but the gradations and

clever use of the planes suggest, that they may be coeval with D(g) 4 of Sarnath Museum.¹ If the contents have been correctly identified the subject matter too lends certain weight. In the early centuries of the Christian era, *Jātaka* scenes were high favourites. From the Kuṣāṇa period there is a marked decline in their popularity, and in the Gupta times at Sarnath, with the exception of D(g) 6 and D(d) 1, of Sarnath Museum, *Jātaka* scenes are rare.² I would, therefore, ascribe it to circa 60 B.C. to 70 A.D.

2. Pillar inscribed in the 157 year of the Gupta era—in the time of Budhagupta. Buff sandstone of Chunar. Ht. 4 ft. $4\frac{1}{2}$ ins. approximately.

It is rectangular at base up to 2 ft. $4\frac{1}{2}$ ins. which contains four niches in each of which are four *avatāras* of Viṣṇu. Above the niches is an octagonal section $5\frac{1}{2}$ ins. in height, superimposed on which is a sixteen sided section $4\frac{1}{2}$ ins. in height.³ Above, base with foliage $5\frac{1}{2}$ ins. in height, surmounting it is a square portion absolutely plain $7\frac{1}{2}$ ins. in height. It is inscribed on one face in the characters of the late Gupta period, and mention *Mahārājādhirāja Budha* (Gupta). These images of *avatāras* of Viṣṇu are for many reasons very important as they happen to be one of the earliest representations of *avatāras* of Viṣṇu. The pillar being inscribed, and what is more dated, they can be objectively used. They show that mediaeval Hindu iconographic formulæ, had not then been developed. We were brought face to face with this problem in evaluating the images found amidst the ruins of the Śiva temple at Bhumārā,⁴

• • ¹ Sahni—*Catalogue*, p. 246.

² *Ibid*, pp. 233 and 247.

³ The divisions of pillars in rectangular, octagonal, sixteen-sided sections commence with Kuṣāṇa umbrella posts.

⁴ Śiva temple at Bhumārā, *Mem. A.S.I.*, No. 36.

and the later temple at Deogarh, but paucity of materials, which still remain acute, prevented the conclusions being placed on a firm basis.

The niche immediately above the inscription, contains an image with two hands and face damaged beyond recognition. The right hand holds the club and the left hand discus. On the second niche, that is niche on the right side of the first, we find the figure of Nārasimha with club and discus in two hands. In the third niche, we have another figure with head damaged—since one hand has a bow we may conclude that it may be a figure but one hand has lotus and another holds hem of the loin cloth—probably Buddha. If the suggested identification is correct, then I feel that it is one of the earliest images of Buddha as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu. This leads us to one of the most interesting points in the development of Indian iconography and mythology—the exact time of inclusion of the Gautama Buddha as an incarnation of Viṣṇu.

3. Fragment of a relief (complete in itself with the exception of the head of the Bull (*Nandī*) of buff sandstone of Chunar. The main *dramatis personæ* is a bearded male figure, with nose damaged, and in *ālīḍha* attitude. His right foot is found resting on a dwarfish figure. On right cheek are conventionalised screw like curls similar to the *Andhak-āsura-badha-murti* of Sarnath Museum. He wears a chignon crown (*Jaṭā-mukuta*) and below it a coronet of human skulls. He wears *kundalas* in the ears and on neck we find a torque and a necklace. The upper part of his body is bare which is evident by the nipples indicated here by concentric circles and a dot within; as well as the navel.⁵ The quality of the modelling is

⁵ It may be noted that one of the incongruities of Gupta art is that they show the navel of the Buddha inspite of the monks robes. Any Gupta image of Sarnath Museum will serve the purpose. The reason is that the drapery was supposed to be diaphanous. But this image, be it noted, has no claims to such drapery.

evident from the torsal plain and the thorax. On arms he has armlets with human face (see one on the right arm). On the waist richly jewelled girdle with the folds of the drapery (or tassels ?) hanging below is the right knee. The central folds, which due to conventionalization are treated very summarily, hang down with a fine curve between the legs. The upper garment is shown in the fashion of a *vanamālā* on Viṣṇu images. In D(f) 34 of Sarnath Museum the garland of the human skulls around Śiva's neck is shown in the same manner. He has ten hands : two of which hold the carcass of an elephant bereft of the skin over his head. The second right hand holds the *ḍamaru*, the third and the fourth right arms are damaged ; the fifth is holding the handle of the *triśūla*. The second left hand holds a shield, the third the trident with which he has speared an *asura*, fourth is missing and the fifth has probably the drinking bowl. Below his left arm is an emaciated figure-Cāmuṇḍā, one of the seven *mātṛkās*. It is evident that it represents one of the *sambhāra-murtis* of Śiva, particularly conducive to *Śākta* form of worship, which caught the imagination of the people from the 9th century of the Christian era. It represents Śiva killing the *Gajāśura* (the demon masquerading as an elephant).

The relief is of great iconographic importance, due to its variance with the south Indian *āgamas*, which shows that inspite of common sectarian beliefs, different iconographic rules prevailed in the peninsular and northern India. That the rules of the *āgamas* were obeyed is amply borne out by the examples illustrated by the late T. A. Gopinath Rao.⁶ In the *āgamas* the left leg of the divinity is expected to be placed on the elephant head

of the *asura*, whereas in the specimen under discussion we find the leg placed on a dwarf. *Aṁsubhedāgama* states that in the *sambhāra-murttis* Śiva should have four or eight arms, while our image has ten. The same is the case with the other known specimen, found in Benafes area, the Sarnath Museum image of *Andhak-āsura-badha-murṭti*. According to the *Kūrma Purāṇa*, Śiva used the skin as his upper garment. Then the *Varāha Purāṇa* informs us that *asura* Nila⁷ was killed by Vīrabhadra, while he was masquerading as an elephant, and after flaying, the skin was presented by him to Śiva, who used it as his upper garment while killing Andhaka.⁸ Since in the example under discussion we find the body of the god up to the waist naked, we may conclude that *Kūrma Purāṇa* was not followed. Another enjoyment of the *āgamas* that the skin of the elephant should form in the background the *prabhāmaṇḍala*, is also not followed, as we find in the sculptures found at Amṛitapura (Mysore), Halebid; and the bronze image of Valuvur; though the body of the elephant is shown without the skin. None of these authorities mentions the animal carcass found on this example.

The fragment happens to be the part of a temple which must have been in existence at Rajghat, where now, the Railway Engineer's office and the Muhammadan burial ground exist. Here the present writer found in 1940, large fragments of architectural pieces, since removed to Bhārat Kalā Bhavan at the instance of the Archaeological Department. As one side of the cheek has been left bare of beards, it is possible that it remained in a niche high above the eye level.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 150.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 379.

4. An architectural fragment of red sandstone of Chunar.⁹ Length 9 ins. \times 8½ ins.

On the left is meandering creeper flat on top as in all examples of the 12th century of Christian era. On the right in a sunken niche we find the figure of Gaṇeśa seated on a cushion in *mahārāja līlā* attitude. He has two arms, the left holding *modakas*, on which the trunk of this zoomorphic divinity rests, but there is a peculiarity in representing the end. Instead of the snout resting on the *modakas* it makes a loop with the end to the proper left of the image. The right hand is in *varadamudrā*, which is significant. He wears a *mukūṭa*. The loop of the long trunk of this theriomorphic divinity is not found in any other image and is absent in all the examples illustrated by Getty.¹⁰ While the *mudrā*, I feel, suggests Buddhist influence. It is needless to point out that the image was found in Benares, where *tāntrika* Buddhism and Hinduism brought about an unholy alliance. It is found in both the hands of Deśī Kārttikeya of the Sarnath Museum.

⁹ Red sandstone is available in Chunar. In fact when buff sandstone of Chunar is first quarried the core exhibits a redness. But these stones differ from those of Kaimur in quality and colour.

¹⁰ Alice Getty—*Ganesa*, London, 1936.

* Published by the courtesy of Dr. R. E. Mortimer Wheeler, Director General of Archaeology in India. Copy right of the photographs except the Gajāsura-samhāra-murti belongs to the writer. The latter belongs to the Archæological Department. It is regretted that the photographers had not the sense to utilise a scale.

THE EXACT DATE OF THE KURU WAR

BY V. B. ATHAVALÉ

A Solar eclipse followed by a Lunar one, on the Kārtika full moon with an interval of 13 days only, and a comet in Puṣya, decide the exact date of the Kuru war.

On the Geographical evidence, I have already proved in the February 1944 issue of *the Allahabad Ganganatha Jha Research Institute Journal*, that the era of the Kuru war is 3000 B.C. The era is expressible as a number containing four digits. The war is a historical event. So until the next three digits are known, the statement remains vague and inconclusive. The century and the decade figures must be worked out from the astronomical evidence only. The aim of this article is to find out the missing figures and thus complete the historical picture.

In the *Mahābhārata*, we get many references about the position of the planets in relation with the stars. The sequence of their positions can be made to reveal the century in which the events took place. The following are some of the important events along with the 'tithi' and the month in which they took place. (1) The war started on the 11th of the first half of the month of Mārgaśīrṣa. (2) On the tenth day Bhīṣma was permanently laid down on the stretcher bed of arrows. Sañjaya was sent post-haste¹ to Dhṛtarāṣṭra at Hastinapur, to report the event the same night. (3) Duryodhana was killed by Bhīma, in the mace fight on the 18th day. (4) This was the last day of the battle, and Balarama had returned from a pilgrimage on this very day. (5) Bala-

¹ अथ गान्धर्वाभिः विद्वान् संयुक्तात् एवम् । आचष्ट निहतं शीघ्रम् । Bb. 13-1

rama had started for the pilgrimage² when the moon was in Puṣya, and returned after 42 days, when the moon was in Śrawaṇā. (6) Bhīṣma was waiting for the northward shift of the sun, so that he may leave his mortal body on the auspicious occasion. This occurred on the 8th of the first half of the month of Māgha, i.e. 58 days after the battle started. (7) The Śrāddha ceremony continued for about a fortnight. (8) The Śrāddha of Duryodhana was performed by Yuyutsu, who³ was a son of Dhṛtarāṣṭra through a Vaiśya wife. (9) Dhṛtarāṣṭra was lamenting over the death of his sons. Many people attempted to pacify him. This was essential. For, without the consent of Dhṛtarāṣṭra, Yudhiṣṭhira could not start the horse sacrifice, which must precede his crowning as an emperor at Hastinapur. (10) As a final attempt to calm the mind of the old king, Vyāsa composed the *Gītā* poem. He asked Sañjaya to sing it to the lamenting king, and try to see if it produced the desired effect. The trial was successful and the king was calmed. (11) Thus two months later⁴ on the Caitra full moon day, the sacrificial horse was let loose. (12) The horse wandered through 11 provinces and returned after a period of two years and ten months on the Māgha full moon day. (13) The actual sacrifice lasted for two months, and the coronation took place on the first of Caitra. (14) Vyāsa had laboured hard during these three years to compose⁵ the Jaya-history poem, to sing it during the afternoon recess of the actual sacrifice. It was a tradition that the Poet Laureate (पुरोवसं मुख्यः) should sing the glory of the ruling family. (15) Yudhiṣṭhira

² चत्वारिंशत् ग्रहानि अथ द्वेच मे निस्तृत्य वै । पुष्येण संप्रयातोऽस्मि ब्रह्मणेन सवागर्तः ॥ Śalya 34-5.

³ त्वयि पिबः च तन्तुः च धृतराष्ट्रस्य दृश्यते । Bhīṣma. 43-98.

⁴ चैत्र्यां हि पौर्णिमास्यां तु तव दीक्षा भविष्यति ।

⁵ त्रिभिः वर्षैः सुदीर्घायी भारताख्यानं *Ādi*, 62-52.

ruled for 36 years. Then occurred the great catastrophe of severe earth quakes and the deluge by the sea in the maritime regions of Kathaiwad. (16) The Yādawas migrated to Prabhāsa owing to the deluge. (17) Arjuna was in Prabhāsa at the time of the death of Kṛṣṇa. He collected the ashes of Balarama and Kṛṣṇa, and returned to Hāstinapur. (18) The Pāṇḍawas got dejected after hearing the news of the death of Kṛṣṇa. They handed over the kingdom of Hastinapur⁶ to Parikṣiti, who was aged 40, and Indraprastha to Yuyutsu. They then started for a pilgrimage. (19) They went to the eastern sea⁷ first. The ashes of Balarama and Kṛṣṇa, which were brought by Arjuna were probably deposited at Puri. Very old traditions recorded in Oriya language tell that the wooden images in the Jagannatha temple contain some relic of the physical body of Kṛṣṇa. It is interesting to note that the wooden image is not called the Mūrti of Jagannatha but is termed a Kalewara (कलेवर) meaning a dead body. (20) During their west-ward tour, the⁸ Pāṇḍawas saw that Dwārakā was still submerged under the sea.

The above sequence covers a period of 40 years. It is clearly a normal one. There are no contradictory statements. The controversy arises when we try to determine the century of the sequence. It may belong to any century, because it shows no unique features by which it can be distinguished from others. Thus until some unique feature is obtained, the problem of the century determination remains unsolved. I have obtained that unique feature, which I have mentioned in the beginning of this article.

⁶ ततो युयुत्सुं भानात्थं प्रमज्जन् धर्मकाम्यया । राज्यं परिददौ सर्वं वैश्यापुत्रे युधिष्ठिरः ॥
अभिषिष्य स्वराज्ये च राजानं च परिक्षिति ।

⁷ ततः ते तु उत्तरेणैव तीरेण लवणोन्मसः । अमुः दक्षिणां दिशं.....

⁸ ददुशुः द्वारकां सागरेण परिप्लुतां.....

But before I take up the discussion, let me show that we can get a tolerably accurate estimate of the era and the century of the war, from the passing away of Bhīṣma on the 8th of Māgha.

The north-ward shift of the sun is an easily observable and unique phenomena in any year. The date and the month in which this occurs is practically fixed during a century. The rate of variation is one day per $\frac{1}{72}$ years. It is called the precession of the equinoxes. At present this northward shift actually occurs on 22nd December, which is Mārga. of our Hindu calendar. At the period of the Kuru war, we know that the shift occurred in Māgha. This shows that the date of the shift has receded by a little more than two months, i.e., 60-65 days. It means that some 4300-4600 years have elapsed since the passing away of Bhīṣma.

Another interesting side light on the problem is that the *Gīta* mentions directly this northward shift in VIII 23. The description in VIII. 12-13 as to how a yogin voluntarily leaves the mortal body, can be seen to have a remarkable coincidence with that of the passing away of Bhīṣma.

Now, we shall turn to the unique occurrences mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*. They were observed nearly two months before the war, i.e., in October. They are three independent and unique observations. All were observed simultaneously in October. These are the three criteria to find out the exact date of the war.

1. चंद्रादित्यौ उभौ ग्रस्तौ एकान्हा हि त्रयोदशी । अपर्वणि ग्रहेण *Bhīṣma* 3-28
चंद्रसूर्यौ उभौ ग्रस्तौ एकमासी त्रयोदशी । अपर्वणि ग्रहेण *Bh.* 3-32. चतुर्दशी पंच-
दशी भूतपूर्वा च षोडशी । इमां तु नामिजानेह अमावास्यां त्रयोदशी । *Bh.* 3-33.
अलक्ष्यः प्रभया हीनः पीणिमासी च कार्तिकीम् । चन्द्रोऽभूदग्निवर्णश्च पद्मवर्ण-
नभस्तले । *Bhīṣma* 2-13. चित्रास्वात्यन्तरे चैव वष्टिः परवः ग्रहः । रोहिणी
पीडयत्येवं उभौ च क्षिमास्करो । *Bhīṣma*, 3-17,

2. धूमकेतुः पुष्यं आक्रम्य । इवेतोग्रहः सधूम इव पावकः ज्येष्ठां आक्रम्य । धुवं प्रज्वालितो घोरं अपसव्यं प्रवर्तते । *Bhṛ̥ṣma*, 3-19 इवेतोग्रहः चित्रां *Bh.* 3-13.

3. संवत्सरस्थायिनी । विशाखायाः समीपस्थी बृहस्पतिसनैश्चरी ॥ *Bh.* 3-27

• The 3rd criterion, the Jupiter and the Saturn staying in Viśākhā for one year, is comparatively a minor one. For, it occurs after every 60 years. The 2nd criterion that a comet should be in Puṣya and be visible in October, is clearly more important. The first criterion, however, is of the utmost importance. "Two eclipses, occurring after an interval of 13 days only, must be visible in October. Three consecutive verses are written to describe this unique phenomenon. It proves that the author of the 3 verses is not only impressed by the unique observation, but is baffled by it. The verse 32 says, "I know that a lunar eclipse occurs on the 14th day of on the 15th day from the new moon. It has occurred at times even on the 16th day. But I never knew a case when it occurred on the 13th day and this too after a solar eclipse."

Out of the two eclipses the lunar eclipse occurred on Kārtika full moon day, according to the quotation cited above. The solar eclipse must, therefore, be either on Āświna Amāwāsyā or Kārtika Amāwāsyā day. In a later paragraph I have proved that a solar eclipse never follows a lunar eclipse on the 13th day. It may precede the lunar eclipse. This shows that the solar eclipse must be on Āświna Amāwāsyā. In October the sun is in Citrā, Svāti and the verse quoted above shows Rāhu to be in Svāti, which proves the certainty of the eclipses.

If a century can be found when all the 3 occurred simultaneously in October, it must be the year in which the war took place.

• In the May 1945 issue of the *Jha Research Institute Journal*, Allahabad, M. Raja Rao has written the

article with the heading “*The Pauranic date of the Bhārata war.*” He has taken a complete survey of all the opinions expressed so far, and the dates worked out either from the astronomical references or from the genealogical tables mentioned in the Purāṇas. On page 127, the author writes, “The modern scholars express the view that the war probably took place some year near 1200 B.C.” On the page 142, he writes, “Thus the several statements of the Purāṇas point out to some year near 2000 B.C., as the date of the Kuruk war. It might have been earlier still but not later.”

In order to test the validity of the two opinions, the author has given the planetary positions in October for 2052 B.C., and 1198 B.C.

The tables are given together for comparison. The month is the same but the eras are 854 years apart. It will be seen that both the years are identical so far as the *Bhārata* tells that all the seven planets were near together at the time of the war. The problem is how to decide between the two. Both the ans-

13-10-2052 B.C.	21-10-1198 B.C.
S. (223)	S. (224)
M. (223)	M. (224)
Mars. (245)	Mars. (217)
Mer. (209)	Mer. (226)
Ju. (218)	Ju. (216)
Ve. (264)	Ve. (236)
Sat. (220)	Sat. (215)
Rāhu (210)	Rāhu (210)
Comet (229)	Comet (229)

The figures in the bracket are the angular distances of the planets counted from the Aświnī as the zero point.

wers cannot be correct. Some additional test must be obtained. M. Raja Rao applies here the test of two eclipses in one month. For 1198 B.C., there is a solar eclipse on the 21st October, but it is not followed by the lunar eclipse at all. In 2052 B.C. however, there is a solar

eclipse on the 13th Sept., and it is followed by a lunar eclipse on the 29th September, i.e., 16 days later. Thus it follows that the year 1198 B.C. must be rejected, 2052 B.C. may be the year, because it satisfies the additional condition of two eclipses in one month, but is doubtful because the 13 day test fails.

The traditional year 3102 B.C. supported by Mr. Vaidya,⁹ does not satisfy even the test of two eclipses in one month. For though there is a solar eclipse on the Kârtika Amāvāsyā, there is no lunar eclipse in the 15 days before or after the event.

Though 2052 B.C. satisfies all the minor conditions, it fails to satisfy the other two major conditions of a visible comet in Puṣya, and the lunar eclipse after 13 days only. The table shows that the comet is in Viśākhā. It being near the sun in October, is not visible.

• While searching for eclipses separated by 13 days only, I came across 1213 B.C. and 2067 B.C. as the two years for which the condition is satisfied. For the year 1213 B.C., the solar eclipse is on the 9th August followed by a lunar eclipse on the 22nd August, i.e. 13 days later. In 2067 B.C., the solar eclipse is on the 28th December followed by a lunar eclipse 13 days later. But

⁹ The importance of the two eclipses separated by 13 days only was recognized by the late Rao Bahadur C. V. Vaidya. But he was under the impression that the lunar eclipse should be followed by a solar one, on the 13th day, because the word moon comes first in both the verses, where it is mentioned. The reason why he failed to get this set of eclipses is as follows. The lunar month is never greater than 30 days. It may be 30 or 29 days. Normally the full moon day comes on the 15th. The dark half may be 14 or 15 days. The full moon day may come one day late, i.e. on 16th. The dark part is then of fourteen days only. If the full moon comes on the 14th, the dark half may be 15 or 16 days. During the bright half, the relative motion of the moon to approach 180 positions, is faster than when the moon is catching the sun on Amāvāsyā. The moon may arrive at the full moon position even on the 13th day, i.e. two days earlier. A Purnimā or Amāvāsyā may be delayed by a day, but never by two days. The 13 day eclipses are thus always in the first half and never in the second.

none of these years can be accepted as a solution. For, the eclipses are not in October, and the other conditions also are not satisfied in these years. Working backward by the Saros rule, I tried to find out the year in which the two eclipses separated by 13 days should occur in October, and in the third millenium as suggested by the Geographical evidence. The year 3016 B.C. satisfies this condition.

In 3016 B.C., there is a solar eclipse on the 29th October, and it is followed by a lunar eclipse 13 days later. As October corresponds with Āświna, the solar eclipse must be on Āświna Amāwāsya. Thirteen days later it was Kārtika full moon day, and the moon was eclipsed. The peculiar expressions in Sanskrit अमांन्वीणिमा, and त्रयोदशी अमावास्या which mean the full moon day, the new moon day (Amāwāsya) and the 13th day having merged into one and the same day, hold good for the Kārtika full moon mentioned above. Because, a lunar eclipse must be on the full moon day only, which is the 13th day. The eclipse means that the sun and the moon are together in one and the same line. The word Amāwāsya means that the sun and the moon are together. As the lunar eclipse has occurred on the 13th day, it means $13=15=30$.¹⁰

¹⁰ An interesting confirmation for the correctness of the year 3016 B.C. can be obtained from Sabhāparwa 81.23 राहुः च अर्कं उपाग्रस्तु अपवर्णिः... It says that the sun is eclipsed on an unusual day. We have already seen that the sun cannot be eclipsed on the 13th day from the full moon. Thus the expression means that the eclipse was on the 16th. The Pāṇḍavās were in exile for thirteen years. Thus this 16th day solar eclipse must have occurred 14 years before the year of the war. It means that in the year 3030 B.C., there we must get such an eclipse. By the Gregory rule, the $3030 + 1929 = 4959$, being divisible by 19, the year 1929 A.D. corresponds to 3030 B.C. In this year, there is a solar eclipse on 9th May i.e., Vaiśākha Amāwāsya. The full moon appeared on 23rd April. This difference of 16 days is unusual, though not rare like the 13 day eclipses. In Bhā 3.32, we get the words 'भूतपूर्वाच्च त्रयोदशी अमावास्या'. The reference to the eclipse on the 16th day is clear. This must have been the eclipse before they went on exile. This date will be very helpful to coordinate the events before the exile.

Now, we must show how we can fix the date of the war from this eclipse. We know that the war took place on the 11th of the first half of Mārga. This is 5 days before the Mārgaśīrṣa full moon day. The war thus started 24 days after the Kārtika full moon day.

This statement can be justified by another independent evidence. Balarāma had returned on the 18th, i.e. the last day of the battle, from a pilgrimage of 42 days. It means that Balarāma had started for the pilgrimage 24 days before the battle began, and the moon was in Puṣya on that day. From this it follows that Balarāma had started on the Kārtika full moon day. Thus, we get the position of the moon and the sun on this day.

Still another confirmation about this day is obtained from a statement in the *Mahābhārata* that Duryodhana¹¹ had issued orders that his armies should march to the battle field when the moon is in Puṣya.

The departure of Balarāma for a pilgrimage, as he did not wish to take part in the battle, and the departure of the armies towards Kurukṣetra, when the moon was in Puṣya, are thus the two independent proofs for the correctness of the year.

The solar date of the war was the 5th of December, and the lunar was the 11th of the first half of Mārgaśīrṣa. From the Gregorian rule that after every 19 years the same tithi and the month correspond with the same date and month of the English calendar, we can get still another verification for the Kārtika full moon. The year 3016 B.C., corresponds with 1943, 1924, 1905 etc. A.D. years. The 29th October is always the Āświna Amāwāsyā for these series of years. Not only that, but the Kārtika full moon day also occurs on the 13th day for this series. Mr. Manerikar from Alibag pointed out

• ¹¹ निर्गच्छन् पांडवैः पुण्येण सहिता मया । Sa. 35-19. रोहिणे वै गते शूरे पुण्येण मधुसूदने । Sa. 35-15.

that Puṣya does not coincide with the Kārtika full moon day. It coincides with the 3rd, 4th, or 5th, of Kārtika Vadya. The Śrawaṇā also does not coincide with Mārgaśīrṣa Amāwāsya, on which the war ended, but with the 4th, 5th, or 6th of the first half of Pauṣa. This shift of 3 or 4 days can be shown to be due to the shifting of the equinox point.

Now we shall take up the comet criterion. Dr. Crommelin¹² of the Greenwich Observatory has given a table of recurrences of the Halley's comet from 240 B.C. to 1910 A.D. It has a period of rotation of 76-77 years. Its orbit being a very elongated ellipse, it is visible only when it is near the perihelion. The perihelion is a point in the orbit of a planet, when it is nearest to the sun. The test of the visibility of the comet in any year is quite simple. If we add 1910 to the B.C. year and divide the total by 77, some remainder is obtained. If the remainder is near 30 the comet is near the aphelion, and hence it is invisible. If the remainder is very small, the comet is near the perihelion and hence it is visible.

If we apply this test to 2052 B.C. and 1198 B.C. respectively, the remainders are 35 and 28. This proves that it was impossible to see the comet in these years. For 3016 B.C., the remainder is -2 only. This satisfies the visibility criterion. Now we shall try to determine the position of the comet in 3016 B.C. But we

¹² Dr. Crommelin's book, "*The Stars*" gives the dates of the perihelion passage of the Halley's comet as follows:

B. C. years:—(1) 15 May 240 B. C., (2) 20 May 163 B. C., (3) 15 Aug. 87 B.C., (4) 8 Oct. 12 B. C.

A. D. years:—(5) 26 Jan. 66, (6) 25 Mar. 141, (7) 6 Apr. 218. (8) 7 Apr. 295. (9) 13 Feb. 374. (10) 3 July 451. (11) 15 Nov. 530. (12) 26 Mar. 607 (13) 26 Nov. 684. (14) 10 Jan. 760. (15) 25 Feb. 837. (16) 19 July 912. (17) 2 Sept. 989. (18) 25 Mar. 1066. (19) Apr. 1145. (20) 10 Sept. 1222 (21) 23 Oct. 1301. (22) 9 Nov. 1378. (23) 8 Jun. 1456. (24) 26 Aug. 1531. (25) 27 Oct. 1607 (26) 15 Sept. 1682. (27) 13 Mar. 1759 (28) 16 Nov. 1835. (29) 20 April 1910 A.D.

must first show that it was seen in October. From the table the October recurrences are:—12 B.C., 1301 A.D., 1607 A.D. Thus to get Oct. recurrence we add, $12 + 1312 + 1618 + 76 = 3018$ B.C. A fairly correct result. The verse quoted above describes the retrograde motion of the comet quite explicitly.

In 2052 B.C. the comet was at 229° . From this to 3016 B.C., 964 years elapsed. Dividing 964 by 76, the remainder is 50. In 50 years it covers an angle of 240° . Adding 229° and 240° and subtracting 360° we get 109° as the angle. But Puṣya is 105° . The *Bhārata* statement is thus correct to the degree. *Bh.* 3.35, पतति उल्काः सनिर्घाताः¹⁸ speaks of a shower of meteors. When the earth is passing through the tail of a comet, the meteor showers occur. This coincidence corroborates the correctness of the statement.

Now we shall show that even the minor conditions of the seven planets coming together, and the Jupiter and the Saturn staying in Viśākhā for one year are also satisfied. These minor conditions were satisfied for 2052 B.C. The difference between 3016 and 2052 is 964 years. But we know that the minor conditions are repeated after every 60 years. Dividing 964 by 60, the remainder is only four. This shows that the minor conditions were satisfied for the year 3016 B.C. also.

All the astronomical references are mainly from chapter 3 of the Bhīṣma Parwa. The first 46 verses of this chapter are by Vyāsa himself. The 47th and the subsequent verses are by Vaiśampāyana. Curiously enough the verses 34 and 37-40 give a description of big earthquakes and a big sea wave. But we know that this catastrophe did not occur before the war and had actually

¹⁸ *Bh.* 3. 13 and 16 are the two references to the comet. The first gives the position of the star in the head of a comet. The 2nd gives the extent of the tail. The angular distance between Puṣya and Jyēṣṭhā is nearly 120 degrees. This proves that the comet was very big.

taken place 40 years after the war. It is probable that Sauti was under the impression that the appearance of the comet and the catastrophe must go together, and thus he transferred the description of this later event in this chapter also. A similar confusion has been made by Sauti in the Mausala Parwa with regard to the peculiar eclipses with a difference of 13 days only. In Dwārakā at the time of the deluge, we find a statement that Kṛṣṇa has not only seen the त्रयोदशी अमावास्या but he even remembers that the same had occurred at the time of the war. The words 'प्रतिस्त्रोतो महानद्यः, प्रत्यगूहुः महानद्यः' are repeated in the Bhīṣma Parwa as well as in Mausala. एवं पश्यन् हृषीकेशः संप्राप्तं कालपर्ययं। त्रयोदश्यां अमावास्यां तान् दृष्ट्वा प्राब्रवीत् इदं॥ चतुर्दशीं पञ्चदशीं कृतेयं राहुणा पुनः। प्राप्ते वै भारते युद्धे प्राप्ता चाद्य क्षयाय नः। इदं च तत् अनुप्राप्तं अब्रवीत् यत् युधिष्ठिरः। पुरा व्यूढेषु अनीकेषु. Mau. 2-17-19.

Big rivers cannot be expected to flow in the reverse direction after an interval of 40 years. Similarly it is impossible to see the peculiar eclipses at the same latitude after an interval of 40 years. Sauti has jumbled them together. The description of the peculiar Amāwāsya in the Mausala Parwa cannot be regarded as a fact of observation, as there are no explicit words उन्नी ग्रस्तौ.

The position of the text of the *Gītā* in the Bhīṣma Parwa, is another example of a jumbled displacement, for which Sauti is responsible. It is there just as if a cart should be attached before a horse. The *Gītā* is the 25th chapter of the Bhīṣma Parwa, and the fight is yet to begin. But in the 13th chapter Sañjaya has returned from the battle field on the 10th day and is reporting about the death of Bhīṣma. In the 25th chapter Arjuna is asking Kṛṣṇa as to why he should draw his bow against the revered Bhīṣma.

It is necessary to explain the Sanskrit word Pralaya which is wrongly translated as a deluge. A deluge means a devastation by water only. The earth-quake devasta-

tion is not included in the word. The word प्रलय includes both. As Dwārakā was a maritime region, there was the deluge by the sea. The Ur and Asur towns in Iraq, which had trade relation with the Dwārakā, were also near the sea, and hence affected by the deluge. At Hastināpura however, there was no deluge, though there was a vast devastation due to the earth-quakes. In order to study the traces which the deluge must have left on the coast of Kathiawad, I have toured along the coast from the port Okhā to the Dieu islands, during April 1945. I have secured ample evidence about the deluge, which can be demonstrated in a lecture, if required by persons interested in the subject.

Finally let me add a few new facts about Kṛṣṇa and Dwārakā. Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa were appointed as the Governors of the Dwārakā region, by king Dhṛtarāṣṭra, nearly 33 years before the war. The Dwārakā town was a new settlement initiated by Kṛṣṇa. It is not the present Dwārakā near the Okha port. The site of the new settlement was near Prabhāsa-Patana. Kṛṣṇa had gone there with 56 Yādava families. The Vṛṣṇi family had received four things (चामरं, व्यजनं, शंखं, आतपत्रं च पांडुरं)¹⁴ from the Kuru king, as a sign of the governorship. The reason for the choice of the site was as follows. The Gir hills which are covered with forests, are very near the coast in this region. Many pirates had chosen this part as their rendezvous. To check their activities effectively, it was necessary to be near the "Lion's Lair." The expression "Lion's Lair" is literally true. For, in India the lion is in the Gir forest only. The *Gītā*, very truthfully associates Kṛṣṇa with the Lion and the Sea. मृगाणां च मृगेंद्रोऽहं । सरसां अस्मि सागरः ।

A comparative table to show how many of the astronomical references mentioned in the *Mahābhārata* do

¹⁴ *Bhāgawata* 10.63. 'वृषण्यः अस्मत् दत्तनृपासनाः । पते योनेन संबद्धाः.....मुजंते अस्मत् उपेक्षया ।

agree with the conditions in each of the year given by each scholar, as the year in which the Kuru war took place is given below.

The table shows clearly that all the conditions in the *Mahābhārata* are satisfied only for the year 3016 B.C. and for none else. It is evident that the solar eclipse decides the correctness of the date, (tithi), month and the figure in the unit place of the year. The comet decides the correctness of the figure in the tenth place.

Name	Year B.C.	Corresponding A. D. year.	Two Eclipses			The Comet				Jupiter Saturn and other planet Positions
			Sun	Moon	Dif.	Year	Vi	M	S	
(1) Mr. Dixit S. B. (Late Astronomer)	5306	1914 or 19 years before or after	not given			25	No.			Correct only roughly Correct to the 2nd decimal place.
(2) Rao B. Vaidya (Late Bharatacharya)	3102	1914 or	17-11	Nil	Nil	7	No			
(3) Mr. Athavale Prof. Nasik College	3016	1924 or	29-10	11-11	13	-2	Yes	Oct.	Pushya	
(4) Mr. Vaidya R. V. Ujjain observatory	2787	1925 or	Nil	2-9	Nil	0	Yes	Mar.	Mriga	
(5) M. Raja Rao, Head Master, South Coorg	2051	1920 or	13-9	29-9	16	35	No.			
(6) Karandikar J. S. Kesari Editor, Poona	1931	1926 or	Nil	Nil	Nil	9	No			
(7) Jayaswal	1424	1920 or	Nil	Nil	Nil	23	No.			
(8) Sankar L.S.	1198	1918 or	21-10	Nil	Nil	28	No.			
(9) Dr. Daptari (Nagpur)	1167	1930 or	Not given			3	No			
(10) Pargiter	980	1927 or	Not given			45	No.			

Explanation of the comet column, the eclipse column, the corresponding year column, and the Jupiter columns:

(1) The comet was last seen in 1910 A.D. during the month of April. It has a period of 77 years. The visibility criterion is to add 1910 to the B.C. year, and divide by 77. If the remainder is within two years, then only it is visible, otherwise it is invisible. The month and the position are worked out only for those, when the visibility condition is satisfied.

(2) The corresponding year is given to verify whether on a particular English date, there is the 'tithi' Amāwāsya or Purnimā, because the eclipses occur on these 'tithis' only. The rule is that after every 19 years the same sequence of Amāwāsya and Purnimā occurs on the same dates of the English month. For instance, 1-1-1915 A.D., and 15-1-1915 are on Purnimā and on Amāwāsya respectively of the Pauṣa month. The years 1934 A.D., 1896 A.D., 1877 etc., all begin with the same 'tithis' and the sequence also remains the same.

(3) Whether a particular year has a solar eclipse or not can be found by the following easy rule. Every solar eclipse recurs after 18 years and 11 days. In this cycle of 18 years there are no eclipses during the years 1902, 1903, 1906, 1913, 1915, 1917 A.D. Thus if we add any of these years to the year to be tested and divide the total by 18, the zero remainder will show that there is no eclipse during that year.

(4) Vi = the visibility condition,

M = month in which it was seen.

S = Star group near which it was visible.

(5) Though Mr. Vaidya R. V. has calculated the positions of the Jupiter and other planets correctly, yet the important solar eclipse conditions are not satisfied and also the conditions of the comet in Puṣya and visible in October are not satisfied. Thus the year is incorrect.

SOME ANCIENT SITES OF BENGAL

BY B. C. LAW

I HAVE briefly dealt with some of the ancient historic sites of Bengal in this paper and I have arranged them according to the districts to which they belong.

Viṣṇupur: Viṣṇupur is in the Bankura district in West Bengal. It is a centre of music culture. For many centuries it had been the capital of the Malla Rājās who gave the name of Mallabhūmi or the land of wrestlers to the country ruled by them. The Mallabhūmi comprised the whole of the modern district of Bankura and parts of the adjoining districts of Burdwan, Midnapore, Manbhūm, and Singbhum. Ādi Malla was the first king who was noted for his great skill in wrestling and archery. Raghunātha who was the founder of the Malla dynasty of Viṣṇupura was born while his parents were on their way to the sacred temple of Jagannātha at Puri in 695 A.D. He defeated the neighbouring chiefs of Pradyumnapura (in the Joypore Police Station) which he made as his seat of government. The royal ensign of the rulers of Mallabhūmi bore the device of a serpent's hood because Raghunātha is said, according to tradition, to have been shaded by two huge cobras with their hoods spread over his head. The cobra's hood carved in stone is even now worshipped in that place under the name of Daṇḍeśvarī. The Hindu rājās of Viṣṇupura were the rulers of a great portion of western Bengal long before the Mahommedan conquest by Bukhtiar Khilji. Jagat Malla, a ruler of Viṣṇupura, removed the capital from Pradyumnapura to Viṣṇupura. The rājās of Viṣṇupura were Śiva worshippers. The temple de-

dedicated to Mallesvara Mahādeva which is considered to be the oldest shrine, is still found there. The rājās afterwards became the ardent worshippers of Mr̥ṇmayī (an aspect of Śakti) whose temple still stands there. The worship of Dharma which Ramāi Paṇḍita introduced became very popular at Viṣṇupura. The celebrated Bengali mathematician Śubhaṅkara Rāya lived under the Malla kings who were great patrons of learning.

The city of Viṣṇupura is named after the god Viṣṇu who was the deity of the royal house at the time of Bir Hamir in the 16th century A.D., who was a great supporter of Vaiṣṇavism. The large stone-gateway of Viṣṇupura fort and the great cannon called Dalamardana may be attributed to him. Many Vaiṣṇava manuscripts were received by him and in quest of them, Śrīnivāsācārya came to Viṣṇupura.

The magnificent temple of Rāsamañca was built by Bir Hamir. Among the later shrines, mention may be made of the following : Temples of Śyāma Rāi, Kālācānda, Muralī Mohana, Madana Gopāla, Madana Mohana, Rādha Śyāma, Lāljeu and Joḍbāṅglā.

The temples of Viṣṇupura are mostly square buildings with a curved roof having a small tower in the centre. Some of them have towers in four corners of the roof. The temple is called *Pañcaratna*, i.e., five towered or *Navaratna* or nine towered. The Śyāma Rāi temple is one of the oldest temples of *Pañcaratna* type in Bengal. Some of the temples at Viṣṇupura contain scenes from the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* on their walls.

Susunia Hill: Another site of historic importance in the district of Baṅkura is the village of Pokhrana or Puṣkaraṇa on the Damodar river, about 25 miles east of the Susunia hill, which was the seat of administration of a ruler named Candravarman as far as it can be gathered from an inscription on the hill,

Tāmrālipti (Tamluk): *Tāmrālipti* (Tamluk) is situated in the district of Midnapore. *Tāmrālipti* or *Damālīpti* is called a city of Suhma according to the *Daśakumāracarita* (Chapt. V). The Epics, Purāṇas, and Buddhist works mention this town. It was a great maritime port and an emporium of commerce from the 4th century B. C. to the 12th century A.D. The temple of Bārga-Bhīmā mentioned in the *Brahmapurāṇa* which was an ancient vihāra, now exists in the town. According to Daṇḍī, the author of the *Daśakumāracarita*, who flourished in the 6th century A.D., the temple of Binduvāsini was situated at *Tāmrālipti* which was visited by the Chinese pilgrims Fā-Hien in the 5th century and Hiuen Tsang in the 7th century A.D. Hiuen Tsang saw a stūpa of Aśoka near this town. Itsing, another Chinese pilgrim, resided here in the Barāha monastery. The present temple of Hanī is said to have been built some 500 years after the destruction of the ancient temple of Binduvāsini by the action of the river Rūpanārāyaṇa.

Navadvīpa: The present railway station of Navadvīpaghāṭa is 8 miles from the town of Krishnanagar in the district of Nadia. To the west of this place, on the other side of the Ganges, stands the town of Navadvīpa, which is a sacred place of the Vaiṣṇavas. It is so called because it is a combination of nine islands. At the age of 24, Caitanyadeva, the great founder of new Vaiṣṇavism in Bengal, left Navadvīpa and lived the life of a hermit. Ballālasena is said to have built a palace here and the ruins of this palace, known as Ballālaḍhipi, are found on the eastern coast of the Ganges, half a mile to the north of the present Māyāpura. A court of justice was established there by Aśokasena, grandson of Lakṣmaṇasena and great-grandson of Ballālasena. At one time it was a great centre of Sanskrit learning and the home of many learned men. It is still a sacred place to the Hindus.

Śāntipura: In the district of Nadia stands Śāntipura on the Ganges. It is the abode of the celebrated Vaiṣṇava reformer Advaitācārya, a contemporary and admirer of Śrī Caitanyadeva. It contains the temples of Madanagopāla, Madanamohana, Kālācānda, Śyāmacānda, etc. Here the celebrated teacher Advaita used to practise asceticism.

About 4 miles from Śāntipura stands the present village of Phuliā which is 9 miles from Rānāghāt and 54 miles from Calcutta. It is the birth place of the Bengali poet Kṛttivāsa, the author of the Bengali *Rāmāyaṇa*. The well-known Muslim follower of Caitanyadeva, Yavana Haridāsa, spent his days here in religious practices.

Plassey: The Palāśī railway station in the district of Nadia is 93 miles from Calcutta. The famous battle-field of Plassey is about 2 miles to the west of the railway station. The name of this place is derived from the Palāśa trees which were plenty there. The British under Lord Clive defeated the army of Siraj-ud-daula, the last independent Muslim ruler of Bengal in the Mango-grove of the historic battle-field on the 23rd June 1757 A.D. This battle has been ably described in verses in the Bengali language in the famous book of Nabin Chandra Sen, *Palāśīr Yuddha*. About 4 or 5 miles from Palāśī, we find the tomb of Mir Madan, the general of Siraj-ud-daula.

Ādi-Saptagrāma: The remains of ancient Saptagrāma are found near the present railway station, called Ādi-Saptagrām, about 27 miles from Calcutta. Saptagrāma was an important city and port. It is so called because the seven sons of king Priyavrata became sages after practising penances there. This place is frequently mentioned in the mediæval Bengali texts, e.g., *Caṇḍīmangala* of Mukundarāma, *Manasāmangala* of Bipradāsa, *Caṇḍī* of Mādhavācārya. It is also mentioned in the *Pavanādūtam*.

written by Dhoyī, the court poet of Lakṣmaṇasena. It lost its importance as a port owing to the silting of the river-bed of the Sarasvatī. In the 9th century A.D. Saptagrāma was ruled by a powerful Buddhist king, named Paramabhattachāraka Śrī Śrī Rūpanārāyaṇa Sinha. The Egyptian traveller Ibn Batuta came here in the 13th century A.D. Saptagrāma, the metropolis of Rāḍha or western Bengal, was later conquered by Jafar Khan whose tomb is still found at Trivenī. Many coins of Muslim rulers, e.g., Sher Shah and Husen Shah, have been found here. During the rule of Alauddin Husen Shah of Gauḍa, it was called Husenabad and was the seat of an imperial mint. In the 16th century A.D. a Hindu chief named Rājivalocana conquered it from Sulaiman, the Sultan of Gauḍa. It is the birth-place of the author of the *Caṇḍī*. We get a glimpse of its prosperity from Bankimachandra's *Kapāla-kunḍalā* and H. P. Shāstri's *Bener Meye*. It is a sacred place of the Vaiṣṇavas being the home of Uddhāraṇa Datta, a follower of Caitanyadeva. Nityānanda, the right-handman of Caitanya, spent many years in this locality. A mosque and a few tombs are still found here.

Vaṁśavāṭī : It is in the district of Hooghly where there is an ancient temple of Haṁseśvarī. The Vāsudeva temple with paṛvanic scenes on its walls is also ancient. Close to Vaṁśavāṭī there is a sacred abode of Uddhāraṇa Datta, a celebrated vaiṣṇava disciple of Caitanyadeva. It is very much frequented by the vaiṣṇavas specially on the anniversary day of this religious reformer, Uddhāraṇa Datta.

Trivenī : It is 5 miles from the present Bandel Junction station. It is a sacred place of the Hindus, situated at the confluence of the Sarasvatī and the Bhāgīrathī. The site is ancient as it is found mentioned in Dhoyī's *Pavanadūta*. The Muslim historians call it Tirpāṇī or Firozabad, as Firoz Shah, Sultan of Bengal, lived here for some

time. During the Muslim period it was an important city and a port. The mediæval Bengali poet Mukundarāma mentions it as a sacred place. It was once a centre of Sanskrit learning. Here we find the tomb of Jafar Khan, the conqueror of Saptagrāma, and close by there is a mosque with the maxims of Holy Quoran written on it. The tomb of Jafar Khan was built over a Hindu shrine containing some inscribed scenes from the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*.

Mahānāda : It is in the district of Hooghly and it can be reached by Magra-Tarkeswar Light Railway. It was once the capital of Western Bengal. Mahānāda contains the ruins of ancient palaces, old Hindu temples and old tanks. According to tradition it was the seat of king Candraketu, the ruins of whose gaḍha (moat) are still found there. The temple of Dvāravasini, old ponds, e.g., Jiyatkunḍa, Pāpaharaṇakunḍa and Sāt Satiner Dighī are found here. Near the old Śaiva temple of Jateśvaranātha we find some tombs. The Jāmāi-Jaṅgal Road, the Vāsiṣṭhagaṅgā and the Jiyatkunḍa are noteworthy.

Pāṇḍuyā : It is situated at a distance of 38 miles from Calcutta. It is commonly known as Pado. It is in the Hooghly District and is quite distinct from *Pāṇḍuyā* of the Malda District. In the 15th century A.D. Samsuddin Isuf Shah, king of Gauḍa, conquered this Hindu kingdom of Pāṇḍuyā. It contained many Hindu temples. An ancient Hindu temple dedicated to Sun God was converted into a mosque. Besides this place contains damaged mosques and a minar which is 127 ft. high. There are two tanks here by the names of Jorāpukur and Pīrpukur. Every year in the months of January and April fairs are held and many people bathe in the Pīrpukur, the water of which is considered to be sacred.

Kātwā (Kāṭadvīpa): It is in the district of Burdwan, and is a sacred place of the Vaiṣṇavas, because here Caitanyadeva at the age of 24 became a hermit and shaved his hair.

• *Jhāmātpura*: Four miles to the north of Kātwā there is a village called Jhāmātpur. It was the dwelling place of Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāj, the celebrated author of the *Śrīcāitanya Caritāmṛta*.

Kālnā: It is in the district of Burdwan and is considered to be a very sacred place to the Hindus, because it was the abode of the famous Vaiṣṇava saints, Sūryadāsa, Gaurīdāsa, Jagannāthadāsa, and Bhagavāndāsa. It is also famous as Ambikā-Kālnā.

• *Murshidabad*: It is situated at a distance of 122 miles from Calcutta, on the bank of the River Bhāgīrathī. It was known to the ancients as Mukshudābād or Mukshuṣābād. It was the capital of the last independent ruler of Bengal. This city was well-built by Nawab Murshidkuli Khan who was then the Viceroy (Subedar) of Bengal. At one time this city was adorned with many magnificent buildings and palaces. It was an extensive city, populous and prosperous. The following are the noteworthy things there:

(1) *Imambara*, which was built by Nawab-Nazim Mansur Ali, is 680 feet long. (2) *Moti Jhil*, which contains a beautiful garden, is now in ruins. (3) *Hazar-duari*, which was the old palace of the Nawab, is a massive structure. (4) *Katra Masjid*. (5) *Tomb of Nawab Sharfaraz Khan* who became the Nawab of Murshidabad for one year after the death of Suja Khan. (6) *Tripolia Gate*. (7) *Jahankosha Cannon*. (8) *Topkhana* which was built by Murshidkuli Khan close to the Katra Masjid. (9) *Nizamat-Adalat* and *Sadar Dewani Adalat*: no trace of them is now found; on the ruins of these a beautiful palace with a delightful garden has been built.

On the other side of the Ganges flowing through the town of Berhampore stands the tomb of Nawab Siraj-ud-daula.

Rāṅgāmāṭī: It is situated in the District of Murshidabad as distinct from *Rāṅgāmāṭī* of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The site of *Rāṅgāmāṭī* in Murshidabad lies on the western coast of the Ganges, a mile and a half to the south-east of Chirati Railway Station, 9½ miles from Bandel. The soil of this place is red and hard and offers a clue for the name of this place. According to some the name is derived from *Raktamṛtti* or *Raktabhitti* (*lo-to-wei-chi*) the name of an old Buddhist monastery which the Chinese traveller Hiuen Tsang found in *Karṇasuvarṇa* in the 7th century A.D. *Rāṅgāmāṭī* is thus believed to have been the site of *Karṇasuvarṇa*. Many coins of the Kuṣāna and Gupta ages, a few mounds of bricks and clay called *Thākuravāḍī* *Dāṅgā*, *Rākṣuṣī* *Dāṅgā*, *Rājavāḍī* *Dāṅgā*, *Sannyāsī* *Dāṅgā*, and a few tanks like *Yamuna Puṣkaraṇī*, *Pir Pukur*, etc. are found there. A Hindu deity made up of stone with eight hands, called *Mahiṣamardinī* has been discovered here.

Pāhāḍpur: The ruins of *Pāhāḍpur* are situated at a distance of 3 miles to the west of the Jamalganj Railway Station (B. & A. Ry.) in the district of Rajshahi. The huge mound of bricks, 80 feet in height, that stands at *Pāhāḍpur* probably gave rise to the name of this place as it looked like a rock. *Somapura* was its ancient name. Situated at a distance of about 30 miles to the north-west of *Mahāsthāna* or ancient *Puṇḍravardhana* and south-east of *Bāṅgaḍ* or ancient *Koṭivarṣa*, there stood an old Buddhist monastery now in ruins. The *Pāhāḍpur* monastery resembles such great monasteries as *Borobudar* and *Prāmbānam* monasteries in Java and *Ankarbhat* monastery in Cambodia. In the Buddhist *viḥāra* at *Pāhāḍpura* we find a square sanctuary with many chambers each having a

courtyard in front and a small portico. A high altar is found probably meant for religious worship.

To the east of this sanctuary we find a little stūpa, called Satyapīrer bhīṭā, where we find a temple of Tārā. The Pāhāḍpura monastery was built in the 8th century A.D. under the Pāla kings of Bengal. The terracotta plaques on the walls of the monastery contain the tales of the *Pañcatantra* and the *Hitopadesa*. The stone images of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, some lovely figures telling the stories of the life of Kṛṣṇa, slaying Dhenukāsura, holding of Mt. Govardhana by Śrīkṛṣṇa are found here. The Epic and Pauranic scenes like the fight of Bāli and Sugrīva, the death of Bāli, the abduction of Subhadrā, etc. are also found. In the 5th century A.D. there was a Jain temple at Pāhāḍpura. The famous Tibetan Buddhist scholar Dīpaṅkara Śrījñāna is said to have spent many years under his teacher, Ratnākara Śānti, in the Somapura mahāvihāra.

Mahāsthānagarha : The present ruins of Mahāsthāna or Mahāsthānagarha lie 7 miles north of the modern town of Bogra. Cunningham identifies this site with the ancient city of Puṇḍravardhana, the name of which occurs in a Brahmanic inscription of the Maurya age. During the 4th, 5th and the 6th centuries A.D. when India was ruled by the Imperial Guptas, Puṇḍravardhanabhūkti was a Gupta province under a Viceroy who had the title of *Uparika*. The river Karatoyā which still washes the base of the mounds of Mahāsthāna separated it from the more easternly kingdom of Prāgjyotiṣa or Kāmarūpa in Assam. Puṇḍravardhana was visited by Hiuen Tsang in the 7th century A.D. According to the Chinese pilgrim this province was more than 4000 *li* in circuit and its capital more than 30 *li* (5 miles). To the west of the capital there was a magnificent Buddhist establishment and near it stood an Aśoka tope. The city lost

its importance from the third quarter of the 12th century A.D. for the later Sena kings of Bengal shifted their capital first to Deopārā in the Rajshahi district and later, to Gauḍa in the Maldah district. Towards the end of the 13th or the beginning of the 14th century* A.D. Puṇḍravardhana was occupied by the Mahommedans. There was a village called Vāsu Vihāra, 4 miles to the west of Mahāsthāna, which, according to Cunningham, was the site of the well-known monastery called Po-shi-po by the Chinese pilgrim.

The following are the important things found at Mahāsthāna: a battered Jain statue; ruins of Hindu and Buddhist shrines; and later tombs and mosques.

Bāngaḍ: The ruins of Bāngaḍ or Bānnagara are found on the eastern bank of the river Punarbhavā, one and a half mile to the north of Gaṅgārāmpur which is 18 miles south of Dinajpur. The region round modern Gaṅgārāmpur was called Damdama during the Muslim period and it may be identical with Koṭikapura or ancient Devakoṭa, the capital of Koṭivarṣa in northern Bengal. Bāngaḍ, according to tradition, was the site of the fortified town of the demon king Bāna whose wife Kālārāṇī is said to have a tank dug called Kālādighī at Gaṅgārāmpura. Besides, there are other tanks, such as Tāldighī and Dhālādighī. Of the ancient buildings and monuments we have no trace at present. A Kamboja king of Gauḍa built a temple of Śiva. According to the copper plate inscription of king Mahīpāla I discovered at Bāngaḍ, Mahīpāla regained his lost paternal kingdom. Some of the old relics of Bāngaḍ are now kept in the Dinajpur palace. Here we find a richly carved stone pillar made of touch-stone, a Śiva temple and a Buddhist Caitya of about the 11th century A.D.

Gauḍa: Gauḍa was the capital of Bengal during the Hindu and Muslim periods. According to some

the namé is derived from Guḍa, i.e., molasses as Gauḍa was formerly a trading centre of molasses. The ruins of Gauḍa lie at a distance of ten miles to the south-west of the modern town of Malda. It was an ancient town as its name occurs in the Epics and the Purāṇas. It was the capital of Devapāla, Mahendrapāla, Ādisura, Ballālasena and the Mahomedan rulers up to about the close of the 16th century A.D. It formed a part of the kingdom of the Imperial Guptas during the 4th, 5th and 6th centuries A.D. There is no trace at present of Ramāvati, the capital of ancient Gauḍa under Pāla rulers. It lay several miles to the north of the present site of the ruins of Gauḍa near the river Kālindī. Lakṣmaṇāvati or Laknauti which was built by king Lakṣmaṇasena was the later capital of Gauḍa under Sena and Muslim rulers. King Ballālasena built a castle at Gauḍa which goes by the name of Ballālabādi or Ballālabhiṭā. The ruins of this fort are found at Shāhdullāpur. One of the biggest tanks in Bengal known as Sāgardighi is attributed to him. Near the present site of Gauḍa stands the ancient village of Rāmakeli which was visited by Caitanyadeva. The abodes of Rūpa and Sanātana, the Rūpasāgara tank, the Kadamba tree, some wells known as Rādhākuṇḍa, Śyāma-kuṇḍa, Lalitākuṇḍa and Viśākhākuṇḍa and the ancient temple of Madanamohana are now found there. There is another village called Khalimpur near the site of Gauḍa. A copper plate inscription of king Dharmapāla of the Pāla dynasty of Bengal has been discovered here. The following relics of the Muslim age are noteworthy :—

- (1) Jān Jān Meah mosque, built by Sultan Giyas-ud-din Mahmud Shah.
- (2) The Dākhil Durwājā or the gate of the ancient Muslim fort of Gauḍa.
- (3) The well-known Sonā mosque (Barduāri)—a square building built of stone.
- (4) Ruins of Hāveli Khās (or the ancient capital).
- (5) Tomb of Sultan Husain Shah, built of

coloured bricks. (6) Feroze minir (high and massive structure). (7) Kadam Rasul mosque, built by Sultan Nasiruddin Nasrat Shah in the 16th century A.D. containing 4 minarets of black stone and footprints of the Prophet. (8) Chikā mosque. (9) The famous *Loton mosque*, built of various coloured bricks (white, green, blue, and yellow).

Besides these there are other noteworthy objects, e.g., the temples of Gauḍeśvarī, Jaharavāsini, Śiva—the Manaskāmanā deity, Ramābhitā, and Pātālacaṇḍī.

Pāṇḍuyā: The ruins of Pāṇḍuyā lie to the east of the river Mahānadā in the district of Malda. A clear trace of Hindu relics is found at Pāṇḍuyā in a dilapidated culvert with images of Hindu deities beneath it. Many remains of the Muslim age are found at this site, e.g., Selāmi-Dargā, Āsānsāhi Dargā, Bāisk-Hāzārī Dargā, Erlakhi and Sonā mosques, and the Ādinā mosque which is the most famous.

Vikrampur: It lies in the Munshiganj sub-division of Dacca. A portion of it is included in the Faridpur district. The name Vikrampur is generally applied to the tract of country bounded by the Dhaleśvarī on the north, the Idilpur pargana on the south, the Meghnā on the east, and the Padmā on the west. The name of this place is derived from a king named Vikrama who ruled it for sometime. Rāmapāla, the ancient capital of Vikramapura, lay 3 miles west of Munshiganj. The name Śrī Vikramapura occurs in the Sitāhāṭī Copper Plate Inscription of Ballālasena. A copper plate inscription of the Buddhist king Śrī Candradeva of the Candra dynasty has been discovered here. Rāmapāla, the birth place of Śīlabhadra, the Principal of the famous Buddhist University of Nālandā, was the eastern headquarters of the Hindu kings of Bengal for sometime. The ruins of a place, called Ballālabāḍī, many ancient ponds called Rāmapāla

dighī, Ballāladighī, etc., and many Hindu and Buddhist deities of the Pāla period have been found at Vikramapura. To the north of Rāmapāla, in a village, mosque of Ādam Śahid is found. The village of Vajrayoginī lying on the south-west corner of Rāmapāla was the birth place of the Buddhist savant, Dipaṅkara Śrīṣṇāna who was born in the 10th century A.D.

Maināmāṭi and Lālmāi Ranges: Maināmāṭi is about 6 miles west of the present town of Comilla. The Lālmāi and Maināmāṭi rocks are situated in the district of Tippera in East Bengal. The name Maināmāṭi is probably associated with Mayanāmatī the queen of Mānik Candra, a king of the Candras who ruled over Bengal in the 10th and 11th centuries A.D. This queen and her son Gopīcandra figure largely in Bengali folk songs. Queen Mayanāmatī seems to have been a disciple of Gorakhanātha, a great Śaiva Yogī while her son was a disciple of a low caste *siddha*. A copper plate inscription of the 13th century A.D. found at Maināmāṭi records the gift of a piece of land by the king Ranaṅkamalla Harikāladeva to a Buddhist monastery at Paṭṭikera. An officer of the royal groom is mentioned as embracing Sahajayāna Buddhism at Paṭṭikeraka. A village of the Tippera district which extends upto the Maināmāṭi hills even now retains the name Pāṭikārā or Paṭkārā. The existence of the kingdom of Paṭṭikera may be traced as far back as the 8th century A.D. It was situated in ancient Samatāṭa. Coins similar to those of the Candra dynasty and terracotta plaques, with figures of Arakanese and Burmese men and women, have been found at Maināmāṭi. In these coins the name of Paṭṭikera occurs. It appears that there was an intimate relation between Burma and the kingdom of Paṭṭikera. Ranaṅkamalla Harikāladeva was a chieftain of this place, while the Devas were then the independent rulers. The Paṭṭikeraka viḥāra of the Pāla period was an important mo-

nastery. A mound at Maināmāṭī known as the ruins of Ānanda Rājā's palace seems to be a monastery. Some rulers of the Candra Dynasty, Śrī Candra, Gobinda Candra, Survaṇa Candra, Pūrṇa Candra, etc., mentioned in the inscriptions ruled eastern and southern Bengal between A.D. 900 and 1050 with Rohitāgiri as their capital. Rohitāgiri probably included the present Lālmāi hills, 5 miles to the west of Comilla.

The naked stone image of a Jaina Tīrthaṅkara found at Maināmāṭī, shows the influence of Jainism in this region. The discovery of such deities as Gaṇeśa, Hara-Gaurī, Vāsudeva, shows the influence of Hinduism there. Of some mounds situated at Maināmāṭī, Ānandarājā's palace, Bhojarājā's palace, Caṇḍimurā, Rūpabānmurā, Sālbānrājā's palace are noteworthy. In one of these mounds we find temples of Śiva and Caṇḍī. A square monastery like that at Pāhāḍpura existed there. The central temple contains on its walls projecting mouldings, lotus petals, etc. Many carved terracotta plaques which contain the figures of Yakṣas, Kimpuruṣas, Gandharvas, Vidyādharas, Kinnaras, Buddha, Padmapāṇi, warriors, animals, lotus flowers, etc. have been discovered. The potteries found there are mostly in ruins. Some small bronze images of the Buddha have also been found.

Sunderban: The forest region of Sunderban was formerly included in the kingdom of Samatāṭa or Baḡḍī (Vyāghrataṭī). The Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsang saw many Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain temples at Samatāṭa in the 7th century A.D.

SOME NOTES ON VYOMAŚIVĀCĀRYA

BY BIBHUTI BHUSHAN BHATTACHARYA

To a student of Indian Philosophy, specially to one interested in chronology and bibliography, it is needless to introduce the name of Vyomaśiva, the author of *Vyomavatī*, a commentary on Praśastapāda's *Bhāṣya* on the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*. But though the name is familiar, the identity, age and other questions relating to this famous author are still veiled in obscurity. An attempt is, therefore, made in the following lines to determine these points with as much accuracy as possible on the data available to us.

Pt. Dhundhiraj Shastri in his introduction to *Vyomavatī* (P. 6, foot note 2.) holds Vyomaśiva to be identical with Śivāditya the author of *Saptapadārthī*. In support of his view he refers to a treatise named *Śivādvaitadarpaṇa* (edited by Nilakaṇṭha Śivācharya, Published at Belgaon, 1928) belonging to the Vīra Śaiva School of Southern India.

The basis of this identification is the statement found in the colophon of a single manuscript of *Saptapadārthī* preserved in a Bombay library, that the work is by Vyomaśiva. But as the name Śivāditya is found in practically all the other manuscripts of the work it was believed that the names Śivāditya and Vyomaśiva referred probably to an identical person (see *Introduction, Saptapadārthī*, Vizianagaram series, Benares).

The editor of the *Śivādvaitadarpaṇa*, however, states definitely that the name Vyomaśiva was given to the author of the *Saptapadārthī*, *Lakṣaṇamālā*, etc. in the fourth stage of his life by his guru Siddha Caitanya Śivāchārya, and also that this writer composed his famous

commentary on Praśastapāda's *Bhāṣya* in the fourth stage. His statement is based on the so-called *Pūvalli Paṭṭāvalī*, from which he has quoted relevant verses in the introduction.

In our humble opinion this identification is not confirmed by the findings of a comparative study of the contents of the *Saptapadārthī* attributed to Śivāditya and the *Vyomavatī* attributed to Vyomaśiva. The views of the two authors on identical problems are utterly divergent. By way of illustration, we may refer to their views as shown below :—

In Saptapadārthī

1. दिक् एकादशविधा p. 18.
2. सामान्यं त्रिविधम् p. 12.
3. रूपं सप्तविधम् p. 20.
4. रूपरसयोरेव चित्रत्वं p. 20.
5. अनुमितिः त्रिविधा p. 22.
6. लिंगं त्रिविधम् p. 22.
7. हेत्वाभासाः षट् p. 23.
8. प्रमाणं द्विविधम् p. 21.
9. मिथ्याज्ञानकारणप्रध्वंससमानाधिकरण-
तत्कार्यसमस्तदुःखाभावो मोक्षः p. 32.

In Vyomavatī

1. दिक् दशविधा
2. सामान्यं द्विविधम्
3. रूपम् अनेकप्रकारम्
4. रूपादि अविभुविशेषगुणाः सर्वेषां
चित्रत्वं
5. अनुमितिः द्विधा
6. लिंगं द्विविधम्
7. हेत्वाभासाः पञ्च
8. प्रमाणं त्रिविधम्
9. नवानामात्मविशेषगुणानामत्यन्तो-
च्छेदो मोक्षः p. 20. (क) (ख)

From even a cursory glance at the above it would appear that such conflicting views could not have emanated from a single person.

Who was then Vyomaśiva? That he was not identical with Śivāditya is a moral certainty. It seems to us more likely that Vyomaśiva was the fifth spiritual successor of Purandara *alias* Mattamayūranātha, the founder of two maṭhas (monasteries), one at the city of Mattamayūrapura, probably identical with ma-yu-lo referred to by I-t-sing as in the neighbourhood of present Hardwar and the other at Raṇipadara to be identified probably with the

original site of the Naroda inscription in Gwalior state (see *Prācīna-lekha-mālā*, Nirṇaya Sāgara., vol. II P. 156; or J. A. S. B., vol. XVI, 1080).

This inscription states that Vyomaśiva was a śaiva saint, being a disciple of Hṛdaya-śiva. Purandara, his fifth spiritual ancestor, who had been an inhabitant of Upendrapura, at the request of his disciple Avanti Varmā, the king, built maṭhas (monasteries) in the cities of Mattamayūrapura and Ranipadar. It is said that Vyoma reorganised these maṭhas (monastries) and raised them from the darkness of moral degradation into which they had fallen.

As a result of this successful undertaking he has been praised in this inscription in many ways. Two of the eulogistic verses about Vyomaśiva are as follows :—

सिद्धान्तेषु महेश एष नियतो न्यायेऽक्षपादो मुनिः ।
 गम्भीरे च कणाशिनस्तु कणभुक् शास्त्रे श्रुतौ जैमिनिः ॥
 सांख्येऽनल्पमतिः स्वयं च कपिलो लोकायते सद्गुरुः ।
 बुद्धो बुद्धमते जिनोक्तिषु जिनः को वाऽधनाय कृती ॥
 संलीनं मुख एव शाक्य करिणामत्युज्जितं गज्जितं,
 त्रासाद्यस्य च जैनजम्बुकशतैर्दुर्व्यहितं संहृतम् ।
 सोढुं जातु न जैमयनीय हरिणैः लीलाकृतं हुकृतं,
 तस्यान्यत् गगनेश काननपते किं स्यात् स्तुतं प्रस्तुतम् ॥

We learn from these that Vyomaśiva was well-versed in śaiva, sāṅkhya, n्याय, वैशेषिक, mīmāṃsā, bōdhi, jaina, and cārvāka philosophies. A study of the *Vyomavati* confirms the above eulogies in regard to the versatile scholarship of Vyoma.

We have no direct evidence concerning the exact chronology of Vyomaśiva. But from references to earlier authors found in his work it is possible to determine his date within the limits of probability. He frequently quotes and refutes the views of Kumārila (P. 579 etc.), Prabhākara, (P. 540) and Dharmakīrti (P. 627). Once he mentions

Kādambārī as an incomplete work (P. 20 (ठ)). The sentences “श्रीहर्ष देवकुलम्” (P. 392) and “अस्ति च श्रीहर्षस्य विद्यमानत्वमात्मनि” (P. 392) point probably to the fact that he was a contemporary of king Śrī Harṣa of Thaneshwar (606-645 A.D.) Maṇḍana and Akalaṅka, the Jaina philosopher, have quoted and refuted the definition of mokṣa as propounded by Vyomaśiva in the *Vyomavatī*. Maṇḍana and Akalaṅka belonged probably to the end of the 8th and the beginning of the 9th century A.D. respectively. Vyomaśiva may, therefore, be placed in the first or second quarter of the 8th century.

Most probably he was a younger contemporary of king Harṣa, as the synchronism of the two persons is evident from the statement अस्ति च श्रीहर्षस्य विद्यमानत्वमात्मनि (etc. P. 392). The age of Vyomaśiva as thus determined is not inconsistent with the probable date of the fifth successor of Purandara, in the aforesaid inscription. It appears from the inscription that the king Avanti Varmā invited his guru Purandara to his capital at Mattamayūrapura. If this king is held to be identical with the Maukhari king of the same name, he was the son and successor of Iśāna Varmā. Avanti's accession to the throne took place about 565 A.D. As Vyomaśiva was fifth in succession to Purandara, the contemporary of Avanti, he may be placed 80 years (20×4) after the establishment of the maṭhas by Purandara, which may be roughly taken as 565 A.D., the year of Avanti's accession. Allowing 20 years in the average to each pontifical chief or ācārya, the date of Vyomaśiva falls in or about the year 645 A.D. Of course, this is a mere guess work, but its confirmation of the date of Vyomaśiva otherwise found makes the probability a matter of practical certainty.

Regarding the exact place where Vyomaśiva lived we have no definite information. But there seems to

be no doubt that the allegation of the Viraśaiva tradition which associated him with Kāñcī or any other part of Southern India is not tenable. A study of *Vyomavati* makes it clear that our author belonged to Northern India in defence of which several internal evidences may be adduced.

In *Vyomavati* South (दक्षिणा दिक्) has been defined as “मध्याह्नसमये दिक्प्रदेशेन संयोगात् दक्षिणेति व्यवहारः” P. 359. That is, South is the direction in which the sun comes in the midday. This statement shows that the author had never seen the sun in the zenith. This only happens in northern India, and to some extent only in central India, but never in southern India. In addition to this, all the place names to which Vyomasiva refers belong to northern India. He refers to Kedāra Giri, namely, “केदारगिरिमाराहतां कलकलाशब्दश्रवणादशनिपातानुष्ठानम्” (P. 572). The inference of the fall of a thunderbolt from कलकला sound is an indication of his acquaintance with the famous shrine in the Himalayas. Pañcapura or Paṇyapura mentioned by him is not traceable in modern maps. But it may be identical with the town called Pañjagoda situated on the river Pañjakora, a tributary of the river Swat. This is on the southern slopes of the Hindukush. The original name of the place was probably Pañcakarpaṭa, as Mr De in his *Dictionary (Geographical)* thinks. The term बाहीक is described as हिठक probably हिरठक बाहीक is a well-known place in north-western India. (If the reading हिरठक is correct it would point to an identification of बाहीक with Herat, which is not unlikely.) It may, therefore, be assumed that the author was a native of northern India. The assumption of Vyomasiva as aṅgācārya of the Viraśaiva order has no foundation in fact, for the Viraśaiva order founded by Vasava dates from the 12th century A.D. and we have shown above that the age of Vyomasiva can never be brought down

beyond the 8th century A.D. The title Śivācārya is an evidence of the fact that he was in all probability a saint scholar of the Siddhānta Śaiva school, which was widely prevalent in that age. All the ācāryas of this school like Aghora Śivācārya, Sadyojyoti Śivācārya, Umāpāti Śivācārya, etc., bore the title of Śivācārya.

The Siddhānta school also had its centres of culture in northern India as well as in southern India. King Bhoja of Dhāra was an authoritative writer on the Siddhānta school as on the other schools. His work has already appeared in two editions, one from Trivandrum and the other from Devakota.

In short our findings are :—

1. Vyomaśivācārya, the author of *Vyomavatī*, is not identical with Śivāditya, the author of *Saptapadārthī*, because they differ in their opinion about several important topics of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. •

2. Vyomaśiva, the author of *Vyomavatī*, lived sometime between the middle of the 7th century and the beginning of the 8th century A.D.

3. He was not a Viraśaiva sannayāsin as the Viraśaiva order was founded by Vasava (वसव) nearly 500 years after his date.

4. Vyomaśiva was not a native of southern India, as we have produced documents to show that he had never even visited south India. •

5. The so-called evidence of the *Pāṇḍipattāvalī* mentioned in the introduction to *Śivādvaitadarpaṇa* is not corroborated by history.

YOGA PSYCHOLOGY IN THE MINOR UPANIŠADS¹

Levels of Consciousness

BY K. C. VARADACHARI

CONSCIOUSNESS is the most important item in psychology, whether it is considered as a function of a spirit, or the soul, or as spirit (psyche) itself. Consciousness is stated to be of many kinds, though to say so may appear to be not altogether warranted. This division into kinds depends upon the kinds of objects and creatures wherein it is seen to appear or manifest. Thus we can speak of metal-consciousness, plant-consciousness, animal-consciousness, human-consciousness, daiva-consciousness and Absolute-consciousness. This fact is already apprehended by the *Aitareya* and *Taittirīya Upaniṣads*.² There are other divisions also according to the number of sensory organs manifested in any creature. Thus we have to concede the fact that consciousness is involved in the several stages of life or manifestation. There are degrees of its involution in matter, plant, animal, human and these stages may well be recognized as the annamaya, prāṇamaya and manomaya stages or levels of consciousness. If we agree to view the whole creative process as the manifestation of the latent power of self-involution of consciousness in its own activity, then it becomes also clear that matter itself is not merely a product of consciousness, but also a closed enveloper of it for some secret occult purpose which could only be drawn out by the higher consciousnesses acting on it.

¹ Cf. *J.S.V.O.I.* Vol. IV. p8; ff and Vol. I. pt. IV., *J.S.V.O.I.* Vol. III.

² *Āi. Upa.* III. 5; *Tait. Upa.* II. 3. *Tejo B. Upa.*; *Su. Upa.* VII; *Bṛha. Upa.* I. iv. 1.

Several theories have arisen on this account. Some keep the Consciousness (the Absolute Consciousness) in its native purity and explain the whole process as 'a veil of Māyā (delusion) without affecting the nature of that consciousness in any manner but all the same revealing that consciousness as differentiated to the differentiated.

Some others hold that the whole process of manifestation is an action by that consciousness itself which is eternally embodied in matter and souls, to whom these are of the nature of eternal modes or bodies. These modes are subtle in the causal stage of the Absolute and these become gross in the effect state of the self-same Absolute. The Absolute is a Will and a Personality of extreme Infiniteness and Fullness and Auspiciousness.

There is a third view which holds that the Absolute though a consciousness is a unity in multiplicity and all the planes of life and matter and mind are but self-positings of its descent which it thereafter links up in its own primal consciousness in and through an ascent of itself through these self-positeds.

This view reveals the reality of all states even like the second view already stated and visualises the organic ascension of all stages and states of consciousness ultimately in the Absolute Consciousness. No doubt some persons will hold that consciousness being an activity should not be made into a substance that can be a unity in multiplicity, much less an eternal unity in an eternal multiplicity; and secondly to hold that consciousness can become degraded into matter or inconscience is also to hold that the Absolute can never remain pure, for we cannot by any means determine how any portion of the eternal unity or its multiplicity can ever become utterly 'de-consciousised' except by an arbitrariness posited in the very nature of the Divine Consciousness. But this need not be a grave

objection if we can hold that the Divine Consciousness is divine even in and through the various formations of itself as matter and mind and breath and other activities in their several configurations or constellations, and yet we may grant to each of these a limited independence or differentium in respect of activities engendered by the status of their stages as matter, breath, or mind. Thus we will find that each of these stages has an autonomy engendered by earlier actions (and nothing exists which has not some sort of action, repetitive or creative or initiative or reactive).

It is the integration of these three or five or seven levels of consciousness that is aimed at in Yoga, which is an effort to arrive at the liberation of consciousness or rather the energy of consciousness from the lower levels since every level is aware of that which is higher but is unable to realise it due to its primitive habit or organization. This release of consciousness from the lower form can happen in only one manner. That is possible only when the lower form sees the pressure of the higher level on itself and is unable to stand the strain of such a higher level or secondly, when the lower level or its manner has become impossible due to changing conditions that demand newer patterns of behaviour. Yoga is the need to liberate oneself from a lower level by recourse to a higher level of consciousness. That this Yoga may be framed up in such wise as to be limited to particular occasions has also been shewn by the *Gītā* when the Lord has stressed on the fact that there are four kinds of seekers; the *ārta*, *jijñāsu*, *arthārthī* and *Jñāni* (VII. 16). The integral seeker is the last mentioned knower, who integrates or seeks to integrate the entire cosmic consciousness within himself and in all his parts, so as to appear to have almost lost every kind of difference or counter-position in being as in action, and whose one-

ness with *Īśvara* is complete in all planes and powers and manifestations. Thus Ancient Indian psychology was fully aware of the several levels of consciousness³ which according to them were first stated to be three, then five and then seven. The highest or the Absolute Consciousness that was absolutely freed from the bondage to the relative consciousnesses of the lower levels was, undoubtedly, the aim of almost all the mystics of the Minor Upaniṣads; and this accentuation of the importance of the highest or Absolute Consciousness to spiritual or real existence led properly to the abnegation of the life of the spiritual beings in and through the lower formations of spirit itself. It is this self-same distrust of material existence or vital or mental existence that led also the postulates of *Māyā* and *Pudgala* and *Samsāra* with their unending repetitive movements in birth and rebirth and bondage to bondage.

The truth of existence is its truth in consciousness, and for consciousness. The reality with which we are confronted is a more or less organic structure, whereas the 'we' who confront such a reality are indeed organic creatures (mind-bodies) if not soul-bodies. But the truth that will be realized as ultimate will always be only in respect of the Absolute Consciousness. The only question that will arise is: can such a consciousness be possible to us who are finite and are yet dwelling in bodies which limit simply because they are yet unable to devise or have not devised ways of responding to such a consciousness, or more properly since such a consciousness has not yet devised its own instruments for its own imperial action or integral being even in terms of this present organism? This question again has been answered in two ways: the first consists in denying utli-

³ I have elsewhere pointed out that the three levels *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *suṣupti* are comparable to levels of consciousness.

mate reality to the physical structure and our own finiteness incident upon this conditioning in such psychophysical structures, a denial which will land us straight into the Absolute Consciousness consequent on the sublation of the present consciousness which is more nearly an inconscience and ignorance rather than consciousness. The second consists in affirming the reality of the finite along with its infinite possibilities. This leads to the affirmation of the possibility of sublimation or divinisation of the entire structure in terms of the Absolute Consciousness apprehended in oneself as the foundational Consciousness at the back of all natural processes or biological and psychological processes so far attained by man. The former seeks to land elsewhere; the latter seeks to attain here; the former is said to be direct and immediate, whereas the latter is indirect and mediated by series of steps or ascents and integrations and therefore halts.

But there is truth in about the same measure in all the states as in the Absolute, though to say so may be considered to be an exaggeration. The Absolute lives and moves in the relative, even as the relative live and move and have their being in the Absolute.

The three states of consciousness usually spoken of in the Upaniṣadic literature are the 'Waking, the Dreaming and the Deep Sleep.' The *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* has given a classical exposition of these three states and it has correspondentially explained these three states with the help of the Praṇava, (the primary Nāda or Sound). The Jāg-rat or the waking state is that of Vaiśvānara,⁴ or of the world (Viśva) in which state all the sensory and motor organs and the mind are fully active in respect of the world of manifestation. The svapna or taijasa (or. of the

⁴ *Māṇḍ. Upa.* 3, 4, 5. cf. *Yoga Sūtras*: III. 15; my 'Living Teaching of the Vedānta': sec I. pp 5—12.

tejas) is a state wherein the motor organs are suspended from action and there is consciousness of inner or internal objects engendered by the waking life in the form of images, which are called subtle objects also. The *śuṣupti* is the state of *Prājñā* wherein the sleeper neither perceives external objects or subtle internal objects nor experiences dreams. The *Prājñāna Puruṣa* is entirely blissful in himself, 'knowledge-faced.' The *Nārada-parivṛājaka Upa.* speaks of the *Jāgrat* as *sthūla-prajñā*, and of the *Svapna* as *sūkṣma-prajñā*, and the *śuṣupti* as *Pra-jñāna-ghana*.⁵ It further adds that these three states are impediments to all creatures hankering after peace. The *Kaivalya Upa.* speaks of the waking state as the state wherein there is enjoyment of women, food, drink and other diverse enjoyments.⁶ The *Varāha Upa.* with apparently quite a different sense speaks of the *Jāgrat* or waking state as the state when the *Buddhi* is in 'full bloom.'⁷ There is again the ancient Jaina view that the fullest consciousness in awareness is possible only when the senses do not restrict the knowing to the restricted content of the phenomenal world. Thus we find that in these definitions of the waking consciousness there is said to be extraverted activity alone and that this extravertedness is consequent upon the sensory and motor organs which are stated to have become outward-directed as the *Kaṭha Upa.* has stated.⁸ This *Jāgrat* state is not comparable with the levels of consciousness such as the reflexive or instinctive stages of conduct in modern psychology. It is more alike the mental and practical consciousness of modern psychology.

⁵ *Nārada P. Upa* 8. cf. 5.

⁶ *Kaivalya Upa.*

⁷ *Varāha.* II.

⁸ *Kaṭha Upa.* II. 1.

The dream psychology is more important and interesting.⁹ Some Upaniṣads say that Dream is *saṅkalpa* and nothing else. The *Varāha* and the *Paingala Upaniṣads* define dream as the 'moving about of buddhi in the subtle *nāḍis*'.¹⁰ The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upa.* has given the explanation that it is due to the power of imaginative reconstruction of self-experience. But dreams are also due to physiological disorders such as windy humour or biliousness or phlegm or influences of God or due to one's own habits or what a man does by way of prognostication.¹¹ The subject in the dream state is purely imaginal and these dreams are not all of the same order. The *Māṇḍūkya* gave the final description that it is the state of *tejas* or illumination, thus referring to the freedom of the subject as consciousness, creative and luminously active. But this freedom is restricted and limited to the psychic being and does not emerge into the actual life except when such dreams are prophetic. This prophetic dream is a different type from the others and belongs to the realm of psychic apprehension of the future—*bhaviṣyat-jñāna*. It is therefore, stated to be due to the influence of God or supermental powers. It is the level of the Unconsciousness in relation to the awaking consciousness, though it is not unconsciousness at all.

• Dreams form an interesting study by themselves but from the standpoint of the Upaniṣads, the dreams are used as analogies to illusion or self-delusion and both the *Jāgrat* and the *svapna* are equated to one another in the realm of illusion. The *Sarvasāra Upa.* which is a chapter of definitions describes the three states as experienced by the soul in relation to the entire system of categories in the

⁹ cf. J.S.V.O.I. Vol. I. "Dreams in the Philosophy of Śrī Rāmānuja"

¹⁰ *Varāha Upa.* II.; *Paingala Upa.* II.; *Sarvasāra Upa.* p. ().

¹¹ Cf. F. S. Hammett: *Conceptual Psychology of the Ancient Hindus*. Psycho-Analytic Review.

Jāgrat, in relation with the vāsanās (affinities or potencies) and fourteen categories omitting the motor organs in the svapna and in absolute non-function in the suṣupti. It would be of great interest to modern psychology to note that from the general theory of the Upaniṣads that the really crucial state of experience is the turya, the fourth which is the real Jāgrat, or awareness rather than the vaiśvānara or svapna-taijasa. The third state of suṣupti which is stated to be achieved at the heart,¹² to which the soul is stated to be going everyday without knowing it,¹³ where the divine dwells in all hearts, is the state when there is absorption¹⁴, and control exercised by the Prāṇjñā¹⁵. This is the state of peace, it is also the state of trance, the primitive trance, when the citta or mind is made unconscious because removed from the contact with the inner soul or psychic being. It is then in the state of aparidṛṣṭa as the Yoga Sūtra states (III.15). Thus controlled by the prāṇjñā it does not move about but becomes quiescent. Without this quiescence there can be no real ascent into the turya or the fourth, where the Self is manifest even without the help of the sensory organs and motor movements. The suṣupti thus forms a bridge to the higher and it is also to be known, or one has to become aware of it, as the sleep of the senses and the citta,¹⁶ or lower mind. Sleep is the union with the self

¹² *Nārada-parivṛāja Upa.* V. "In the eyes there is waking state; in the throat the dreaming, in the heart the dreamless sleep, and in the head the turya state."

¹³ *Muṇḍaka. Upa.*

¹⁴ *Māṇḍ. Upa. Kārikā*, III. 35.

¹⁵ *Māṇḍūkya Upa.* 5 :

¹⁶ *Śārīraka Upa.* says that Citta is the chief organ in suṣupti which is surely a mistake. *Paingala Upa.* rightly says that suṣupti is the state of cessation because of tiredness of the soul in the jāgrat and svapna. (II).

as the *Chāndogya Upa.* states (VI. 8). The *Nārada-parivṛāja Upa.* speaks about the three states already mentioned in terms of this Prajñāna or Prājñā. The Jāgrat is the gross prājñā; the svapna is the subtle prājñā; the suṣupti is prājñā itself. The first is the trifling prājñā, the second is dual prājñā, the third is the internal prājñā. All the states are held to be yet states of ajñāna or kārmic limitational activity of consciousness, since they are limited by the body-consciousness in some manner. The sleep state is sometimes held to be a difficult state to investigate or know about except through inference. The content of this state it is impossible to know. But this state is correspondentially linked up in Yoga with the psychic condition of the preliminary peace on which foundation alone any further or deep experience can be built up. This state may also be called the Night of the soul. It is the ākāśa, which is of the nature of darkness both inside and outside, as the *Maṇḍalabrāhmaṇa Upa.* (IV) says. Beyond this state alone lie the other ākāśas such as the Mahākāśa which is or has the fire of deluge in and out; then there are the Sūryākāśa and Paramākāśas.

That is the reason why the fourth state is stated to be the most important step in Yoga, the turya, which reveals the higher three levels of consciousness beyond the limited body or the limitations of the body. The movement into that consciousness that is supra-sensory, can only happen through the path transcribed already, that is through the subliminal svapna which is penetrated further and deeper in the suṣupti, the prājñā. It is because of this fact of so-called nivṛtti or interiorising, that is not introspecting, where the mind that is but the configuration of our habits and instincts and cravings is simply 'overpowered' (as Gauḍapāda states in his *Kārikā* (iii. 35), that there happens a leap into the supramental,

As the *Nārada-parivṛāja Upa.* says "It is through Viśva and others in order that the realization of Parabrahman should be attained."¹⁷ Thus when Śrī Aurobindo explained in his masterly work *Life Divine* that the prajñā has to be understood in a deeper and profounder sense than the ordinary thinkers have done he was stating the Upaniṣadic truth or rather drawing the attention of all to the truth that true consciousness *cit*, that is *sat* and *ānanda*, is to be arrived at through the prajñā that is really jñāna not unconsciousness or mere suspension of activity. For in truth it is the first step in the sādhanā of Consciousness, the levels of sensory and motor experiences being but activities of consciousness in the levels of ignorance or matter and vitality. We arrive at the true nature of Consciousness or jñāna or prajñāna or vijñāna only *via* the subliminal which is known to have two divisions the dark side of ignorance and wish and saṅkāpa, the bright side of knowledge and inward light and transcendence. It is because this fact has not been grasped by scholars unacquainted with the nature of the prajñā and consciousness that there have occurred large criticisms about the nature of yogic psychology. The prajñā state is the state of pure buddhi or cogniscience.

In the understanding of the Upaniṣadic theory of levels we find that we have to see that the Upaniṣadic psychologists were more interested in going deeper into the nature of consciousness even as it manifests itself in the subliminal svapna and suṣupti, and by that process arrived at the consciousness that was so focalised as to be just identical with the trance state but not quite. The transcendence of consciousness over its own bodily tenement was the goal aimed at for there seemed to be no other way towards perfect omniscience or liberation. No

¹⁷ *Nārada-p. Upa.* VIII.

doubt modern psychologists are not prepared to conceive of this* possibility of knowing extra-sensorily. The *Varāha Upaniṣad* describes the seven stages of ascent of consciousness (bhūmikas) which resemble the stages of purification, that leads towards the turiya consciousness.¹⁸ The Yoga Sūtra commentary *Maṇiprabhā* also mentions the seven stages of this process.¹⁹ But it is the *Akṣyupaniṣad* that mentions the Yoga bhūmikas.²⁰ The third stage here is called the jāgrat, the fourth is called the swapna, because in this stage the seer sees everything of the world as if it were dream (paśyanti swapnavallokam). This is stated to be the state when one views things of the world as of equal value or worth and attains equality or poise of being in respect of them as being illusory products. The fifth state is stated to be the suṣupti or suṣuptighana. The sixth is stated to be the turiya whereas the last is stated to be the state of videha-mukti (release from the body).

Therefore, it would be clear that the different meanings given to the several terms depend upon the kinds of approach that are made and the terms jāgrat and swapna and suṣupti do not mean the same thing in Yoga as what they denote in ordinary life.²¹ For it is stated also in the *Gītā*, that what is day for the yogin is night for the ordinary man and vice versa. The levels from

* 18 *Varāha Upa.* IV. cf. *Mahopaniṣad* V. cf. *Yoga Sūtra*. II. 27.

19 III. 40-45. cf. C. A. Bennett: *A Philosophical study of Mysticism* pp. 52-53.

20 *Akṣyupaniṣad* II. 15, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37 (Adya ed.)

21 The whole process of yoga consists in the movement in depth with the one aim of realising the free consciousness as self or soul. This fronting of the consciousness or psychic being is more like concentration rather than relaxation, it is an act of taking aim rather than diffusion. That is why the whole process of the seven steps lead to deeper and deeper depths of consciousness till the concentric Samādhi is reached in the turiya. The three steps are widening circles of release of consciousness rather than contracting circles of action.

which the lower sensory and motor activities are surveyed are supersensory both subtly conceived and grossly conceived.

The turya state has had the fortune of being spoken about in most extravagant terms. It is calmness, it is non-dual, it is the unlimited mystery difficult of attainment²². This is the most real and permanent state.²³ It is the plane of sectacy, which permeates or should permeate the lower states²⁴. It is stated to be dhvanyātmaka.²⁵ It is stated to be the state of peace. It is the state of self in its true nature as saccidānanda. It is stated to be the akṣara.²⁶ It is the state wherein all the vāsanās are transcended. It is the supreme abode. It is the incorruptible state of knowledge, integral and unitary. It is the dharma-megha. It is the state experienced in the head or sahasrāra²⁷. It is the state of perfect unity with the Divine²⁸. It is the experience of the Mahākāśa, beyond which remain the further levels of Divine Mind such as the sūryākāśa and paramākāśa, or the turyātīta. It is called the seventh stage in the Jñāna-levels,²⁹ and the sixth in the Yoga-bhūmikas.³⁰ It is in this state that one begins to have real padārthabhāvanā. It is called the state of samādhi and tāraka. This is the way towards the perception of the eternal being who is the self through whom one loves all things, wife and

²² *Māṇḍ. Upa.* 7 ; *G.K.* III. 46-47.

²³ *Tripādvibhūti Mahānārāyaṇa Upa* : Turīyamakṣaram itiśrute,ḥ turīyasya nityatvam prasiddham.

³⁴ *Śiva Sūtra*, I. 7.

²⁵ *Mahānārāyaṇa Upa.* VII.; *Nāḍabindu Upa.*

²⁶ *Tripādvibhūti Mahānārāyaṇa Upa.*

²⁷ *Nārada-parivrajaka Upa.* V.

²⁸ *Bṛha. Upa.* IV. B. 20, *Cha. Upa.* VII. 15.2 ; *Maṇḍala Br Upa.* II. 5. 1. *Tejobindu.*

²⁹ *Varāha Upa.*

³⁰ *Akṣyupaniṣad.* cf. *Yoga Sūtras.* I. 1, 47, 48 ; III. 2.

child and others³¹. He is to be realized in the heart, who is of the³² size of the barley or rice, or of the size of the thumb, the Vāmana³³. This experience must be and has always to be achieved in one's own heart, for by that realization the knots of ignorance are ultimately and finally cut, as the *Br̥ha. Upa.* (IV. III. 6) says. It is the integral Praṇava³⁴.

The turya state leads us to the gnostic being or true jāgrat which can permeate the entire lower levels, and divinise them or sublimate them. True education or knowing consisted in ancient practice in this process of divinising of the lower jāgrat and svapna and leading through the deep sleep of the senses to the waking state of the central consciousness which is of a nature identical with that of the Divine. The earlier Upaniṣads like the *Māṇḍūkya* stop with these four stages, for the fourth or turya really is the beginning of the consciousness of our true nature distinct from the matter and its categories of evolutes. Then alone we are beginning the true journey of life in the Divine. The self knows the Self of all, who is the self in the Sun and Earth and beyond. That consciousness is the apprehension of the turyātīta, beyond the head or above the head. We may perhaps consider that these are states of being and knowing that pertain to the close intimacies with the central reality in all, the Divine, the Nirguṇa, the Eternal, who is also described as the Śūnya³⁵ or the void of sensory being and knowing and enjoying, and momentariness and restriction. Some

³¹ *Br̥ha. Up.*

³² *Br̥ha. Upa.* IV. vi. 1; IV. 1. 7; *Subālo Upa.*

³³ *Kaṭha Upa.*

³⁴ *Nārada—P. Upa.* 28, 20 cf. *Nārada-P. Upa.* VIII.; *Chā.* and indeed all Upaniṣads.

³⁵ *Saubhā. Upa.* : prabhāśūnyam, buddhi śūnyam, śūnyam nirāmayam sarvasūnyam nirābhāsam. It is the state of tanmāya : AnnaP.

hold that the turyātīta may correspond to the nirvikalpaka samādhi or asamprajñāta samādhi, which is stated to be the experience of absolute identity with the Divine. It is also stated to be the state of unsupportedness, nirālamba³⁶. It is the state of amanaska³⁷.

The turya and the turyātīta states thus conceived in relation to the Rāja Yoga are mainly deepening trance-states. Whereas it is not so when these states are considered as Vedāntic or Jñāna-states. This has a profound difference. Even the nāḍopāśanā or the praṇavopāśanā leads only to the trance-states. There thus follow directions regarding the videha-mukti.³⁸ The problem of the levels of consciousness thus get a purely internal experience, even though so far as the so-called Jīvanmukti state is stated to be a state of freedom on all planes of consciousness. The permeation of the turya (self-state) and the turyātīta (or Brahma-sampatti) of the lower levels of consciousness, is not fully conscious or direct but mediated by the trance-state. That is one of the main reasons for these yoga methods failing to solve the problem of life. They imply withdrawal and renunciation of the waking life that we know; they faintly promise the release even from the world-life-worries gradually if not, not at all. Indeed the illusory theory gets upperhand and the seeker after Yoga has just to liquidate himself on the planes of our ordinary consciousness. It is true that these states also involve the acquisition of powers or siddhis, even contact with the powers of the spiritual world called the devas, yakṣas etc.³⁹ But all these do not help the evo-

³⁶ *Upa. V. 104. Maho. Upa. IV. Nirālamba Upa.*

³⁷ *Maṇḍala Brāhmaṇa Upa. II. v. 1; Avadhūta Upa.*

³⁸ *Cbā. Upa. VIII. 3. 4; Mahānārāyaṇa Upa. X. 5. 6; Muṇḍa. Upa. III. 216; Īśā. 17 Varāha Upa. Jñāna-bhūmi seventh;*

³⁹ Cf. Siddhis in the *Yoga Sūtras. III. 17 ff; Śaṇḍilya. I. 7. 52; Advaya Tāraka; Yoga Śikha Upa. 51; Yoga Sūtra. III. 50.*

lution of the ordinary man.⁴⁰ That is one of the strongest criticisms levelled against the developments of the Minor Upaniṣads. The Minor Upaniṣads are in one sense the products of experiences in several kinds of Yoga and the levels or bhūmikas are states on the path, and all these states were recorded as experienced. So far they mark a great chapter. These experiences have also befallen to mystics of other nations. In the literatures of the Buddhists,⁴¹ Śaiva-siddhānta, Vīraśaivism, Tantricism we have further developments recorded. But in none of these we find the original clarity of the simple Upaniṣadic paths of the earlier seers. Speculative psychology is not the word to be used in this connection, however. There is for the seeker after the path of these yogas enough guidance given, but then the question will always recur: is it worth all this effort? As Śrī Aurobindo has remarked: "Trance is a way of escape—the body is made quiet, the physical mind is in a state of torpor, the inner consciousness is left free to go on with its experience. The disadvantage is that trance becomes indispensable and that the problem of the waking consciousness is not solved, it remains imperfect." It is because of this that all the rich promises of the yoga of the minor Upaniṣads do not evoke the enthusiasm of the ordinary man. They appear to be, with all their charms, ways of escape from the main problem of divine evolutionism, the discovery and the recovery of the Divine in the physical mind, as in the inner mind.

⁴⁰ *Mahopaniṣad*. VI.: Antassāṅgaparityāgi bahissamsāravāniva. Kartā bahir akartāntarloke...: This ideal is fully expressed but this consciousness of the supramental Omniscience and Being does not permeate the physical consciousness or mind.

⁴¹ Cf. *J.S.V.O.I.* Vol. III p. 77 ff: *Buddhist and Yoga Psychology*.

• NOTE:—My friend Prof. Dr. B.L. Atreya has worked on the correlation between the Minor Upaniṣads and the Yoga Vāśiṣṭha very well and in a deeply scholarly manner. The dates he assigns to these Minor Upaniṣads are after that great work. But some of these are likely to be earlier and some indeed appear to be very late. If these are taken together here, it is because psychical experiences appear undatable.

ṬODARANANDA

BY K. MADHAVA KRISHNA SARMA

ṬODARĀNANDA is an encyclopædia of Hindu Law, written * under the patronage of Ṭodaramalla, the Finance Minister of Akbar. As the following statement at the beginning of the work shows, several scholars collaborated in completing this voluminous digest, each writing on the subject in which he was an expert. Thus the portion relating to Jyotiṣa was written by Nīlakaṇṭha, the author of the *Samjñātāntra* and the *Tājika Nīlakaṇṭhī*¹.

असौ कदाचिद्विदुषो विशुद्धानाहूय सत्कृत्य विनीतमूर्तिः ।

नानापुराणस्मृतिसारभूतं समादिशद्ग्रन्थममुं विधातुम् ॥

The other collaborators are not known at present. MSS. of this important work are very rare. A complete MS has yet to be brought to light. Of the several parts of the work, called Sankhyas, only some have been noticed by Aufrecht in his *Catalogus Catalogorum* and by Prof. Kane in his *History of Dharma Śāstra*. There is a MS of the work in the *Anup Sanskrit Library*. This seems to be the most complete of all those so far known to us. In his preface to the *Catalogue of Smṛti Mss.* (R.A.S.B.) pp. 25—26, Haraprasad Shastri gives an account of this from an old list of MSS in the Library. This account is, however, incomplete, as Haraprasad Shastri did not himself examine the MSS. The several parts into which the work is divided and the various topics dealt with herein have thus remained unknown to scholars. Information regarding these as well as the genealogy of Ṭodaramalla, extending over seven generations, is con-

¹Kane, *History of Dharma Śāstra*, Vol. I, Sec 104.

tained in the first part of the work, called *Sargāvatāra-sankhyā*. The portion relating to genealogy is as follows :

राजन्यवंशसरसीरुहचण्डभानुः—
 श्रीटण्डनान्वयमहोदधिपारिजातः ।
 बालो विशालभुजमण्डलखण्डितारि—
 रासीन्मुरारिपदवारिरुहातिभक्तः ॥

एतस्यात्तलिराविरासतनयो वीरोऽतिधीराग्रणी-
 विश्वख्यातभुजप्रकाण्डमहिमा भूलोकभूषामणिः ।
 यन्नामस्मरणे भवन्ति कवयो रोमाञ्चितैरञ्चिता
 यस्याद्यापि यशः प्रसर्पति दिशः शीतांशुबिम्बच्छलात् ॥

एतस्य पुत्रो निजगोत्रनेत्र—
 द्वयस्फुरत्कैरवशीतधामा ।
 कामारिरामार्चनचारुचेता
 दामाभिरामाकृतिराविरासीत् ॥

अस्सूरे तस्य सूनुस्त्रिदशपतिपुरीनागरीगीतकीर्तिः
 पञ्चेषु द्वेषिशीर्षस्खलितसुरसरिद्वीचिनिर्घातमूर्तिः ।
 आसीदासीमभूमीवलयगतयशः स्तोमसोमोरिबाला—
 स्फूर्जत्सिन्दूरमालाहरणपटुकरः कृष्णपादाब्जभृङ्गः ॥

अग्रे गण्यो नृपाणामतुलबलवतां वैखरीणां शरण्यो
 मान्यो विद्वज्जनानां नयविनययुजां बाहुजानां वरेण्यः ।
 चञ्चच्चक्षुश्चकोरीचयतुहिनश्चिर्भिक्षुकान्ता जनाना—
 मेतत्पुत्रः पवित्रस्त्रिदशपतिरिव द्वारकादास आसीत् ॥

एतस्य पुत्रो द्विजमल्लनामा
 बभूव धामाखिलसद्गुणानाम् ।
 यशो यदीयं बहुशो विशालं
 दिक्चक्रवालं धवलीकरोति ॥

श्रीमत्कृष्णपदारविन्दविगलन्माध्वीकबद्धादर—
 स्त्रैलोक्ये विदितः कुती भगवतीदासोऽस्य पुत्रोऽभवत् ।
 कीर्त्या यस्य सुधांशुसुन्दररुचा भूमण्डलं निर्मलं
 यद्दानेन दरिद्रवेश्म सुचिरं दारिद्र्यमुन्मूलितम् ॥

भूलोकस्य विभूषणं त्रिजगती वैदग्ध्यविश्रामभूः
 पुत्रोऽस्य क्षितिमण्डले विजयते श्रीटोडरक्षमापतिः ।
 यस्मिन् शासति पाकशासन इव क्षोणीं पवित्राकृती
 सद्यः कणयुधिष्ठिरादिविरहक्लेशं धरित्री जही ॥

धीमान् विश्वसृजश्चिराय पुलकद्दोस्तम्भसम्भावना-
 भूमिष्टोडूरमल्ल एष जयताद्वाहूद्भववष्टण्डनः ।
 रौजन्येषु तमोमयेन कलिना क्रूरेण निम्नोचितो
 यस्मिन्नभ्युदितो जगद्विमलयन् साम्राज्यतिग्मद्युतिः ॥

Thus from the above we get the following table :--

Bāla
 |
 Attali
 |
 Dāmodara
 |
 Assu
 |
 Dvārakādāsa
 |
 Dvijamalla
 |
 Bhagavatidāsa
 |
 Tōḍaramalla

The divisions of the book are enumerated as follows :-

सर्गावताराः कालस्य गणनं कालनिर्णयः ।
 देशा द्विजातिसंस्कारा आचारः शुद्धिनिर्णयः ॥
 श्राद्धानि वर्षकृत्यानि व्रतानां विधयस्ततः ।
 प्रतिष्ठाविधयः पूजा देवतानां ततः परम् ॥
 दानानि ग्रहयागादि शान्तिकं तैथिको विधिः ।
 विवादो व्यवहारश्च राजनीतिस्ततः परम् ॥
 प्रायश्चित्तं कर्मपाक आयुर्वेदः प्रसङ्गतः ।
 ग्रन्थेऽस्मिन् टोडरानन्दे सर्वभेदनिबध्यते ॥

As stated here, the work consists of nineteen Sankhyas.

(1) Sargāvatāra, (2) Kālanirṇaya, (3) Saṃskāra, (4) Ācāra, (5) Śuddhinirṇaya, (6) Śrāddha, (7) Varṣakṛtya, (8) Vratavidhi, (9) Pratiṣṭhāvidhi, (10) Pūjā, (11) Dāna, (12) Śāntika, (13) Tairthika, (14) Vivāda, (15) Vyavahāra, (16) Rājanīti, (17) Prāyaścitta, (18) Karmavipāka and (19) Āyurveda.

In the *Anup Sanskrit Library* the following Sankhyas are available. Sargāvatāra (2 MSS—one dated Samvat 1630). Saṃskāra (2 MSS—one dated Samvat 1736), Ācāra (2 MSS—one dated Samvat 1631), Śuddhi (Ms. dated Samvat 1639), Vrata (Ms. dated Samvat 1639), Varṣakṛtya, Pūjāvidhāna, Dāna, Vyavahāra (3 MSS—one dated Samvat 1630), Prāyaścitta, Samaya, Āgama (Ms. dated Samvat 1631), Śāntikapauṣṭika, Jyotiṣa (Gaṇita, Gaṇitasāṅkhyodāharaṇa, Grahasankhya, Horā-Sankhya, Saṃhitā Sankhya), Vivāha and Āyurveda. Some of these Mss. belonged to Kavindrācārya.

One Ms. of the Ācārasankhya dated Samvat 1631 (A. D. 1574) and another of Vyavahāra dated Samvat 1630 (A. D. 1573) were written at Agra in the reign of Akbar. Ṭoḍaramalla died in Lahore in 1589 A. D.¹² Prof. Kane states that “Literary works were compiled under the patronage of Ṭoḍaramalla between 1565—1589 A. D.” The above dated Mss. were copied during this period and hence they are very important.

¹² Kane, *History of Dharma Śāstra*, Vol. I, p. 423.

THE FIVE PROVISIONAL DEFINITIONS OF VYĀPTI (VYĀPTI-PAÑCAKA) IN GAṆGEŚA

BY TARA SANKAR BHATTACHARYA

GANGEŚA defines inferential knowledge as arising from the knowledge of the minor term having Vyāpti or invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term.² Hence, in the beginning of his discussions on Vyāpti he puts the question: What is Vyāpti or invariable concomitance (of the middle term with the major term) the knowledge of which is the instrument of inferential knowledge?

But in considering the knowledge of Vyāpti to be the cause of inferential knowledge, Gaṅgeśa strikes a note of difference with the Old School. Vātsyāyana's definition of inferential knowledge that it is the knowledge of the meaning of the term which has the sign after the sign is properly known³ (the sign is the middle term, the term having it is the minor term and the meaning of the minor term is the major term), shows that the knowledge of Vyāpti is not at least the immediate cause of the inferential conclusion. And this point is clarified by Uddyotakara when he says that the instruments of inferential knowledge are the perception of the sign (the middle term), the remembrance of Vyāpti and the consideration of the sign (līṅga-parāmarśa) of which the last

• • ¹ Vyāpti here means the universal relation or invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term in an inference.

² *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Part II, p. 2 (Calcutta edition).

³ Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* on the 3rd aphorism of Gotama (mitena līṅgena līṅgino'rthasya Paścānmānamanumānam).

one viz., *liṅga-parāmarśa* is the immediate cause of inferential knowledge⁴. *Liṅga-parāmarśa* implies "the present perception of the middle term in the minor associated with the memory of its connection with the major"⁵. Gaṅgeśa⁶ also uses the term *liṅga-parāmarśa* for the instrument of inferential knowledge, but he means by it, as Mathurānātha points out, the knowledge of Vyāpti. The *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī*⁷ (on verse 67) also raises the question of the instrument of inferential knowledge and points out that, according to the Old School, the middle term which is being actually perceived as a concomitant is the cause of inference. But this view of the Old School is defective, says Viśvanātha. Mathurānātha also refers to this view of the Old School and refutes it by the proposition that, if the middle term, which is being considered, is the cause of the inferential conclusion, then there cannot be any inferential knowledge from the middle term or sign that is past or that is yet to come.⁸ Viśvanātha also refutes the view of the Old School following the same argument.

Thus, the instrument of the inferential knowledge, according to the Navya-Nyāya, is the knowledge of Vyāpti, i.e., invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term. Now what is this Vyāpti? A thinker preceding Gaṅgeśa considers that invariable concomitance (Vyāpti) is negation of inconsistency or

⁴ *Nyāya-Vārttika*, 5th Sūtra. On the instrument of inferential knowledge according to the Old School, *Vide*, *Nyāya-Darśana* by Mm. Phani Bhusan Tarkavāgiśa, Vol. I pp. 135—137.

⁵ Dasgupta: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol., I., P. 351.

⁶ *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, Part II, Page 2 (Calcutta edition. This edition contains the commentary of Mathurānātha).

⁷ *Liṅga-Parāmarśo Vyāptijñānam*. *Ibid*, p. 19.

⁸ *Ibid*. *Parāmṛśyamāna-liṅgasyānumitikaraṇatve atītānāgataliṅgadanumitirna syāditi bhāvaḥ*.

unexceptionability⁹ (avyabhicaritattvam) which can be determined by five definitions.¹⁰ These definitions are not considered, by Gaṅgeśa, to be sufficient to explain the nature of Vyāpti, for all of them, it is alleged, fail in the case of an exclusively affirmative (Kevalānvayī) inference, i.e., an inference in which the major term is universally present. The nature and meaning of these five definitions are discussed below :—

The first definition of Vyāpti is non-existence, in the middle term, of objects having a substratum in which the major term does not exist (sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvam). It means that the places which do not contain the major term are the substrata of certain objects and that the absence of these objects in the middle term determines Vyāpti. Let us take an inference to illustrate this: the hill is fiery, as it has smoke. Here 'smoke' is the mid-

⁹ Eaton in his "*General Logic*," P. 59, remarks: "Where the subject or the terms are general, the proposition is general, e.g., 'Men quarrel,' 'Red is colour,' 'Beauty is different from truth,' 'All good things are rare.'" Again, he says: "The simplest definition of a general element in a proposition would be, any element that does not refer to a definite individual (person, event, object, etc.)." From this standpoint "some men quarrel" is also a general proposition, Stebbing also thinks in like manner. He observes: "A general proposition, therefore, makes an assertion about all or about some of the members of a class" (*A modern Introduction to Logic*, P. 43). On the other hand, the traditional Logic, following the lead of Aristotle, means by universal judgments only those judgments which "make the judgment explicitly of all the cases under consideration" (Welton, *Ground work of Logic*, p. 48). Now the definition of Vyāpti as the negation of inconstancy shows that Vyāpti concerns all and not some. From this standpoint this definition is akin to traditional Logic rather than to modern Logic of Eaton and Stebbing.

¹⁰ It is not definitely known as to who was the author of these five definitions. In the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūkeśa*, the commentary of Jagadīśa on the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, it is said that the upholder of the view of the negation of inconstancy to be the essence of Vyāpti, is the commentator (Tīkā-kṛt) and this commentator is Vācaspati Miśra. But though Vācaspati Miśra thinks that the negation of inconstancy is the essence of Vyāpti, he nowhere formulates the five definitions. Hence, the author of these definitions might be some follower of Vācaspati Miśra.

dle term and 'fire' the major. The places which are the locus of the non-existence of the major term 'fire,' are lake, etc., for fire does not exist there. There are, again, things, e.g., fish, moss, etc., whose substratum is lake. These fish, moss, etc., do not exist in the middle term smoke. This non-existence marks Vyāpti. In plain language smoke invariably accompanies fire, because the existence of the terms which are present in the places where fire does not exist, is negated in smoke.¹¹

In this inference, which may be said to be in the first figure, the major term is wider than the middle. Therefore, the universal proposition, "all cases of smoke are cases of fire," is not simply convertible. The converse of this proposition is "some cases of fire are cases of smoke." Hence, if we change the middle term and make a wrong syllogism, "all cases of fire are cases of smoke; the yonder hill is a case of fire; and, therefore, it is a case of smoke," then the major premise should not come within the scope of the definition of Vyāpti just explained.¹² And this is exactly the case. The substratum of the non-existence of the major term 'smoke' is, for example, the red-hot iron bar and existence

¹¹ The first definition of Vyāpti has some similarity to Hobhouse's conception of general proposition. He says: "And hence any uniformly observed relation A—B must be generalised, if no concomitant C exists, a change in which would be followed by a change in B." *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 327. Again, he remarks: "The possibility of the disturbing concomitant is the "counterconsideration" which must be dismissed before a suggested generalisation can be affirmed." *Ibid.* P. 328.

¹² Two kinds of inferences are distinguished in the Nyāya: (1) Saddhetuka and (2) asaddhetuka. In the former, the middle term is invariably accompanied by the major term. In the latter, some cases of the middle term are accompanied by the major. Here the major premise, say all cases of fire are cases of smoke, is not materially universal. A true definition of Vyāpti should apply only to saddhetuka inference and not to asaddhetuka which is fallacious. It should be remembered in this connection that the Nyāya syllogism is both formally and materially true.

pertaining to red-hot iron bar is not negated in fire. Hence, the definition does not apply to this fallacious inference.

• The definition of Vyāpti explained above is based on the category of negation. But there are inferences which are exclusively affirmative (Kevalānvayī). The inference, “all things are nameable, as they are knowable” (all things are knowable because nothing exists outside God’s knowledge at least), is a case in instance. Here the question of the substratum of the non-existence of the major term does not arise, because the major term is universally present (Kevalānvayī). There is no negation of the major term at any locus. Hence, the first definition of Vyāpti is incompetent to deal with such inferences. Gaṅgeśa, therefore, rejects it as incomplete.

The commentator Raghunātha points out that the first definition is feared (by the author of the definitions) to be inapplicable to an inference whose major term is of partial extensivity (and to remove this defect the second definition has been formulated)¹³. Consider, for example, the inference, it has the conjunction of monkey, because it is this tree, i.e., as it has the essence-this-tree. In this inference the major term monkey-conjunction partially extends to the substratum of the middle term, which is this tree, for the attribute monkey-conjunction can be located only in a portion of this tree. It is at the top of the tree, but not in its root. Now, according to the first definition the negation, in the middle term, of the location or existence of objects abiding in a substratum where the major term does not exist, is Vyāpti. This principle to be true in the inference under consideration, would mean that there is negation in the middle term, the essence-this-tree, of the location of objects which

¹³ *Vide, Vyāpti-Pañcaka-Dīdhiti.*

exist in a locus where the major term, monkey-conjunction, is absent. But the essence-this-tree permeates the whole tree. Hence, the formula demands that the existence pertaining to the negation of monkey-conjunction should be negated throughout the whole tree. But really there is the negation of the negation of monkey-conjunction only at the top of the tree where the monkey sits. In the root there is the negation and not the negation of the negation of monkey-conjunction. So, the first definition is inadequate for an inference in which the major term is of partial extension (*avyāpya-vṛtti*).

The commentator Mathurānātha,¹⁴ on the contrary, thinks that with the exception of the exclusively affirmative inference, the definition is almost a complete picture of Vyāpti. Let us follow at some length his line of interpretation of the first definition.¹⁵

The first definition indicates denotatively that the negation, in the middle term, of the things which by nature exist in the locus where the major term is negated, determines universal relation between the middle term and the major term. It, however, is put connotatively thus: The negation of existence determined by the substratum of the negation of the major term is invariable concomitance or Vyāpti. Here the said non-existence, in the middle term, is a general negation, i.e., the negation of the whole species existing in the locus in which the major term is negated. The negation neither includes anything falling outside such a species, nor excludes anything coming under it. For if it extends beyond the species in question, then the definition becomes too-wide, and if it omits any particular under the species,

¹⁴ *Vide, Vyāpti-pañcaka-rahasya.*

¹⁵ In understanding Mathurānātha's "*Vyāpti-pañcaka-rahasya*," the Bengali translation of R. N. Ghose's "*Navya-Nyāya*," has been very helpful.

then it becomes too-narrow. In the former case we get *ativyāpti* and in the latter *avyāpti*. Indeed every general negation should be *itara-vāraka* (prohibiting others to come under it) and *nyūna-vāraka* (prohibiting being less than its own denotation). In other words, a general negation should avoid wideness and also narrowness.

The negation of the location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term is, therefore, a general negation relating to all the individuals of the same species. If it is not a general negation, then the definition applies to a fallacious (*asaddhetuka*) inference. Let us take the false inference: 'The mountain is smoky, as there is fire there. Here 'fire' is the middle term and 'smoke' the major. Smoke is negated in water, red-hot iron-ball, etc. But if the negation of the location of these things in fire be not exhaustive, one may concentrate on a particular locus, say water, and show the absence of the location of water in fire. In that case the definition applies to a fallacious inference. It commits the fallacy of two-wide generalisation (*ativyāpti*).

On the contrary, if the negation of the whole class of objects of the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, is accepted, then the definition does not apply to a fallacious inference. Let us take the major premise, fire is a case of smoke, where fire is the middle term and smoke the major. The definition to be applicable to it, the location of all objects belonging to the locus where smoke is negated, should be negated in fire. But the red-hot iron ball, though negating smoke, is not itself negated in fire. Hence the definition does not apply to this inference and as such is not too-wide.

But though the definition fails in the case of a fallacious inference, it can well characterise a correct inference. Consider, for example, the major premise, 'all cases of smoke are cases of fire,' in which smoke is

the middle term and fire the major. The negation, in smoke, of the location of objects existing in the substratum of the non-existence of fire, being a general negation, no object in whose support fire is negated, can be located in smoke. Hence, the definition quite fits in such an inference.

But the definition will not apply even to a correct inference, if the negation of the location of objects existing in a support where the major term is negated, be not exhaustive. For if the negation is not strictly general, then it follows that there is the negation, in the middle term, of the location of some objects having a locus where the major term is negated. In that case, as two sub-contraries are not necessarily opposed, it follows that sometimes the existence determined by the substratum of the non-existence of the non-existence of the major term is negated in the middle and sometimes not. The result is that the major premise is narrowed down to a particular proposition.

Again, the non-generality of the negation of the location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term, may also mean that in some cases there is the negation of the negative of the major term in the middle and in some cases there is the negation of the non-negative of the major term in the middle, i.e., the objects which are co-present with the major term, may not be located in the middle. In that case the middle term does not invariably accompany the major term.

The above discussions clearly show that the negation, in the middle term, of the location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term is a general negation. Now this location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term, is to be taken or understood in the relation which is the determinant of the middle term (Hetutāvacchedaka-sambandhena vivakṣaṇīā).

In the enthymematic inference,¹⁸ "the hill is fiery, as it has smoke," the determinant relation of the middle term 'smoke' is *saṃyoga* (conjunction), because smoke is in conjunction with its substratum, the hill. Hence the location pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term should be determined by the relation of conjunction. If we take the location of objects in the substrata of the non-existence of the major term 'fire' in some other relation, say inherence, there the first definition cannot properly determine *Vyāpti*. For the substrata of the non-existence of fire may be lakes, cloths etc., and also a part of smoke where fire does not reach. Now if we take the location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of fire, in the relation of inherence, then we find that the part of the middle term 'smoke,' which is the locus of the non-existence of fire, does exist in the relation of inherence in smoke (as the part inheres in the whole). But according to the first definition, the non-existence, in the middle term, of objects having a locus where the major term is negated, constitutes *Vyāpti*. Hence the definition fails, if the location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term is taken in the relation of inherence. But the case is otherwise if we take the location in the relation of conjunction. The part of the smoke does not exist in the relation of conjunction to the smoke, for conjunction is an external and impermanent relation, whereas the relation of part to the whole is organic and permanent. Hence there is the negation of the part of the smoke in the smoke itself in the relation of conjunction. Thus the definition succeeds in this case.

¹⁸ The commentators of *Nyāya* use enthymemes as their examples, and though a syllogism is considered to have five members, yet the practice is to use two propositions in an inference.

We have explained the failure of the first definition in the inference, the hill has fire, as it has smoke, when the location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term is taken in the relation of inherence. We shall also explain that the definition cannot determine Vyāpti, if the location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term fire, is taken in any kind of time relation. Everything that has an origin exists in time relation to everything else. Smoke, the middle term, does bear time relation to the locus of the non-existence of the major term, say the lake. Smoke is either simultaneous with the lake, or it precedes the lake or succeeds the lake. Hence there is not the negation of the location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term in the middle, if the location is considered in time relation. Therefore the definition falls short of adequately representing Vyāpti in such a case.

We have seen that there are cases of inference in which the relation determining the middle term may be conjunction and that the location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term should stand in the same relation to its substratum. But as there may be inferences in which the middle term may remain in some other relation in its substratum, let us consider an inference in which the middle term is determined by the relation of that kind of inference which has for its base (anuyogi) the minor term¹⁷. This is a substance, as it has existence. Here substance-hood¹⁸ is the major term, 'existence' the middle, and 'this' the minor term. The

¹⁷ 'Inherence' is manifold according to the New School where as according to the Old School it admits of no variation.

¹⁸ There is a typical formula current among the Bengali scholars of Nyāya to determine the major term: *Bān mān varjiyā, sādhyā ān garjiyā; yadi nā thāke bān mān, tva carāyā, sādhyā ān*. This means that the major term should be an abstract noun like substance hood when substance represents the major term and when the major term is represented by an adjective like fiery, it should be fire.

locus of the non-existence of the major term substance-hood is quality, action¹⁹, etc., which are not substances. Now the middle term 'existence' inheres in the minor term 'this' in a manner in which existence inheres in a substance. The relation of inherence, in this case, is determined by the essence of substance, so that we get here inherence plus such determination and not inherence pure and simple. Thus inherence in this instance is *dravyānuyogī* (pertaining to substance or having substance as its substratum). This relation of inherence-pertaining-to-substance is the determinant of the middle term in this inference. Now the location pertaining to quality, action, etc., which are the locus of the non-existence of the major term, is certainly negated in the middle term in the relation of inherence-pertaining-to-substance.

•One important point is to be borne in mind in this connection. The location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term has the same relation to its locus as determines the middle term. But this relation determining the middle term has again its collective extensity (*Paryāpti*) which should neither be exceeded nor be narrowed. In the inference, this is a substance, as it is existence, we have found that the relation determining the middle term is inherence-pertaining-to-substance. If we narrow this relation by omitting the adjunct pertaining-to-substance²⁰ and consider inherence

¹⁹ The New School admits seven categories like substance, quality, action, inherence, generic attribute, particularity and negation. Here it follows the Vaiśeṣika system. For the Vaiśeṣika categories, see Rādhākṛiṣṇan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II.

•²⁰ The omission of "pertaining to substance" narrows the relation in the following manner: In the relation of inherence-pertaining-to-substance the essences, "pertaining to substance" and "inherence," determine the relatedness of the relata. Here the determinants of the relatedness are two in number. But if we omit "pertaining-to substance," then the number is narrowed down to one.

itself to be determinant of the middle term, then the definition does not apply to this inference and becomes incomplete, as existence (the middle term) inheres also in quality and action which are the locus of the negation of the major term substance-hood.

The definition shares the same fate, if the relation determining the middle term is widened. Consider again the inference, it is a substance as it has existence. Here the relation determining the middle term is inherence-pertaining-to-substance; the locus of the non-existence of the major term is action where substance-hood does not inhere. Now if we consider the location pertaining to action either in time relation or the relation determining the middle term²¹ (which is inherence-pertaining-to-substance), then there is not the negation, in the middle term, of existence determined by the substratum of the non-existence of the major term. For the location or existence determined by the alternative relation will exist in the middle term. Nothing in fact, prevents the middle term to bear time relation to action which is the locus of the non-existence of the major term. Hence the middle term does not invariably accompany the major term.

The relation determining the middle term and the relation determining the location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term are thus the same having the same collective extensity. This collective extensity is a relation whose substratum is determined by number and in determining the exact number implied by this relation, the essence of the things to which the number is applied, should be taken into consideration. When

²¹ The alternatives time relation and inherence-pertaining-to-substance widen the relation determining the middle term in the following manner: Inherence-pertaining-to-substance is the determinant of the middle term. But to this are added the essence-time-relation (kālikatva) and essence-alternative (anyataratva). Hence the over extension.

we determine the number of pots, for example, we should say that the essence-pot or pot-hood, extends upto that particular number, say two. For the collective number two may exist on the pot and cloth, when the cloth is placed on the pot and in that case the exact collective extensity with regard to pot cannot be determined. But the essence-pot or pot-hood is a generic attribute which inheres only in pots and can never inhere in the cloth. Hence the difficulty of determining the exact collective extensity of pot disappears, if the collective extensity is said to rest on pot-hood.

Remembering this rule of collective extensity we can find out the exact collective extensity of the relation determining the middle term in an inference. Let us consider the inference, the hill has fire, as it has smoke. Here the relation determining the middle term is conjunction. The essence of conjunction is conjunction-hood or connectedness. The extensity of the relation of connectedness is unity or one-ness pertaining to connectedness. Let us again consider the inference, it is a substance, as it has existence. Here the relation determining the middle term is inherence-pertaining-to-substance. The collective extensity of this relation is duality or two-ness, viz., essence-inherence plus essence-pertaining-to-substance. Hence in these two inferences the extensity of the relation through which the location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term, should be taken, is unity and duality respectively.

The relation determining the middle term is thus the relation through which things exist in the substratum of the non-existence of the major term. This is a safeguard the transgression of which leads, according to some, to the fallacy of too-narrow definition and, according to others, to that of an absolutely absurd or impossible (*asāmbhava*) definition. When a definition applies to

some cases and not to all, it is too-narrow. When it applies to no case, it is absolutely absurd. Now the definition, "the non-existence, in the middle term, of objects abiding in a substratum in which the major term is negated," is too-narrow, when the relation determining the middle term does not determine the existence of objects in the locus of the non-existence of the major term and when relatedness is supposed to belong only to those relations which are the determinants of existence (Vṛttiniyāmaka). In the inference, they have finite space, as they have jar-hood, the negation of the major term finite space, is infinite space whose substratum is infinite space itself. The relation determining the middle term jar-hood is inherence-pertaining-to-jars. But in the infinite space nothing can exist in the relation of inherence-pertaining-to-jars, as this kind of inherence is found only in jars and nowhere else. Yet there is the absence of the middle term jar-hood in the infinite space, jar-hood abiding only in jars. Hence the definition applies to this inference at least and as such is not absolutely absurd, though too-narrow, as it does not apply to other cases.

But the definition turns to be absolutely absurd, if relatedness is supposed to belong also to the relation in which a term does not exist in a substratum. A, for example, does not exist in B in the relation of inherence. Here non-existence in inherence may be taken as a genuine relation. And if so taken, the definition of invariable concomitance under discussion results in absolute absurdity, if the relation determining the middle term is not the determinant of the location pertaining to the locus of the negation of the major. To take the inference, they have finite space, as they have jar-hood, the middle term jar-hood can exist in any relation of non-existence in the infinite space which is the substratum of the negation of the major term, as jar-hood exists only in

jars and no where else. Hence the definition, according to which the non-existence of the objects of the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, determines Vyāpti, does not apply to this case and turns to be absolutely absurd.

Thus things exist in the locus of the non-existence of the major term through the relation determining the middle. But what is the exact significance of the non-existence of the major term in the definition? This is to be understood as a negation whose counterpositiveness is determined both by the relation determining the major term and by the essence of the major term (*sādhyābhāvaśca sādhyatāvacchedaka—sambandhāvacchinna sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinna-pratīyogitāka vodhyaḥ*). In the inference, the hill is fiery, as it has smoke, the major term fire has conjunction with the hill. Hence, the relation determining the major term is conjunction. Similarly, the essence of the major term is fire-hood and not smoke-production or anything else, for in the inference in question fire is taken as fire. Now the counterpositive of the negation of the major term is the major term itself and it is fire on this occasion. The counterpositiveness fire-hood abides in the counterpositive fire. Hence the negation of the major term fire is a negation of fire-hood in the relation of conjunction. Fire-hood has no conjunction with the lake; the objects existing in the lake are negated in the middle term smoke. Thus there is the negation, in the middle term, of the existence of objects having a locus where the major term is negated and this is the demand of the definition.

.. But if the negation of the major term means only the negation of the essence of the major term and not in the relation determining it, then the definition becomes too-narrow. In the above inference, if there is the negation of fire-hood, but not through the relation of con-

junction in which fire exists on the hill, then fire-hood may be supposed to be negated through the relation of inherence. But fire-hood is inherent only in fire. Hence it is negated on the hill in the relation of inherence. Smoke, on the contrary, exists on the hill. Hence there is not the negation of location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term and as such the definition is narrowed.

The definition also is guilty of narrowness, if the negation of the major term, in the inference, the hill has fire, as it has smoke, implies only the negation of fire in the relation of conjunction and not the negation of fire-hood. For in that case a particular type of fire, say the fire of kitchen, may be supposed to be negated in the relation of conjunction and the substratum of such negation can be the hill where kitchen-fire does not exist. On the hill again smoke may exist and thus the definition fails.

The definition labours under the same difficulty, if the negation of the major term, in the above inference, does not mean only the negation of fire-hood, but the negation of fire and water both. For in that case the substratum of the negation of the major term would be the substratum of the negation of both fire and water. This substratum may be the hill, as fire and water together never exist on the hill (and as a matter of fact no where), and the hill again, may be the substratum of smoke.

The above discussions clearly show that the negation of the major term in the definition should be a negation of the essence of the major term in the relation determining it, so that if the major term bears the relation of conjunction, or inherence, or any other relation, to the minor term, the essence of the major term should be negated in the same relation. But the relation determining the major term and the relation in which it is negated, though same, may be unequal in respect of the number of related-

ness, i.e., in respect of collective extensity. This collective extensity should also be the same in both cases. In the inference, it has existence, as it is a generic attribute,²² the relation determining the major term is inherence, as existence inheres in its substratum. The essence of the major term should be negated in this relation. But if it is negated in the relation of inherence-pertaining-to-substance, then the extensity of the relation determining the major term is unity (only inherence) and the collective extensity of the relation in which the essence of the major term is negated is duality (inherence and pertaining-to-substance). But this inequality invalidates the definition. For the substratum of the negation of the major term existence, in the relation of inherence-pertaining-to-substance, is quality and action, as existence abides in that relation only in substance and nowhere else. The middle term generic attribute again inheres in quality and action. Hence there is not the negation of location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term and the definition turns to be futile.

Just as the collective extensity of the relatedness determining the major term and of the relation in which the major term is negated, should be the same, so the collective extensity of the essence of the major term and that of the essence-major-term negated should be the same. For there are two cases where the inequality of them leads to the fallacy of a too-narrow definition. In the first case the determinant relation of the major term is counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitā*) and in the second, knowledge-hood (*Viṣayitā*). The speciality about the relation of counterpositiveness is that an essence in which a thing is negated, is the essence in which that thing exists in the relation of counterpositiveness on the nega-

* ²² Existence abiding in substance, quality and action, is a superior generic attribute. *Vide, Bhāṣā-pariccheda, 8.*

tion. When kitchen-fire is negated, the kitchen-fire is the counterpositive of the negation (and not fire) and the relation of counterpositiveness is with regard to kitchen-fire holding between it and its negation. Similarly when the orange is known as being sweet, the orange-sweetness is the object of knowledge and this orange-sweetness stands in the relation of knowledge-hood to knowledge. So in these two cases the substratums of the relations (and these substrata are negation and knowledge respectively) can contain nothing else than the essence-kitchen-fire and the essence-orange-sweetness respectively. But in the case of any other relation, the term related can exist in its substratum as essences other than that which determines the relation at a particular context. Thus when fire is taken to exist, in conjunction, on the hill, as fire, it may also exist on the hill as a substance or known object. Hence, counterpositiveness and knowledge-hood are unique kinds of relation.

Now let us take two inferences in which the essence determining the major term is negated through the relations of counterpositiveness and knowledge-hood respectively, but in which the collective extensities of the essence determining the major term and the essence in which the major term is negated, are not equal. This has not kitchen-fire because of the non-existence of kitchen-fire. Here kitchen-fire is the major term in the relation of counterpositiveness. The essences determining the major term are kitchen-hood and fire-hood and thus the collective extensity of the essences determining the major term is duality. But if the negation of the major term is taken to mean the negation of fire-hood only in the relation of counterpositiveness, then the negation of the major term means the negation of fire-hood, as the counterpositive of the negation of fire-hood is fire-hood. The substratum of the non-

existence of fire-hood may be the negation of kitchen-fire ; for through the relation of counterpositiveness fire-hood does not exist on the negation of kitchen-fire. In other words, when we say that kitchen-fire does not exist, the counterpositive of the negation is kitchen-fire and not fire or fire-hood. Hence the negation of kitchen-fire is a substratum where fire or fire-hood as a counterpositive does not exist. Therefore the negation of kitchen-fire is the substratum of the nonexistence of fire-hood or fire through the relation of counterpositiveness. But the middle term is the negation of the kitchen-fire. Hence, the definition does not apply to this case and therefore is incomplete.

Now to take an inference in which the major term is determined by the relation of knowledge-hood. This has kitchen-fire, as there is the knowledge or perception of kitchen-fire. Here kitchen-fire is the major term as determined by the relation of knowledge-hood and the essences kitchen-hood and fire-hood and, therefore, the collective extensity of the essences determining the major term is duality as before. Now if, like the previous inference, we consider the negation of the major term only as fire-hood (leaving out kitchen-hood) through the relation of knowledge-hood, then the substratum of the non-existence of the major term may be the perception of kitchen-fire, as fire or fire-hood exists in relation of knowledge-hood, in the knowledge or perception of fire or fire-hood and not in the perception of kitchen-fire. The middle term again is the perception of the kitchen-fire. Hence the definition does not apply to this case and is narrow.

Thus the collective extensity of the relation determining the major term and that of the relation in which it is negated should be the same. Similarly the collective extensity of the essence determining the major term

tion. When kitchen-fire is negated, the kitchen-fire is the counterpositive of the negation (and not fire) and the relation of counterpositiveness is with regard to kitchen-fire holding between it and its negation. Similarly when the orange is known as being sweet, the orange-sweetness is the object of knowledge and this orange-sweetness stands in the relation of knowledge-hood to knowledge. So in these two cases the substratums of the relations (and these substrata are negation and knowledge respectively) can contain nothing else than the essence-kitchen-fire and the essence-orange-sweetness respectively. But in the case of any other relation, the term related can exist in its substratum as essences other than that which determines the relation at a particular context. Thus when fire is taken to exist, in conjunction, on the hill, as fire, it may also exist on the hill as a substance or known object. Hence, counterpositiveness and knowledge-hood are unique kinds of relation.

Now let us take two inferences in which the essence determining the major term is negated through the relations of counterpositiveness and knowledge-hood respectively, but in which the collective extensities of the essence determining the major term and the essence in which the major term is negated, are not equal. This has not kitchen-fire because of the non-existence of kitchen-fire. Here kitchen-fire is the major term in the relation of counterpositiveness. The essences determining the major term are kitchen-hood and fire-hood and thus the collective extensity of the essences determining the major term is duality. But if the negation of the major term is taken to mean the negation of fire-hood only in the relation of counterpositiveness, then the negation of the major term means the negation of fire-hood, as the counterpositive of the negation of fire-hood is fire-hood. The substratum of the non-

existence of fire-hood may be the negation of kitchen-fire ; for through the relation of counterpositiveness fire-hood does not exist on the negation of kitchen-fire. In other words, when we say that kitchen-fire does not exist, the counterpositive of the negation is kitchen-fire and not fire or fire-hood. Hence the negation of kitchen-fire is a substratum where fire or fire-hood as a counterpositive does not exist. Therefore the negation of kitchen-fire is the substratum of the nonexistence of fire-hood or fire through the relation of counterpositiveness. But the middle term is the negation of the kitchen-fire. Hence, the definition does not apply to this case and therefore is incomplete.

Now to take an inference in which the major term is determined by the relation of knowledge-hood. This has kitchen-fire, as there is the knowledge or perception of kitchen-fire. Here kitchen-fire is the major term as determined by the relation of knowledge-hood and the essences kitchen-hood and fire-hood and, therefore, the collective extensity of the essences determining the major term is duality as before. Now if, like the previous inference, we consider the negation of the major term only as fire-hood (leaving out kitchen-hood) through the relation of knowledge-hood, then the substratum of the non-existence of the major term may be the perception of kitchen-fire, as fire or fire-hood exists in relation of knowledge-hood, in the knowledge or perception of fire or fire-hood and not in the perception of kitchen-fire. The middle term again is the perception of the kitchen-fire. Hence the definition does not apply to this case and is narrow.

Thus the collective extensity of the relation determining the major term and that of the relation in which it is negated should be the same. Similarly the collective extensity of the essence determining the major term

should be equal to that of the essence in which it is negated. And the relation and essence determining the major term should be the same as those in which it is negated. But the question may be asked: What is the exact significance of the substratum of the non-existence of the major term in the definition—the negation of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is invariable concomitance? This substratum of the non-existence of the major term is to be understood in the relation of attributiveness or self-sameness with regard to negation (*abhāviya-viśeṣanātā*). If it is taken in any other relation, say knowledge-hood or partial extensity, then the definition would be guilty of narrowness. Let us take two inferences in which the substratum of the non-existence of the major term exists through the relations of knowledge-hood and partial extensity respectively. It has quality, as it has knowledge (knowledge is a quality according to *Nyāya*). In this inference quality, in the relation of inherence, is the major term, for quality inheres in the substance. The middle term again is knowledge in the same relation, knowledge being a quality. The substratum of the negation of the major term quality, in the relation of knowledge-hood is knowledge, for the non-existence of quality stands in the relation of knowledge-hood to its knowledge. The existent in this substratum (knowledge) inheres in it, as the relation determining the middle term is inherence. In knowledge again the knowledge-quality inheres. Hence existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is determined by knowledge-quality. But the middle term is knowledge itself in which knowledge-quality inheres. Thus we do not get the negation of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term and as a result the definition becomes too-narrow.

If we take the substratum of the negation of the major term, in the above inference, in the relation of partial extensity, then the same substratum is knowledge. For the relation of partial extensity means the non-existence of something in some cases of another thing (as the non-existence of smoke in some cases of fire, say the red-hot iron ball) and some cases of knowledge have not the non-existence of the major term quality. In other words, knowledge, is a quality and there is not any case of knowledge in which quality is absent. Hence if the negation of quality is to find a substratum in which it partly or wholly does not exist, such a substratum is knowledge, for in every case of knowledge quality exists, i.e., knowledge is the negation of the negation of quality. But the middle term is knowledge. Hence the definition does not apply to this inference.

The second inference for our purpose is, it has existence, as it is a generic attribute. Here the relation determining the major term is inherence, as existence inheres in its substratum. The relation determining the middle term is selfsameness, as the proposition, it is a generic attribute or universal, strictly implies that the minor term, it, is the substratum of the substratum-hood of the universal and the relation between the substratum-hood and the substratum is selfsameness. In fact, the middle term, universal, here, is only a symbol for its substratum-hood, so that the real middle term, in this case, is substratum-hood of the universal. And the reason why "the substratum-hood of the universal" is the middle term here is clear. For in the proposition, it is a universal, it and the universal mean the same thing and if "universal" is taken as the middle term, then the minor and the middle terms become identical. Hence, the word "universal" here stands for its substratum-hood.

Thus the relation determining the middle term is self-sameness and that determining the major term is inherence in the above inference. The negation of the major term existence is non-existence. The substratum of non-existence, in the relation of knowledge-hood, is knowledge, because everything including non-existence, stands in the relation of knowledge-hood to knowledge. Now existence or location pertaining to knowledge through the relation of selfsameness, is also found in the substratum-hood of the universal, as it is also known. But this is again the middle term. Hence the definition does not apply to this inference and is, therefore, incomplete.

(To be Continued)

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

EARLY HISTORY OF THE VAIṢNAVA FAITH AND MOVEMENT
IN BENGAL, FROM SANSKRIT AND BENGALI SOURCES.
By SUSHIL KUMAR DE, M.A. (Calcutta), D.Lit. (London),
University of Dacca. PP. ii, 535. General Printers
and Publishers Limited, Calcutta, 1942. Rs. 10.

Dr. S. K. De needs no introduction to the scholarly world. His work on the History of Sanskrit poetics has already established his reputation as a scholar of great merit. The present work is entirely of different type. Portions of it appeared in various Oriental Journals—foreign and Indian—during 1934-37. It is for the first time that the author has published the whole of it in a book form, much enlarged and revised in the light of his more recent studies. The book contains seven chapters, dealing with the beginnings of Bengal Vaiṣṇavaism, the advent of Caitanya, the six Gosvāmins of Vṛndāvana, the devotional sentiments (Rasa-śāstra), Theology and Philosophy, Ritualism and Devotional practices, and the literary works. In fact, the present volume covers a comprehensive study of Caitanyaism in Bengal. The author has based his treatment upon the activities and teachings of Caitanya and his disciples and followers. He has utilised all possible Sanskrit and Bengali sources in this work. Much has been written on Bengal Vaiṣṇavaism from time to time, but as far as I can recollect it is certain that such an exhaustive and authoritative treatment has been placed for the first time in the hands of scholars.

It is a fact that like the study of Nyāya Śāstra, Bengalis got inspiration in the cult of Vaiṣṇavaism from Mithilā. But there is a vast difference between the nature of the so-called Vaiṣṇavaism found in Mithilā in Medieval age and

what flourished in Bengal. There was no Vaiṣṇavaism *par excellence* in Mithilā. Maithilas have been *Pāncadevopāsakas*, so they did not ever regard the songs composēd on Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa either in Sanskrit or Maithili as devotional. Really speaking, Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa have been treated in Mithilā in these songs like ordinary Nāyaka and Nāyikā. These songs have been from the days of Vidyāpati or even earlier sung on occasions of marriages and other similar ceremonies where human love has been the centre of all activities. Besides, there was no Vaiṣṇava movement of any kind which would have been responsible for the Vaiṣṇava spirit in Bengal. Hence, it seems that there was something intrinsic in the very nature of Bengalis which though inspired by the Maithili songs having the names of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, yet took altogether a different shape and resulted in the form of Bengal Vaiṣṇavaism.

The book is indeed one of the best products of the period and both the author and the publisher deserve our best congratulations.

THE ĀRYĀ-ŚATAKA OF APPAYYA DĪKṢITA. Edited by Prof. N.A. GORE, M.A., with a Sanskrit commentary of Dr. V. Raghavan, M.A., Ph. D., Poona, 1944. Rs.1-4.

The work under review is a collection of 100 verses written in Āryā metre on Śiva.

Prof. Gore deserves our thanks for publishing this interesting collection of verses in a book form with a good introduction of his own. We should be much more thankful to Dr. V. Raghavan for having written an interesting and lucid commentary on them.

The work is attributed to the well-known literary figure—Appayya Dikṣita. But except that the above

name occurs in the colophon of the work there is no other proof. It is a good addition to the literature.

THE BROTHERHOOD OF RELIGIONS. By Sophia Wadia, PP. xx, 288. International Book House Ltd., Ash Lane, Bombay, 1944. (Second Edition). Rs.3.

The book under review first appeared in 1939. It consists of 18 lectures chosen from among many delivered at different places and under different auspices during 1932-37 by Madame Sophia Wadia, the editor of the Indian P. E. N. She has tried here "to bring out the line of ideation which reveals religious expression and religious living as worth while and useful in any sphere of existence." She holds that "the spirit of service and the unity of knowledge are the two chief genuine expressions of Religion." The lectures are very interesting and useful for understanding in popular way the common features of the various faiths of the country.

THE TECHNIQUE OF CASTING COINS IN ANCIENT INDIA. Memoirs of the Numismatic Society of India, No.1. By Dr. Birbal Sahni, M.A., Sc.D. (Cantab), D.Sc. (London), F.G.S., F.R.S., Professor of Botany, University of Lucknow. Pages 68. The Numismatic Society of India, Bombay, 1945.

The volume under review describes some of the modes of casting coins in ancient India. The material here described comes from eleven localities, most of them in the Indo-Gangetic basin. According to Dr. V.S. Agrawala it may provisionally be arranged in the following chronological order: (1) Bronze die from Eran (Ca. 3rd Cen. B.C.), (2) Rohtak moulds (Ca. 100 B.C.), (3) Taxila moulds (Ca. 15 B.C.), (4) Mathura Moulds (probably n_0t

older than 2nd or 1st Cen. A.C.), (5) Atranji Khera mould (Kusāṇa period : 2nd Cen. B.C.), (6) Sanchi moulds of the Western Kṣatrapa dynasty (within the limits Ca. 150 and 388 A.C.), (4) Kondapur mould for punch marked Andhra and Kṣatrapa coins, (8) sunet moulds (Ca. 3rd Cen. A.C.—Post-Kusāṇa and pre-Gupta), (9) Kāshi mould of the reign of Candragupta II (375-417 A.C.), (10) Nalanda moulds (Gupta period : Narasinhagupta Ca. 500-550 A.C.; Jayagupta Ca. 625-675 A.C.), and (11) Kadkal moulds (11th-14th Cen. A.C.)

While the coins of ancient India have long been a subject of study, the coining techniques have received very little attention of the scholars. It is a matter of great pleasure that a scientist like Dr. Birabal Sahni has taken up the subject and has done a good deal of investigation in the matter. His researches are of immense value and we are all grateful to him for the unique service that he is doing in the cause of ancient Indian culture.

JAGADVIJAYACCHANDAS OF KAVINDRACHARYA : Edited By Dr. C. Kunhan Raja of the University of Madras, Pages LVII, 163. The Ganga Oriental Series, No. 2, Anup Sanskrit Library, Bikaner, 1945.

The authorities of the Anup Sanskrit Library, Bikaner with the help of Dr. C. Kunhan Raja have been doing active service to the cause of Sanskrit learning. They have published several rare Sanskrit works. The work under review was written by Kavindrācārya Sarasvatī of Benares who was patronised by the Moghul Emperors—Jehangir and Shah Jehan and also by several Indian States. It seems that the title of the present book refers to some ruler of the earth and Dr. Raja associates it with the name of Shah Jehan.

The book appears to have been written in praise of some king in daṇḍakā metre, like the *Virudāvalī* of Raṅhudeva Sarasvatī. There is no poetic beauty anywhere though it is full of anuprāsas. The Introduction of Dr. Raja is quite informative.

MUDRĀRĀKṢHĀSAPURVASAMKATHNAKA OF ANANTASARMAN.

Edited by Dr. Daśharatha Sharma, M.A., D.Litt. of Bikaner. Pages XX, 55. The Ganga Oriental Series—No. 3., Anup Sanskrit Library, Bikaner. 1945.

The *Mudrārākṣasa*, the well-known dramatic work of Viśākhadatta, needs no introduction. It is unique in its field. The work under review is a kind of historical introduction to the drama in high class Sanskrit prose. It helps in several ways the proper understanding of the course of the play and here lies its importance. Dr. Daśharatha Sharma deserves our congratulations for bringing out such a fine edition of this important work.

BHAGAVADGĪTĀ BHĀRATĪYA DARŚANĀNĪ CA. By Mm. Anantakrishna Shastri of Calcutta University. Pages 94. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavana, Bombay, 1944. Rs. 2-12.

The work under review is a summary of the ten lectures delivered by Mm. Anantakrishna Shastri under the auspices of the Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavana, Bombay, on the *Gītā* and the various schools of Indian Philosophy. Mm. Shastri is a great scholar of Indian Philosophy, particularly of Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā. He is well read in other systems of thought and has written a good deal on these systems. The lectures are popular and authoritative. The author has tried to compare the views of the *Gītā* with those of the systems of philosophy. Students of philosophy in general will be benefited by it.

THE JNĀNADĪPIKĀ, MAHĀBHĀRATA-TĀTPARYA-TĪKĀ OF DEVABODHĀCĀRYA ON THE UDYOGA-PARVAN OF THE MAHĀBHĀRATA. Critically edited by Dr. Sushil Kumar De of the University of Dacca, PP. XVI, 74. Bhāratiya Vidyā Bhavana, Bombay. 1944. Rs.3.

The Bhāratiya Vidyā Bhavana, Bombay, under the patronage of Shri K. M. Munshi with its publications under the General editorship of Acharya Jina Vijaya Muni and Dr. A. D. Pusalker is doing wonderful work. It has published several rare and important works in Sanskrit and Prakrit. The volume under review is one of those rare works. It is said to be the earliest commentary on the Udyoga-Parvan of the *Mahābhārata*. Though very brief, it is regarded as a commentary of great importance both for the proper understanding and the correct version of the text. Dr. De has taken great pains to make the volume quite successful with a critical introduction. We understand the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute is also publishing parts of this commentary. The publishers deserve our congratulations for this fine edition.

SANGĪTARATNĀKARA OF ŚĀRNGADEVA (Vol. I Chapt. 1). Translated into English by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja. Pages xiv, 175. The Adyar Library Series No. 51. The Adyar Library, Madras. 1945. Rs. 4.

Saṅgītaratnākara is one of the most important treatises on Sangita. There is hardly any work on Indian music known so far in Sanskrit which is as exhaustive as this. Several works were written later based on this work. The Adyar Library published this text along with the two well-known commentaries of Kallinātha and Simhabhūpāla. It was announced then that an English translation of this would also be prepared and issued as the last volume of the series. It is most gratifying to see that

the promise has been fulfilled. The value of the translation has been much more enhanced by the addition of important notes and explanations given in the footnotes from the commentaries. No English translation of any important music work is available with explanations. The entire credit goes to Dr. C. Kunhan Raja who has taken great pains to make the translation a success. He has tried to keep himself quite close to the original and at the same time make the English renderings as readable and intelligible as possible. He deserves all our encouragement and congratulations for doing this great service.

DOCTRINE OF KARMA, A STUDY IN ITS PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE. By Swami Abhedananda, Pages XIV, 142. Ramakrishna Vedanta Math, 19B, Raja Rajkrishna Street, Calcutta (second edition) 1944.

The Law of Karman is the most vital problem of Indian Philosophy. Upon it depend several other difficult problems which Indian philosophy has to discuss. The entire mystery of both the individual and the universal creations is hidden from the human knowledge behind the veil of the law of Karman. Śrī Swāmī Abhedānandaji has tried to discuss this in this small book of his in a popular way. It is a summary of the lecture which the Swāmiji delivered in America. In seven chapters and two Appendices, the author has discussed the law of Causation, Law of Action and Reaction, Law of Compensation, Law of Retribution, Philosophy of Work, Secret of Work, Duty or Motive in Work, Delusion, Heart and Mind. The author has not followed any particular school of thought in his treatment of these topics. He has tried to be much more practical in discussing these questions. For a general reader the book is quite useful.

B. C. LAW VOLUME, Part I. Edited by Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar, Prof. K. A. Nilakantha Sastri, Dr. B. M. Barua, Dr. B. K. Ghosh, and Prof. P. K. Gode. Pages xxviii, 705. Published by the Indian Research Institute, Calcutta, 1945.

The volume under review contains articles contributed by the friends and admirers of Dr. B. C. Law, D.Litt., Ph.D., F.R.A.S. etc. of Calcutta to be presented to him on the completion of his 55th year on the 25th October 1946. The services of Dr. Law to Ancient Indian History and Culture in general and Buddhistic Studies in particular are too well-known.

Besides being a scholar of great merit Dr. B. C. Law is a great philanthropist. There is hardly an Academic Institution of higher grade which has not received generous donation from him. Both for his scholarship and generosity Dr. Law has been a source of inspiration to the younger generation of scholars. It is therefore in the fitness of things that a volume containing articles of eminent scholars on Indology should be presented to him as a mark of appreciation of his scholarship.

The volume consists of about 66 articles on Indology by eminent scholars both of the country and abroad. Every article speaks of the deep scholarship of its author and it is easily one of the best commemoration volumes presented in recent years. Both the editors and Dr. Law deserve our best congratulations on this occasion.

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FEBRUARY, 1946

[Part 2

THE
JOURNAL
OF THE
GANGANATHA JHA
RESEARCH INSTITUTE



ALLAHABAD

Board of Editors :

Prof. R. D. Ranade

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Published by
Mm. Dr. Umesha Mishra,
Ganganatha Jha Research Institute,
Allahabad.

Printed by K. Mittra, at
The Indian Press, Ltd.
Allahabad.

JOURNAL

OF THE

GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FEBRUARY, 1946.

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NĀDA, BINDU AND KALĀ

BY GOPINATH KAVIRAJ

A student of ancient Indian mysticism of the Tāntric and Yogic type very often comes across the terms ' Nāda,' ' Bindu ' and ' Kalā.' These are found both in popular works written in the vernacular and in original Sanskrit texts. As the sense of the terms is not usually quite clear and free from ambiguity an attempt is here made to find out the different meanings attached to them in the different schools of thought, in the belief that in the attempt it may be possible to discover a clue to the central idea underlying the expressions.

The *Śārada-tilaka*, while describing the origin of the manifested world, contains the following passage :

सच्चिदानन्दविभवात् सकलात् परमेश्वरात् ।
आसीच्छक्तिस्ततो नादो नादाद् बिन्दुसमुद्भवः ॥
परशक्तिमयः साक्षात् त्रिधाऽसौ भिद्यते पुनः ।
बिन्दुर्नादो बीजमिति तस्य भेदाः समीरिताः ॥ ¹

This shows the order of manifestation as follows :

- (i) Parameśvara, described as ' Sakala ' and ' Saccidānanda Vibhava.'
- (ii) Śakti.
- (iii) Nāda (Para).

• ¹ I. 7-8.

- (iv) Bindu (Para).
 |
 (v) —————
 Bindu Bija
 (Apara)
 (vi) Nāda (Apara).

In the above passage the word 'Parameśvaraḥ' means evidently the Supreme Divine in which infinite Power—Śakti or Kalā²—lies in eternal Union. The Divine Being is described as of the nature of an eternal Self-existence (सत्), Self Consciousness and Delight. During creation what first happens is the manifestation of Power-Śakti which so long lay hidden in the depths of the Being. There is no doubt that this Power is characterised by Will (इच्छा), which is its first evolute.

In the *Śiva Purāṇa*, *Vāyaviya Saṃhitā*, it is said that the emergence of Śakti in the beginning of creation is like the appearance of oil out of oil-seeds. It is a spontaneous act, initiated by the Divine Will. In other words, it is through the Divine Will (शिवेच्छया) that the Supreme Power (परा शक्ति) which is synonymous with it and remains concealed in the Divine Essence (शिवतत्त्वैकतां गता) reveals itself (परिस्फुरति).³

The appearance of Śakti after the great Cosmic Night is like the revival of memory in a reawakened person, after the unconsciousness of sleep. The desire for a vision again of the lost world is associated with a sense of Void, which is Māyā. Māyā stands at the be-

² In this context the word Kalā stands for the Supercosmic Transcendent Power of the Lord and is to be clearly distinguished from the five Kalās, viz. Nivṛtti, Pratiṣṭhā, Vidyā, Śānti and Śāntyatīta, which are evolved as forces from Bindu conceived as Cosmic Matter and Force and related to the Cosmic Tattvas and Bhuvanas.

³ शिवेच्छया परा शक्तिः शिवतत्त्वैकतां गता । ततः परिस्फुरत्वादौ सर्वे तैलं तिलादिव ॥

ginning of subsequent creation and the Divine principle which produces it, is its Lord and Controller. The vision of Void is accompanied by an indistinct sound called Para Nāda, which fills the entire space. Nāda is of the nature of light. That sound and light co-exist and are related as phases of the same phenomenon are recognised in the Tantras. The first Self-expression of the Supreme Will (इच्छा) is the origination of Void (शून्य) and of the sound and light filling this Void. All this comes under the category of Will. The next step is represented by the concentration of this diffuse light-sound into a focus (under the secret influence of Will), called Bindu. It is in this stage that the Power of Action (क्रियाशक्ति) distinctly unfolds itself. The creative principles (तत्त्व) are evolved out of this Supreme Bindu. The Bindu subsequently breaks itself into three, the three parts being known as Bindu, Bija and Nāda. Bindu is the part in which the Śiva aspect is predominant, while in Bija Śakti prevails. In Nāda, however, the elements of Śiva and Śakti are of equal strength.

What disturbs the equilibrium of the Bindu? The *Śārada-tilaka* says nothing in reply to this question. The *Prapañcasāra* says:—

कालेन भिद्यमानस्तु स बिन्दुर्भवति त्रिधा ।
 स्थूलसूक्ष्मपरत्वेन तस्य त्रैविध्यमिष्यते ॥
 स बिन्दुनादबीजभेदेन च निगद्यते ॥⁴

From this it is evident that according to Śaṅkarācārya it is Kālā which breaks the equilibrium of the Bindu. And in this view Kālā is an eternal aspect of the Eternal Puruṣa, through which His intimate knowledge of the Supreme Prakṛti is said to be derived. Prakṛti knows Herself and is Self-luminous. The actuating power of

Kāla is suggested elsewhere also by the expression कालप्रेरितया.⁵ The *Prayogakramadīpikā*⁶ explains the term thus :

प्रकृतेरेव प्रलयावस्थायो यत् परिपक्वदशानन्तरं सृष्ट्युन्मुखैः कर्मभिर्मिन्नं स्वाकारनिरूप्यं रूपं त्रीजसौ बिन्दुः ।

The Great Sound which comes into being when the Bindu splits itself is known as Śabda-Brahman, as the *Śāradā-tilaka* and *Prapañcasāra* observe :

मिथ्यमानात् पराद् बिन्दोरव्यक्तात्मा रवोऽभवत् ।

शब्दब्रह्मेति तं प्राहुः सर्वागमविशारदाः ॥ ⁷

बिन्दोस्तस्माद् मिथ्यमानाद् रवोऽव्यक्तात्मको भवेत् ।

स खः भृतिसंपन्नैः शब्दब्रह्मेति कथ्यते ॥ ⁸

It is well known that what is figured as the pericarp of the thousand-petalled lotus within the crown of the head is the so-called Brahmarandhra which is often referred to as a Void. It extends through the *Suṣumnā-nāḍī* down to the very bottom of the interior of the spinal column. If the mind rests in the Void it loses its restless nature and becomes a blank—a state usually known as *Unmanī* or *Nirbija Samādhi*. It is here that one attains to the realisation of oneself as *Para Śiva* above the *guṇas*. The Will Power and Supreme *Nāda* emerge from this source. Evidently, this *Mahā-śūnya* is identical with the *Vyāpinī*.⁹

The terms sixteenth (षोडशी) and seventeenth (सप्तदशी) *Kalā* of the Moon are used differently in different texts. When the Supreme *Nāda* (iii) is called the sixteenth or

⁵ *Pr. Sā* 1.46.

⁶ p. 412.

⁷ *Sā. Tila.* I. 11-12.

⁸ *Prapa. Sā.* I. 44.

⁹ This is according to the *Svacchanda Tantra*. But some writers equate *Mahāśūnya* with the Initial (आद्य) *Nāda*. See *Pūrṇānanda's Śrī Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

Amā-Kalā, the name 'seventeenth Kalā' or 'Samanā,' is reserved for the Supreme Power (ii). But at other times the term Unmanī is attributed to the seventeenth Kalā, when the words Śakti and Śūnya are used synonymously.

The Supreme Nāda stands for the supercausal or Mahā-Kāraṇa state of Brahma, which is known as Visarga Maṇḍala. If the Supreme Śakti is called Kula and the Supreme Śiva-Akula, the sphere of Visarga may be described as below them both. But usually it is placed in the upper layer of Brahmarandhra below which in regular order are the spheres of the Sun, the Moon and the great Vāyu—all within the limits of the thousand—petalled lotus.

The causal state of Brahma is represented by Śabda-Brahma or Kulakuṇḍalinī, figured as a triangle consisting of three principles (तत्त्व), viz., Bindu, Bija and Nāda, issuing from the Para-Bindu under division. The triangular Kuṇḍalinī would thus appear to be a manifestation of the Primary Power represented by Para-Nāda and Para-Bindu.

The subtle principles of cosmic structure issue out of the Kuṇḍalinī and begin to locate themselves in distinct centres in the forehead and lower down in the sympathetic system. It has already been observed that the Bindu (lower) is Śiva and Bija is Śakti and Nāda (lower) is the product of their Union. Bija or Śakti is virtually the entire alphabet, the letters of which are arranged in a triangular fashion designated in the Tantras as 'अ-क-य' triangle—an equilateral triangle the three sides or lines of which are formed of 16 letters each, beginning with अ, क and य respectively. Thus, 48 letters constitute the three equal sides of this triangle. This triangle is intimately associated with the principles of Kāmakalā—a subject which is outside the scope of the present paper. The constituent bindus of Kamakalā are thus three—two causal (कारण) and one of the nature of effect (कार्य).

The Nāda which springs from the inter-action of Bindu (lower) and Bija is to be distinguished from Śabda-Brahman which manifested itself during the division of Para-Bindu. The latter may be described as Mahānāda. The Nāda contains within itself the indistinct sounds of all the letters of the alphabet, much in the same manner as the sunlight may be said to consist of all the coloured rays known to us. The truth of the matter is that Mahānāda or Śabda-Brahman, in its manifestation as Kuṇḍalinī, is located in the body of a man and serves as the mechanism for the articulation of sounds.

The continued practice of a mantra causes it to be sounded in a subtle manner in the Suṣumnā. The sound expands itself and is blended with the lower Nāda—it does not and cannot rise upto the Mahānāda higher up. The locus of Mahānāda is free from the action of ordinary Vāyu which cannot rise up to it. It may be of some interest to note that Mahānāda is associated with the Para-Nāda in the Brahmarandhra above it on one hand and with the lower Nāda on the other. The power involved in the lower Nāda crosses the middle of the two eye brows (ब्रूमध्य) and flows down the Suṣumnā channel. At the lowest point Nāda is converted into the Kuṇḍalinī. The forces of the Bija as concretised in the latter are all within the lower Nāda.

The position of Para-Bindu has a special value for contemplation, in as much as it represents the nexus of the Divine Plane on one hand and the Cosmic and Super-cosmic spheres on the other. It is the place where Nāda extends into Mahā-Nāda or Śabda-Brahman, beyond which is the Divine Nāda within the Infinite. Para-Nāda above is Supra-mental (उन्मनी) Divine Consciousness and Light while Mahānāda below is the source of Universal Creation. Para-Bindu stands between the two. It is for this reason considered to be the best centre for contemplation of Guru.

It may be stated that the Bija consists of Varṇas and that these are driven down to take their respective places in the six centres below, as soon as the downward moving power of Mahānāda passes through the middle of the two eye-brows and extends into the spinal column. These Varṇas, the modifications of Mahānāda, being the blends of Nāda and Bija are so many actions generated from Para-Bindu which is pre-eminently characterised by active Power. Mahānāda cannot give rise to the different creative principles unless it passes through the stage of Bindu.

We need not proceed further to describe the progressive stages of creation. From what has been said above the meanings of the terms Nāda, Bindu and Kalā must have been made sufficiently clear. We thus find that in the above analysis, which follows mainly the traditions set up by Lakṣmaṇa Deśika and Śaṅkarācārya, there are three Nādas—Para-Nāda, the antecedent of Para-Bindu ; the Mahānāda called therein Śabda-Brahman, which follows the disruption of Para-Bindu ; and the Nāda which results from the union of Bindu and Bija. Similarly, there are two Bindus—Para-Bindu which is produced from the focussing of Para-Nāda and which is the source of Śabda-Brahman, the immediate spring of creative forces ; and Apra-Bindu which is the effect of Para-Bindu with the Śiva element prevailing. As regards the Kalā, it would appear that the Supreme Śakti which is the eternal associate of the Divine principle and remains always in it, either as completely absorbed in it and incapable of differentiation or as partially emergent is the Highest Kalā. In a lower sense, however, the name Kalā is used to signify the Bija mentioned above. That is to say, the Varṇas, symbolised as the letters of the alphabet and conceived as the basic principles of lower Nāda in the sound potentials, are Kalās in this sense. From this point of view the triangle called 'अ-क-य', otherwise described as Kuṇḍalinī, is the Kalā.

(2)

The view-point of the Śaiva-Āgama of the dualistic schools may now be taken up for discussion. Here the Divine Essence of Śiva is conceived as inalienably associated with a Power or Śakti which is purely Divine and identical with it. The Essence and Power, both of the nature of Cit or Pure Consciousness, constitute the two aspects of one and the same Divine Principle. Śiva is a transcendent unity. Śakti too is really one, though it appears as ज्ञान or क्रिया according to the character of the data on which it functions. It is the Will (इच्छा) of Śiva and is essentially one with Him. Bindu is the eternal material principle outside Śakti, but subject to Its action. It is co-eternal with Śiva and Śakti, and the three principles are usually described as the three jewels (रत्न) of Śaivism and its holy Trinity. In creation (in pure creation directly and in impure creation indirectly) Śiva's place is that of an agent, Śakti's that of an instrument and Bindu serves as the material stuff. Śakti being immaterial never suffers any modification during action, but the Bindu does. The modification of the Bindu which follows from a disturbance of its equilibrium (क्षोभ) under the stress of Divine Śakti at the end of Cosmic Night (प्रलय) gives rise to five Kalās which appear as it were like five concentric circles with greater and greater expansion. These Kalās which precede further progressive modifications called Tattvas and Bhuvanas bear the names of Nivṛtti (outermost), Pratiṣṭhā, Vidyā, Śānti and Śāntyatīta (inmost). This represents one line of the evolution of Bindu, as that of the objective order (अर्थ). The other line is represented by the evolution of Sound or Śabda. In this aspect we find Nāda, Bindu and Varṇa as the three-fold expression of Bindu arranged in an order of increasing externality.

Bindu is synonymous in this system with Mahāmāyā and Kuṇḍalinī. It is pure Matter-Energy and is to be distinguished from Māyā and Prakṛti,¹⁰ which are impure.

It is the matrix of pure creation and is the source of two parallel lines of evolution, viz., of Śabda and Artha, so that it is to be looked upon as of a dual nature. The *Pañskara-Āgama* says :—

शब्दवस्तुभयात्मासौ बिन्दुर्नान्यतरात्मकः ।

The order of Śabda Creation out of the disturbed Mahāmāyā is thus given :

- (i) Mahāmāyā.
- |
- (ii) Nāda.
- |
- (iii) Bindu.
- |
- (iv) Sādākhya.
- |
- (v) Īśa.
- |
- (vi) Vidyā.

In this scheme Mahāmāyā stands for Para-Bindu in its undisturbed condition and Nāda represents the same Bindu when the Cit Śakti has acted upon it. As the action of Śakti upon Bindu is in a sense constant it may be assumed that (i) and (ii) are really two aspects (logically successive but in actual fact simultaneous) of the same principle, Nāda representing the disturbed part of Mahāmāyā. If Mahāmāyā

¹⁰ In the Śaiva-Āgamas of all the schools which recognise the 36 tattvas Māyā and Prakṛti are distinguished. They are not identified as in the *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (IV. 10.) : माया तु प्रकृति विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् । In the Āgamas generally Māyā is eternal, but Prakṛti is not so. For Prakṛti is evolved from Kalā which itself is an evolute from Māyā. But in some places in the Tantras they are differently conceived. Prakṛti stands for the material principle in a general way and Māyā is one of the Vikalpas under this category. Thus, we read : माया तत्त्वकृतिनद्वयतत्वादि कर्मविषयभेदेनेति । प्रकृतितत्त्वस्वयैवान्तर्गता विकल्पोऽयमुक्तः । तत्राचित्शक्ति-मात्रं तावत् प्रकृतिः । तस्याः स्वान्तर्गतस्वैशितृकालंप्रयोज्यस्वकल्पिततदीयमिति मूर्तिरिदमवगमोऽस्मिन्-चेतनां सोढुं नानास्वादिप्रत्ययकरमवान्तरशक्तिमात्रं बोधा । + + + मायायां अप्यन्तर्गतं तेषां परिच्छिन्नरूपतादिप्रत्ययकरमविद्यालक्ष्यमवान्तरशक्तिमात्रमिदं शक्तिः । + + + तस्याः शक्तेर-प्यन्तर्गतं यत् तद्व्यतिरिक्तानां प्राक्तनमवोपार्जितं कर्मजातं तदिह कर्म । न च केवलमय कर्मयोऽ-वस्थानमिति तत्समवायी सक्तिलोऽन्विदोऽन्वयेयते यत् शैवप्रक्रियायां प्रकृतितत्त्वं व्यपदिरयते ।

is Kuṇḍalinī in its essence, Nāda is the same Kuṇḍalinī in its awakend and active state. Mahāmāyā as such has no relation with Puruṣa or the human soul, but as Nāda or Kuṇḍalinī it resides in every Puruṣa, normal and super-normal.¹¹ The truth is that the evolution of Mahāmāyā into four-fold Vāk, e.g., Parā or Sūkṣmā, Paśyanti, Madhyamā and Vaikhari and the obscuration of the inherent Divinity (शिवत्व) of every human soul under the veil of mala or original impurity working from the beginningless past (अनादि) are co-eternal phenomena. Transcendence of Parā Vāk and removal of this veil of obscurity signify therefore a single act, which is only another name of the culmination of the process of divinisation of the human soul interpreted from the dualistic standpoint of the school as the restoration of its lost purity. We are thus in a position to understand why sometimes Mahāmāyā and at other times Nāda is identified with Śiva Tattva. Understood in this light Bindu (iii) would mean Apra Bindu and be a name for Śakti Tattva. The next evolution, Sādākhyā (iv), which is held to comprise Sadāśiva Tattva (including the human Sadāśivas, (अणु सदाशिवः), five Brahmas, ten aṅus (Praṇava, etc.) and six Aṅgas, stands for Akṣara Bindu¹² and denotes Nāda in its form of gross but undifferentiated Sound (ध्वनि). The stage called Īśa (v) represents an intermediate state between the aforesaid Akṣara Bindu and Vaikhari Vāk expressed as letters of the alphabet in all their

¹¹ The gloss on the *Sarvajñānottara Tantra* cited by Umāpati in his commentary on a Kārikā of the *Svatantra Tantra* (being the 24th Kārikā of his compendium) says:—

कुण्डलिनीशब्दाच्या तु भुजङ्गकुटिलाकारेण नादात्मना स्वकार्येण प्रतिपुरुषं भेदेनावस्थितो, न तु स्वरूपेण प्रतिपुरुषमवस्थिता । The original couplet runs thus :

याऽयं कुण्डलिनी शक्तिर्मायाकर्मानुसारिणी ।

नादबिन्दादिकं कार्यं तस्या इति जगदस्थितिः ॥

¹² Aghora Śivāchārya identifies Akṣara Bindu with Paśyanti Vāk in his commentary on the *Ratnatraya* (verse 74).

permutations and combinations.¹³ The eight Mantreśvaras and their Śaktis (eight in number, e.g., Vāmā, etc.) fall under this class. The last (vi) named Vidyā, which includes the final stage of sound evolution, embraces all the Mantras and Vidyās, all the Āgamas and the so-called Vidyārājñīs (Queens of Vidyās, seven in number)—in fact, all audible sensible sounds familiar to us.

It is interesting to observe that Mahāmāyā as described above is called Parā Śakti and considered as the Ultimate Cause (परमकारण) of the world. It is also of the nature of Nāda and is distinguished from the Nāda lower down (ii) as Sūkṣma Nāda.¹⁴

The Siddhāntins who maintain the doctrine of Nāda repudiate the theory of Sphoṭa and other allied theories of verbal knowledge and seek to explain the process of the origin of Śābdabodha on the basis of this doctrine. Rāmakaṇṭha in his *kārikās* has tried to show that the doctrine of Sphoṭa is unable to render an adequate account of the meaning of a word. The relation between a word (शब्द) and its meaning (अर्थ) is what is usually known as (वाच्यवाचकभाव)—a relation of what denotes or reveals (वाचक) with what is denoted or revealed (वाच्य) by it. But wherein lies the denotative character (वाचकता) of the word concerned? The object denoted by the word is external, but the word which denotes it is mental (बुद्ध्यारूढ)—the two are

¹³ The Īśa stage may be said to correspond to the Madhyamā Vāk, which is characterised by thought (अन्तः संनिरूप) and possesses an ideal order in its parts.

¹⁴ Sometimes the term Sūkṣma-Nāda is applied to Bindu, the cause of Akṣara-Bindu. The commentary on Bhoja's *Tattvapraśaṅga* holds that Sūkṣma-Nāda, belongs to Śakti-Tattva. This view is endorsed by Sarvajña Śambhu in his *Siddhānta-dīpikā*. Aghora Śivāchārya in his commentary called *Ullekhinī* on Rāma Kaṇṭha's *Ratnatraya* identifies Sūkṣma-Nāda with the first manifestation (called simply Nāda) of Bindu which is synonymous with Para-Nāda (see *Ratnatraya*, Kārikā 22).

distinct and incommensurate. No word is capable of denoting its sense by virtue of its own nature, but its denotative power makes itself felt only when it represents in thought (परामर्श) the object (वाच्य) to be denoted which is external to it. This representation called परामर्शज्ञान is of the nature of what may be called thought form and reveals the object. Hence, some thinkers are inclined to attribute denotative power to this परामर्शज्ञान, in so far as it reveals the object concerned. But the Tāntric philosophers are of opinion that though परामर्शज्ञान as an intellectual act exists independently of the external object, it is a contingent phenomenon and arises under the action of some Causal factors working behind. Such an act does not occur in the case of external objects not previously cognised by the senses. Rūpa, rasa, etc. become objects of mental परामर्श of the speaker. That through which the origin of such परामर्श becomes possible is called Nāda. Nāda giving rising to परामर्शज्ञान (अन्तःसंज्ञत्वं), and not physical Śabda, possesses the denotative character (वाचकता). The sense intended to be conveyed is that the Nāda of the speaker creates in the man hearing a sense of the thing intended to be denoted (वाच्यता). The physical Śabda to which the vocal organ of the speaker gives expression manifests Nāda. Nāda as thus manifested produces in the hearer the sense of the object meant. Nāda reveals all Śabdās and Arthas. Hence every act of discursive knowledge is impregnated with Śabda.

Nāda is multiple, being unique in each individual, and is a product. Every animal soul (पशु आत्मा), having a nature of its own, experiences its own Nāda which arises from Anāhata-Bindu.

THE DATE OF THE DADHIMATĪ-MĀTĀ INSCRIPTION

BY V. V. MIRASHI

THIS inscription was originally found by Munshi Devi Prasad in an old temple dedicated to Dadhimatī-Mātā and situated in a desert about 24 miles north-east of Nagor in the Jodhpur State. Nagor is about 80 miles north-east of Jodhpur. The inscription was noticed by Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar, first in the *Progress Report of the Archaeological Survey, Western Circle* for 1906-07, p. 31 and later in the *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. XXIII, p. 74. Dr. Bhandarkar gave a short account of the record and read its date as 289 which he referred, on the evidence of the form of its letters, to the Gupta era. Thereafter the inscription was edited with a facsimile by Pandit Ram Karna, in the *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. IX, pp. 299 f. The Pandit also, following Dr. Bhandarkar, read the date as 289 and referring it to the Gupta era took it as equivalent to A.D. 608.

The date of this record has considerable importance, for the inscription quotes a well-known verse¹ which occurs in the *Devī-māhātmya* (popularly known as the *Saptasastī*). This *Māhātmya* is commonly regarded as an interpolation in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*. The age of the *Purāṇa* literature is still uncertain. It has been generally admitted that there have been several additions made from time to time to the different *Purāṇas*, but in the absence of reliable internal and external evidence, none of the existing *Purāṇas* can be definitely dated. As the present inscription cites a verse from one of the *Purāṇas* and contains a definite date, its evidence

¹ The verse is सर्वमङ्गलमङ्गल्ये शिवे सर्वार्थसाधिके । शारङ्ग्ये श्यामके गौरि नारायणि नमोऽस्तु ते ॥ *Adhyāya* XI. Verse.

is often cited for fixing the lower limit for the date of the Purāṇa literature in general and of the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* in particular.² The date of the present record does not however, admit of verification in the absence of such details as a week-day, nakṣatra etc., or reference to such occurrences as a lunar or a solar eclipse. As there are certain circumstances which make the reading of the date and its interpretation doubtful, my friend Dr. V. S. Agarwāla, Curator of the Provincial Museum, Lucknow, suggested to me that it should be carefully examined in view of its importance from several points of view. This I propose to do in the present article.

The inscription mentions in the beginning the name of the illustrious Dhruvāṇa without any royal title prefixed to it.³ It then records the donations in *drammas* of certain Brāhmaṇas evidently for the construction or repairs of the temple of the goddess Dadhimatī. The date occurs in the last line (13) of the record and is expressed in numerical symbols. Pandit Ram Karna read it as follows:—Samvachcharṣe (śa) teṣu 200 80 9 Śrāvaṇa ba 10 3, *i.e.*, in the year 289, on the 13th *tithi* of the dark fortnight of Śrāvaṇa. As stated before, both Dr. Bhandarkar and Pandit Ram Karna have ascribed this date to the Gupta era. I shall discuss the reading of the date later on, but supposing that it is correct and the date is referred to the Gupta reckoning, it becomes equivalent to A.D. 608. This interpretation is open to several objections:—

(1) Firstly, it is very doubtful if the Gupta era had extended to the deserts of Rājputāna. We have now have

² See e.g. Winternitz's *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I, p. 565, n.2.

³ Dhruvāṇa was apparently the local Governor. As shown below, the reigning king must have been a member of the Pratihāra dynasty of Māṇḍavyapura. See the Jodhpur inscription of Pratihāra Bāuka, *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 87 f.

several records of the Gupta era, but except for this doubtful case, no date of that era comes from Jodhpur, Jaislmir, Bikaner or any other States of Rājputāna. Nay, even in Jaipur, Ajmer and Udaipur⁴ which lie to the east of Jodhpur, no inscriptions of the Guptas have been found. The imperial rule of the Guptas no doubt extended to Daśapura (modern Mandasor) which lies further to the east, but even there, the Gupta era, if ever it was introduced in that part of the country, was soon supplanted by the Mālava or Kṛta era. We have several dates of that era, ranging from the year—461 to the year 589 (A.D. 405 to A.D. 533), which come from Mandasor⁵ and clearly show that the Mālava era was well established there in the fifth century A.D. It is, therefore, very unlikely that the Gupta era was current as far west as the State of Jodhpur in the beginning of the seventh century A.D.

Secondly, the characters of the Dadhimatī-Mātā inscription show that the record is much later than the beginning of the seventh century A.D. to which it has to be relegated if the date is referred to the Gupta era. Pandit Ram Karna thought that the record was dated in that era, because according to him 'the letters *r*, *s*, *n*, *ṇ*, *jh*, *h*, *d*, and *b* are identical with those of the Mandasor inscription of Yaśodharman-Viṣṇuvardhana of M. V. 589 (A.D. 543-44).⁶ But even a cursory glance at the facsimilies of the epigraphs will show that there is not only no similarity between their characters, but that the letters of the Dadhimatī-Mātā inscription show a marked development as compared with

⁴ The date G. 407 of the inscription from Dhoḍ (Udaipur State) is suspicious as it has been differently read by Dr. Bhandarkar at different times. See *P.R.A.S.W.C.* 1905-06. p. 61, *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XII, p. 12, n. 1 See his *List of Inscriptions*, No. 1371.

⁵ See Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar's *List of Inscriptions of Northern India*, Nos. 3, 6-9 etc.

⁶ *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XI, p. 299.

those of the Mandasor inscription. Let us take a few test letters and compare their forms in the two epigraphs. *K* in the Mandasor inscription is still dagger-shaped, though its cross-bar shows a slight bend; in the Dadhimatī-Mātā inscription it has developed a loop on the left and has almost attained the shape seen in the modern Nāgarī. *D* had no tail in the Malwa record, but it clearly shows one in the Jodhpur inscription. *M* had no loop on the left in the former record, but it has developed a cursive one in the latter. As Bhüler has shown, this kind of loop is usually noticed since the 8th century A.D. *Y* was still tripartite in the Mandasor inscription, but it has clearly attained the bipartite form in the Jodhpur record. In the case of the palatal sibilant *ś* the old horizontal bar has become hook-shaped in the Jodhpur inscription, while the Mandasor *praśasti* retains the old form. The forms of these test letters approximate those in the Jodhpur inscription⁷ of Pratihāra Bāuka of V.S. 894 (A.D. 837) which comes from the same State. They leave no doubt that the Dadhimatī-Mātā inscription is much later than the Mandasor *praśasti* of Yaśodharman, dated V.S. 589 (A.D. 532).

Thirdly, the Dadhimatī-Mātā inscription mentions several donations in *drammas*. *Dramma* as a coin appears very late in Indian inscriptions and literature. The name of the coin is derived from the Greek *drachma*, but it does not seem to have been current in India during the time of the Bactrian Greeks. The earliest *drammas* discovered so far are those of the Pratihāra Emperor Bhoja (circa A.D. 836-885) which were called *Ādivarāha-drammas*. In South India references to *drammas* occur first in a record of the Śīlāhāras inscribed in Śaka 765 (A.D. 843). The *drammas* may, therefore, have become current in India towards the

⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 87 f.

close of the eighth century A.D.⁸ The present inscription which records gifts in *drammas* may not therefore be as early as the beginning of the seventh century A.D.

These circumstances point to the conclusion that the date of the Dadhimatī-Mātā inscription was probably recorded in an era which was started later than that of the Guptas. The only other era to which the date can be referred is that of Harṣa which probably commenced in A.D. 606, on the occasion of that Emperor's accession. That the territory of the Jodhpur State was included in the Empire of Harṣa seems quite likely. Harṣa's father Prabhākaravardhana had probably defeated the Gurjara king, for in the picturesque language of Bāṇa he was the cause of constant wakefulness to him. The Gurjara king was probably ruling over the country round Jodhpur. As a matter of fact we have now an inscription dated V. S. 894, discovered near Jodhpur itself, which mentions a long line of Gurjara princes ruling at Māṇḍavyapura (5 miles north of Jodhpur), the earliest of whom must have come to the throne towards the close of the 6th century A.D.⁹ Bāṇa says in another place that Harṣa himself defeated the king of Sindhu and appropriated his fortune.¹⁰ While doing this he must have subdued the kings ruling in Rājaputāna. Latterly, Harṣa's claim to overlordship of the entire North India has been called in question, but even those who dispute this claim admit that his suzerainty extended to the States of Rājputānā.¹¹ That his era had penetrated to Rājputānā is shown by a copper-plate grant¹² of the year 73 found in the State

⁸ Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar says that the *dramma* was prevalent all over North India from the 9th to the 13th century A.D. See his *Lectures on Ancient Indian Numismatics*, p. 206. See also J.R.A.S. 1920, pp. 151-2.

⁹ *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XVIII, p. 88.

¹⁰ *Harṣacarita* (Nirnaya sagar ed., p. 111).

¹¹ Tripathi, *History of Kanauj*, p. 80.

¹² *Annual Report of the Rajputana Museum*, for 1932-33, p. 2.

of Udaipur. It is not, therefore, unlikely that the present inscription is dated in the era of Harṣa.

It may, however, be objected that if the date 289 of the inscription is referred to the era of Harṣa, it becomes equivalent to A.D. 895, but this date is too late for the characters of the inscription. There is another circumstance which militates against such a late date. The date of the present inscription is expressed in numerical symbols. That these symbols gradually went out of vogue in the ninth century A.D. is well illustrated by the dates recorded in the stone inscription found at Āhār.¹³ This inscription is a public copy of several documents recording donations, etc., and bearing dates of the Harṣa era ranging from 258 to 298. In the case of the first two of these dates, viz. 258 and 259, the hundreds are denoted by numerical figures, but the tens and units are expressed by symbols. All subsequent dates in that record are denoted wholly by decimal notation. This clearly indicates that the numerical symbols went out of fashion in North-west India in the second half of the ninth century A.D. If the present record is dated in A.D. 895, it looks strange that it contains such symbols to express its date.

A careful examination of the symbols used in the present inscription shows that there is a mistake in the reading of the date. As already stated the date is expressed by means of three symbols which are read as 200, 80 and 9. There is no doubt about the reading of the last two symbols, but first one does not appear to signify 200. Pandit Ram Karna took it to represent 200 because it resembles *sū* which he says 'is just after the fashion so often observed in Jain manuscripts.'¹⁴ This reading is open to several objections. In the first place, the symbol does not look like *sū* as there

¹³ *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XIX, pp. 52 f.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. XI, pp. 300-01.

is no clear sign denoting the length of the medial *ñ*. Secondly, in the period to which this inscription can be referred on palaeographic grounds the usual device to convert the symbol for 100 into one for 200 was to add a horizontal bar to the right of its vertical,¹⁵ but no such bar is seen in the present case. The use of *sñ* to signify 200 is noticed in very late records such as Jain manuscripts. I would therefore read the year in the date of the present inscription as 100 80 9, i.e., 189. The date of the record is therefore the year 189, Śrāvaṇa ba 13 i.e., the 13th *tithi* of the dark fortnight of the year 189. This date being referred to the Harṣa era corresponds to A.D. 795-96.

The date thus read satisfactorily explains all matters. As stated before, the characters of the inscription closely resemble those of the Jodhpur inscription of the Pratihāra Bāuka, which is but natural as the latter record was inscribed in A.D. 837 i.e., only about forty years later. The decimal notation had not yet come into vogue for the first two of the dates recorded in the Āhār inscription which are more than sixty years later than that of the present inscription are expressed in numerical symbols. As shown above, the *dramma* coins must have been current about this time; for though no actual coins of this period have yet been discovered, those of the Pratihāra Bhoja I who flourished only about 40 years later have been found in abundance. There does not therefore, seem to be any objection to the reading of the date proposed above.

The lower limit for the date of the *Devīmāhātmya* of the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* is, therefore, A.D. 795. It must, of course have been composed long before this date if

¹⁵ *Indian Palaeography* (English Translation), p. 81. Bühler also has remarked that a distinct *ñ* (as a sign of 200) as in MSS. appears only in an inscription of the 9th century from Orissa. See his *Pl. III*, col. xviii.

Bāṇa's *Caṇḍīsataka* was based on it.¹⁶ Pargiter, who had discussed the date of this work independently has come to the conclusion that 'the *Devī-māhātmya* . . . was certainly complete in the 9th century and very probably in 5th or 6th century A.D.'¹⁷

¹⁶ Quackenbos, *Sanskrit Poems of Mayūra*, p. 251.

¹⁷ *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, English Translation by Pargiter, Introd., p. xx.

A CLAY VOTIVE STUPA FROM SARNATH

BY ADRIJ BANERJI

THE last ritual of man has given rise to various customs, and symbolisms that later on sprang from it are so varied that volumes could be written on them. Whether cremation or burial was the earliest ritual connected with the dead is unknown. Elsewhere the present writer has shown that in the Brāhmaṇa period burial was known both to the "Āryans" and to the 'asuras'—the original inhabitants of India (?).¹ But the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* shows a different type of ritual, and Gautama laid down elaborate conditions for its performance, worthy as he himself thought of *rāja-cakravartins*. The essence, however, in these references are always lost. Whatever be the date of the *sutta*, the point to be borne in mind is that it mentions known customs, which were expected to be followed by the faithful and were no new innovations of the Buddhists.² From this sprang those hemispherical *stūpas* over the last remains of the master, and on the spots alleged to have been associated with certain events of his life. The earliest of these do not go back to a very remote age than that of the Mauryas. The Niglivā Pillar Edict mentions an existing *stūpa* raised over Kanakamuni, which was worshipped by Aśoka,³ and the *stūpa* at Piprawa is slightly earlier than the reign of Candragupta-Maurya.

¹ JBORS, vol. xx, pp. 182-83.


² *Ibid*, vol. xxvi, pp. 170 ff. Rhys Davids *The Dialogues of Buddha*, vol. iii, pt. ii, London, 1910, pp. 154-57. The idea of interring of cremated bones is itself a Vedic ritual A. E. Keith—*Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas* (Harvard Oriental Series) vol. 31, pp. 420-22.

³ *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, vol. i, pp. 165-6.

It may be suggested, however, that in course of time the mortal remains of the master became very scarce, and that was probably the reason which led Aśoka to excavate certain relic bearing (*dhātugarbha*) *stūpas*, and raise fresh structures. In course of time the custom was extended to the mortal remains of the disciples of the master and leaders of new schools of thought. This is probably the explanation of the existence of small *stūpas* in Gorakhpur and Basti districts. With passing of time leaders of new schools of thought and saints must have become scarce. But the custom which had sanctioned raising of *stūpas* at places associated with the memory of the last Buddha, had become sanctified by age. This explains the existence of so many votive *stūpas* of brick and stone at Sanchi, Sarnath, Bodh-Gaya, etc. This practice resulted in twofold developments in the design and shape of the mediæval Buddhist *stūpas*; which is such an interesting feature and has yet to be studied; and also in a peculiar ritual which sprang up. This though occasionally noticed by archaeologists has not received the attention it deserved.

The rains of 1943 were heavy. Heavier was the sudden rainfall towards the end of September, which caused a spate in the rivers Gumti (Gomati) and Varuṇā. It resulted in unusual subsidences and erosion. At Sarnath, it revealed a small object, similar antiquities already existed in the Sarnath Museum. It is made of fine sandy well levigated clay. The burning has turned the clay into an orange colour. The *stūpa* consists of almost parabolic *aṇḍa*, *bṛī* and the *chattra*. Below it was a lump of clay, which on being separated from the *stūpa* was found to be a sealing containing the Buddhist creed 'Ye dhamma hetu, etc,' in the characters of the 12th century ~~CE~~. There was a projecting circular knob at the base of the *stūpa*, which also bore an impression. So far as I know in the various Buddhist sites excavated,

J. G. J. R. I



Bottom of clay *Stūpa* from Sarnath.
On the left the tablet with the *sūtra*. On the right the
bottom of the *Stūpa* with the impress of the sealing and
knob to receive the sealing.

similar terra-cottas have been unearthed but their significance does not seem to have been discussed.

At Rajgir in 1905-06 Sir John Marshall found similar objects.⁴ At Sarnath, the late Rai Bahadur D. R. Sahni thought that similar antiquities were found in *stūpa* no. 40.⁵ Excavating at Satyapirer Bhita at Paharpur Rao Bahadur K. N. Dikshit came across similar votive *stūpas*.⁶ I have had the good fortune to examine the baked votive *stūpas* included in his *Catalogue* by the late Rai Bahadur D. R. Sahni, but none of them betrays the characteristics that distinguish this *stūpa*, though I suspect that they were all of the same

⁴ A.R., A.S.I., 1905-06, p. 97.

⁵ Speaking of F (d) 9 he stated: "that such *stūpas* were frequently built into larger ones is shown by the fact that core of *stūpa* no. 40 to the north east of the Main Shrine at Sarnath was in the main constructed of *stūpas* of unbaked clay." In the first place these *stūpas* were fired. Secondly, turning to Sir John Marshall's account we find: "The structure was opened and a stratum of unbaked clay tablets was reached little below the top. In shape they are hemispherical with a diameter of between five or six inches. In the centre of the composition appears the Buddha, sitting in the *bhūmisparśa-mudrā* in a shrine surmounted by a spire, the latter having plainly been introduced by later engravers in imitation of the Bodh-Gaya temple. The rest of the space is occupied by representations of Votive *stūpas*, while below the Buddha is inscribed the Buddhist creed in characters of eighth or ninth century, "(A.R.A.S.I., 1906-07, pp. 80-81). This detailed description convinces us that a confusion has arisen. Because Sahni describes F(d) 9 and others." Miniature *stūpa* of baked clay The base has the shape of a bowl. The drum is of the usual cylindrical form and the *hti* or the finial is broken off. Inside the *stūpa* near the bottom is inserted a little tablet with the Buddhist creed" (*Cat. of Museum of Archaeology at Sarnath*, p. 309). It is clear that these objects do not possess the figure of Buddha with the spire of a temple and the representations of the votive *stūpas*. They were baked. The objects found in *stūpa* No. 40 were of different type—probably clay sealings, some of which still exist in the Sarnath Museum. By these remarks I do not mean that such *stūpas* were not interred even at Sarnath. But at least such objects were not found in *stūpa* no. 40. The word sealing does not explain their form, it would be more correct to call these 'votive tablets' like F (d) 19 of Sahni's *Catalogue* (p. 310).

⁶ A.R., A.S.I. 1930-34, pt i. pp. 124-125, pt. ii, plate lix figs. a, b, c and d.

kind. Possibly the lower tablet which is such an interesting feature of this *stūpa* had become separated. The features of this particular type are: the central knob at the bottom of the *stūpa* bears the impression of the sealing, which was attached to the bottom of the *stūpa* when clay was still soft. This makes one conclusion inevitable that the seal was stamped and dried in the sun previous to its attachment to the bottom of the *stūpa* and fired together in a furnace or an oven. If the seal had been previously fired, the double burning would have turned it black; and if the *stūpa* and the sealing had been burnt separately, they could not have been joined later on. The quality of firing is the same in both the objects: The seal was prepared, and the *stūpa* moulded, then the earth was scooped away from the bottom of the votive *stūpa* to facilitate the attachment of the sealing. The knob like tenon entered the sunk surface of the *stūpa*. Then they were fired and interred.

What was the significance of this ritual? The late Dr. Theodore Bloch drew the attention of Sir John Marshall to a passage in the Hiuen-Tsang, regarding a custom which was peculiar to India. The pilgrim is reported to have recorded: "It is a custom in India to make little *stūpas* of powdered paste, their height is six or seven inches, and they place inside them a *sūtra*, this they call *dharmma-sarīra*" The italicised portion I believe explains the position of the sealing, between the bottom of the *stūpa* and the outer surface of the lump of clay bearing on obverse the *sutra*.⁷

⁷ The height of the present *stūpa* with the sealing is about 1½ inch cf. Beal—*Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. ii, p. 146.

I am indebted to Dr. B. N. Chopra, D.Sc. (Cantab), Director, Zoological Survey of India for the photograph of the *stūpa* and the sealing. The article is being published by the courtesy of Brigadier R. E. Mortimer Wheeler, Director General of Archaeology in India.

THE ROLES OF VYĀSA, SANJAYA, VAIŚAMPĀYANA AND SAUTI IN THE KURU WAR NARRATION

BY V. B. ATHAVALE

As I have determined the exact date of the Kuru war, it becomes a historic incident. It is no more a fiction. As the *Gītā*, which is well known as a standard poem dealing with metaphysical problems, begins with a description on the first day of this war, many people try to interpret the names संजय, धृतराष्ट्र, दुर्योधन, कृष्ण, अर्जुन etc., in a philosophic manner. They think that it is an allegory on the fight that goes on between the Soul and its enemies the lust, anger etc. But though the proper names can be interpreted philosophically, it does not follow that the names must be imaginary. It is a peculiarity of the Sanskrit language that even the proper names can be given some interpretation.

Let us take the name Vyāsa. From the three references (देवलः व्यासः, मुनीनां व्यासः व्यासप्रसादात्) to the name in the *Gītā*, it becomes clear that Vyāsa was a revered and well known sage (Muni). Vyāsa is a family name. In *Śān.* 346. 12, 13 it is mentioned that Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana Vyāsa is the name of the author of "*Hari — Gītā*." This proves that Vyāsa was the family name, while Kṛṣṇa was the personal name of the muni. This proper name Vyāsa is interpreted by Vaiśampāyana, as विव्यास वेदान् यस्मात् (1.63.88), विव्यास एकं वेदं चतुर्धा (1.605). It means that because the Vedās were arranged and classified by Kṛṣṇa, he was called Vyāsa.

This tendency to give interpretation of the proper names can be traced to the Vedic literature. In the *Chān. Upani.* 1.2.9-11, we are told that Aṅgīrā, Bṛhaspati, Ayāśya had chanted the Udgītha in the Yajñas in consecutive succession. These are the proper personal names of the father, son and the grandson respectively. But each proper name is given with its derivation and interpretation as follows : अंगानां रसः = अंगिरा; वाग्धिवृहती तस्या एष पतिः = बृहस्पति, आस्यान् यदयते = अयास्य. But because the fictitious derivations are given, it does not follow that the persons were fictitious.

As 5000 years have elapsed since the war event occurred, it is but natural that the historical narration of the event, which is available now, is much distorted, mutilated, and expanded. A vast collection of poems numbering 100000, called *Mahābhārata*, is a record of the past events. Let me put forth some constant features of the poem, about which all agree. It is divided into 18 main Parvas. As the war lasted for 18 days, it is but natural that this number is chosen to commemorate the event. The names of the 18 'पर्व' are also constant. The first 'पर्व' contains the early history of the Kuru family while the 18th ends with the death of the five brothers.

The dialogue of the *Mahā-Bhārata* is a *triple dialogue*. This fact is generally forgotten. Let me make clear the meaning of the term. "Triple dialogue." The *Gītā* dialogue is a dialogue within a dialogue. It is not a simple dialogue between two persons. Kṛṣṇa is talking with Arjuna on the Kuru field. This is a single dialogue. But when Sañjaya is reporting the same dialogue to Dhṛtarāṣṭra at Hastināpura, it becomes a double dialogue. In a double dialogue, there are two different place names, and the least number of persons is four. In a triple dialogue, there must be three places and the least number of persons must be six. In time sequence it is evident that the event

must be earlier and the report must be later. A second report of the same event must be the latest.

We must now see what are the three places and who are the six minimum persons in the triple dialogue. We begin, of course, from the latest. The place is Naimiṣāranya. A *brāhmaṇa* called Śaunaka is performing some sacrifice in the forest. Other *brāhmaṇas* have also assembled for the sacrifice. A person who has travelled much, has arrived in the sacrifice, and he is telling the stories which he has heard during his travels. His family name is Sūta. His personal name is Ugraśrawā, and his father's name is Lomahaṇṣaṇa.

He is reporting a dialogue between Vaiśampāyana and the king Janamejaya at Hastinapura. Sūta is¹ not telling that he was present at the time of the dialogue. He tells that while touring, he visited the Kurukṣetra. As he had heard about the Kuru war and other stories he has toured to see the places. Sūta is reporting the stories he has heard and not describing the events he has personally seen. The family name of Sañjaya is also Sūta. The *Gītā* mentions the name in 11.26. 'सूतपुत्रः तथासौ'. As Arjuna is pointing to Sañjaya and saying "this son of Sūta," it proves that this Sūta was present on the battle field at the time of the talk of Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna. I know that this reference is generally construed to be the name of Karna. But about that we shall discuss later.

Vaiśampāyana, in his turn, is recounting some old history, which was composed by Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana Vyāsa, and had the name Jaya. Thus Vyāsa is the original

¹ जनमेजयस्य राजर्षेः सर्पसत्रे महात्मनः ।

कृष्णद्वैपायनप्रोक्ताः सुपुण्याः विविधाः कथाः ।

कथिताः चापि विधिवत् याः वैशंपायनेन वै ।

श्रुत्वाहं ताः विचित्रार्थाः महाभारतसंशिताः ।

अन्तर्धानं अस्मि तं देशं शुद्धं यत्राभवत् पुरा ॥

historian and a contemporary of Bhīṣma. We know that Bhīṣma died 58 days after the war.

Here is a summary of the three distinct times, the places and the authors of the composition. (1) Sūta Ugrasrawā Lomahaṛṣaṇa is the author of the *Mahābhārata*. The place is Naimiṣāranya. The audience was composed of Śaunaka and other Brāhmaṇas. There were no kings to hear this recounting. We are not much concerned with the probable period of Ugrasrawā. Because we are trying to reconstruct the history in the story told by Ugrasrawā. (2) Vaiśampāyana is the author (of भारत) or a story-teller. The place is Hastinapura. The king Janamejaya is asking his chief priest to recount the history and the glory of his ancestors. We are now directly concerned with the period of Janamejaya, because he was a great-grandson of Arjuna. (3) The time and the occasion on which Vyāsa told the account was the last two months of the Aśwamedha sacrifice, and Jaya was the name.

We shall now turn to the narration by Sauti to his Brāhmaṇa audience. In *M.1.1.105* द्वैपायनः पूर्वं पुत्रं अध्यापयत् शुक्रं² Sauti tells, "This history was taught by Dwaipāyana to his son Śuka in the past, who, in his turn, taught it to the disciples who were fit. Śuka recounted the account to गंधर्वः...श्रावयामास वै शुक्रः (Parikṣiti) in the earlier times. Vaiśampāyana told it again to the human world in recent times.

Sauti gives the occasion on which Vaiśampāyana told the Bhārata story in *M.1.1.96-99*. "When all had passed away after continuing to live up to a ripe old age, the king Janamejaya and his courtiers requested Vaiśampāyana to tell the past history during the afternoon interval of

² Vyāsa (Kṛṣṇa) was a contemporary of Vṛṣṇi (Kṛṣṇa). Vyāsa (Śuka) was a contemporary of Parikṣiti. Vaiśampāyana was a contemporary of Janamejaya. Vaiśampāyana was a disciple of Vyāsa Suka, but not of Vyāsa Kṛṣṇa.

the sacrifice." This story consisted of 24000 verses and had no Upākhyānas.³

In 102, 109 Sauti tells, "This poem with Upākhyānas is, however, my composition, and contains one hundred thousand verses."⁴ This shows clearly that the Upākhyānas are due to Sauti. It is not my present aim to count the number of verses in the Upākhyānas and try to see how many remain by deducting the number from 100000.

After writing the Upākhyānas Sauti has made some changes in the original Ākhyāna also. I shall illustrate it by an example. In the Udyoga Parwa the chapters 173-196, are named *Ambopākhyāna*. These 24 chapters contain 799 verses. In this is the story of Śikhaṇḍī being a female first, but turned male later. It is interesting to note that in these 799 verses, there is no verse by Vaiśampāyana. In Sanskrit there is no indirect form of speech. So when a story teller is quoting others, it is the others who are speaking for the moment. In the Ākhyānas we generally find a verse or two by Vaiśampāyana, which shows that he is narrating the account to the king Janamejaya. In the Upākhyāna, on the other hand, no verse of Vaiśampāyana is found. In the chapter 169, Vaiśampāyana is quoting Bhīṣma. The speech of Bhīṣma continues in about 60 verses. Bhīṣma is telling the account of the powers of different warriors. But when the name Śikhaṇḍī comes in, Bhīṣma tells that as Śikhaṇḍī was heard to be a woman first, he would not raise his bow against Śikhaṇḍī. This is the last and the only verse in the ch. 172, where Śikhaṇḍī is reported as being a woman first. All the 799 verses of the *Ambopākhyāna* are written by Sauti to explain how

³ चतुर्विंशति साहस्रीं चक्रे भारतसंज्ञिताम् ।
उपाख्यानैः विना तावत् भारतं प्रोच्यते बुधैः

⁴ एकं शतसहस्रं तु मयोक्तं वै निबोधत ।

उपाख्यानैः सह ज्ञेयं इदं भारतमुत्तमम् ॥

Śikhaṇḍī was a woman first. The Upākhyāna is thus clearly a fiction. The last verse was probably introduced by Sauti to connect the previous chapter with the Upākhyāna. In the *Gītā*, Vyāsa calls Śikhaṇḍī a Mahārathī. He has even sounded his conch in answer to the conch sounded by Bhīṣma. Sauti has probably added the verses 12-20, in *Bhīṣma* 15. Because, Duryodhana is telling Duśśāsana to see that Śikhaṇḍī does not kill Bhīṣma, by taking advantage of the fact that Bhīṣma will not raise his bow against him as Bhīṣma had heard that Śikhaṇḍī was a woman first. Sauti has also added some verses.⁵ उद्योगे कथितं यत् तत् तथा जाता शिखण्डिनी in *Bhīṣma* 97.37-41. Because here is the occasion when Śikhaṇḍī has killed Bhīṣma.

Let me now point out some peculiar expressions which are due to Sauti only. Vyāsa or Vaiśampāyana could never have used these expressions. Sauti uses the words "Kuru-Pāṇḍawa," "Kaurawa-Pāṇḍawa." This shows that Kaurawa means the sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra only. But as Kuru was the ancestor of both Pāṇḍu and Dhṛtarāṣṭra, the meaning is clearly wrong. In the *Gītā* Vyāsa has addressed Arjuna as Kuru-nandana 36 times. Vaiśampāyana addresses Janamejaya, a great-grand-son of Arjuna, as Kuru-Puṅḡawa. In the *Gītā*, the expression is always धार्तराष्ट्राः, धृतराष्ट्रस्य पुत्राः and never कौरवाः पाण्डवाः, कुरुपाण्डवाः.

Now, we shall try to determine the occasion when Vaiśampāyana told the story. As we know the date of the war, the period of King Janamejaya can be determined. Parikṣiti got the throne 40 years after the war. Parikṣiti was born in the month of Phālguna, just before the horse for the sacrifice was let loose on the Caitra full moon day. (9th April 3015 B.C.). His age was thus 40 when he got

⁵ Here the reference to उद्योगपर्व is clear. But we have already seen that अम्बोपाख्यान was a fiction by Sauti, and hence these verses in the आख्यान are not by वैशम्पायन.

the throne. *M.1.49.17* and *25*, tell that Parikṣiti⁶ died at the age of 60. He had four sons. But they were very young when he died. Janamejaya, who was the oldest, was probably five or six years old only. Because *M. 1.44.6*, tells that when Parikṣiti died, the people performed the funeral rites and declared the child Janamejaya as the king. When he was about 20 he was married to Vapuṣṭama, the daughter of Suvarṇawarmā, who was the king of Benares. One day he asked his chief priest the cause of the death of his father. *M.1.49.22* describes the episode. Here is a summary of the episode. Parikṣiti ruled in the same way as the king Yudhiṣṭhira for about 15 years. Later he acquired a mania for hunting. Just as Pāṇḍu, the father of Arjuna had acquired. Parikṣiti practically handed over the rule of the kingdom to his ministers. One day while hunting in the forest, the deer, he was following, was lost sight off. One muṇi was meditating in the forest. Parikṣiti approached the muni and asked him the way in which the deer fled. There was no answer. The king got enraged, took a dead serpent and put it round the neck of the meditating muni, who was quite unconscious of what had happened. When Śṛṅgī, the son of the muni returned, he knew about and cursed the king that he will die of serpent poison on a particular date.

It appears that Śṛṅgī had planned to kill Parikṣiti by administering poison in spite of the requests of his father Śamīka, who was insulted by the king. For, Śamīka had sent a word to Parikṣiti, a week in advance to be on his guard as Śṛṅgī was adamant to carry out the threat in his oath, correct to the day. King Parikṣiti had taken pre-

⁶ प्रजा-हन्ताः तव पिता षष्टिवर्षाणि अपालयन् ।

परिभ्रान्तो बभूव : च षष्टिवर्षोऽवराण्वितः ।

cautions not to stir out during the week⁷ preceding the day of the threat. The king repented very much when he came to know that the previous intimation of the poisoning plot was supplied by the same Muni, whom he had insulted unknowingly in a fit of anger. He had kept all forms of medical help ready in the case of emergency. No one was allowed to approach the king.

It appears that Śṛṅgī had approached Takṣaka of the Nāga family and some others of the Sarpa family, to secure their help in his plot of revenge. Sarpa family was one of the families of chieftains, who controlled the Khāṇḍawa forest region, near Kurukṣetra. This Sarpa family had probably some grudge against Arjuna, when he burnt and cleared a part of the Khāṇḍawa forest, for the expansion of the kingdom of Indraprastha. One or two days before the announced date of poisoning, the following talk took place between Takṣaka and a Brāhmaṇa named Kāśyapa. The Brāhmaṇa had a good antidote against poison. When he heard that the king will be poisoned by Takṣaka he took his medicine with him and started to see the king with the hope of getting a good reward for saving the life of the king. Takṣaka chancely met him on the way and knew his mission. At first Takṣaka did not believe in the efficacy of the medicine. He challenged that the poison he had, had no antidote. To test the antidote, Takṣaka put his poison in a tree and the tree was dead. Kāśyapa administered his antidote and the tree revived again. Then Takṣaka offered him a good deal of money for *not* using his

⁷ It is well known that the *Bhāgawata* is always read completely in a week, which always ends on the Bhādrapada full moon day. It means that Parikṣiti died on that day due to poison. In order to keep up his mind in place during the week of suspense, Śuka, the son of Vyāsa, told him the story of Kṛṣṇa. In the *Bhāgawata*, Uddhawa is the important companion of Kṛṣṇa, as Arjuna is in the Bhārata story. Uddhawa was a well-known figure in the Vṛṣṇi family, just as Vidura was in the Kuru family. The author of भागवत is not कृष्णार्पण व्यास but शुक्र, कृष्णव्यास ।

antidote. On the evening of the declared day, Takṣaka and his confederates disguised themselves as munis and approached the king to give the blessings of the sage Śamika. They offered some fruit to the king, and went away. The king ate the fruit, thinking it to be a blessing. But he collapsed soon, as the fruit was poisoned.

When the king Janamejaya knew this story of the planned death of his father, he determined to start a campaign against the Sarpa and the Nāga families. The head quarters of the Nāga family was the Taxilla region. It was Takṣaka Nāga, who founded the city Taxilla in his name. In the *Gītā* we get the name Ananta as the chief among the Nāga, and Vāsukī among the Sarpa families. The third family name is the Airāvata among the Gajendras.

These three family names are generally misinterpreted. They are supposed to mean serpents, cobras, elephants etc. Especially Airāvata is described as a fabulous elephant with seven trunks. But it is not so. *M.* 1. 37, tells that when these families came to know the decision of the king Janamejaya, there was a sort of consultation between *Ailāpatra*, Vāsukī, and other chieftains about the best way to avoid the campaign. Some suggested⁸ that by treachery all the war (Yajña) preparations could be made useless. Finally Elāpatra remarked that King Janamejaya was a very cautious warrior and he cannot be so easily befooled as it was thought to be.

⁸ अपरे तु ब्रुवन्नागाः तत्र पण्डितमानिनः ।
 मन्त्रिणः अस्य वयं सर्वे भविष्यामः सुसंमताः ॥
 अथवा य उपाध्यायः क्रतोरस्य भविष्यति ।
 तं गत्वा दशतां कश्चित् भुजंगः स मरिष्यति ॥
 अथवा संस्कृतं भोज्यं दृश्यन्तु भुजंगमाः ।
 गृहे आनीय वध्न मः जले प्रक्षोभितं हृष्यन् ॥
 सर्पाणां तु वचः श्रुत्वा हस्तापत्रोऽज्ज्वीर इदं ।
 न स बद्धो न भविष्य न स राजा तवाभिषः ॥१.३८.२॥

In this narration Sauti often uses the word Yajña or Satra. Both of these words are commonly used to denote the offering of oblations in the sacrificial fire. The whole narration becomes quite intelligible if the words are not translated literally, but rendered allegorically to mean war.

To prove that these family names are not fictitious, I have secured a strong evidence from the Pali literature of the Budhistic period, to support the statements. It mentions four branches of the Ahi kingly families. Airāpatha is one of the names of the members of these families “चत्वारि अहिराज कुलानि । एरापथः.....”

The first two chapters of the *Mahābhārata* are just like an index to its contents. The third chapter opens with a description of a Satra of the king Janamejaya, which had continued in Kurukṣetra for 12 long years. The word Satra cannot mean a sacrifice, here. Because the sacrifice ought to have taken place at Hastināpura and not at Kurukṣetra. As we have seen above, it means a long campaign planned by the king Janamejaya against the chieftains governing over the forest region near Kurukṣetra, because they had taken part in the poisoning plot. Though the aim of the king was to invade Takṣaka, because he was the chief organizer of the plot, yet from the practical point of view, it was necessary to deal with the enemies near the capital first, and then turn to Taxilla, as it was a long way off. We shall see in a few moments that this is exactly what is described in the 20th prose sentence of the third chapter.

In the first ten sentences, we get the story of the curse uttered by a female dog, because the three brothers of the king had beaten a small cur for no fault. The king is worried by the curse. If we simply interpret the curse to mean the bite of a mad dog, the whole of the next story becomes both consistent and intelligible. The king finished the Satra and returned to Hastināpura. He was worrying about the way in which his brother could get free from

the curse. One day while hunting in a forest, in his kingdom, he saw a small hermitage. The name of the hermit was Śrutaśrawā. The name of his son was Somaśrawā,⁹ who was smart and young, and had also practised a good deal of penance. The king was in search of some Purohita, who would cure his brother from the curse. The father told that his son was born from a wife, who came from the Sarpa family, and thus he was an expert in such matters. This reference clearly shows that the Sarpa families had specialised in poisons, poisonous bites as well as their antidotes.

Śrutaśrawā (श्रुतश्रवा) told the king Janamejaya that his son could accept to become the Purohit on one condition. The condition was that if he asked for a boon then it must be granted without any delay or reserve. The king accepted the condition and Somaśrawā went with the king to Hastināpura. The king handed him over to his three brothers and asked them to act according to the advice of the young priest, because the priest had promised to relieve them from the curse. The king then left for Takṣaśilā to invade the country and bring the country under his control.

In the 20th sentence of the 3rd chapter the story ends abruptly with the mention of the place Takṣaśilā as given above. The name Takṣaśilā appears again in the 5th chapter of the 18th Parwa only. Here are the two verses.¹⁰

⁹ पुत्रोऽयं मम सप्यां जातो महातपस्वी
समर्थोऽयं भवतः सर्वाः कृत्वा शमयितु
अस्य तु एकं उपांशु व्रतं । यदेतत् उत्सहसे
ततो नयस्व एनं ।.....स भ्रातृन् उवाच
यत् अयं ब्रूयात् तत् कार्यं अविचारयद्भिः ।
भ्रातृन् संदिश्य तक्षशिलां प्रस्थमिप्रस्थे ।

¹⁰ ततः समापयामासुः कर्म तत् तस्य राजकाः ।
आस्तीकः च अभवत् प्रीतः परिमोक्ष्य भुजंगमान् ॥
विसर्जयित्वा तान् सर्वान् राजापि जनमेजयः ।
ततः तक्षशिलायाः सः पुनरायात् गजाव्हयं ॥

“The Yajña (campaign) was finished. Āstika too was pleased as he could secure the release of the people of the Sarpa family, by using the boon which was granted to him by the king Janamejaya. The king too, when he saw that his Yajña at Takṣaśilā was over, returned back to Hastināpura.”

It is interesting to note that the Place name Takṣaśilā appears only twice in the whole of the *Mahābhārata*. The appearance of the name in the 3rd chapter where the Bhārata story of the king Janamejaya begins, and its re-appearance at the end of the story is very significant. But before elucidating the point, let me give the information about Āstika, who had secured the release of the Sarpa families at Takṣaśilā.

M.I. 54., gives the information that Āstika was the son of Jaratkāru, who was the sister of Vāsukī, of the Sarpa family. At a late age she was wedded to an old ṛṣi, having the same name as that of hers (Jaratkāru.) Her son Āstika went to the Yajña of Janamejaya, promising Vāsukī that he could secure the release of the Sarpa and the Nāga families. When Āstika arrived in the Yajña (army camp), the king was engrossed in discussing the plan of getting Takṣaka Nāga captured and brought into the Yajña. Takṣaka had fled away from Takṣaśilā and had taken the shelter of another chieftain (Indra). When all other measures of the capture of Takṣaka failed, the king ordered the Purohitas in the Yajña to capture even the Indra who was trying to save Takṣaka. The Indra got frightened and left Takṣaka to his fate. In this way the king Janamejaya could capture Takṣaka alive. The smart, young Āstika praised the valour of the king. The king was pleased and told him to ask for any boon, and it would be immediately fulfilled. Āstika took advantage of the opportunity and demanded the immediate release of all the captured prisoners. Janamejaya was in a fix. As Takṣaka was the main organizer in poisoning Parikṣiti, Janamejaya did not like that he should go scot-free. He

asked Āstika to demand any other thing except that. But Āstika was firm and Janamejaya finally ordered the release of Takṣaka.

• The *Mahābhārata* gives this account in 1.56. The place where the Satra continued is not mentioned. But we can now easily tell that events happened at Taxila. Vāsukī must have approached Somaśrawā, who was born from a Sarpi mother and taken him to Taxilla. Somaśrawā had cured the brothers of Janamejaya from the dog-bite poison. Janamejaya could secure his services on the condition that none of his requests were to be refused. The Āstika who could secure the release of Takṣaka, must therefore, be identical with Somaśrawā, the youthful son of Śrutaśrawā. The description of Āstika in the 56th chapter tallies with the description of Somaśrawā in the third chapter. Thus, Jaratkāru is identical with Śrutaśrawā and the sister of Vāsukī was wedded to him.

Thus, it will be seen that we can now trace all the historical events from the death of Yudhiṣṭhira to the victorious return of the king Janamejaya after his last campaign at Takṣaśilā.

As we know the exact date of the Kuru war, we can calculate the years of the important incidents. Here is the table of the incidents :

(1) Kuru war	5-12-3016 B.C.	मार्गशीर्ष शुद्ध ११
• (2) Death of Bhīṣma		
58 days after the war	1-2-3015	„ माघशुद्ध
(3) Horse let loose	9-4-3015	„ चैत्रपूर्णिमा
(4) Birth of Parikṣiti	?-3-3015	„ फाल्गुन
(5) Horse returns	5-2-3012	„ माघपूर्णिमा
'(6) Crowning of Yudhiṣṭhira	22-3-3012	„ चैत्रप्रतिपदा
(7) Dhṛtarāṣṭra goes to the forest	2997	

- | | | |
|---|-----------|---|
| (8) Parikṣiti gets the throne | 2976 | |
| (9) The date on which the <i>Bhāgawata</i> story was told by Śuka. K. Vyāsa | 4-9-2956 | भाद्रपद शुद्ध ८ |
| (10) The date of the death of Parikṣiti | 11-9-2956 | भाद्रपदपूर्णिमा |
| (11) The year of the victory at Taxilla can be approximately 30-32 years after the death of Parikṣiti | 2926 | As Janamejaya was only 5 years when the father died, we can say that he was 20. In a couple of years he started the 12 year Satra at Kurukṣetra, and 3 years more for Taxila. |

A big victory sacrifice must have taken place at Hastināpura. It was in this sacrifice that the king Janamejaya asked Vaiśampāyana, the chief priest, to recount the victorious deeds of his ancestors. It is interesting to note that there is no speech of Vaiśampāyana in the 2267 verses of the 59 chapters of the Ādi-parwa. It begins first at the opening of the 60th chapter. This proves conclusively that it is Sauti who has written these verses.

Another important feature, in the first 50 Adhyāyas, is that Vaiśampāyana is not present in the two Satras, one at Kurukṣetra and the other at Takṣaśilā. He appears only when the Yajña at Hastināpura has started. It is clear from this that the Satra at Kurukṣetra was different from the Yajña at Hastināpura. The ministers of Janamejaya were the priests in the war Satra. The priest Vaiśampāyana had to deal with the religious traditions and ceremonies. From

the third chapter to the 59th, there is the account of Parikṣiti and Janamejaya only. We know that the Takṣaśilā campaign took place nearly 50 years after the death of the Pāṇḍawas. We do not know the age of Vaiśampāyana, but it would not be wrong to assume his age to be 60-70. As the king has asked him to tell the past history, it seems that he must have been a disciple of Śuka Kṛṣṇa Vyāsa, who was the priest of the Kuru family during the period of Parikṣiti. Had Śuka been alive at the victory of Janamejaya, he would certainly have become the head priest. But we get no reference to Śuka in this period. It means that he too must have passed away. This tallies quite well with the following statement of Sauti :—

जातेषु तेषु वृद्धेषु गतेषु परमां गतिम् ।
 जनमेजयेन पृष्ठः सन् वैशंपायन अंतिके ॥
 स सदस्यैः सहासीनः श्रावयामास भारतम् ।
 कर्मक्षेत्रेषु यज्ञस्य चोद्यमानः पुनः पुनः ॥

We can now understand why Sauti has not introduced the names Vyāsa or Vaiśampāyana while giving the account of Janamejaya, with which the ch. 3-59 are mainly concerned. Dwaipāyana Vyāsa is certainly out of question, and Vaiśampāyana has to recount the history of the Pāṇḍawas. Thus, before starting the history of the Pāṇḍawas, Sauti has given a short history of Parikṣiti and Janamejaya in these chapters, in the way in which he had heard the account in his tour.

Now, we have crossed the outer hurdle of the triple dialogue in the *Mahābhārata*, and we can ignore Sauti and his Brāhmaṇa audience in the Naimiṣāraṇya. We have also crossed the inner hurdle of the triple dialogue. For, we know the name of the story teller, his audience, the place as well as the reason for which the dialogue started. We can now easily cross the innermost hurdle as follows.

Thus the king Janamejaya performed the horse sacrifice 90—92 years after the Kuru war. Vaiśampāyana, the chief

priest in this sacrifice, tells in the Śānti. Ch. 346, 11—12, that the full name of the author of "*Hāri-gītā*," is Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana Vyāsa and that he is Nārāyaṇa on this earth. This proves that the great Vyāsa Muni was a contemporary of Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva. In the "*Hari-gītā*" text, Sañjaya tells that it is through the grace of Vyāsa that he was able to hear the conversation between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna and also see the cosmic vision which Kṛṣṇa had given to Arjuna.

The *Gītā* begins with a dialogue between the king Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Sañjaya. As Sañjaya is extolling Vyāsa, it proves conclusively that Vyāsa must be a revered and old personality. It is better at this stage to get an approximate idea of the ages of Kṛṣṇa, Arjuna, Dhṛtarāṣṭra, Vyāsa etc., at the time of the war. When Arjuna had taken down his great bow, which was hung on the Śami tree, he says that "I have been wielding a bow for the last 65 years." Supposing that Arjuna began to learn Dhanurweda, under the expert guidance of Droṇa, at the age of 7 or 8, it means that at the time of the war, his age was about 72. Kṛṣṇa was about 80. In Udyoga 52.10, we get a statement that 33 years had elapsed since the clearing and burning of the Khāṇḍawa forest and the Pāṇḍawas created a new kingdom of Indraprastha. Subhadrā, the sister of Kṛṣṇa was wedded to Arjuna a few years before the burning of the forest. Arjuna was on a tour of one year's penance, and at that time he had gone to Dwāraka, where the wedding took place. Rajasūya Yajña was performed by Yudhiṣṭhira about 15 years before the Kuru war. It was for the sake of expansion of the territory under his control. It is mentioned in the Sabhā-Parwa, (M.2.45.52) that Abhimanyu, the son of Subhadrā, was young enough to talk with the chieftains who had assembled for the Yajña. We can assume that his age was about 7 or 8 at that time. Thus, during the war, the age of Abhimanyu was only 23. Dhṛtarāṣṭra was probably 90 and Vyāsa was probably 95.

Now, let us turn to the *Gītā* dialogue. Technically the *Gītā* dialogue is a compound dialogue. It means a dialogue within a dialogue. Some talk has taken place between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna at Kurukṣetra, and Sañjaya is reporting the talk which he heard, and the cosmic vision he had seen to Dhṛtarāṣṭra, at Hastināpura. The past tense "I have heard," व्यासप्रसादात् श्रुत्वान् कृष्णात् साक्षात् कथयतः in 18.74, is significant. The words " संस्मृत्य संस्मृत्य संवादं, संस्मृत्य संस्मृत्य रूपं अत्यद्भुतं हरेः" do also point out that Sañjaya is stirred by the repeated memory of what he has seen and heard.

From the statement of Sañjaya, it becomes clear that Vyāsa has not written the dialogue from mere imagination. But if we want to prove that the dialogue is based on some historical event, then we cannot depend only on the evidence of the text of the *Gītā*. For, it is like arguing in a circle. We must cite some external proof in support of the historical incident.

The following are the four independent references to the same historical event. (1) *M.* 1.1.181. कश्मलेनाभिपन्ने रथोपस्थे सीदमाने अर्जुने Dhṛtarāṣṭra, while weeping after the death of Duryodhana, says, "When I heard that Arjuna was on the point of fainting in the chariot, and that Kṛṣṇa had shown him the whole world in his own body,—"
(2) Śānti. 348.8 समुपोदेष्वनीकेषु कुरुपांडवयोर्मृधे । अर्जुने विमनस्के... When Arjuna got confused by looking at the arrayed armies, Kṛṣṇa gave him some advice. (3) Bhīṣma 43.6. ततो धनंजयं दृष्ट्वा बाणगांडीवधारिणं । पुनरेव महानादं व्यसृजत... Seeing that Arjuna had taken back the bow which he had thrown away, the people on the Pāṇḍawa side got delighted and blew their conches again. (4) Aśva. 160.9-13. "When the crowning ceremony was over, and Kṛṣṇa was thinking of going back to Dwāraka, Arjuna requested him to repeat the Jñāna, which Kṛṣṇa had given on the Kurukṣetra"

These four statements from different chapters fully support the description of Arjuna given by Vyāsa in the *Gītā* text. Dhṛtarāṣṭra says that he had heard about the Moha of Arjuna. Sañjaya says that he had seen the disturbed state of Arjuna. As Dhṛtarāṣṭra was blind, he must have heard it from Sañjaya. Now, we shall try to understand why Sañjaya says that he had been able to see and hear the incident through the grace of Vyāsa. If Sañjaya has seen the incident, it means that he was at Kurukṣetra on the first day. We get a direct verification for this. For in Bhīṣma, 13.1-2 Vaiśampāyana tells that Sañjaya came back from the battle field to Hastināpura, to report that Bhīṣma was laid down on the stretcher bed of arrows on the tenth day. *Bh.* 14.3.9 and 44.5.21. also show clearly that Sañjaya was on the battle field for all the ten days. In Droṇa 1.6-7, Sañjaya has again come back at night to Dhṛtarāṣṭra, to report the death of Droṇa on the 15th day. This means that Sañjaya had returned to the battle field after reporting the death of Bhīṣma. Droṇa. 51.1, and 89-5 tell that Sañjaya was also wounded on the day on which Abhimanyu was killed and he had fought with Cekitāna. Droṇa 182.20 and 183.4, tell that Sañjaya took part in the war council of Duryodhana, which was held at night on the day on which Ghaṭotkaca was killed.

Karṇa was killed by Arjuna on the 17th day, in the evening. Karṇa 1.17 and 2.1-2, tell that Sañjaya came back to Hastināpura in the night with the aid of swift horses, to report the death of Karṇa. He must have returned to the battle field early in the morning. For Śalya was killed within a few hours of the start of the battle on the morning of the 18th day. On the same day Sañjaya had to fight a battle first with Dhṛṣṭadyumna. In this Sañjaya was defeated and had to run away. While running away he came across Sātyakī, who attacked Sañjaya again. In this battle, the breast armour of Sañjaya was pierced

and thus Sañjaya fainted. Sañjaya was then caught by Sātyakī. Kṛṣṇa says 'ग्रहीत्वा संजयं चासौ निवृत्तः शिनिपुङ्गवः Śa. 27.3. When Dhṛṣṭadyumna saw that Sañjaya was caught, he asked Sātyakī not to keep him alive but to kill him. Sātyakī was on the point of killing him with a sword, when Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana intervened and asked Sātyakī not to kill him but to keep him alive. Sañjaya was thus saved. While returning to his camp in the afternoon, Sañjaya had crossed a distance of about two miles, when he saw Duryodhana all alone. He told Duryodhana that he was saved through Dwaipāyana. On this day Balarāma had returned after a pilgrimage of 42 days. In the evening the mace fight between Bhīma and Duryodhana took place and finally Duryodhana was killed. Sañjaya did not start for Hastināpura on the same night, as he was exhausted. He started however, for Hastināpura the next day early in the morning. •Śalya. 1.14, 25.

ततः पूर्वाह्नसमये शिविरात् एत्य संजयः ।

प्रविवेश पुरीं दीनो दुःखशोकसमन्वितः ।

वेपमानः ततो राज्ञः प्रविवेश निकेतनं ॥

gives a clear cut statement on this point.

From the information given above, we shall try to determine the exact role of Sañjaya in the Kuru war. Whenever each important incident occurred in the battle, he immediately ran post-haste on horse back, to report it to Dhṛtarāṣṭra. He was, therefore, a war correspondent on the side of Duryodhana. Even before the war, when the preparations were going on, it was Sañjaya who carried messages between Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Yudhiṣṭhira. There is a special Parwa called Sañjaya-Yāna, consisting of 13 chapters, where his status is made clear. The story that the life of Sañjaya was saved through the grace of Vyāsa is worth studying closely. For, through it we can get a correct explanation of the statement of Sañjaya in the *Gītā*, that it was through

the grace of Vyāsa that he was able to see the cosmic vision and also hear the conversation. The most important security which a war correspondent must enjoy, is that no one should attempt to kill him, thinking him to be an enemy or a traitor. It seems that Vyāsa had handed over to Sañjaya some signatory ring, by seeing which people should understand that he is not to be killed. The four verses in *Bh.* 2. 9-12 वराणां ईश्वरो व्यासः संजयाय वरं ददौ । नैनं छेत्स्यति शस्त्राणि... can very well be interpreted to mean that Vyāsa had handed over to him something like a passport, which allowed him to pass unhindered anywhere in the battle zone and that he was not to be killed under any circumstances. We have seen above that Sañjaya was on the point of being killed by Sātyakī, but he was saved through the intervention of Vyāsa. It does not certainly mean that Vyāsa had bodily appeared on the battle field and ordered Sātyakī not to kill him. The clear and simple explanation of the miracle is that something like a passport was found on the body of Sañjaya, when he was unconscious. It is this which saved his life.

I have so far proved that the name of the author of the *Hari-Gītā* was Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana Vyāsa, and that he was a contemporary of Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva Vṛṣṇī. Sañjaya who was a disciple of Vyāsa was specially chosen by Vyāsa as a sort of foreign diplomat and a war correspondent. As Vyāsa had to write the famous historic *Jaya poem*, (अहं तु कीर्तिं एतेषां कुरूणां, पांडवानां च सर्वेषां प्रथमिष्यामि ।) it was necessary that Vyāsa should choose the proper man for such an important task. Vyāsa thus got a direct and first hand information from Sañjaya. This was utilized by him in writing the *Jaya poem*. Sañjaya had naturally a great regard for Vyāsa. This regard for Vyāsa is well expressed in the last five verses of the *Gītā* text. It is also clear that the fainting of Arjuna on the battle field and Kṛṣṇa trying to bring him to a normal state, are not fictitious but are actual historical

incidents. Vyāsa has ingeniously utilised the incident as a historic background for preparing a concise, selfsufficient and self-consistent discourse on the Adhyātma and religious problems, which practically confront every individual.

Now, we shall try to determine the probable period or occasion for which the poem was composed. The *Jaya poem* was composed as a historical document for singing it in the afternoon interval of the actual horse sacrifice, which takes place after the horse returns from the tour. Vaiśampāyana tells in 1.62.20 definitely that the kings who wish to get a success over the enemies, should hear the *Jaya history*. This makes it clear that the *Jaya poem* was for kings and barons. The problems of the common individual in the street were not dealt with in the *Jaya poem*. In 1.62.52, and 18.5.42, both Vaiśampāyana and Sauti tell that the *Jaya history* was completed by Vyāsa after a continuous hard labour for three years. We know that the horse had wandered through 11 provinces for two years and ten months. The period of three years of labour fully agrees with the three year period of the horse sacrifice and this concordance of three years conclusively proves both the intention and the period during which it was written. It was Vaiśampāyana, who must have written the famous verse "Jaya should be read after saluting Nara, Nārāyaṇa, the goddess Saraswatī and Vyāsa." (For, he calls him Nārāyaṇa. In the *Gītā* the word *Nārāyaṇa* is absent.) We do not know the total number of verses the *Jaya history* contained. To commemorate the success after 18 days of war, the history was split up into 18 main divisions called Parwas.

KĀLIDĀSA'S TREATMENT OF LOVE

BY K. R. PISHAROTI

GREAT, no doubt, has been the havoc wrought by love. More often than otherwise, it has ruined man and woman ; shattered family life ; disturbed social life ; distracted political life ; affected religious life often of individuals and sometimes of communities. But this has been the work not of love, but of Kāma-passion, wrongly termed love. True love, however, is void of sensuousness, is divine in origin, in expression and in achievement, and such love has been the most constructive of all human emotions. It begets and sustains life, elevates and purifies life and secures the bliss of heaven on earth. It has formed the foundations of family life and has contributed, in a far richer measure than anything else, for human progress and civilisation. No wonder, then, it has always exercised the highest genius of man, and in every representation of human life at the hands of poets and dramatists throughout the world, this emotion has claimed the most important part. In the absence of this emotion man may, or may not, have been what he is today, but he would certainly have been the loser by many a work of art.

• Indian literary tradition has recognised the importance of love in human life even in the earliest phase of its existence. For, this figures as the central theme of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the source of its inspiration as well. Kālidāsa, the worthy descendant of Vālmīki, Vyāsa and Bhāsa, has only one theme in all his works—poems and dramas—*love* which in his eyes embraces both man and nature ; and this eminently human emotion he has depicted with consummate skill, not merely the joys of love in enjoyment and the sorrows

of love in separation, but also of its ultimate transformation from love of flesh to love of spirit. Love sprouts up only under certain specific conditions, particularly of health and wealth, bespeaking fullness and richness of life. In poverty and squalor, in anguish and sorrow, when mind is worried with problems of existence in, or exit from, the world, carnal passion may run riot as an instrument to help to forget one's worries, but the fair flower of love cannot blossom and radiate its fragrance around. No sensory enjoyment is, indeed, possible, when man's mind is worried or his body is sick. Here, then, we find the reason why literature represents the lover as being always above want and the beloved very fair, and both in the enjoyment of the best of health. Love, then, if it should be stable, must be based on a *complexus* of attractive qualities. It is engendered by a primary appeal to the principal senses, by the vision of a sweet form and by the music of a sweet voice ; it grows under the healthy conditions of character and conduct and of reciprocity of affection ; gains strength and permanency with the satisfaction of the senses, usually following possession and ownership of the object loved ; and finally becomes elevated when the *he* in the lover visualises the *she* in the beloved, i.e., when the appeal of the senses becomes replaced by the yearning of the spirit. And, if the course of love does not run smooth, there is, we may be sure, some flaw in conduct ; but, if it ends in a tragedy, it certainly bespeaks a failure in character. These and other phases of this ever exacting and ever exalting emotion, the prince of Indian bards has depicted for us in his works.

All the works of Kālidāsa, poems and dramas, deal with love. The *Mālavikāgnimitra* describes the attainment of the pleasures of love of a human couple. The *Vikramorvasya* advances one step further and sets forth the fullness of the joys of enjoyment as well as the madness of the sorrows of separation between a human and a nymph,

The *Śākuntala* presents to us the rare bliss of love, purified in the fire of repentance. The *Meghasandesa*, the perfectest gem of a love lyric, sets forth, in all its richness, the anguish of love in separation. The *Rtusambhāra* tells us that every season is equally congenial for love in enjoyment. The *Kumārasambhava* represents love as the victor of even the destroyer of Cupid, while the *Raghuvamśa* depicts the varied phases of love, both in enjoyment and in separation. In these varied works, then, the prince of India's bards has given us a rich and full exposition of love in its multifarious phases—love which brings together man and woman into a unified whole, which is conceived as *Ardhanārīśvara*, its significance and indivisibility being elucidated by the comparison to the union of *Pratyaya* and *Prakṛti*, or, in the words of the poet, वरवधूसमागमः प्रत्ययप्रकृतियोगसन्निभः. *Pratyaya* and *Prakṛti*, by themselves, have no significance and can discharge no function; they become expressive and eloquent and discharge their function in life only when united. Man and woman become expressive when united, but not when they stand independent: Expression of life is rendered possible only because of their union.

Love implies a union of two souls as closely as physical circumstances permit: it is thus an activity in which two souls are involved, who possess equal rights and who are equally interested in the furtherance of the activity, each of whom demands at the hands of the other, covertly or openly, equality of interest, equality of conduct and equality of treatment. Neither of the partners could, much less should, claim ownership and possession of the other as a matter of right and each should do unto the other as each should be done by. Each should beget the confidence of the other by kindness and generosity; create mutual interest by words and deeds; ensure reciprocity by solicitude; efface self-interest by self-surrender; and thus for ever and for ever enjoy the fair flower of love serene. If, however,

love should be elevated to higher heights, if it should take wings and soar into heaven, if it should for ever be a green shoot and not a dry stick, if it should function as a potent factor for the good of the individual and thus of the community, it should yield its legacy, namely the child. Thus alone can the union of two souls, each longing for the other, take permanent roots and grow into a tree yielding rich foliage and richer fruits. In the *Vikramorvaśya* and the *Śākuntala*, love in enjoyment begets its legacy, and the issues born thereof, Āyus and Bharata, have, for that very reason, to get themselves purified by life in spiritual abodes under the rigour of ascetic discipline. Compare with these the issues of *Sudakṣiṇā* and Dilīpa or of Pārvatī and Śiva. In these cases, union follows asceticism, and so the issues, Raghu and Kumāra, take upon themselves the duties which devolve upon them by virtue of birth. Difference also may be noticed, regarding the achievement of these two : Āyus, the son of Purūravas, carries on the traditions of the family ; Bharata, the son of Duṣṣyanta, evolves *Bhārata-varṣa* and the culture it stands for. Raghu finds a noble empire and prepares the way for Rāmarājya, while Kumāra saves the world from destruction and chaos. Thus greater and stronger the spiritual bias in which the children are born, the richer and the more enduring is their achievement. Only in the fullness and richness of love's union are great issues born, but the greatest are born, only when love flourishes and functions in a spiritual atmosphere. Has not this some valuable light to throw on heredity and capacity ?

Interesting, again, is the choice of partners in the varied love affairs described by Kālidāsa. The lover is not a novice, but is well-experienced in the art of love and has enjoyed the pleasures a woman can give. Thus Agni-mitra, when he makes love to Mālavikā, has his wedded queen, whose bond slave was his new flame. Purūravas

is a veteran in love affairs, his one absorbing source of sorrow being the absence of an issue to succeed him. Duṣṣyanta had a harem filled up with the fairest of the fair and he has also been longing for an issue. These, therefore, are presumably well-advanced in age—in any case, past the age of romance, if we may use a common expression. Yakṣa was semi-divine in origin, and, being what he is, must certainly be above *Ekaṣatmivrata*. Śiva is presented as a widower who was so much upset by the loss of his consort that he repaired to the Himalayan abodes for practising penance and asceticism. Thus, the majority of his heroes are past masters in the art of love, and they comprise among themselves gods and celestials, demi-gods and mortals. None of them has presumably come across the woman who would give him soul's satisfaction, and that is why he figures as a lover. Final and complete satiation comes with the satisfaction *not* of the senses, but of the soul.

The womenfolk, on the other hand, are all of them, naturally enough, *Mugdhās*, yet to have the experience of sex and its ramifications, except Urvaśī and Yakṣiṇī. Both these are semi-divine and are idolised by their lovers, and so far as the former is concerned, she is as much enamoured of her earthly lover, as if he was her first and only lover. Mālavikā, Śakuntalā and Pārvatī are fresh as flowers. Mālavikā is a princess born with all the fervour of youth and beauty and carried away by the glamour of the royal personality. Śakuntalā, born of a celestial nymph and possessed of the beauty of the morning star, is brought up under the guidance of Kaṇva in an atmosphere of asceticism, not unworthy of her father. She thus happily combines by virtue of heredity, glory of form and love of enjoyment, attaining development in the subdued influence of spirituality. In similar environments is Pārvatī brought up—in the glories of the Himālayan abodes, amidst sages and saints. Distinct from these stand Urvaśī, the great light of heaven,

always living a life of voluptuous ease and sensuous enjoyment. Here, then, are differences noticeable in the heroines. The dazzle of a royal court, breathing every material comfort, the simple beauty of a forest home and the serene grandeur of a mountain home, both bathed in spiritual discipline and ascetic rigour, the glories of Indra's court—such is the atmosphere in which Mālavikā, Śakuntalā, Pārvatī and Urvaśī are presented; and in their respective lovers they meet the man who alone could give them souls' satisfaction.

The sources of attraction which the heroines found in their respective lovers are also different, and these to some extent reveal their innate character and upbringing. Mālavikā is carried away by the physical charms of Agnimitra and the luxuries of his court; Urvaśī, by the valour and chivalry of Purūravas; Śakuntalā, by the dignity and regal bearing of Duṣṣyānta, with whom she falls in love, even before she knows he was a king; and Pārvatī, by Śiva's spiritual greatness, but more by his infinite capacity for loving. In other words, personal charms, chivalrous conduct, regal bearing, greatness of spirit—these form the immediate sources of attraction which draw the woman folk to their respective lovers. So far as the lovers are concerned, first comes, as is always the case, rare physical charms, but they desire the retention of their love for entirely other reasons. Agnimitra struggles through for undisturbed possession solely through the desire for physical enjoyment, and his wedded queen makes a virtue of necessity by permitting their union,—indeed a clear instance of the transformation of *sex-feeling* into *maternal-feeling*. Such also is the motive of Purūravas—the continued enjoyment of divine pleasure with Urvaśī, but, in his case, egoism becomes lifted, when he is finally united with Urvaśī. In this case also, his wedded queen has her *sex-feeling* metamorphosed into *maternal-feeling*. Sensuous ego-

ism is, again, the fundamental motive of Yakṣa. He is anxious for the safety of his beloved, so that he might continue, as of old, to enjoy the bliss of love for ever and ever after the period of his curse. On an entirely different footing stands the love of Duṣṣyanta. He longs for reunion not so much for regaining the source of pleasure he has lost, rather forfeited, but to make amends for his cruel conduct in rejecting his beloved. Here is an essential difference in the love treatment in the *Śākuntala*, and this in no small measure accounts for its unique greatness.

Noticeable also is the cause of the *Vipralambha*, which the lovers suffer. Purūravas suffers, because even while engrossed in sensory enjoyment, he casts loving glances at another, and Urvaśī forgets her celestial character and behaves just like an ordinary woman: in other words, this couple suffers from insatiety. Duṣṣyanta suffers from the curse of Durvāsā, but even this resulted in Śākuntalā's being too much engrossed in memories of the bliss of love in enjoyment which makes her forget the duties entrusted to her. Yakṣa suffers separation through over-indulgence which makes him forget his duty towards his leige lord. In all these instances we find a failure in duty, resulting from too much of attachment—failure of domestic duty, of social duty, and of official duty. Failure of duty must have its inexorable result. Offence results from too much of attachment to the object of love and, therefore, punishment involves separation from one's beloved, thus presenting a perfect correlation of offence and punishment, which is suggestive of the early retributive phase of punishment. It is of some interest to notice here that failure in domestic or social duty is more serious than failure in official duty and hence while Yakṣa's separation is limited by time, that of Purūravas and Duṣṣyanta is left undefined. And, indeed, it has to be pointed out that these two become reunited

with their beloved, when they have purified themselves in the fire of repentance.

The varied phases of love, both in its higher and lower forms are, again, represented in a series of striking pictures in the poet's great Epic poem, the *Raghuvamśa*. Compare, for instance, the highly spiritualised love of Dilīpa and Sudakṣiṇā and the noble fruit of their love, namely Raghu, presented in the opening cantos and the life of licentious dissipation of Agnivarṇa, with which the poem closes ; as a result of which the great royal family was forced to leave Rāmarājya and all that it stood for to the safe custody of a child in the womb of the widowed queen. The former creates an empire, but the latter not merely destroys the empire, but also all the cultural traditions it has so laboriously built up in the course of centuries. The elevated love of Dilīpa has its counterpart in the description of the rich and full love in enjoyment of Aja and Indumatī, which, as the sequel hath it, ends in a tragedy, as such love necessarily must. The dissipation of Agnivarṇa is preceded by the highest ideal of marital love of Rāma and Sītā, which has conquered not merely space but also time. But the sequel shows that even Rāmarājya is not proof against love's dissipation.

A question may here be asked : If the aim of the poet has been to picture love in its varied phases of the joys of enjoyment and the sorrows of separation and its transformation from love of flesh to love of spirit, why depict so many pairs of lovers, why repeat apparently similar love situations? We have already given an answer to this question : they represent different types and different degrees of moral development. The question admits of an answer also from the point of view of readers. They are all of them embryonic lovers, or lovers passing through similar experiences at least in imagination, each with his own likes and dislikes and possessed of different outlook on life and divergent

sense of values and ideals of beauty. If, therefore, the poet has given us different pairs of lovers, if he has depicted different circumstances in which their love matures and ascends from the physical to the spiritual, it is to make a wider appeal and thus enable people of divergent temperaments to realise, each in his own way, the essential nature of this eminently human emotion, both in its finer and grosser phases. No two readers picture the same heroine alike and no reader pictures different heroines alike. The Śakuntalā I picture is distinctly different from the Śakuntalā others picture, and my Śakuntalā is quite different from my Pārvatī. Here we get the secret of varied representations of of similiar love-facets. The poet is solicitous of exalting the love capacities of all of us alike, despite our individualistic differences. Compare, for instance, the *Rativilāpa* in the *Kumārasambhava* and the *Ajavilāpa* in the *Raghuvamśa*, the *Vipralambha* in the *Meghasandēśa*, the *Vikramorvaśya* and the *Śākuntala*, and the *Sambhoga* in all these as well as in the *Mālavikāgnimitra*. In *Ajavilāpa* we have the outpourings of the anguished heart of a man, while in *Rativilāpa* we have presented the broken heart of a woman. To the former life has lost its charms, but to the latter, life is at an end. Indeed, the one complements the other, and the two together show the completeness of the void that love can create in human life. The *Vipralambha* portrayed in different works are, as we have already pointed out, differently described and motived, and so, while we pity Purūravas and sympathise with Yakṣa, our hearts go out towards Duṣṣyanta. There are, no doubt, repetitions—and indeed who would or could avoid them—in the description of love in enjoyment also, but there are also at the same time essential differences, as much as there are in human practices under the influence of this maddening passion. The grabbing sensuousness of Agnimitra, the self-surrendering love of Purūrayas, the chastened love of Duṣṣyanta, the aesthetic

love of Śiva, the mad love of Aja, the serene love of Rāma, the lascivious love of Agnivarṇa—who would not find differences in these? God, demi-god and man—all are moved, more or less alike, under the storm and stress of love.

And lastly, the love that Kālidāsa depicts blossoms only in unison with nature. He has throughout his works evinced an infinite capacity for connecting with this premier human emotion every phase of animate and inanimate nature, terrestrial, atmospheric and celestial. Towns and cities, hills and valleys, mountains and rocks, rivers and seas, clouds and winds, the sun and the moon and the stars, day and night, light and shadow, thunder and lightning, trees and creepers, flowers and shoots, birds and beasts—all these figure as fully and closely as man and woman. Duṣṣyanta's love blossoms only in the serene beauties of Kaṇva's hermitage; that of Purūravas, in aerial regions amidst clouds and mountain peaks, not unworthy of the celestial nymph; that of Agnimitra in his palace gardens; that of Aja on the banks of the Sarayū; that of Śiva amidst the glories of the Himālayas; Dilīpa's love fructifies only in the hermitage of Vaśiṣṭha and Rāma enjoys the full bliss of domestic felicity on the banks of the Godāvarī while Yakṣa enjoys the bliss of love at Alakā amidst the glories of Mt. Kailāśa. Thus, the love that Kālidāsa depicts never blossoms within closed doors. Neither does it suffer indoors. The disowned Śakuntalā finds solace in the Āśrama of Mārīca; Sītā abandoned by Rāma gains asylum in the hermitage of Vālmiki; Urvaśī retreats in her wounded pride to Kumāravana and there becomes converted into a creeper; Śiva resorts to a Himālayan Tapovana to seek solace after the loss of his first wife, and Yakṣa seeks Rāmagīryāśrama to spend his year of exile. Thus the romance of love is intimately connected with the romance of nature, and in the fusion of the two alone does human life attain perfection; in their unison we have the romance of life. The

works of Kālidāsa, then, help a cleansing of the human soul ; not merely that, but instil an overflowing love of nature and a profound feeling for the beautiful. There is nothing ugly in nature, as there is nothing ugly in man. The whole earth, animate and inanimate, is beautiful, whatever be the aspect noticed.

To conclude : Eternal is the theme of love, which throbs in every form of life and which spurs all life to activity ; and it is as old as life itself. The immortal works of Kālidāsa, alive with the beauty of form and infused with spiritual grace, present unto us the varied phases of love, as it swells and surges in human breasts. Indeed, the poet would have it that the beauty of soul can be grasped only through the realisation of the beauty of body. If soul's liberation from oppressive moods is the end of religion, herein has the poet visualised for us a way of release from the mundane ills of life—a method that has been practised by the Gopīs of old in the sylvan beauties of Br̥ndāvana, when they made love for Kṛṣṇa the sole instrument of *Mokṣa*, the mode which has become popular in the Gōpī-Kṛṣṇa cult. The prince of Indian bards is thus only too true, to the traditions of the land, when he enthrones love and elevates it as the supreme ideal for all humanity to follow. In any case we know—and it is within the experience of all of us—that when one begins to love one puts oneself at one's best in body and mind, in words and deeds, becomes filled with love and sweetness and sees only beauty everywhere. Let us, then, learn the lesson that Kālidāsa has handed down to us through his works :

Love forms beautiful ; Love actions beautiful ; Love notions beautiful ; And through love visualise Beauty absolute—Godhead Supreme.

KĀYAM RĀSO, A NEW SOURCE OF MEDIEVAL INDIAN HISTORY

BY DASHARATHA SHARMA

THE manuscript of the *Kāyam Rāso* was discovered at Fatehpur, Jaipur State, by my friend Mr. Agar Chand Nahta of Bikaner. Originally, it described the history of the Kāyam Khānī chiefs of Fatehpur up to V. 1691; but in V. 1710 the author, who was the uncle of the then reigning chief Sardār Khān, added to it the life and achievements of his brother and Sardār Khān's father, Daulat Khān II. As the manuscript is not without considerable historical value, being based partly on personal testimony and partly on an old historical poem, we summarise here its contents for the reader of the *Journal*.

As the Kāyam Khānīs are Cauhān Rājputīs converted to Islām, Jān Kavi, the author of the poem, naturally begins with their genealogy. But curiously enough, he begins not with Brahmā, as most Indian genealogies generally do, but with Adam, the first man created by God. Āda or Ādi was the son of Adam's twelfth Semitic descendant. Then followed Anādi, Jugādi, Meru, Brahmādi, Mandira, Kailāsa, Samudra, Phenā, Vāsaga, Rāha, Rāvaṇa, Dhundhumāra, and Marīca. This Marīca's son was Jamadagni, and Jamadagni's son was the famous Paraśurāma whose grandson Vacha (Vatsa) was the grandfather of Cahuvāṇa. Our manuscript thus agrees with the Bijoliā inscription in giving a Brāhmaṇa origin to the gallant Cauhāns, though, perhaps, without being conscious of it. It has just put before us the tradition of the origin of the Cauhāns as it was known to the Kāyam Khānīs, without any attempt to take their

genealogy to the Sun or the Moon, and in this lies its great value.

Of Cahuvāṇa's descendants, the most famous, according to our MS., were Mānikade, Ānā, Bisal, Prthvirāja, and Hammira. In the direct line of the Kāyam Khāni chiefs, the names listed up to Kāyam Khān are Cahuvāṇa, Muni, Bhopāl, Kalanga, Ghangharāja, Kāṇharade, Amarā, Jevaṛā, Bairasī, Udairāja, Jasarāja, Kerorāi, Vijairāja, Padmaṣī, Prithirāja, Lālachanda, Gopāla, Jaitasī, Punapāla, Rūpa, Rāvaṇa, Tihūṇapāla and Moṭerāya. Moṭerāya was the ruler of Dadrewā, now a village of some importance in the Bikaner State. His son Karam Chand was carried away by Sultān Firoz Shāh (1351-1388)¹ to Hissar, converted to Islam, and named Kāyam Khān.

Kāyam Khān.

Kāyam Khān was brought up and educated by a Muslim *Amir* who made him the head of his family, even though he had other sons of his own. So great was the trust reposed by the Emperor Firoz in Kāyam Khān that he left the latter in charge of Delhi when he himself proceeded against Thātṭa. When the Mughals attacked Delhi in the Emperor's absence, hoping to find it an easy prey, Kāyam Khān beat them back with great slaughter and was, for his bravery, given the title of Khān Jahān.² He was equally a favourite of Muhammad (1389-1392) and Mahmud (1392-1394).³ On the death of the next ruler Nāsir Khān (Naṣrat Shāh), he came into conflict

¹ The dates are mine.

² The statement is of doubtful veracity. No doubt, Khān-i-Jahān, the minister of Firoz Shāh, who was left in charge of Delhi, during his master's absence at Thātṭah, was also a Hindu convert. But there is nothing to prove that he was our Kāyam Khān. According to *Shams-i-Sirāj Afīf*, the real Khān-i-Jahān died in 770 H., i.e., 1368 A.D. Kāyam Khān perhaps lived on to 1414 A.D., the year of Saiyyad Khidr Khān's accession.

³ The dates are mine.

with Mallū Khān, an old slave of Fīroz Shāh, who had become all-powerful at Delhi and usurped the throne. Mallū Khān was even believed to have hastened the death of his master by poisoning him.⁴

In the meanwhile Timūr had invaded India. Mallū Khān tried to oppose him and was defeated. Timūr occupied Delhi and made it over to Khidr Khān before leaving for Kabul. Mallū Khān tried to recapture the city but was defeated and slain by Khidr Khān.⁵

Khidr Khān now tried to subjugate the rest of the country. He sent Mojdīn (Muizuddīn) of Rohtak and Jhajjar, the Governor of Lahore, against Kāyam Khān who had made himself master of Hissār. Kāyam Khān defeated and slew Mojdīn and, shortly after, allying himself with another Khidr Khān, the Governor of Multān, marched against Khidr Khān Pathān of Delhi.⁶ On the way they slew Rāthod Chūdā of Nāgor.⁷ They were successful also at Delhi. But the good relations between the two friends did not last long. (Saiyyad) Khidr Khān, getting jealous of Kāyam Khān's power, had him treacherously pushed off into a river. So ended the life of the brave Kāyam Khān.

Tāj Khan.

Kāyam Khān had five sons of whom the eldest was Tāj Khan. He paid homage neither to Khidr Khān nor

⁴ The *Rāso* makes Mallū Khān a minister of Nasrat Shāh. He was certainly so for some time. But for the greater part of his career he was in the service of Nasrat's rival Mahmūd.

⁵ The actual facts are a bit different, though Mallū Khan, no doubt, died fighting against Khidr Khān. It was not Khidr Khān who marched against Delhi; rather, it was Mallū who marched against Multān and was slain in the defensive action fought by the Saiyyad Governor in 1405 A.D.

⁶ The *Rāso* here appears to have got confused between the names Khidr Khān and Daulat Khān Pathān. It was actually the latter who was defeated by Khidr Khān, the Governor of Multān.

⁷ The fact is vouched for by *Rāo Jaitsī ro Chand* (*Bibliotheca Indica*).

to his successors Mubārak Shāh, Muhammad, son of Farīd, Alāuddin, and Mubārak's son Amānat Khān.⁸ Next came Bahlol Lodī.⁹ Instead of submitting to him, the two brothers, Tāj Khān and Muhammad, took service with their relative Firoz Khān of Nāgor. When the Khān invaded the territory of Rāṇa Mokāl of Mewār, the two brothers accompanied him, and continued fighting even when the Khān himself had run away.¹⁰ Their success, however, instead of pleasing the Khān, turned him against them, and the two brothers thought it best to leave Nāgor. The Khān of Nāgor pursued them. In the fight that followed Tāj Khān was badly wounded and left for dead in the field and Muhammad took to flight. Some Rāṭhors, finding Tāj Khān alive, had him cured and then sent to Hissār where he continued his victorious career and plundered Khetri, Kharkharā, Bohānā, Pāṭan, Amer, Revāsā and Gawargarh.

Fateh Khān.

Tāj Khān was succeeded by his eldest son Fateh Khān. Finding it difficult to continue at Hissar on account of Bahlol Lodī's enmity, he founded the town of Fatehpur and made it his capital on the 5th of the bright half of Caitra, V. 1508. He built also the forts of Palhū, Bhādra, Sahebā and Bhārang. Towards the middle of

⁸ I do not know of any Amānat Khān. The order of succession is otherwise quite correct.

⁹ If we take into account Bahlol's career as the ruler of Delhi only, Tāj Khān was not certainly his contemporary. Bahlol succeeded to the throne in V. 1508, the year of the foundation of Fatehpur in the time of Tāj Khān's son Fateh Khan. The other events, too, listed under Tāj Khān took place before the establishment of the Lodī dynasty.

¹⁰ This testimony of a third party about Mokāl's success is of value.

his reign, however, he submitted to Bahlol whom he helped in defeating Hishāmuddīn of Māṇḍū.¹¹

Some other achievements credited to him are the defeat of the Mewātīs at Dhoṣī, slaying of Mushki Khān Kirnāni at Sirsā, plunder of Āmer, and the defeat of the Jātūs of Bhiwanī and Ajā Sānkhālā.

Shams Khān, the son of Tāj Khān's brother, had, in the meantime, established a principality of his own at Jhūnjhaṇū. He had very good relations with Jodhā, the founder of Jodhpur, and gained the friendship of Bhalol Lodī by giving him his sister in marriage and marrying the Lodī ruler's daughter to his own son.

Jalāl Khān.

Fateh Khān's son Jalāl Khān enlarged the fort of Fatehpur by building a large gate. He defeated the Mughal, Chaupan Khān, a general of Nāgor, and plundered Chānpolī and Amer.

On the death of Shams Khān, the ruler of Jhūnjhaṇū, his son Fateh Khān, the son-in-law of Bahlol, succeeded to the chiefship of Jhūnjhaṇū. He drove out the other claimant Mubārak who, after appealing in vain to Bīkā and Bīdā,¹² took refuge at Fatehpur. Jalāl seated him on the throne of Jhūnjhaṇū.

Jalāl, not being on good terms with the Nāgorīs, had gone to Luhāgar to have offensive operations against them. In his absence Bīdā occupied Fatehpur with the help of Dilāwār Khān Pathān. As soon as the news reached Jalāl's camp, his son Dulat Khān started for Fatehpur and easily recaptured it by a surprise attack.

¹¹ I do not know of any Hishāmuddīn of Māṇḍū. Bahlol had to fight against Malwā. Hishāmuddīn may have been the name of some general of the Māṇḍū kingdom.

¹² Bīkojī was the founder of the Bikaner State and Bidojī was his younger brother.

Daulat Khān

Daulat Khān did not submit to Lūn Karan of Bīkāner who, after a while, was killed in the fight with Turkomans at Dhosi. Babar is said to have visited India *incognito* at the time. He found that India had three great men, Sikandar Lodī at Delhi, Hasan Khān Mewāṭī at Alwar, and Daulat Khān at Fatehpur. Daulat Khān defeated Tanwar Mān, Muhabbat Khān Sarkhānī of Hissar, and the Gaur-Nirbānas who had plundered Nāgor.

Daulat Khan, like his father, interfered in the affairs of Jhūnjhaṇū. He put Mahabat Khān on the throne of Jhūnjhaṇū by defeating the reigning chief Bhikhan Khān, a grandson of Mubārak Khān.

Nāhar Khān.

Nāhar Khān, the next chief, was on good terms with the Bīkāner family, and was a favourite of Sher Shāh Sūr of Delhi. He gave him alkaline ash, a valuable product of his principality. In V. 1593, he built a palace at Fatehpur.

About this time, the Rāṇā of Mewār invaded Nāgor, Gāngo, of Jodhpur, Sūjo of Āmarsar, Jaitsī of Bīkāner and Nāhar Khān sided with the Khān of Nāgor. The Rāṇā was defeated and pursued back into his territory. But near Makrānā, Jagnāl Panwār, the Rāṇā's deputy at Ajmer, faced the victorious allied armies. Such was his apparent strength that the Khān of Nāgor left the field, and Jaitsī, Sūjo, and the Āmer ruler thought it best to return to their respective States. Nāhar Khān alone stood fast, caring little what would happen, and won a great victory.¹³

¹³ The Rāṇā of Mewār at the time was probably Vikramāditya. The account is highly exaggerated.

Fadan Khān.

Nāhar Khān's successor, Fadan Khān, was a favourite of Islām Shah Sūr. Humāyun favoured him, and Akbar honoured him in spite of Bīrbal's opposition. He gave his daughter in marriage to the Mughal Emperor Akbar and stood surety for the good faith of the Hindus. It was through his intercession that Rāisāl became a Darbārī at the Mughal Court.

Nearer home, he defeated Bīdāwat marauders and burnt Chānpoli and Pūnkh. He was succeeded by Tāj Khān.

Tāj Khān II.

Tāj Khān plundered Sārā and Kharkharā, and the fort of Yedal Khān. Having defeated Mālik Tāj he put in disorder the affairs of the *thānā* of Raiwārī. His son Muḥammad Khān was a good warrior. His death, in the prime of his life, came as a great shock to the old chief.

Alif Khān.

Alif Khān, the next chief, was the grandson of Tāj Khān. Akbar confirmed him in the possession of Fatehpur, and *Shikdār* Sher Khān helped him by driving out Shyamdās, son of Gopāl Kacchawāha. Alif Khān introduced his relative Shams Khān of Jhūnjhaṇū to Akbar and had a *mansab* conferred on him.

Alif Khān's first expedition was against Kāngrā. He and Jagat Singh¹⁴ captured the stronghold of Dhamehari and subdued the adjacent territory. Raja Tilok Chand submitted and was taken to the Emperor.¹⁵ Next Alif

¹⁴ Probably a Kaccawāhā chief.

¹⁵ This refers to Akbar's last expedition against Kāngrā,
F. 6

Khān was sent against the Rāṇā of Mewār. Salīm, who was in command of the Mughal forces, put him in charge of the *thānā* of *Sādrī*. Both Alif Khān and his relative Shams Khān proved zealous in their work and received the commendation of the Prince by building a platform with the heads of the enemy.¹⁶

On Akbar's death, Jahāngīr renewed the grant of Fatehpur. During his reign Alif Khān quelled many serious disturbances. Going with Rāi Manohar, he subdued the Mews of Mewāt. A more difficult task was that of meeting the rising of Dalpat Singh of Bikāner who had defeated Jyāndī Khān at Sirsā. Jehangīr sent against him Alif Khān, twenty other Omrāhs and Shaikh Kabīr.¹⁷ At Sirsā the Omrāhs quarrelled with Alif Khān over the question of water. Had not Shaikh Kabīr intervened, there would have been a good deal of bloodshed. Alif Khān, who was in the vanguard, overtook the fleeing Dalpat Singh at Bhāṭhu, now a town in the Hissār district, and made him submit to Jahāngīr.¹⁸

Next, Alif Khān proceeded against the Jāṭs from whom he captured Bhiwānī. Pleased by his good work, the Emperor made him the *faujdar* of Mewāt, from where he was transferred after some time to the Deccan to take part in the expedition against Malik Ambar. Prince Parvez put him in charge of the *thānā* of Malikpur, and fixed his own quarters at Ādilātād proceeding whence he captured Yāmanātād. Somewhat later other Mughal generals, Khan Jakān Loṇī, Abdullā Jakhmī, Mānsingh Kachawākā and Rāthor Rāy Singh also reached the Dec-

¹⁶ The events refer to Salīm's expedition against Mewār in 1599 A.D.

¹⁷ Shaikh Kabīr, styled also Shajāt Khān, was a descendant of Shaikh Salīm Chasti. He held high office with distinction in Bengal.

¹⁸ For further details see *Tuzuk-i-Jahāngīrī*, English translation by Rogers and Beveridge, I, pp. 258-259.

can. But they did not fare well in the fight against Malik Ambar. Though Abdullā fought bravely,¹⁹ he was defeated and forced to retreat to Burhānpur. Outposts were given up one after the other; Alif Khān alone held on to Malikāpur in spite of the continued attacks of the Deccanis.

From Malikāpur Alif Khān was sent against the Bhils. He captured Papilak, Jalābpur and Fatihpur, and received an increase in his *mansab*.

Nearer home, Alif Khān's son, Daulat Khān, curbed the predatory activities of the Bidāwats, and proved successful also in the *jāgirs* of Paṭaudā and Rasūlpur which were assigned to him on the condition that he brought them under full subjection to the Imperial authority. The earlier *jagirdars*, Rāna Sagar²⁰ and Rāi Singh, had been driven out by the predatory Kachawāhās who cared little for Imperial orders. Daulat Khān defeated their leaders Mādho, Narhar, and Nāhar; Girdhar's son Gokul submitted without any fighting. Pleased with Daulat Khān's services Jehāngir granted to him Udaipur Bāruwō, which he occupied by driving out its occupant Alakhān.

Alif Khān was about this time summoned from the Deccan and made once again the *faujdar* of Mewāt. The Mughal power in the Deccan, however, needed him. So he was sent back there.

• Jahangir was determined to reduce Kāngra. Sūraj-māl²¹ had raised no inconsiderable disturbance in the

¹⁹ A historian would rather say that he fought rashly, for the defeat of the Mughals was largely due to his over-confidence. Abdullā was defeated by Malik Ambar in 1611 A.D.

²⁰ He was the uncle of Rājā Amar Singh of Mewār and was, for a time, one of the claimants to the Sisodiā throne.

²¹ He was the son of Rājā Basu and had been sent there on behalf of the Emperor. He, however, proved, a traitor and had to be put down by Vikramājīt, one of the good commanders of Jehangir and for long one of his most trusted chiefs.

region near Kāngra. Alif Khān and Vikramājīṭ drove him out of Nūrpur, which was left in charge of the former. Vikramājīṭ advanced upon Kangrā, but returned to his base after having arranged a rather unsatisfactory compromise. It was now Alif Khan's turn to be active. He reduced Kahlūr, and, on Vikramajit's settlement being disapproved by Jahāngīr, advanced upon Kāngrā itself and captured it. Jehāngīr increased Alif Khān's *mansab* and, when he (the Emperor) visited Kāngrā, showed further his favour by presenting the Kāyamkhānī chief with horses and elephants. From Kāngrā the Emperor went to Kāshmir.

Alif Khān reduced also Thāṭṭa²² and put down the mountaineers' rising, after Sādik Khān had proved unsuccessful. Next he reduced the Lakhī jungle. When Alif Khān reached Kasūr, Bhāṭī Mansūr submitted to Jahāngīr Bātūs and Dogrās fled away, and on his reaching Pākpaṭṭan by way of Chihunī and Depālpur, Bahādur Khān Dhūḍhī offered his submission, and all the surrounding territory began paying taxes.

On the death of Sardār Khān the hillmen rebelled. Alif Khān was therefore sent to Kāngrā. He captured Kahlūr, Mandī, Suket, and Sikandrā. But this time, the opposing forces instead of melting away slowly gathered strength and Alif Khān soon found himself opposed by the forces of Jagat Singh Paidhāniā, Bishambhar Candhyāl, Candrabhān of Gaḍhabhon, and Fatūj Sawāl. A fight of six days put their leader Jagat Singh to flight. But, as luck would have it, Sādik Khān recalled a part of the Mughal forces. As soon as the hillsmen heard the news they returned in still greater force. With himself in the centre and Rūpacand and Bāso Daḍhwāl on

²² Thāṭṭa is not the town of this name in Sindh, but a fort in the hilly region near Kāngrā.

the sides, the brave Alif Khān attacked them. But it was fighting against very big odds. His allied commanders ran away. So Alif Khān alone continued the contest, and fell on the field covered with the mantle of glory. Others who died with him were Sahm Khān, Kamāl, Nathā, Jamāl, Bhikhan, Bahlol, Lāḍu, Peroj, Daulā, Abū, Sikandar, Sarif, Ūdā, Partā, Chaturbhuj, Manihardās, Juhārdas, Jagā, Manohardās and Mohan.

Alif Khān's had been a long and successful life. He had gone from one *mansab* to another. Twice he had been in the Deccan, thrice in Mewāt, twice in Mewār, four times in Kāngrā; three times he had defeated the Kach-wāhās, once he had been to the Lakhī jungle and forced its people to pay tribute, and he had conquered also Bhi-wānī and Thaṭṭah. He died in V. 1683 and was very soon worshipped as a *pīr*.

In V. 1691 the author wrote this narrative on the basis of an old *kavitta*.

Daulat Khān. II.

Daulat Khān was made the Governor of Kāngrā on the death of his father. He had to meet the disturbances consequent on the death of the Emperor Jahāngīr, and received an increase in *mansab* from the new Emperor Shah Jāhān for having steadfastly held to his post.

Shāh Jahān conferred also a *mansab* on Daulat Khān's son Tāhar Khān. He was at Agra when Amar Singh of Nāgor killed Salābat Khān. Shāh Jahān assigned Nāgor to Tāhar Khān who, going there with a big army from Fatehpur, captured it without any serious opposition.

Daulat Khān too came for a while to Nāgor. From here he was sent to Peshāwar. When the Junior Prince, Murād, went and captured Balkh²³. Daulat Khān accom-

²³ In 1646 A.D.

panied him. He was in the Uzbek territory also with the other Prince,²⁴ Diwān Rustam Khān, and Daulat Khān. Tāhar Khān, the eldest son of Daulat Khān, who was in attendance on the Prince at Balkh, died about this time and great was the sorrow of Daulat Khān.

From Balkh the Mughals returned to Afghanistan. Shah Jahān now sent an army to capture Kandhār. Daulat Khān fought bravely and has some success.²⁵ But with the coming of winter, Mughal difficulties increased and they had to fall back on Kābul.²⁶ Even though the siege was reopened on the receipt of re-inforcements from India the Mughals had no success; the Persian Army of Shāh Abbas held its ground.²⁷ Daulat Khān died of fever in V. 1710 while the siege was being prosecuted.

Sardār Khān.

The next chief of Fatehpur was Sardār Khān, the grandson of Daulat Khān. The Rāso ends with the writer's good wishes for him and Fadan Khān.

* * * *

We have summarised above the main facts of the Rāso. As the Kāyam Khānī chiefs with whose life it deals were almost throughout connected with the rulers of Delhi, the sidelight that this work throws on Imperial history is far from unimportant or uninteresting. That Alif Khān's son had to proceed against Kachawāhās of Paṭaudā and Rasūlpur, and Alif Khān himself had more than once to chastise the Mewātīs and to put down the

²⁴ The other Prince was Aurangzeb who had been sent there in 1647 on account of Murad's carelessness.

²⁵ The success must actually be ascribed to his leader Rustam Khān.

²⁶ 1649 A.D.

²⁷ Second siege by Aurangzeb. 1652 A.D. For details see Sir J. N. Sarkar's *Aurangzeb*, Vol I.

Fāṭūs of Bhiwāñi are, for instance, fairly instructive facts for a student of Mughal administration. And, then, *Rāso* is not also without considerable literary value. We give below a few verses culled at random from the book to show that its author, Jān, was no mere versifier.

बांकै बांकैही बने, देखहु जियहि विचार ।
 जो बांकी करवार हूँ, तो बांको परवार ॥
 बांकै सों सूघो मिलै, तो नाहिंन ठहराइ ।
 ज्यों कमान कबि जान कहि, बानहि देत चलाई ॥
 कहा भयो कबि जान कहि, बैरी बकी कुबात ।
 कब के गिर गिर कहत हैं, पर गिर ना गिर जात ॥
 सूर-बीर अरु मीन जल, इनको येक सुभाइ ।
 तरफि तरफि दोऊ मरै, जो पानी घटि जाइ ॥
 रहे न केहूँ हीन जल, सहे न दोऊ गार ।
 सूर-बीर पुनि बीर को, पानी ही सों प्यार ॥
 येक बात कबि जान कहि, बढ़्यो मीन तें सूर ।
 भीन मरै पानी घटे, सूर मरै जल पूर ॥
 खेत माहि जो मरि पड़े, है ताहि को खेत ।
 जाके पाइ न छूटि है, जैत दई तिह देत ॥

The following lines about Tāhar Khan's death at Balkh also deserve being put before our readers :—

मरि करि ताहरखान जू, हितवन यह दत्त दीन ।
 नैन बहन हिरद दहन, मनहि गहन तन छीन ॥
 प्यारे ताहरखान बिन, क्यों करि है मन गाढ़ ।
 उन डाइन बैरन बलख, लियो करेजा काढ़ ॥
 धर्मराज कैसे कहूँ, कौन धर्म यहु आहि ।
 काटतु ऐसी कलपतर, कृपा न उपजि काहि ॥
 ताहरखाँ बिनु चित्त को, चिंता भई असंख ॥
 चन्द्रकान्ति मन भाँति नित, चुयो करत है अंख ॥
 सुज्जन दृग अरहट घटी, भरि भरि ढरि ढरि जाहि ।
 दुर्जन विहरत फिरत है, दसन अघर रस माँहि ॥
 मरन पूत कौ सुन पिता, कैसे धीर धरंत ।
 रोवनहार ही रोइये, यहु दुख आहि अनंत ॥

THE FIVE PROVISIONAL DEFINITIONS OF VYĀPTI (VYĀPTIPĀÑCAKA) IN GAṄGEŚA

BY TARA SANKAR BHATTACHARYA

(Continued from page 88)

LET us again take the same inference, it has existence, as it is a universal, in which the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is determined not by the relation of knowledge-hood but by the relation of partial extensity. Here the relations determining the major term and the middle term are inference and selfsameness respectively, as in the previous case. The middle term again is substratum-hood of the universal and the major term is existence. Now the substratum of the negation of the major term, in the relation of partial extensity, is knowledge. For the other name for the relation of partial extensity is location determined by the substratum of the negation of the counter positive itself (svābhāvavat-vṛttitva). In the inference under discussion, the same counterpositive is the term non-existence (the negation of the major term) and the negation of the counterpositive is, therefore, existence. The substratum of existence again is substance, quality and action to which knowledge stands in the relation of object-hood (Viṣayatā). Hence non-existence has knowledge as its substratum in the relation of location determined by the substratum of the negation of the counterpositive itself or the relation of partial extensity. Now location determined by knowledge in the relation of selfsameness can be found also in the substratum-hood of the universal which is the middle term. Hence, the definition fails.

But if the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is taken in the relation of selfsameness, then the defini-

tion succeeds. In the inference, it has quality, as it has knowledge, the substratum of the negation of the major term quality, in the relation of selfsameness, can be substance, action, universality, particularity and inherence, but not quality, as the negation of quality does not exist in quality. Now existence determined by the categories, excepting quality, in the relation determining the middle term, which is inherence in this case, is negated in the middle term knowledge, knowledge being a quality. Thus, the definition escapes from the fault of narrowness.

Similarly, in the inference, it has existence as it is a universal, the substratum of non-existence (the negation of the major term), in the relation of selfsameness, is particularity, inherence and negation, for existence does not inhere in them. The relation determining the major term is again inherence. Hence particularity, inherence and negation have non-existence-as-determined-by-the-relation-of-inherence through the relation of selfsameness. Now the middle term is substratum-hood of the universal in the relation of selfsameness. The location determined by particularity, inherence and negation is negated in it (the middle term) in the relation of selfsameness, as these are not the same as the substratum-hood of the universal. Hence the definition applies to this inference.

Thus the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, in the definition, should be considered in the relation of selfsameness. But objection may be raised (from the standpoint of the Old School)²³ that there are cases where the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is not determined by the relation of selfsameness and yet a

²³ According to the Old School the negation of negation or double negation is affirmation. The New School, on the contrary, takes double negation to be a case of positive negation, since the negation of negation is formally a negation, but materially an affirmation. Thus the negation of the negation of the jar is the jar which is a positive negation.

correct Vyāpti is available. Consider, for example, the inference, it has the absolute negation of jar-hood, as it is the cloth. Here the major term is "the absolute negation of jar-hood." The negatron of the major term is the negation of the negation of jar-hood, i.e., the affirmation, 'jar-hood.' To get the substratum of the non-existence of the major term in the relation of selfsameness, we must have jar-hood substrated in the relation of selfsameness. But jar-hood, being a generic attribute, bears the relation of inherence to its substratum and not selfsameness. Hence the definition is inadequate for such an inference, if the relation determining the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is selfsameness.

Likewise, the definition fails in the inference, it has the mutual negation of jar, as it is the cloth. For the negation of the major term, "mutual negation of the jar," implies the affirmation, 'the jar,' and the jar does not exist in the relation of selfsameness in its substratum.

The answer of Mathurānātha to this objection of the Old School is that the latter's conception of the nature of double negation is unacceptable. For according to the Old School the absolute negation of absolute negation is the counter positive or affirmation, so also the absolute negation of mutual negation. But this view is erroneous. The absolute negation of the absolute negation of a thing is also a negation. The negation of the negation is formally a negation and not an affirmation. Likewise the negation of mutual negation is also formally a negation. The negation of the negation of the cloth is of course the cloth, but it is none the less a negation. It, therefore, is a positive negation (Bhāvarūpyabhāva).

Viewed in this light, the inference, it has the absolute negation of jar-hood, as it is the cloth, or the inference, it has the mutual negation of the jar, as it is the cloth, comes within the scope of the definition, even when the

substratum of the non-existence of the major term is taken in the relation of selfsameness. For the negation of the absolute negation of jar-hood or the mutual negation of the jar is also a negation, and, in the relation of selfsameness, the substratum of the last negation is jar-hood or the jar itself. Now existence determined by the jar or jar-hood does not exist in the cloth. Hence the definition is not frustrated.

But even if the view of the Old School, with regard to double negation, is accepted to be correct, the relations determining the substratum of the negation of the major term can be determined. This substratum is determined by different relations in different cases. In the inference, the hill has fire, as it has smoke, the relation determining the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is selfsameness; in the inferences, it has the absolute negation of jar-hood, as it is the cloth and it has the mutual negation of the jar, as it is the cloth, such a relation is inference, and so on. But there can be a single formula covering all cases of these relations. It is a relation in which the non-existence of the major term which is taken as a generic attribute and which is determined by the relation determining its essence, exists in its substratum (साध्यतावच्छेदक-सम्बन्धावच्छिन्न - प्रतियोगिताक - साध्याभाववृत्ति - साध्यसामान्यीयप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसम्बन्धः.) Let us explain this with the help of the inference, the hill has fire, as it has smoke. Here the major term fire is determined by the relation of conjunction; the major term as a generic attribute is fire-hood; the substratum of the negation of fire-hood is determined by the relation of self-sameness, as the negation of a generic attribute exists in its substratum only in this relation; such a substratum can be the lake in which there is the negation of fire as fire. Existence pertaining to the lake is negated in smoke. Hence, the definition applies to this inference,

Similarly, according to the formula, the relation through which the negation of the major term exists in its substratum, is inherence, in the inference, it has the absolute negation of jar-hood, as it is the cloth. For the relation determining the major term here is selfsameness (as absolute negation of a generic attribute, like jar-hood, exists in the relation of selfsameness in its substratum), the negation of the major term in this relation is jar-hood and jar-hood exists in the relation of inherence in its substratum. It should be noted here that the major term in this inference is the negation of a generic attribute or a general negation and hence the condition of the formula that the negation of the major term as a generic attribute should be taken, is satisfied.

But the question may be asked : Why should we take the negation of the major term as a generic attribute ? The answer is that if the major term is not taken as a generic attribute, then there are inferences which will not come under the definition. Consider the inference, it is an object (of valid knowledge), as it is known, in which the relation determining the major term is inherence. Here the major term is to be negated in the relation of inherence. But if a knowable object, as determined by the relation of inherence, is not negated as a generic attribute, then the substratum of such negation can be determined by time relation, as a particular negation exists in its substratum both in time relation and the relation of selfsameness. Now the substratum, in time relation, of the negation of a knowable object is time. But every knowledge, excepting God's, is produced and the limiting adjunct of everything that is produced is time and, therefore, knowledge that is produced or limited knowledge, may be called time. Hence the substratum, in time relation, of the negation of a knowable object may be knowledge that is produced or finite knowledge. The middle term is also knowledge which, therefore, has not the negation of existence pertaining to

the substratum of the non-existence of the major term. Thus the definition is involved in the fallacy of narrowness, if the major term as a generic attribute is not negated.

The definition, likewise, will be faulty, if in the same inference the relation determining the major term is knowledge-hood, but the relation determining the substratum of the negation of the major term is time relation. For all objects exist in the relation of knowledge-hood and so all objects, as knowable, constitute the major term in the relation of knowledge-hood ; the substratum, in time relation, of the negation of all knowable objects, is, like the previous case, finite knowledge.. Hence the definition, as in the previous case, is guilty of narrowness.

But if the major term, as a generic attribute, is negated, then the definition applies to this inference, whether the relation in which the major term stands is inherence or knowledge-hood. For when the major term, "object of valid knowledge" is taken in the relation of inherence, the substratum of its negation, as a generic attribute, will be generic attribute, inherence, particularity and negation, in relation of self-sameness (as a generic attribute does not inhere in the generic attribute, inherence, particularity and negation) and existence determined by these is negated in the middle term knowledge, knowledge being a quality of the subject only.

In the same way, if the relation determining the major term in the inference, it is an object of valid knowledge, as it is known, is knowledge-hood, then all objects of valid knowledge are implied by the major term, and the substratum of its negation, in the relation of self-sameness, is something other than knowledge. But the middle term is knowledge. Hence the definition is applicable to this inference.

Thus the negation of the major term, in the definition, is a negation of the major term as a generic attribute, if

we accept the view that double negation is affirmation. Now this major term as a generic attribute means, affirmatively, the major term as a whole, or as the entire class, and negatively, it is other than that counterpositiveness which is not the determinant of the major term, i.e., it is the difference or negation of the negation of the major term. But to take the major term, as a generic attribute, in the former sense, the relation determining the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is selfsameness. In the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke, fire as a whole or the class fire, is fire-hood whose negation bears the relation of selfsameness to its substratum. For the negation of the negation of fire-hood or the generic fire, in the relation of selfsameness, posits the generic fire or class fire, the major term as a whole. Here the point to be noted is that the negation of the generic fire exists, in the relation of selfsameness, in its substratum and the negation of the negation of generic fire also exists in the same relation in its substratum. But this last substratum, in that relation, is fire-hood. Hence the negation of the major term as a class exists, in the relation of selfsameness, in its substratum.

Now to take the negative meaning of the major term as a generic attribute, the counterpositive other than that which is not the determinant of the major term, means the negation or difference of the negation of fire, in the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. But the negation of the negation of fire posits the generic fire or fire-hood, when these negations bear the relation of selfsameness to their substrata. Thus, in any case the negation of the major term stands in its substratum in the relation of selfsameness. Even when the major term is "absolute negation," or "mutual negation," the relation in which its negation stands in its substratum is selfsameness, if the negation of negation is also a negation. But if the negation of negation is taken as an affirmation, then this relation is inherence in most cases.

But objection may be raised that, in the inference, it has the mutual negation of the jar, as it is the cloth, the major term as a generic attribute is not negated and that the relation determining the negation of the major term is not inherence, but identity. For the major term here is a negation and a negation is not a generic attribute, and secondly the jar (the negation of the mutual negation of the jar) does not inhere in its substratum, but exists on itself in the relation of identity and the jar is not the middle term "cloth."

The reply to this objection is that the mutual negation of the jar is the counterpositive of its negation and it is a general negation. Secondly, the negation of the mutual negation of the jar posits jar-hood which inheres in jars and jars are not cloths.

But it may be objected that though the absolute negation of absolute negation is the counterpositive, yet the mutual negation is not the counterpositive of the absolute negation of its absolute negation. For the negation of the mutual negation of the jar is the jar and when a jar is negated, the counterpositive is the jar and not the mutual negation of the jar.

But this objection rests on the misconception of the nature of the knowledge of the thing having the mutual negation. When we have the knowledge of the mutual negation of the jar, we do not have the knowledge of the absolute negation of the mutual negation of the jar; on the contrary, the recognised custom of the Old School is to admit, in this case, a knowledge of the absolute negation of the absolute negation of the mutual negation of the jar. Udayana in his "*Nyāya-Kusumāñjali*" definitely asserts this, when he says that the counterpositiveness of a thing is the negation of its negation (अभावविरहात्मत्वं वस्तुनः प्रतिपोगिता). Again the teachers consider the absolute negation of jar-hood as the same as the mutual negation of the jar. Hence

the argument that the absolute of the absolute negation of the mutual negation of the jar, posits the jar and not the mutual negation of the jar, is one-sided having no support from any other quarters.

Thus, the relation determining the substratum of the negation of the major term is the relation which determines the counterpositiveness, as a generic attribute, of the major term which is negated being determined by the relation in which it stands. But it may be urged that the last relation is a superfluity, so that the major term, as a generic attribute, need not be negated being determined by the relation in which the major term stands to the minor term. In the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke, fire-hood is the major term as a generic attribute, whose negation exists in lake etc., in the relation of selfsameness, in any case. Hence fire-hood need not be negated being determined by the relation of conjunction in which fire stands to the hill. In other words, the statement that fire should be determined by the relation of conjunction is unnecessary.

But this objection is not sound, as there are cases in which this adjunct is necessary. Consider, for example, the inference, it has the negation, in time relation (through the relation of selfsameness), of the qualification of valid knowledge which is a feature of soul-hood, as it is soul-hood.²⁴ Here the major term, "the negation, in time relation, of the qualification of the valid knowledge which is a feature of soul-hood," is determined by the relation of selfsameness. The negation of the major term, as determined by this relation, is qualification of the valid knowledge, which is a feature of soul-hood, in time relation. The negation of the major term, as a generic attribute, is also the qualification of the valid knowledge which is a feature of soul-

²⁴ All finite things bear time relation to Eternity (Mahākāla) and every other finite thing. The soul is an eternal substance (nitya-dravya) and is, therefore, neither finite nor Eternity itself. Hence the knowledge of the soul is negated in time relation.

hood, in time relation. But the negation of the major term, as determined by time relation, may be negated in the relation of selfsameness, and this double negation will posit the major term. Hence, like the time relation, the relation of selfsameness is also the determinant of the counter-positive of the negation of the major term. But in this relation the qualification of valid knowledge which is a feature of soul-hood (the negation of the major term) exists in the soul which has the middle term 'soul-hood' in it. Hence the definition does not apply to the inference and is narrow. To explain this narrowness of the definition in plainer words, the relation in which the major term as a generic attribute is negated, should be the relation in which the negation of the major term should exist in its substratum. Now the relation determining the major term, as a generic attribute, when it is negated, may be selfsameness. Hence, the negation of the major term should bear this relation to its substratum. But in this relation such a substratum is the soul and the middle term is soul-hood. Hence there is not the negation, in the middle term, of existence determined by the substratum of the non-existence of the major term and as such the definition fails.

It should be remembered that here we have taken the negation of the major term as a generic attribute and have neglected the adjunct that the major term, as determined by the relation determining it, should be negated. And this neglect is responsible for the narrowness of the definition. If we retain the adjunct, then the definition is no longer narrow. For the relation determining the major term is selfsameness; the negation of the major term, in this relation, is valid knowledge which is a feature of soul-hood; the major term as a generic attribute is the negation of the valid knowledge which is a feature of soul-hood, in the time relation; the negation of the major term as a generic attribute is valid knowledge which is a feature of

soul-hood, in time relation ; in time relation the substratum of valid knowledge which is a feature of soul-hood is the finite object (as every finite thing bears time relation to every other finite thing) ; the finite object is not the middle term soul-hood ; hence the middle term has the non-existence determined by substratum of the negation of the major term.

One important point crops up in this connection. The example of inference, taken by Mathurānātha, in this case has a major term which is universally present. The negation, in time relation, of the qualification of valid knowledge which is a feature of soul-hood (the major term) exists everywhere. But according to Gaṅgeśa the five provisional definitions do not apply to an inference whose major term is, universally present. Hence the view of Mathurānātha seems to be that Gaṅgeśa's stricture on the definitions are not applicable to all inferences whose major term is universally present, but to some inferences of such nature.

However, if we accept the view that double negation is affirmation, then the substratum of the negation of the major term, in the first (provisional) definition of Vyāpti, is determined by the relation determining the counterpositiveness of the major term as a generic attribute which is negated being determined by the relation in which the major term stands to the minor term. And as the negation of mutual negation is also affirmation, the definition applies even to an inference whose major term is determined by the relation of identity and when the substratum of the negation of such a major term is determined by the relation determining the major term as a generic attribute which is negated, being determined by the relation in which the major term stands to the minor term. In the inference, it has the cow, as it has cow-hood, let the major term be taken in the relation of identity. Then the negation of the major term is the non-existence of the cow in the relation

of identity. The cow or the class-cow in the relation of identity is the class-cow. The negation of the class-cow exists in its substratum in the relation of selfsameness. Hence the substratum of the negation of the major term is determined by the relation of selfsameness. Such a substratum is things other than the cow. Existence determined by these is negated in the middle term cow-hood. Hence the definition well applies to this inference.

But there may be a case of inference in which the substratum of the negation of the major term, when taken in the relation determining the counterpositiveness of the major term as a generic attribute which is negated being determined by the relation determining the major term, would invalidate the definition. Consider, for example, the inference, it has the mutual negation of the jar, as it is the essence of jar-hood (ghaṭatvatva, i.e., the essence of the essence of the jar).²⁵ Here the negation of the major term is the jar. And as the substratum of the negation of the major term is determined by the relation determining the counterpositiveness of the major term as a generic attribute which, as determined by the relation determining the major term, is negated, we get the mutual negation of jar-hood as the generic major term and the negation of the mutual negation of jar-hood is jar-hood itself. But as the counter-positive of a mutual negation is determined by the relation of identity, the substratum of jar-hood must be determined by this relation. But this substratum in this relation is jar-hood. The middle term again is the essence of jar-hood in which there is the existence determined by jar-hood. Hence the definition fails in this case.

To obviate this difficulty Mathurānātha points out that the major term as a generic attribute should be negated absolutely. Let us see how this saves the definition from

²⁵ Jar-hood is the essence of the jar. But this jar-hood is composed of some essence and this is called the essence of jar-hood,

narrowness. The major term, in the above inference, as a generic attribute is the mutual negation of jar-hood. If it is negated absolutely, we get jar-hood. Jar-hood inheres in jars existence pertaining to which is negated in the middle term, the essence of jar-hood (as in the essence of the essence of the jar, there is not the jar). Hence the definition applies to this inference and is not narrow.

The point hinted at here is that if the generic major term has absolute negation, then the relation determining it is no longer identity, as identity is the determinant of the counter positiveness of the mutual negation and not of absolute negation. And if identity is not the relation through which the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is taken, the definition applies to this inference and is not incomplete.

The relation in which the negation of the major term should exist in its substratum is sufficiently discussed by this time. The next thing is to indicate the nature of this substratum itself. This substratum of the non-existence of the major term should be undetermined by any other thing. In other words, only that substratum is to be taken on which the negation of the major term completely extends. Understanding this substratum in this sense, let us see whether the definition fails in the inference, this has the conjunction of monkey, as it is this tree (we have seen in the beginning that, according to Raghunātha, the second definition is formulated, as the first definition is feared to be incapable of explaining Vyāpti in this inference). The major term, in this inference, is the conjunction of monkey. The relation determining the major term is inherence, as conjunction is a quality inhering in a substance. The essence of the major term is monkey-conjunction. The non-existence of monkey-conjunction is either partial or complete. On the thing which has the conjunction of monkey, the negation is of partial extensity, as some portion

of this thing has the monkey-conjunction and some not. On the things, which can never have monkey-conjunction, the negation is of complete extensivity. Now the substratums of the negation of the major term monkey-conjunction are the root of this tree and the entities having no conjunction with monkey. But only the latter, viz., the entities having no conjunction with monkey, is to be taken into consideration, as on these the negation completely extends. These entities are quality, etc., on which the monkey can never sit. Non-existence pertaining to quality, etc., exists on this tree on which the monkey sits. This tree again is the middle term. Hence there is negation ; in the middle term, of existence determined by substratum of the non-existence of the major term and the definition is not invalidated.

Similarly, the definition applies to the inference, it has the negation of specific existence other than that of quality and action, as it is quality, because the substratum on which the negation of the major term completely extends, in the relation of selfsameness, is negated in the middle term quality (the negation of the major term gives us existence other than that of quality and action ; its substratum is substance, and specific existence inhering in substance is negated in quality).

But there may be a case of inference in which the question of a substratum on which the negation of the major term completely extends, does not arise. It has the non-existence of monkey-conjunction, as it is existence. In this inference, the major term is the non-existence of monkey-conjunction. The negation of the non-existence of monkey-conjunction is of partial extension and never of complete extension. For the negation of the non-existence of monkey-conjunction really means monkey-conjunction, which cannot be present throughout a tree. Hence, the question of the complete extension of the negation of the major term in its substratum does not arise in this case.

The answer of Mathurānātha to this objection is that it is an instance of inference whose major term is universally present²⁶ and to this kind of inference, the definition does not apply according to Gaṅgeśa himself.

But objection may be raised that the definition is guilty of narrowness being inapplicable to an inference in which the negation of the major term extends to its substratum partially, but in which the major term is not universally present. Consider, for example, the inference, it has the difference of monkey-conjunction, as it is a quality. Here the major term is difference of monkey-conjunction or the mutual negation of monkey-conjunction. The negation or the mutual negation of monkey-conjunction is monkey-conjunction. This monkey-conjunction always exists on the part of an object. Hence the substratum of the negation of the major term is of partial extension. The major term, "difference of monkey-conjunction," is also not universally present. Hence the definition fails in this instance.

Mathurānātha meets this charge in two ways. Firstly, to those, who take the difference of monkey-conjunction to be kevalānvayī (as there is always the difference of monkey-conjunction in a part of the object which has the conjunction of monkey and in all other objects having no such conjunction), the definition is not faulty, as the claim of the definition to apply to a kevalānvayī inference, is set aside from the beginning. But those who do not take the major term, in this inference, to be kevalānvayī or universally present, consider the negation of mutual negation of the thing having partial location of some other thing in it, to be a separate negation which extends completely to

²⁶ The major term in the inference, it has the non-existence of monkey-conjunction, as it has existence, is universally present, because there is the non-existence of monkey-conjunction in every object. When the monkey is on the tree, there is the non-existence of monkey-conjunction at its root and on all other objects with which the monkey is not united. According to some logicians, however, this is not a genuine Kevalānvayī inference.

its substratum. The negation of the mutual negation of monkey-conjunction, therefore, has a substratum to which it completely extends. Thus the objection is misconstrued.

We have by this time indicated the exact significance of every term in the definition (of Vyāpti)—the non-existence, in the middle term, of objects having a substratum in which the major term is negated, determines Vyāpti. We have seen that the non-existence determined by the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is a general negation, the existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, is determined by the relation determining the middle term, the negation of the major term is determined by the relation and essence determining the major term, the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is determined by the relation of selfsameness and lastly on this substratum the negation of the major term is to extend completely. But objections may be raised against the view that existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, is determined by the relation determining the middle term. So before we begin our discussions on the second definition, let us set aside these objections.

In the first place, the definition applies to a fallacious inference like, it has fire, as it has space, if the existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, is determined by the relation determining the middle term. For the relation determining the middle term, in this case, is inherence, and the middle term space does not inhere in lakes, etc., which are the substratum of the non-existence of the major term.

Secondly, the definition does not apply to a correct inference like, it is a substance, as it has existence other than that of quality and action. For here the relation determining the middle term is inherence; the major term is substance-hood; the substratum of the non-existence of

substance-hood is quality and action ; existence pertaining to quality and action is determined by inherence ; the middle term is existence other than that of quality and action, i.e., existence inhering in substance ; existence inhering in substance also inheres in quality and action, as existence is a common feature of these three ; and so there is not the negation of location pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term. Thus the definition is narrow, as it does not apply to a correct inference.

Thirdly, in the inference, it has existence, as it is a substance, the definition is frustrated, because inherence, particularity and negation, which are the substrata of the non-existence of the major term, have never their location determined by the relation of inherence which is the relation determining the middle term.

In answer to these objections, Mathurānātha adds fresh adjuncts which make the definition applicable to all cases of inference whose major term is not universally present, including the above three. Let us try to understand the definition in this new perspective. The general negation of existence pertaining to the substratum on which the negation of the essence of the major term completely extends, through the relation of selfsameness, is to be taken in the relation of selfsameness as determined by the location determined by the relation determining the middle term which exists in the substratum which is determined by the essence determining the middle term. In comparatively plain language, it means that the non-existence, pertaining to the substratum of the negation of the major term, should be determined by such a relation of selfsameness²⁷ as has for its

²⁷ According to Navya-Nyāya, the difference of the relate makes the relation different. The relation of conjunction, for example, is conjunction-pertaining-to-the-jar, when the jar is in conjunction with the ground ; conjunction-pertaining-to-fire is another type of the relation of conjunction, when fire exists on the hill, and so on. Thus the relation of conjunction is manifold. Similarly the relation of selfsameness is different with the difference of the terms related.

term (the term related) the middle term which is determined by the essence and relation in which it exists in its substratum, the minor term. To make it simpler still, the middle term exists in a particular relation and as a nature or essence ; the location of the middle term, so conditioned, bears the relation of selfsameness to the middle term, the located ; this type of selfsameness should be the determinant of the non-existence pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term ; the existence pertaining to the locus of the non-existence of the major term, may be taken in any proper relation and need not be, exclusively, determined by the relation determining the middle term. Let us see how the definition, understood in this sense, applies to the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke and to other inferences where the definition is alleged to be inapplicable. We shall also show that the definition, taken in this light, is not too-wide applying to wrong inferences. To take the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke, the substratum of the non-existence of the major term fire is lake, part of the smoke, etc. The essence determining the middle term is smoke-hood (here smoke is taken as smoke and not as causing invisibility and so on). The relation determining the middle term is conjunction. The substrata of smoke in the relation of conjunction are hill, kitchen, etc. Thus smoke possesses the virtue of being located in the relation of conjunction and can exist, as smoke, on 'the hill, kitchen, etc. This virtue of being located in the relation of conjunction and existence, as smoke, on the hill, kitchen, etc., bear the relation of selfsameness to smoke. the existence pertaining to lake, part of the smoke, etc., in time relation or conjunction, or inherence, or any other relation, should be, through the relation of selfsameness, in the middle term smoke. But the negation of existence, as determined by the relation of conjunction or time relation, pertaining to the lake, or the negation of existence, as deter-

mined by the relation of inherence, pertaining to the part of the smoke, is universally present, when it exists in its substratum in the relation of selfsameness whose term (the related) is the location of smoke, as determined by the relation of conjunction whose substratum is hill, etc., on which again smoke exists. In other words, existence of lake, as determined by the relation of conjunction, or the existence of the part of smoke, as determined by the relation of inherence, is everywhere and everywhere negated in the relation of selfsameness whose term is the smoke, as determined by the relation of conjunction and as existing on the hill, etc., for such a negation is one whose counterpositive is determined by a relation of an opposed substratum (व्यधिकरण-सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभाव) and a negation of this kind is universally present. Hence such a negation exists in the middle term smoke and the definition is not faulty.

Similarly, in the inference, it has existence, as it is a substance, location pertaining to particularity, inherence and negation, which are the substrata of the negation of the major term, existence, is negated in the middle term, substance, in the relation of selfsameness whose term is existence as determined by the relation of inherence. For particularity, inherence and negation cannot exist in the relation of selfsameness whose term is existence which inheres in substance, attribute and action (and not in particularity, inherence and negation) and the negation of these categories, in the said relation, is a negation whose counterpositive is determined by the relation of an opposed substratum. But such a negation, being universally present, is also present in the middle term. Hence the definition applies to this case.

Likewise, the definition does not apply to the fallacious inference, it is a substance, as it has existence.²⁸

²⁸ The inference, it is a substance, as it has existence is no fallacious, if the middle term existence means existence-inhering-in-substance. But if it is taken as simple existence, the inference is wrong.

For here the major term is substance-hood ; the substratum of its non-existence is attribute, action, etc., in the middle term existence, existence pertaining to attribute, action, etc., in the relation of selfsameness, whose term is existence as determined by inherence, is not negated, as existence exists on itself in the relation of selfsameness.

Let us now see whether the definition applies to the inference, it is a substance, as it has existence other than that of quality and action. Here the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is quality, action, etc. Existence pertaining to quality, action, etc., in the relation of inherence, is to be negated in that relation of selfsameness which has for its term, the middle term, as determined by the relation in which it exists in its substratum and by the essence determining it. But the middle term is existence other than that of quality and action. Hence existence pertaining to quality, action, etc., is to be negated in the relation of selfsameness whose term is existence other than that of quality and action, *i.e.*, existence of substance. But such a negation is universally present. Hence, the charge of narrowness of the definition fails, as it applies to this case.

In the same manner, let us see whether the definition applies to the fallacious inference, it has fire, as it has space. Here the substratum of the negation of the major term fire is lakes, etc. Existence inhering in lakes, etc., is to be negated in the relation of selfsameness which has for its term the middle term, space, as determined by the relation in which it exists in its substratum and by the essence determining it. But space has no substratum. Hence such a relation of selfsameness is logically absurd. And as a consequence, the question of the application of the definition to the fallacious inference under discussion, does not arise.

(To be Continued)

FULL LIGHT ON THE REAL SITE OF THE BHARADVĀJĀŚRAMA

BY R. M. SHASTRI

1. *Introductory*

THE present subject has been in course of discussion in our local dailies for several months. Over a dozen of learned writers have already presented their viewpoints before the readers of these dailies. I will make a comprehensive note of all the available data and arrange them here for my intelligent readers to form their own final judgment.

Dr. Kailash Nath Katju has made a thorough attempt to establish a *prima facie* case in his plausible articles.¹ He has been followed by Prof. N. N. Ghosh² who is more speculative than realistic, and Mr. C. P. Mittal, C. E. Engineer³ whose articles present merely freakful manoeuvring and *argumentum baculinum* rather than any 'historical facts' which he seems to have accredited himself with the contrasting preference to 'sentiments' which he has farthered upon two other scholars who on account of having honestly differed from him or Dr. Katju have been the victims of his depreciatory criticism. The afore-said three writers have disputed the genuineness of the claim of the present site of the Bharadvājāśrama to its being the original and ancient one and have sought to locate

¹ *Vide*, the Sunday *Leader* and *A. B. Patrika*, both dated August 19, as well as the *Bharata*, September 2, 1945.

² *Vide*, the Sunday *Leader*, August 26, and the Sunday *A. B. Patrika* September 2, 1945.

³ *Vide*, the Sunday *Leader* and *A. B. Patrika*, September 2, and the Sunday *Leader*, November 11, 1945.

the old Āśrama of Vālmīki's days at about 45 (or at least 10) miles west of Allahabad on the bank of the Yamunā, which according to them then flowed into the Gaṅgā there.

The other side has, so far, been represented by Dr. P. K. Acharya⁴ and the late Rai Bahadur Kaushal Kishor alias Śrī Bhikhārī Sewānanda⁵ as well as by Kunwar Koshalesh Prasad Narayan Singh of the Baraon State,⁶ all holding the Āśrama to have always stood in its original place. Dr. Acharya has more or less made a bare statement of facts. Śrī Bhikhārījī has amplified his article with arguments bearing on Rāma's journey from Ayodhyā to Citrakūṭa. And the Kunwar Saheb has met Dr. Katju's point of 10 *krośa* distance by proving a *Krośa* to have been equal to 4 miles and by suggesting that Citrakūṭa in the Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa means the commencing point of the range of hills of that name 15 to 20 miles north of Dr. Katju's modern Citrakūṭa (*i.e.*, the present Kāmada-giri) which name denoted no particular hill in the whole range before Rāma. A gentleman from Jhansi has, in his letter to the Editor, *A. B. Patrika*⁷ corrected a wrong statement of both Dr. Katju and Mr. Mittal, telling us that the present distance of the Ganges from Kanauj is only 3 miles and not 12 as mentioned by them. Mr. V. K. Mathur of Bijnore appears to be still studying the subject without throwing his weight on either side. Mr. Shivanath Katju after restating Dr. Katju's case, has, given expression to his own idea that "the Ashram of Sage Bharadwaj was and should be taken to be where it is located at present"; and the same has been

⁴ The Sunday *A. B. Patrika* and the *Leader*, September 16 and November, 25, 1945.

⁵ The Sunday *Leader* and *A. B. Patrika*, September 16, 1945.

⁶ The Sunday *Bharata*, September 30, 1945.

⁷ Dated 2-9-45.

amply confirmed by Mr. "Murlidhar" (Allahabad), an octogenarian, who has been "almost all his life" in close touch with the said Āśrama and who has brought to light certain incontestable 'facts gathered from his long experience and observation.'⁸ A few other gentleman including Pandits Kedarnatha Acharya, Jagannatha Prasad Shukla, etc., have also discussed the subject in the Hindi daily, the *Bharata*.

Dr. Katju avers to have given publicity to his view in order "to invite discussion on this most important topic." And Mr. S. N. Sanyal⁹ earnestly hopes that "this question should be further discussed" and "an authoritative light thrown on the actual position of Bharadvajashrama." I do not know if the subject has already been sufficiently discussed to the satisfaction of both the gentlemen. But I am quite confidently and positively aware that the task of *throwing authoritative light*, which none have so far succeeded to throw or sufficiently and fully release, remains yet unaccomplished and as such falls to my lot.

Now, as one who, some years ago, studied the present subject as minutely as a student of Sanskrit interested in the ancient history and topography could and also as an humble member of the Bharadvājāśramā Reconstruction Committee set up by our most revered countryman and citizen, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, it behoves, and devolves on, the present humble writer to take a stock of the arguments advanced and facts given by his precursors in favour of their respective views and to give out the whole truth in its right setting, so that the possibility of a defective vision leading to the formation of a wrong judgment may be entirely precluded from the view points of all the seekers after the truth of the matter, and that

⁸ *Vide*, his letter to the Editor, *A. B. Patrika*, October 25, 1945.

⁹ *A. B. Patrika*, August 20, 1945.

all the writers on the subject, being no more prone to fall into Charybdis in their attempts to avoid Scylla, may be enabled to revise their deflative or divergent inferences in the light of the present synthesis and arrive at a common and yet sound conclusion.

At the very outset, it may be told that, *apropos* of my researches bearing on the present subject (embodied in a short paper which I read in the History Section of the *All-India Oriental Conference*, Benares Hindu University, on January 2, 1944, and which, though a little too awkwardly tampered with in the press, appeared, under the caption *Ancient Prayāga*, in the *Allahabad University Magazine*¹⁰ and according to my most up-to-date knowledge, the hypothesis of Dr. Katju and his supporters amounts really to no better than a preposterous, fantastical and arbitrary conglomeration of promiscuous fragments and is wholly untenable. For, as will, for good and all, be quite evident from an attentive perusal of the present paper, the Bharadvājāsrama has always remained in its original place and has never shifted even infinitesimally. Nevertheless, it has gradually diminished in area,—which (according to the *Vālmīkīya-Rāmāyaṇa*¹¹, was represented by a cluster of trees occupying not less than 4 to 5 sq. miles (*īśramam Krośa-mātre tu dadṛśuḥ Piṇḍita-drumam*), where the whole retinue in the form of a vast army of Bharata (for whom this place is said to have turned into the level ground of 5 *yojanas* from all sides—*N.W.R.*, 104. 29. *Vulgate*, 91.29-30) was lodged and entertained by a stroke of the Sage's Divine power,— and which has, in very recent times, been limited to what could originally have been the actual site of the great Sage's individual residence

¹⁰ Vol. XXII, No. 3 (February, 1944), pp. 74-79.

¹¹ *Ayodhyākāṇḍa*, in its North Western Recension, Canto 102, and Bengal Recension (Gorresios edition), canto 98, stanzas 22-23.

(or place of meditation and worship), apart from the whole Āśrama under the supervision of that Patriarch (*kula-pati*) with thousands of inmates living in their separate huts standing in open space at some honourable distance from one another in a glaring antithesis to a modern University whose hostels present a much-too congested aspect. This ancient *Krośa-mātra* site of the original Āśrama must have extended over many times more the grounds occupied by the present Allahabad University with all its Colleges and Hostels, covering the whole high level from the present Rajapur and new Katra to the Darbhanga Castle and the Ananda Bhavana below which the sacred confluence of the Gaṅgā and Yamunā would be visible during at least the four months of the rains (July to October) even as late as Akbar's times. There is absolutely nothing in the *V.-Rāmāyaṇa* to show that the Bharadvājaśrama or the confluence of the two sacred rivers at which it stood could ever exist away from modern Prayāga (Allahabad). The whole error lies in the deficient handling of the *V. R.* text by Dr. Katju.

A superficial study of some popular edition of what is only the Southern recension of the *V.-R.* has led Dr. Katju to some "reflections" and certain "conclusions" which, to an average reader might appeal as captivating 'confections' and amazing 'allusions' but to a genuine researcher must appear only as their author's vagarious 'deflections' and self-hypnotising 'illusions.' In fact, the basis of his study seems to be neither whole nor safe and reliable enough to deduce any authentic conclusions therefrom. The world of letters shall ever remain indebted to the *Bhandarkar Research Institute*, Poona, for its most laudable enterprise of bringing out a thoroughly critical edition of the *Mahābhārata*. None, however, have, so far embarked upon producing a similar edition of the *V.-R.*, excepting the *International Academy of Oriental Research*,

Lahore, that has published only the first 6 cantos of its *Bālakāṇḍa* edited by Prof. Raghu Vira. Let us hope that the *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Allahabad, established in North India with the similar aim as the *B.O.R. Institute* in South India, will suitably meet that long-felt need of the inquisitive scholars. A partial attempt was made by the *Research Department, D.A.-V. College, Lahore*, to publish a critical edition of the North Western Recension of the *V.R.* and fortunately, its first product in the direction (with which we are mostly concerned in our present discussion), *viz.*, the *Ayodhyākāṇḍa* edited by Pandit Ram Labhaya, M.A., is already in our hands since 1928. Besides a coordinative comparison of the above and Gorresio's edition (of the Bengal recension) with the popular one representing the Southern recension (which latter I am referring to as the *Vulgate*), a minute study of certain portions of the *Vulgate* itself would convince an impartial student of the futility of the stand taken by Dr. Katju and other gentlemen of that ilk.

Again, Dr. Katju, whose special study and contribution belong to other fields, might "have not come across a discussion of *this topic* anywhere in the light of the description in the *Ramayana*"; but the fact of the matter would remain that at least three men have, from time to time, written on it before him. Firstly, F. E. Pargiter, wrote in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (London), 1894, on the "*Geography of Rāma's Exile*," drawn not only mainly from the *V.-R.* but also from the *Mahābhārata*, in more than 4 formes (pp. 231-264). Next, Mr. T. Paramasiva Iyar, having arrived at certain conclusions from his study of the *V.-R.* during 1922-26 (with his zeal revived by certain disagreeable words of the late Dr. Rabindranath Tagore expressed in June, 1934, and by the speeches delivered in July, 1934, of Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru and Raja Gopalacharya happening to identify *Laṅkā* with Ceylon), ultima-

tely in 1940 published his "*Rāmāyaṇa and Lankā*" (Parts I and II). He has located *Lankā* in the north of Jubbulpore (C.P.); and, discussing the present topic¹² with the conclusions about Bharadvāja's Āśrama so very similar to Dr. Katju's, he has, to a great extent, anticipated the fruits of the latter's labour. And, lastly, as already mentioned above, I myself have contributed a short paper on the same topic, basing my contentions chiefly on the V.-R. and substantiating them further by references to other things also.

Dr. Katju (followed by Mr. Mittal) has in his argument, made much of the point of river deflections and has really overhit the instance of the Ganges. Kanauj,—regarding which he has modified his observation in the *Bhārata*¹³ to the effect that formerly the Ganges was flowing below its walls and subsequently the river had shifted 12 miles away from it and is now again coming nearer, still remaining 7 miles away from, the town,—is, as already pointed out by Mr. D. N. P., Jhansi, a wrong instance. Had Dr. Katju ever visited Patiali-on-the Ganges in Etah district or Kampila in Farrukhabad district or the Town-hall of Farrukhabad, or had he only read the accounts of these and some other places on the Ganges in certain districts of the United Provinces in the Gazetteers, he would have furnished more appropriate and correct instances. Patiali and Kampila which originally stood on the Ganges have now only an old stream of the same river named 'Būṛhī-*Gaṅgā*' (Old Ganges) left there, whereas the main Ganges has now gone very far to the north from these two places. And the Town-hall of Farrukhabad popularly known as Qitā, where the local Public Library is situated and which, presenting the highest level, is believed to be the original place of Draupadī's *Svayamvara*, had the Ganges flowing below, in recent times, the old bed, being still called *Tarāī*.

¹² On pp. 10, 100, 101, and Preface, pp. 1, 28-29.

¹³ September 2, 1945.

The river has, however, gradually shifted 3 miles to the north. The instance of the Ganges at Ballia which has had three cities of that name preceding the present one in quite different localities or of the Rāmagaṅgā in certain places would have been perhaps more accurate and impressive. But, then, these and such other instances would prove or disprove nothing about the ancient site of the confluence of the Gaṅgā and the Yamunā; and a mere conjecture of “a fairly large fluctuation in the course of either . . . to be involved” cannot establish the ancient confluence in question near Rajapur or Lalapur in the Banda district.

Dr. Katju’s imagination “that the Rishi abides with us always in spirit on the confluence shifting from place to place” has, like a truism, very much influenced several writers on the subject, not barring the late Śrī Bhikhārījī, who in the second paragraph of his article has, in spite of locating the Bharadvājāśrama correctly “at the same place where it is at the present day,” written, “It should be noted . . . the ashrama automatically moved along with it (*i.e.*, the confluence).” But such remarks can be treated as no better than a purely frantic and non-sensical travesty. Before Akbar’s Bund, the confluence, at least during the rainy season, was actually just below the present Bharadvājāśrama, which lay on the left bank of (a stream) the Yamunā even as late as in the 14th century when the *Adhyātma-Rāmāyaṇa*¹⁴ was composed¹⁵; but in what sense could it be shifting at a distance of about 3 or some times (as this very year) even more than 4 miles from its real place near the present Ananda Bhavana to the sandy banks of the Trivenī, due north to

¹⁴ (Mentioning it in VI. XIV. 12).

¹⁵ *Vide*, the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute Journal, Vol. I, Part 2., February, 1944, pp. 215—239; the Allahabad University Magazine Vol. XXII, No. 3, February 1944, p. 79.

Arail—Someśvara, where the confluence must have stood often for the winter and nearly always for the summer? Or, why should pilgrims from all over the country, after having a dip in the sacred confluence at the Bund during the rains and at about a mile or two miles further east during other parts of the year, make it a point to take all the trouble of covering an additional distance of 2 to 4 miles for a sight of the said Āśrama, and not suppose like Dr. Katju and others that the Āśrama in question changes places from the Bund Road near the Fort to opposite the Someśvara Temple in the south and the *Akelā Ped* (Single Tree) Pathaśalā in the east from time to time and that therefore they need not go beyond the confluence itself to offer their worship to the said Āśrama? Or, does Dr. Katju think that a distance of 2 to 4 miles is quite negligible in his new theory of the Bharadvājāśrama following the shifting of the confluence from place to place? In fact, the Bharadvājāśrama has always stood in its own place and commanded the respect of its pilgrims, irrespective of the shifting of the confluence during various seasons, just like the Allahabad Fort Temple or, to some extent, even the Temple of Dattātreya and the residence of the well-known Nāgā Bābā near it, in our own times. And, so, remarks like the above which are calculated to mitigate the greatness or importance of its particular locality are only apt to miscarry and fall flat.

2. *Ayodhyā to Śrīngaverapura*

Except for a few deficiencies the late Bhikhārījī's article gives almost a correct view of the whole matter both as regards the Bharadvājāśrama as well as Rāma's route from Ayodhyā not only to Śrīngaverapura but also up to Citrakūṭa. I have already exposed the meaninglessness of his admission that "if the confluence shifted

on account of the changing courses of the two rivers the ashrama automatically moved along with it." Another point in his article, namely, that according to Vālmīki in between the Syandikā (Sai) and Srīngaverapura (Singraur) there were a few small kingdoms" lacks cogency and relevancy to the present context. Here he is misled perhaps by the wrong *Tilaka* commentary of Rāma.¹⁶ Govindarāja interprets the passage differently. To me, however, the reference seems to point to the same fact as mentioned in the *Vulgate*,¹⁷ or the *N.W.R.*,¹⁸. Or, it may be a corrupt reading of something originally referring to Guha's territory. Or, again, it only suggests that there was the dependent kingdom (of Guha) whose trustees were the great potentates of Ayodhyā.¹⁹

Then, again, I am simply amazed to find an amusing and puerile observation in that veteran's article as follows : "What leaves one wondering is that plenty of jungle was available close by in the north in the submontane tracts of the Himalayas where the period of the *Vana-vasa* could well have been spent and more comfortably too, e.g., at one of the places now occupied by hill-stations. Then, why this journey to the South, in the country of cannibals and hereditary enemies of the rulers of Kosala?" The writer himself has forthwith suggested "spirit of adventure" and "possibly also the desire to live as far away from Ayodhya as possible" to be the reply.

But any one who has studied the *Rāmāyaṇa* not in passing only but a little carefully cannot raise a funny question or suggest a silly reply as quoted above. When Rāma is ushered in the presence of Kaikeyī and Daśaratha

¹⁶ On the *Vulgate*, II. 50.11.

¹⁷ II. 31.22. *N.W.R.*,•

¹⁸ 34.16.

¹⁹ cf. *Vulgate*, II. 52.72 and 50. 38-39.

seated together, the Queen at Rāma's request discloses that she has been granted two boons by the King.—Firstly, that in Rāma's place Bharata should be annointed, and, secondly that Rāma should immediately start for and live in the Daṇḍaka Forest for 14 years.²⁰ 'Daṇḍaka in the South' is already mentioned by Mantharā reminding Kaikeyī of the occasion for the latter to get the two boons from Daśaratha.²¹ Subsequent references to the uninhabited forest of Daṇḍaka are too numerous to be specified.²² Sumantra informs Bharata that Guha, king of the Niṣādas, who was old and a friend of Rāma, was an expert in the knowledge of the Daṇḍaka forest and that he must be knowing the whereabouts of Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa. Pargiter has concluded his discussion on the location of this particular forest region²³ as follows: "Daṇḍaka, therefore, appears to have been a general name which comprised the forests from Bundelkhand down to the river Krishna. Northwards it must have stretched well up to the Jumna, for King Guha of Srīngaverapura is described by his charioteer to Bharata, as being well-acquainted with Daṇḍaka forest,"²⁴ the reference being to Gorresio's edition of the *V.-R.* Thus, the submontane tracts of the Himālayas are entirely out of question in view of Rāma's acceptance of Kaikeyī's definite bidding for the Daṇḍaka forests, since he was given no alternative of the ordered journey to the south. And, first of all, when he left the boundary of his own territory of Kośala, Rāma entered

²⁰ N.W.R., 19.36 and 39; *Vulgate*, 18.33 and 37.

²¹ N.W.R., 11.12; *Vulgate*, 9.12.

²² N.W.R., 19.67; 21.56 and 26.28; 29.38; 34.2 and 5; 78.47; 96.3; 104.60; 115.20 and 23; 120.16-17; *Vulgate*, I. 1.40; II. 19.23; 20.28, 30-31; 21.64; 30.39; 60.3; 72.45; 84.12; 91.59; 101.23 and 25-26; 107.16-17; etc). In the N.W.R., 96.3 = *Vulgate*, 84.12.

²³ On p. 242 of his paper, "*Geography of Rāma's Exile*".

²⁴ *Ayodhyākāṇḍa*, 92.3.

that of his bosom friend (*sakhā*), Guha, a forester²⁵ whose capital was at Śrngaverapura and who knew the Daṇḍakas too well. Rāma did so most probably in order to overtly appraise him with his own sudden turn of luck and covertly to awaken his friend's concern in his own immediate affairs as well as perhaps to consult him about the Daṇḍakas whitherward he was bound and of which his forester friend was a specialist. And we know that, in fact, Guha's emissaries followed Rāma closely from Śrngaverapura up to the Bharadvājāsrama and kept themselves in hourly touch with even his further movements towards Citrakūṭa (a step in the direction of the Daṇḍakas). They communicated all the news of Rāma's up-to-date whereabouts to Guha, who as a feudatory chief,²⁶ had to serve as the middleman between Ayodhyā and Daṇḍaka or between Kaikeyī-cum-Daśaratha and Rāma to confirm the accomplishment of the latter's ill-fated banishment through Sumantra, the royal charioteer and minister, as the messenger.²⁷ This is the purpose of Rāma's bending towards this side and not as the belief of the local inhabitants of Singraur relied upon by Śrī Bhikhārījī would have it, "that it was the desire of meeting her (*i.e.*, Śāntā Devī married to R̥śyasr̥ṅga) . . . which impelled Śrī Rāma to swerve in this direction instead of trekking directly to the south towards Prayāga." It is also not only doubtful but highly improbable if the Ganges in those good old days was, as in our times, narrowed enough to afford a ferry to cross it easily by boat opposite Prayāga from Phaphamau side, especially when, in order to cross the Yamunā before the Desire-fulfilling Banyan tree near Prayāga, the two brothers had no means other than of

²⁵ N.W.R., 51.9, 11, 24; 52.3, 5-6; 96.3-4; 98.5, 7-8; 102.213.

²⁶ N.W.R., 51.15; *Vulgate*, 50.38-39.

²⁷ *Vulgate*, 57. 2-3..

preparing a raft for themselves.²⁸ And Śāntā Devī was, in reality, the daughter of Ramapāda, king of Aṅga, who was a close friend of Daśaratha.²⁹ She was neither Daśaratha's daughter nor Rāma's sister in the real sense as alleged by Śrī Bhikhārijī except according to friendly relationship, which also explains the word *Jāmātā* (son-in-law) in I. 9.19. Another reason of the said swerving might have been that, next to Ayodhyā, it was this south-eastern most extremity of the Kośala country adjoining the forester Guha's territory³⁰ with which Rāma should be quite familiar, owing to his own mother, Kauśalyā, hailing, very probably, from³¹ and his maternal uncle belonging to, this very part of Kośala, as is also suggested by the following words of Sumantra addressed to Rāma when the former was reluctantly going back to Ayodhyā: "Or, again, shall I tell the Queen (meaning Kauśalyā), 'I led your son (*i.e.* Rāma) to his maternal uncle's place (*lit.* family) and you, therefore, need not worry? Fain should I abstain from telling a thing like that even if it were false. How shall I tell such an unpleasant truth?'"³² Rāma's maternal uncle had also given him (possibly at a time when Rāma had at an earlier occasion been to his place) an elephant, Śatruñjaya, by name, which among many other precious things was given away to Vaśiṣṭha's son, Suyajña, by Rāma when leaving for the forest,³³ and which marked the front of Bharata's army visiting Rāma at Citrakūṭa.³⁴ And thousands of villages which belonged to Kauśalyā as

²⁸ *Vulgate*, 55.4-6 and 13-19; *N.W.R.*, 59.3-5 and 11-18.

²⁹ *Bālā-Kāṇḍa*, *Vulgate*, 9.14, 18; 10.32-33; 11.3, 19, 30-31; and 18.6.

³⁰ *N.W.R.*, 50.24-27; *Vulgate*, 50.8-11.

³¹ *N.W.R.*, 26.7.

³² *N.W.R.* 55.8-9; *Vulgate* and *Govindarāja's* Text, 52. 45-46.

³³ *N.W.R.*, 35.9; *Vulgate*, 32.10.

³⁴ *N.W.R.*, 111.14; *Vulgate*, 97.25.

her exclusive property (*lit.*, means of subsistence³⁵) were in all likelihood, her *strī-dhana* she had obtained from her brother or father (whose name occurs as Bhānumat in the *Vulgate*³⁶) and were most probably situated in this very part of the Kośala country, which Rāma must have previously visited more than once. So it would be quite natural if Rāma passed through that favourite region on the eve of his long sojourn in a far-off uninhabited country. If we bear the above-mentioned facts and considerations in mind, Rāma's old and very fast friendship with Guha,³⁷ Bharadvāja's old acquaintance with Rāma indicated by the words: "O Kākutstha, I see you come here or hitherward after a long time,"³⁸ and the rather personal touch in the description of this country-side people closely following Rāma and the latter's pathetic appeal to them to return³⁹ become thoroughly intelligible. Otherwise, queries as to (1) when could a fast friendship of Rāma with Guha be contracted and have developed, (2) when could Bharadvāja have previously chanced to meet Rāma on this side, and (3) why were those country-side people feeling so much attached to Rāma, or why was he himself so much moved by their accompaniment on that particular occasion, cannot be satisfactorily answered.

Another loop-hole in Śrī Bhikhārījī's article is to be found in the following words: "Tons . . . 'Tamasa' Close by is shown in the place where Sarwan was killed accidentally by Maharaja Daśaratha." But the name 'Sarwan' is nowhere to be seen in the *V.-R.* The *Vulgate*

³⁵ N.W.R., 34.16; *Vulgate*, 31.22.

³⁶ I.13.26.

³⁷ N.W.R., 51.9; 52.3, 5-6; 56.3-4; 98.5,7-8; 102.2-3 and 12; *Vulgate*, 50.33, 36, 42-43; 51.4, 6, 27; etc.

³⁸ N.W.R., 58. 21; Govindarāja's text, 54.21.

³⁹ N.W.R., 50. 20-24; *Vulgate*, 50.4-7.

(in Chapters 63-64 where the story of the ascetic boy killed accidentally by Daśaratha is described) mentions no name at all and refers to the victim by certain epithets only, such as *tapasvin*, *ṛṣi*, *tāpasa*, *maharṣi*, *vānaprastha*, *brahmavādin*, *muni-putra*, *muni*. The N.W.R. gives the same story in Chapters 69 and 70 and in the latter the boy's blind parents call him by the name of Yajñadatta, which is also found in the *Rāmāyaṇa-Maṇjarī*, the famous 11th century rendering of Rāma's story by the great polymath of Kaśmīra, Kṣemendra. Even about the origin of this ascetic boy there is no unanimity. The southern tradition followed by the *Vulgate* and Kālidāsa⁴⁰ as well as the latter's commentator, Mallinātha, describes him to have been a non-twice-born issue of a Vaiśya father and a Śūdrā mother; and this is why Daśaratha did not incur the sin of killing a Brāhmaṇa. But, then, how can the above version of the boy's origin be reconciled with his performance of the Vedic study, Sandhyā and fire-worship⁴¹ and with his various epithets including *ṛṣi*, *maharṣi* and *brahmavādin* mentioned in the *Vulgate* itself, as also with the following words of the blind father, "O King, because the ascetic boy was killed unknowingly by you, a Kṣatriya, therefore the sin of killing a Brāhmaṇa does not forthwith invest you?"⁴² Kṣemendra's *Rāmāyaṇa-maṇjarī* (Ayodhyā-parvan, v. 953) seems to have followed a version which admitted the full-fledged Dvija (=Brāhmaṇa)—hood of the ascetic boy. N.W.R.,⁴³ however, has a middle course to follow in that the boy informed Daśaratha that he was "begotten on a Śūdrā mother by a Brāhmaṇa father living in the forest and was, therefore, not a [full or genuine] Brāhmaṇa (=Dvija), by killing

⁴⁰ 63. 50-51; *Raghuvamśa*, IX. 76.

⁴¹ 64. 32-33.

⁴² *Vulgate*, 64-55. •

⁴³ 70. 43-44.

whom the king should be apprehensive of *Brahma-batyā*. This is all about the ascetic boy in the *V.-R.*, where he is described nowhere by the name of 'Sarwan,' which we hear from the morning beggars playing with wood-sticks.

Śrī Bhikhārījī has indicated quite sure landmarks in the tradition keeping alive the memory of the places associated with Rāma by the words like 'Rāmachurā,' 'Rāmaghat,' etc. But he has deplorably failed to give any such proof in the following : " Starting from Prayāga, the party struck out southwards and tradition says that they stayed for a day at village Kanaili close to Sarai-Aqil. From here keeping in a south-western direction they reached the Gurauli ghat on the Jumna and crossed it here (Guraulighat is still a ferry)," where any place-name like 'Rāmaghāṭa' or 'Rāma caurā,' does not occur. In fact, Rāma crossed the Yamunā not very far from Bharadvāja's place; and the name 'Rāma-ghāṭa' now applied to the Ganges close south to the O.T.Ry. Izat Bridge also remains to be explained. But I will discuss this point in full details later on. Śrī Bhikhārījī has quoted no authority for Rāma's " taking permission of Muchkunda, a native chieftain and zamindar of the area " to construct a *parṇa-kuṭī* at Citrakūṭa. And I myself propose to solve the puzzle of the distance of Citrakūṭa from Prayāga.

Except for the above-noted defects the article of Bhikhārījī is remarkable and mostly represents the correct view of the matter.

(To be Continued)

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN FESTIVALS THE SUKHASUPTIKĀ OF THE ĀDITYAPURĀṆA AND THE NĪLAMATAPURĀṆA (A.D. 500-800) AND ITS RELATION TO THE MODERN DĪVĀLĪ FESTIVAL.

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IN my paper on the *History of the Dīvalī Festival* (c.A.D. 100—1945)¹ I have pointed out the following facts :—

(1) यक्षरात्रि mentioned by the *Kāmasūtra* as an important festival is identical with its *deśī* name जक्खरत्ती mentioned by हेमचन्द्र in his *Deśināmamālā* and explained as दीवाली or दीपालिका.

(2) Another lexicographer Puruṣottamadeva in his lexicon त्रिकाण्डशेष also equates यक्षरात्रि with दीपालि (see St. Petersburg Worterhuch under यक्षरात्रि). This author is earlier than A.D. 1159.

(3) यशोधर in his commentary *Jayamaṅgalā* on the *Kāmasūtrā* explains यक्षरात्रि as सुखरात्रि (यक्षरात्रिरिति । सुखरात्रिः । यक्षाणां तत्र सन्निधानात् । तत्र प्रायशो लोकस्य द्यूतक्रीडा)².

Mr. Apte in his *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* explains सुखरात्रि as the “night of new moon (when lamps are lighted in honour of *Lakṣmī*),” but does not record any usages of this term.

If the above explanations are correct we can form the following equation of all these terms :

यक्षरात्रि = सुखरात्रि (according to यशोधर)
associated with द्यूतक्रीडा and यक्षः.

¹ According to Krishnamachariar (p. 890 of *Classical Sanskrit Literature*, 1937) Yaśodhara's “gloss is later than Kokkoka (12th cent. A.D.) and cannot be earlier than the 13th century A.D.” Kokkoka is the author of the *रतिरहस्य* (*Ibid*, p. 892).

² Mr. B. M. Khuperkar in his Marathi Translation of कामसूत्र and its Commentary by यशोधर, Bombay, 1938, p. 83 translates this passage as follows :—“कातिक अमावास्याच्या रात्रीला यक्षरात्र म्हणतात, रथा रात्री यक्षांचे सान्निध्य असते. या रात्रीमध्ये बहुतेक लोक द्यूतक्रीडा करितात”

=जक्खरत्ती according to हेमचन्द्र (A.D. 1088-1172) is equal to दीवाली or दीपालिका.

=दीपाली (according to त्रिकाण्डशेष—Before A.D. 1159).

=सुखरात्रि the night of new moon when lamps are lighted in honour of लक्ष्मी (Apte's Dictionary).

We can visualize the दीपावली in the above equation but the term सुखरात्रि (given as an equivalent of यक्षरात्रि by यशोधर with two features viz. (1) द्यूतक्रीडा or gambling and (2) यक्ष-संनिधान or association with यक्षs) remains vague. Let us, therefore, see if we can find out any descriptions of this सुखरात्रि. In this connection I have to point out that Hemādri³ records the description of a व्रत called सुखसुप्तिका or सुखसुप्तिव्रत (आदित्यपुराणोक्त) which in my opinion is identical with सुखरात्रि mentioned by यशोधर in his commentary on the *Kāmasūtra*. This description reads as follows :—

Pages 348-349—सनत्कुमार उवाच ।⁴

अमावास्यान्तु देवाश्च कार्तिके मासि केशव ।

अभयं प्राप्य सुप्तास्तु सुखा क्षीरोदसानुषु ॥१॥

³ Vide pp. 348-349 of *Caturvargacintāmaṇi* by Hemādri Vol. II (Vratākhaṇḍa, Part II) *Bib. Indica*, Calcutta, 1879.

⁴ The Kashmirian नीलमतपुराण which is supposed to be “not later than 6th or 7th century A.D.” by its Editors Ramlal and Zadoo (Vide p. 7 of Intro. to नीलमत, Lahore, 1924) contains दीपमालावर्णन on कार्तिकामावास्या or सुखसुप्तिका, which reads as follows :—
Page 42 (Verses 505-515).

“तथा पक्षे व्यतीते तु कर्त्तव्या सुखसुप्तिका ॥५०५॥

पञ्चदश्यां यथा विप्र तथा मे गदतः मृगु ।

तस्यां दिवा न मोक्तव्यं बानातुरजनं विना ॥५०६॥

सूर्ये स्वस्तनुप्राप्ते पूजयित्वा करीषिणीम् ।

दीपवृक्षास्तनौ देयाः देवतायतनेषु च ॥५०७॥

चतुःष्यथश्मशानेषु नदीपर्वतवैश्मसु ।

वृक्षमूलेषु गोष्ठेषु चत्वरेष्वपणेषु च ॥५०८॥

लक्ष्मीर्देत्यभयान्मुक्ता सुखं सुप्ता भुजोदरे ।
चतुर्भुजस्य हस्तान्ते ब्रह्मा सुप्तस्त पङ्कजे ॥२॥
 अतोऽर्थं विधिवत्कार्या मनुष्यैः सुखसुप्तिका ।
 दिवा तत्र न भोक्तव्यमृते बालातुरान् जनान् ॥३॥
 प्रदेशसमये लक्ष्मीं पूजयित्वा ततः क्रमात् ।
दीपवृक्षाश्च दातव्या शक्त्या देवगृहेषु च ॥४॥
 चतुष्पथे श्मशानेषु नदीपर्वतवेश्मसु ।
 वृक्षमूलेषु गोष्ठेषु चतवरेषु गुहासु च ॥५॥
 वस्त्रैः पुष्पैः शोभितव्याः क्रयविक्रयभूमयः ।
दीपमालापरिक्षिप्ते प्रदेशे तदनन्तरम् ॥६॥
ब्राह्मणान्भोजयित्वादी विभज्यं च बुभुक्षितान् ।
 अलङ्कृतेन भोक्तव्यं नववस्त्रोपशोभिना ॥७॥
 स्निग्धैर्मृगैर्विदग्धैश्च बान्धवैर्निभूतैः सह ।
शङ्करस्तु पुरा द्यूतं ससर्जं सुमनोहरम् ॥८॥
 कार्तिके शुक्लपक्षे तु प्रथमेऽहनि सत्यवत् ।
 जितश्च शङ्करस्तत्र जयं लेभे च पावर्वती ॥९॥

वल्लैश्चैवापणाः सर्वे कर्तव्याश्चोपशोभिताः ।
 दीपमाला परिक्षिप्ते प्रदेशे तदनन्तरम् ॥५०९॥
 स्वर्लंकृतैश्च भोक्तव्यं द्विजेन्द्र नववाससा ।
 सुहृद्भिर्ब्राह्मणैः सार्धं बन्धुभिश्चानुयायिभिः ॥५१०॥
 ततः प्राप्ते द्वितीयेऽह्नि स्वनुलिप्तैः स्वलंकृतैः ।
 क्रीडितव्यं तथा द्यूतैः श्रोतव्यं गीतवादितम् ॥५११॥
 विशेषवच्च भोक्तव्यैः पूर्वोक्तैस्तैः जनैस्सह ।
 तस्मिन् द्यूते जयो ययय तस्य संवत्सरः शुभः ॥५१२॥
 तस्यां रात्रौ तु कर्त्तव्यं शय्यास्थानं सुशोभितम् ।
 गन्धैर्वल्लैस्तथा धूपैः रत्नैश्चैव भिलंकृतम् ॥५१३॥
 दीपमानापरिक्षिप्तं तथा धूपेन धूपितम् ।
 दयिताभिश्च सहितैः तैर्नैया सा निशा भवेत् ॥५१४॥
 पूज्या नूतनवासोभिः सुहृत्सवन्धिबांधवाः ।
 ब्राह्मणाभूत्यवर्गाश्च चन्द्रदेव यथाविधि ॥५१५॥

इति नौ० कार्तिकाम यां दीपमालावर्णनम्

The above passage corresponds to verses 398 to 407 in the Critical Edition of *Nilamata* (pp. 36-37) by K. S. J. M. de Vreese, (Leiden), E. J. Brill, 1936.

अतोऽर्थं शङ्करो दुःखी उमा नित्यं सुखोषिता ।
 तस्माद् द्यूतं प्रवर्तव्यं प्रभाते तत्र मानवैः ॥१०॥
 तस्मिन् भवेज्जयो यस्य तस्य संवत्सरं शुभम् ।
 पराजये विरुद्धन्तु लब्धनाशस्ततो भवेत् ॥११॥
 श्रोतव्यं गीतवाद्यादि स्वनुलिप्तैः स्वलङ्कृतैः ।
 विशेषवच्च भोक्तव्यं प्रशस्तैर्बान्धवैस्सह । १२॥
 तस्यां निशायां कर्त्तव्यं शय्यास्थानं सुशोभनम् ।
 गन्धपुष्पैस्तथा वस्त्रैः रत्नैर्ममल्यैरलङ्कृतम् ॥१३॥
 दीपमालापरिक्षिप्तं तथा धूपेन धूपितम् ।
 दयिताभिश्च सहितैर्नैया सा च भवेन्नृशा ॥१४॥
 नवैर्वस्त्रैश्च संपूज्य द्विजसम्बन्धिवान्धवान् ।

इत्यादित्यपुराणोक्तं सुखसुप्तिव्रतम् ।”

The foregoing description of सुखसुप्ति or सुखसुप्तिका quoted as an extract from the *Āditya-purāṇa* by Hemādri (c.A.D. 1260) is practically identical⁵ with the दीपमालावर्णन (or सुखसुप्तिकावर्णन) found in the Kashmirian *Nīlamatapūṛāṇa* which is considered “not later than 6th or 7th century A.D.” “The historian Kalhaṇa (about 1148 A.D.) drew on the *Nīlamata* in his *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* for the ancient history of Kashmir and he regarded it as a venerable *Purāṇa*. It must therefore, be several centuries earlier than Kalhaṇa’s work” —says Dr. Winternitz.⁶

Hemādri states the source of his extract on सुखसुप्तिव्रत viz. आदित्यपुराण but no such statement has been made by the author of the नीलमतपुराण. Presuming that the आदित्यपुराण is earlier than the नीलमतपुराण it is possible to suppose that the नीलमत has borrowed the extract from the आदित्यपुराण which is mentioned by Alberuni (c.A.D. 1030) in his

⁵ This identity is not merely in respect of the contents of the extracts from the आदित्यपुराण and नीलमतपुराण but there is verbal parallelism with slight variations as will be seen from a comparison of the two extracts quoted one below the other.

⁶ Vide p. 583 of *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I, Calcutta, 1927. Kalhaṇa calls the work नीलमत (राजतरङ्गिणी) I, 14; 16) or नीलपुराण (l.c. I, 178). The Pandits of Kashmir usually call it नीलमतपुराण.

list of *Purāṇas*.⁷ Even if this supposition is not accepted we are justified in inferring that the सुखसुप्तिकाव्रत and the practice of observing it on the New Moon day of the month of *Kārtika* (कार्तिक-अमावास्या) was current say between A.D. 500 and 800.

The features of this सुखसुप्तिकाव्रत as revealed by the extract quoted by Hemādri and that from the नीलमतपुराण are as follows :—

- (1) This *vrata* is to be observed on कार्तिक अमावास्या.
- (2) लक्ष्मी or करीषिणी (the goddess of wealth) is to be worshipped after sun-set (प्रदोषसमये, सूर्ये तु अस्तमनुप्राप्ते).
- (3) All persons, except children and sick persons, should observe *fast* by daytime.
- (4) After लक्ष्मीपूजन *lamps* should be lighted all round in temples, cross-roads, cemeteries, on mountains, rivers and on houses, at the foot of trees, in cow-sheds, in caves etc.
- (5) Market-places should be adorned with festoons and flowers.
- (6) At a place illuminated with rows of lamps, food should be distributed to the hungry and Brahmins should be entertained with a dinner, along with all classes of one's relatives and dependents. On this occasion one should wear ornaments and new garments.
- (7) On the 1st day of कार्तिक-शुक्लपक्ष⁸ God शंकर was defeated by पार्वती in a dice-play (द्यूत), hence he was in a sorry mood on this day while पार्वती or उमा his consort was in a pleased mood. All people, therefore, indulge in द्यूत early in the morning on this day. Those who win in this द्यूत will have a prosperous year while those who lose will suffer much loss. One should hear music of all sorts and dine with all one's relatives.

⁷ Vide p. 90 of *Purāṇic Records* by Dr. Hazra, Dacca, 1940.

⁸ The नीलमतपुराण does not refer to this date. It merely states "द्वितीयेष्टि." The story of शंकर playing द्यूत with पार्वती on कार्तिक शुक्ल प्रतिपदा is also not mentioned by the नीलमतपुराण.

(8) On that night a fine bed should be prepared, decorated with different cloths, jewels and garlands and perfumed with scents and flowers. One should pass this night on this bed in the company of one's wives with rows of lamps on all sides and with incense burning.

(9) On this night all one's friends, relatives and kinsmen as also Brahmins and servants should be honoured with the gifts of new garments.

The time-table of the सुखसुप्तिका celebration as found in the passage from आदित्यपुराण quoted by Hemādri (A.D. 1260) may be represented as follows in relation to the time-table of modern Divālī :—

Month	Pakṣa	Day	Particulars of Observances
1945 (Deccan)	आश्विन	कृष्ण	१३ धनत्रयोदशी—First day of modern <i>Divālī</i> .
	Do.	Do	१४ नरकचतुर्दशी—Second day of modern <i>Divālī</i>
	Do.	Do.	१५ लक्ष्मीपूजन—Third day of modern <i>Divālī</i>
	कार्तिक	शुक्ल	अमावास्या १ बलिप्रतिपदा—Fourth day of <i>Divālī</i>
	Do.	Do.	२ यमद्वितीया or भाऊबीज Fifth day of <i>Divālī</i>
Between A.D. 500 and 1000 A.D. (North India) आदित्यपुराण and नीलमतपुराण	कार्तिक	कृष्ण	१५ लक्ष्मीपूजन—Observance of सुखसुप्तिकाव्रत—Illuminations all round—Feasting at night but fast by day—Gifts of new garments to all.
	Do.	शुक्ल	१ द्यूत of शंकर and पार्वती—Men should play द्यूत on this day—Feasting with relatives, Music, etc.

It will be seen from the above table that the सुखसुप्तिका of the आदित्यपुराण and the नीलमतपुराण which was celebrated on कार्तिक अमावास्या more than a thousand years ago in North India is now celebrated on आश्विन अमावास्या in the Deccan. The features of the सुखसुप्तिका are practically identical with those of the modern *Divali* celebrations on आश्विन अमावास्या including the लक्ष्मीपूजन. We can, therefore, equate सुखसुप्तिका with दीवाली or दीपालिका. The problem of the genesis and development of *Divali* is a very complicated one but the following equation of different terms for *Divālī* may be helpful towards its clarification :—

यक्षरात्रि =	सुख- रात्रि =	सुखसुप्तिका	जक्खरती (यक्षरात्रि)	= दीपाली
Between A. D. ११०० and ४००		Between A.D. ५०० and ८००	A.D. १०८८ — ११७२	Between ११०० and ११५९
(कामसूत्र)	यशोधर on कामसूत्र	नीलमतपुराण and आदित्यपुराण	हेमचन्द्र in देशीनाममाला	त्रिकाण्डशेष of पुरुषोत्तमदेव

Now as regards the apparent shifting of the date of लक्ष्मीपूजन day from कार्तिक अमावास्या in the time of the *Ādityapurāṇa* and the *Nilamata purāṇa* to आश्विन अमावास्या now current in the Deccan, I have to point out that this shifting is only apparent and not real. In this connection Mr. S. B. Dikshit⁹ states that the system of computation of months is पूर्णिमान्त to the north of Narmadā river while it is अमान्त to the south of Narmadā. In accordance with this explanation we get the following equation of the two days pertaining to सुखसुप्तिका or Divālī.

⁹ Vide pp. ३९२-३९३ of *History of Indian Astronomy* (in Marathi) by S. B. Dikshit, Poona, १८९६. I am thankful to Prof. N. A. Gore of the S. P. College, Poona for drawing my attention to these pages.

अमान्त To the South of Narmadā	पौर्णिमान्त To the North of Narmadā
आश्विन -कृष्ण १५ (अमावास्या) कार्तिक-शुक्ल १ (प्रतिपत्)	= कार्तिक-कृष्ण १५ (अमावास्या) = कार्तिक-शुक्ल १

It will thus be seen that the dates for celebrating the सुखसुप्तिका more than a thousand years ago correspond exactly to the लक्ष्मीपूजन day and the बलिप्रतिपदा day of our modern *Divālī*. Secondly all the features of the सुखसुप्तिका in respect of joyous ritual and merry-making closely agree with the current features of *Divālī* celebrations on आश्विन अमावास्या and कार्तिक शुक्ल प्रतिपत् or बलिप्रतिपदा. We may, therefore, conclude that this सुखसुप्तिका of the आदित्यपुराण is indential with सुखरात्रि (with द्यूत etc) equated by यशोधर with यक्षरात्रि of the *Kāmasūtra* (c.A.D. 100—300).

The *Ādityapurāṇa* or at any rate the passage in it about सुखसुप्तिका appears to have been composed in North India where the पौर्णिमान्त computation of months was current. The *Nilamata purāṇa* was definitely compiled in Kashmir and consequently the पौर्णिमान्त computation followed in it can be easily understood.

We now require more descriptive particulars of यक्षरात्रि as such from early sources preferably before A.D. 500. In a late lexicon of A.D. 1660 viz., the *Kalpadrūkōśa* of Keśava. (G.O. series, Baroda, Vol. I. p. 411) I find the following line containing the word यक्षनिङ् which is identical with यक्षरात्रि :—

“सिनीवालय दीपाली यक्षनिङ् बलिपर्व च”

Mr. Apte in his *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* gives the following explanations of some of the above terms :—

सिनीवाली—The day preceding that of the new moon, or that day, on which the moon rises with a scarcity visible crescent,

दीपाली—Particularly the festival called *Divālī* held on the night of the new moon in आश्विन.

- यक्षरात्रि—the festival called दीपाली (q.v.) (यक्षनिङ् = यक्षरात्रि). Perhaps बलिपर्व = बलिप्रतिपदा = कार्तिक शुक्ल प्रतिपत्.

If the line from the *Kalpadrūkosa* indicates several days of the modern *Divālī* Festival we can allocate these terms to their respective days as follows:—

सिनीवाली = आश्विन कृष्ण १४ or नरकचतुर्दशी
 दीपाली same } = आश्विन कृष्ण १५ (अमावास्या) (लक्ष्मीपूजन day)
 as यक्षनिङ्
 बलिपर्व = कार्तिक शुक्ल १ or बलिप्रतिपदा

It remains to be seen if there are any sculptures or paintings, early or late, which may be looked upon as representing any aspects of the *Divālī* festival. The study of the representations of Purāṇic episodes in sculpture or painting would prove a very useful and fruitful occupation to any devoted student of Hindu religion and culture. In the extract from the *Ādityapurāṇa* about *Sukhasūptikā* quoted by Hemādri reference is made to the story of the dice-play of God Śaṅkara and his consort Pārvatī on *Kārtika Śukla 1* and the defeat of Śaṅkara by his better-half in this dice-play. While this paper was being read out to my friend Mr. R. S. Panchamukhi, Director of the *Kannada Research Institute Dharwar*, he observed that this story is represented in the sculptures at Ellora. I requested Mr. Panchamukhi to send me some detailed information about these sculptures and like a true devotee of Sarasvatī Mr. Panchamukhi promptly supplied to me the following information¹⁰ in his letter dated 16th January 1946:—

¹⁰ I take this opportunity of recording my most grateful thanks to Mr. Panchamukhi for this information as also for his scholarly interest in the history of the *Divālī*. He has promised to prepare a short article on the Ellora sculptures representing the Śaṅkara-Pārvatī dice-play (*dyūta*) and send it to me for publication. I have also requested him to prepare similar papers on many other representations of Purāṇic stories which he may have noticed in sculptures or paintings. These papers are bound to give a sound historical perspective to these stories.

“While reading your illuminating paper on the history of the *Dīpāvalī* festival, I observed that the play of Śiva and Pārvatī with dice is depicted in stone. I have attached extracts from my inspection notes for your information. The play is depicted in the sculptures of the Ellora Caves excavated by Rāṣṭrakūṭa Kṛṣṇa I (A.D. 757-772).”

Extracts from the Inspection Notes.

“*Ellora Caves*—There are in all 34 caves excavated on the sides of a hill about a mile from the village Verula or Ellora. Of these the first 12 are *Buddhist*, 13-29 *Śaiva* (Hindu) and 30-34 *Jain*.

Cave No. 14— The left side wall has the following sculptures :—

(5) Śiva and Pārvatī playing with dice, Gaṇapati is standing close by and other attendants, with *Cauris* in their hands standing at the back. *Nandi* below is being teased by the *Gaṇas*.

Cave No. 15—Scene of Śiva and Pārvatī playing with dice as in the Kailāśa temple, below the bull at the foot being teased by the *Gaṇas*. The *Gandharvas* with garlands in their hands are shown in the air (Ākāśa).

Cave No. 16—(*Kailāśa* temple)

Four-handed Śiva with four-handed Pārvatī seated below the tree on the mountain playing

¹¹ Compare extract from *Ādityapurāṇa* quoted by Hemādri :—

“शङ्करस्तु पुरा ब्रूतं ससर्ज सुमनोहरम् ॥८॥

कार्तिके शुक्लपक्षे तु प्रथमेऽहनि सत्यवत् ।

जितश्च शङ्करस्तत्र जयं लेभे च पार्वती ॥९॥

अतोऽर्थं शङ्करो दुःखो उन्ना नित्यं सुखोषिता ।”

Judging by Mr. Panchamukhi's notes the artist of the Ellora Kailāśa temple sculptures has put in stone the spirit of elation of Pārvatī and the crest-fallen bewilderment of Śaṅkara in a marvellously delightful manner,

at dice. On the rectangular plate spread out in front are placed at the four corners, groups of five *Pagaḍis*. *Śiva* has in his right hand some *Kauḍīs* in the act of being thrown on the ground. *This exactly corresponds to the play of pagaḍis in the Divālī festival.*

... ..

Śaṅkara and *Pārvatī* playing with dice. *Śaṅkara* showing by his fore-finger that *Pārvatī* should play one more game, while *Pārvatī* expressing by the palm of her hand that she had played off and finished the game and would not play any further. *Śaṅkara* is holding her hand at the fist to induce her to play and is shown with dice in the other hand. *Śaṅkara* has four hands, while *Pārvatī* has only two.

Cave No. 21—(Rāmeśvara).

Śiva and *Pārvatī* playing at dice. *Śiva* suggesting as before, by the fore-finger that she should play another game; *Pārvatī* suggesting by her right hand that she had won the play and finished the game. *Śiva*, however, drags her by the skirts of her garment and begins to play with dice by another hand. One of the female attendants is waving a fan and another holds the braid of hair of *Pārvatī*."

The above notes on the Ellora sculptures of the 8th century A.D. pertaining to the *Śaṅkara-Pārvatī dice-play* are sufficiently illuminating. The relation of this dice-play to the dice-play of men and women on the Divālī day on *Kārtika Śukla 1* as mentioned in the *Ādityapurāṇa* extract quoted by Hemādri (c.A.D. 1260) needs to be further investigated from sources earlier than A.D. 700, both literary and sculptural. It remains to be seen if the association

of *Sukharātri* (=Yakṣarātri=*Divālī*) with *dyūta* or dice-play pointed out by Yaśodhara has a definite origin in the dice-play of Śaṅkara and Pārvatī on *Kārtika Śukla Pratipadā* as mentioned in the *Ādityapurāṇa*. Is it possible to suppose that the Ellora sculptures representing this dice-play has any connection with the dice-play on the Divālī day? We have already seen that Somadeva Sūri who gives us a description of the Divālī festival in A.D. 959 lived in the reign of Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Kṛṣṇa III about 200 years later than Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Kṛṣṇa I (A.D. 757-772) who excavated the Ellora caves, in which we find the sculptures about *Śaṅkara-Pārvatīdyūta* for dice-play so vividly depicted. I hope that the students of the history of Indian art would throw some search-light on this question and clarify some of the issues in this paper.

•Proceedings of the Annual General Meeting of the General Council

THE Annual General meeting of the General Council of *the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* was held in the Balarampur Hall of the Hindu Boarding House, Allahabad, on Friday, February 15, 1946 at 4 p.m. In the unavoidable absence of the President, Dr. Amaranatha Jha, the Vice-President presided. After the minutes of the last meeting held on November 25, 1944, were read and confirmed the Secretary, Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. Umesha Mishra, read the following report :—

The activities of the Institute during 1945 have been naturally limited owing to the various difficulties which such an organisation has to face in the beginning. The Foundation Stone of the building of the Institute was laid on February 13, 1945 by His Excellency Sir Maurice G. Hallet, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., I.C.S., LL.D., Governor of the United Provinces in the North East corner of the Alfred Park where a plot of land measuring about one and a half acres has been given to the Institute by the Government. But due to building materials not being available and high labour charges it has not been yet possible to start the construction of the buildings. The draft of the lease for the plot has been now finally agreed upon and the formal execution of it will soon take place. A sub-committee consisting of Dr. Amaranatha Jha, Dr. Tara Chand, Dr. Ishwari Prasad, Dr. A. Siddiqi, Pandit K. Chattopadhyaya and the Secretary to draw out plans and prepare estimates of the building, of the list of furniture and equipments to be submitted to the Government has been appointed and it is hoped that the report of the sub-committee will be ready before the end of this month.

The Institute has now been registered under the Society's Registration Act of 1860 and the Rules have been printed and published.

MEMBERSHIP

The total number of Ordinary Members on the 31st December 1945 was 61. The Institute lost in the course of the year 18 of its Ordinary Members. 26 new members were enrolled in course of the year. 7 of the Ordinary Members compounded for life-membership. With 68 life-Members, 21 donors, 2 Ex-officio members, 2 nominated Members and 10 Honorary Members, the total membership of the Institute is 164.

MEETINGS

There were 5 meetings of the Executive Committee. The Finance and the Research Committees each met once.

JOURNAL

During the period under review Vol. II and Part I of Vol. III of the Quarterly Research Journal consisting of about 512 pages have been published. The Board of editors is extremely sorry for the delay in the publication of the Journal due to the peculiar circumstances caused by war. But it is hoped that with the improved situation it will be possible to publish it regularly in time now.

LIBRARY

New publications are received from the authors and publishers from time to time for review. Most of these books are at present retained in the Library. Thus in addition to what we had from the Library of the late Dr. Sir Ganganatha Jha, more than a hundred volumes have been added to the number of the books in the Library. The cataloguing of these books has not so far been com-

pleted and so the exact number of the volumes cannot be given at present.

In the Manuscript Section of the Library 40 manuscripts have been recently received as presents. Some of them are valuable and rare. A manuscript of Kālidāsa's *Kumārasambhava* dated 1678 Samvat and a few belonging to the Rāmānuja School are important ones. The Pandita working in this section is making a descriptive catalogue of these manuscripts. About 200 manuscripts have been sorted and card boards have been placed on both sides of each manuscript as cover. Efforts are being made to get cloth to be used as binding of these manuscripts.

The library gets 33 Journals and Periodicals in exchange and efforts are being made to add new ones to the exchange list, and also to complete the sets of these Journals from their very beginning. I am glad to inform the Council that some of these have been now received free of cost except that the Institute has to pay the Railway freight.

CONFERENCE

The Institute was invited to send representatives and message to the 150th Jubilee of *the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal*. Dr. Amaranatha Jha, the Vice-President and Pt. K. Chattopadhyaya a member of the Executive Committee of the Institute were nominated for the purpose.

*As the Institute is now a Registered Public Educational Organisation, the Income-Tax Department has kindly exempted it from paying Income-Tax. This has helped us a good deal in our savings. It is needless for me to say that the Funds so far raised are mainly due to the influence of our honoured President, the rt. hon. Sir Tej Bahadur Saptu and the efforts of Dr. Amaranatha Jha, the Vice-President of the Institute. But as both of these were busy during the course of the year, the latter having also been away from the country for a long time, there has been no

substantial addition to our funds. But as the war is now over, it may be hoped that through the influence of our President and Vice-Presidents and the efforts of the individual members our funds may increase in near future. It was because of the initial grant of Rupees three thousand only during the current financial year with a view that the Institute may go ahead with its activities from the U. P. Government, we have been able to decide for the award of a scholarship of Rupees one hundred per month for research in Indian Philosophy. Lack of sufficient funds has prevented us from taking up any other work or giving more scholarships.

PUBLICATION

We have decided to undertake the publication of the Sanskrit records with the Imperial Records Department of Government of India and Dr. S. N. Sen, the Director of Archives and a member of the Institute has kindly agreed to prepare the Press copy of the records and translate them into English. The work is nearing completion and it will soon be sent to the Press. The Institute is very grateful to His Highness the Maharaja of Tehri-Garhwal for having generously agreed to meet the cost of this publication.

This is in brief the report of the year. The Secretary takes this opportunity of expressing his gratitude to those who have helped the activities of the Institute with donations and contributions of articles or otherwise. It is hoped with the kind co-operation of the members and also of our donors we shall be able to give better account of our activities when we meet next.

After the Secretary finished his report Dr. A. Siddiqi, the treasurer, presented the following first Audit Report and the Statements of the Accounts and also the Draft Budget for 1946-47.

The Council decided that the Accountant-General be requested to make arrangements for auditing the accounts of the next year.

Thereupon the Vice-President requested Professor R. D. Ranade to deliver his address, the text of which is the following :—

Dr. Ganganatha Jha holds that Harmony is the Law of Nature and that Harmonisation is therefore his aim. He says—"at the very outset however, the believer in this Harmony is faced by the *Diversity* with which the very notion of Indian Philosophy has become inextricably associated; whenever one reads or even thinks of Indian Philosophy, it is invariably in terms of the 'Six systems,' '*Ṣaḍ-darśana*.' This expression 'six systems,' however, is of comparatively recent origin, and entirely illogical in origin at that." The expression is a misnomer. There is, Dr. Jha holds, only one system of Indian Philosophy and that Philosophy is the Vedānta—pure Vedānta shorn of all its speculative excrescences. The old divisions of philosophy appear to have been, according to Dr. Jha, only two—Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, as mentioned by Yajñavalkya—where the term. 'Nyāya' stands for *Reasoning* and 'Mīmāṃsā' for *Investigation, Deliberation*. These comprise the whole philosophy of India, indeed of all Philosophy. So Dr. Jha holds that these so-called six systems are not so many different and mutually exclusive systems,—but only the various stages of the same seeking after Truth—'*Brahmajijñāsā*' and hence these are mutually complementary—each helping the other.

As regards the study of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Dr. Jha says that the proper study of Vedic texts becomes necessary for the right knowledge of things, "as there are many things that are not amenable to the other means of knowledge. The most important of these things is *Dharma, the Duty of Man*. A right knowledge of this Duty can be derived

only from the Veda. It is here that the study of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā comes in, as providing the methodology of ascertaining the real meaning of the Vedic texts bearing upon Dharma.”

In the ultimate analysis, the highest knowledge of the soul, which is the main subject of Vedānta, can be attained only through the proper study of these texts ; hence, in this the help of Mīmāṃsā becomes essentially necessary. Thus the two Mīmāṃsās (form) one single composite whole ; the Preliminary Mīmāṃsā providing the methodology for the interpretation of Vedic texts and the *Uttara* or Final Mīmāṃsā providing the much-needed knowledge of the soul as found in those Vedic texts.

As to the view that these two systems are opposed to each other—one teaching *karma* and the other *Jñāna*,—Dr. Jha says that the main subject-matter of both the schools is the same, *i.e.*, the means of knowing Dharma, and through that, Truth. The idea that Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā deals with the *karmakāṇḍa* is due to the fact that all the examples that the system has taken for elucidating its methodology are taken from the ritualistic performances.

Regarding the relation of knowledge and action, Dr. Jha supports the orthodox Hindu point of view. He thinks that their combination, which has all along, from Manu downwards, formed the final thesis of Indian Philosophy and Religion. This forms the very backbone of all our Philosophies and morals ; and there is no departure from this basic truth that Knowledge and Action are both essential for the welfare of man. If later on, says Dr. Jha, differences arose, they related only to the relative importance of the one or the other ; that both are needed—on this there is no difference of opinion. As to the view of Śaṅkara expressed in his *Gītā-Bhāṣya* (II.11), Dr. Jha holds, that if we study carefully the above, passage of the *Bhāṣya*, we find that what is denied here, and in other similar passages,

is only the *joint* (samuccīta) efficacy of Knowledge and Action towards the final realisation of the Truth (mokṣa), which means that this 'Combination' is not the direct and immediate cause of emancipation for which *Jñāna* alone is the recognised means.

Regarding the question of morality in Indian Philosophy Dr. Jha has taken a very bold stand. He has shown the superficiality of the observations made against it by the old foreign scholars, viz., Davies, Jacob, Deussen, Gough and others, by giving an elaborate account of the details of the Laws of Morality in his *Philosophical Discipline* and has proved how in India Philosophy can never be divorced from Religion. In support of these Dr. Jha has given a sympathetic account of Christian and Islamic mysticisms also.

Dr. Jha, like the great Vācaspati Mishra, has translated the most difficult and important works of the well-known systems of Indian Philosophy, Nyāya—Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-yoga, Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā, and Buddhism. Though his thesis for the *Doctor of Letters* was the *Prabhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, he was equally an authority on all the Systems of Indian Philosophy. His *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its sources* is indeed his *magnum opus*. His literary activities did not confine merely to philosophical schools. His two volumes of *Hindu Law in its sources*, translations of the *Kāvyaprakāśa* and *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtravṛtti*, his Sanskrit commentaries on the *Śāṇḍilya-Bhakti-Sūtras* and the *Prasannarāghava* are some of the works which enable us to know the depth of his scholarship in other subjects as well. His translations of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakāvyā* and the *Tattvasaṅgraha* are wonderful.

• His Philosophical teachings are just like those of Kumārila. • He also like the latter believed that for the realisation of the Highest Truth the knowledge of the Ātman—the teachings of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara are the only true

and direct means. He believed with Śaṅkara that prior to the achievement of *Jñāna*, the *Upāsana* of *Saguṇa-Brahma* is most essential. Here is the true combination of *Knowledgecum-Action*, the essence of the teachings of Śaṅkara. "It was the idea of *progressive* or *gradual liberation* attained through the 'combination of Knowledge and Action,' holds Dr. Jha, "that saved Hinduism from external and internal aggression and came to be embodied in the many saws and maxims that are found interspersed throughout our literature." In his *Śaṅkara Vedānta*, Dr. Jha has said how out of the ancient Philosophy of the Upaniṣads Śaṅkara constructed a comprehensive theological system and also a practical social polity, which, while it satisfied, on the one hand, the demands of the intellectual section of the community, also answered the needs of the common man of the world. Dr. Jha says, "Men should love each other, because the *Supreme One* is manifest in the many, and according to the formula—*That Thou Art*—we and our neighbours are really one. My neighbour's good is therefore my good. Philanthropy merges into intelligent and refined selfishness."

Dr. Jha has, very clearly shown how the Great Śaṅkara proclaimed the immense of God and the solidarity of man and built upon this the ethical code. It bound men to each other, high and low, and indeed to all beings. Śaṅkara's basic principles also, holds Dr. Jha, allow the widest latitude to those who are eager for ceremonies and image-worship which was also preached, later on, by Padmapāda, one of his pupils, to realise within themselves in some concrete form their highest ideal of the One Supreme Life, the Self. At the same time they afford the fullest scope to the intellectual and speculative minds, or to men with refined and cultured emotions, to comprehend reality. In this manner Śaṅkara effected a compromise between Hinduism and its endless ramifications, from Buddhism onwards, and brought about the final

absorption of all these into the ancient faith which Śaṅkara revitalised. Not only this ; in this compromise lies the seed of the greater compromise represented by Universal Brotherhood."

This is in brief the substance of the Philosophy which Dr. Jha has taught to the world. I have taken this opportunity to speak on this simply to create an interest amongst our students who may like to work on this subject for his higher studies.

While proposing a vote of thanks to the Lecturer, Dr. Amaranatha Jha said that the task of thanking Prof. Ranade would have been performed justly, adequately and fittingly by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, the president. "I naturally am at a disadvantage in speaking on this occasion. I shall venture to offer brief observations. I always felt that Dr. Jha did not present his books to the public in a sufficiently attractive and popular style. Again I took the opportunity of suggesting to him that he might bring out a popular handbook of Indian Philosophy. For some reason or another, owing possibly to—shall I be impertinent to say—contempt for popularity, he disdained to come down to the level of the average reader. I think that was a pity. And the result of all his life-work has been that it is read by only the learned. I think also that he spent a great deal of his time in presenting to foreign readers the difficult texts on Indian Philosophy. He spent very little time in writing in Hindi or Maithili. He did produce some books on Indian Philosophy in both these languages. But the major part of his work was all in English. I wish to add one word more and it is this that his industry and devotion to scholarship - was unique. We who are much younger are not able to devote so much time to reading and writing as he devoted practically to the last day of his life."

"It was a marvel to us who knew him all our lives how in spite of numerous distractions he seemed able to

concentrate on his reading and writing forgetting for the time being all the numerous worries and business of the head of a big family ; even when he was in official life as Principal of the Benares Sanskrit College or as Vice-chancellor here, he was able to produce a great mass of literary work. That is a feature of his career which familiarity with him made all the more wonderful."

Audit Report of the Account of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute

This is the first audit of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Allahabad since its inception. The accounts for the period from November 1943 to March 1945 were examined. The receipt and expenditure of the Institute up to March 1945 are noted below :—

RECIEPT

		Rs.	a.	p.
Donations received during 1943	..	66,598	12	0
Donations received during 1944	..	54,316	10	10
Donations received during January to March 1945	..	5,639	4	0
TOTAL	..	1,26,554	10	10

EXPENDITURE

		Rs.	a.	p.
Cost of Almirrahs	..	284	0	0
Postage Stamps, Printing of the Journal, and Conveyance, etc., during 1943	..	730	13	6
Postage Stamps, Printing of the Journal, and Conveyance, etc., during 1944	..	2,187	8	9
Do during January to March 1945	..	2,120	15	7
BALANCE	..	1,21,231	5	0
		1,26,554	10	10

DETAILS OF BALANCES

Security deposit with the Imperial Bank	..	1,09,818	4	3
Deposit in the current account with the Imperial Bank	..	11,237	0	3
Cash in hand on 31-3-1945	..	176	0	6
TOTAL	..	1,21,231	5	0

The Records were maintained satisfactorily. The facilities rendered in audit are thankfully acknowledged.

Dated 11th Dec. 1945.

(Sd.) DHARMA KISHORE,
Honorary Auditor.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA OF NIMBĀRKA AND VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA OF ŚRĪNIVĀSA (COMMENTARIES ON THE BRAHMA-SŪTRAS), Translated and annotated by Dr. Roma Bose, M.A., D.Phil. (Oxon), Published in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series*, in three Volumes. Pages viii + 884, xii + 312. Price Rs. 17-8. 1940-43.

The first two volumes contain the English translation of the Bhāṣya of Nimbārka on the *Brahma-Sūtra*, called *Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha* and that of the *Vedānta-Kaustubha*, a commentary by Śrīnivāsa on the *Saurabha*, while the third volume is devoted to the critical study of the thoughts and the life-sketch of the important authors of the school.

The school of Nimbarka is one of the four well-known Vaiṣṇava schools of Vedānta. Its metaphysical theory is *Bhedābheda*. Brahman or Kṛṣṇa is the only highest Independent reality. The dependent realities are—the conscious Jīva and the Non-conscious Aprākṛta, Prākṛta and Kāla : Nimbarka's *Bhāṣya* is very simple and easy. The commentary of Śrīnivāsa is very elaborate and lucid. Never before any attempt was made to translate these works into English and the scholarly world is very grateful to Dr. Mrs. Roma Choudhury for this great achievement. The only other work which was published before these volumes on the school is the *Nimbarka School of Vedānta* by me and Dr. Umesha Mishra published by the Allahabad University.

The third volume of the book under review is very useful. It deals with the comparative studies of the thoughts and presents to us in clear and lucid manner all that other schools of Vedāntic thought have to say on important problems. It also deals independently with the doctrines of the

School and supplies us a bibliography of the authors and their works.

The attempt is quite successful and deserves every encouragement. The volumes are very useful for the study of Vedantic thoughts in general.

THE GLORY THAT WAS GŪRJARADEŚA, Parts I and III.

By K. M. Munshi, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, pp. xiv + 136, vi + 284. Price Pt. I. Rs. 6; Pt. III. Rs. 15, 1943.

The first Part, the *Mūlarāja Solanki Millennial celebration Volume*, deals with the Pre-Historic West Coast. "In the year 998 of the Samvat Era, Mūlarājadeva, the Cālukya or Solanki, came to the throne of Aṇahilavāḍa, Pāṭaṇa. He founded a dynasty which contributed in the largest measure to the development and growth of modern Gūjarāta. In memory of the accession of this ruler, at its biennial sessions in 1942, the *Gūjarāti Sābitya Parisad*" requested Shri K. M. Munshi to write a history of the Cālukyas of Gūjarāta. The book under review is the result of that undertaking which Shri Munshi has fulfilled with the co-operation of other scholars.

The first Part is divided into three sections : (1) Introductory, divided into three chapters and an Appendix, (2) Aryans : Pre-Vedic and Vedic, containing five chapters and two Appendices, and (3) Post-Vedic Aryans : The Yādavās, divided into three chapters and two Appendices. All the chapters are very critically treated and are quite interesting. Prof. D. N. Wadia, Dr. H. D. Sankalia, Shri D. C. Munshi, Shri K. M. Munshi, and Dr. A. D. Pushalkar have contributed to this Part. All these scholars deserve our warm congratulations for this scholarly and admirable achievement. The volume throws enough light on the various problems of Ancient Indian History and those

engaged in the researches of the period will find a good deal of information in this book. I heartily congratulate the authorities of the *Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavana*, Bombay, for such a fine publication.

The third Part is designated "*The Imperial Gūjaras.*" The rulers dealt with belonged to different dynasties and came from the warrior class who started their career between 550 and 700 A.C. in Gūjaradeśa. The volume covers a fairly big period extending up to 1526 A.C. in a way and has been exclusively written by Shri K. M. Munshi alone. This Part deals with the three great families of Gūjaradeśa, viz. Pratihāras, the Paramāras, and the Cālukyas. The social and cultural aspects of the period have been given prominent place in this book. Like the first Part, it is also very critical and scholarly. The material placed before the historian in this book can easily be utilised for some bigger volumes on the period. Both the authorities of the *Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavana* and Shri Munshi deserve praise and congratulations for this most interesting and useful production.

PRAKRIT LANGUAGES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN
• CULTURE. By Dr. S. M. Katre, M.A., Ph.D. (London)
and Published by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavana, Bombay.
• 1945. Pages ix + 102. Price Rs. 2-8.

• *Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavana*, Bombay has been doing admirable service to the cause of our ancient culture. It has been publishing standard authoritative books on different topics with the co-operation of highly qualified scholars. The book under review has been written by Dr. Katre, who needs no introduction to the scholarly world. The book is divided into six chapters. • The author claims to have treated together at one place all the branches of middle Indo-Aryan for the first time. The main lines of deve-

lopment, though briefly, have been shown with great success. The presentation is quite lucid and interesting. Students of Prakrit will find the book quite useful.

HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT. By Mahamahopadhyaya Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri. Published by the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras, 1945. Pages 94. Price Rs. 2.

This is the second book published from the newly started *Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute*, Madras. It is a collection of four small lectures on the literary criticism in Sanskrit delivered by the late Mm. Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri under the auspices of the Annamalai University in 1931. Professor Sastri was a scholar of great reputation both in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Sāhitya. His critical and mature estimate of the science of poetics is found in these lectures. In the words of the President of the Institute 'it surveys with the minute and far-going vision of a master all the problems that beset the path of a critic who is bent on reaching the citidal of poetic excellence.' Every student of poetics will be very much benefited by the study of these lectures. The authorities of the Institute deserve our best congratulations for bringing into light the mature thoughts of the late Sastri with whose sacred name the Institute is associated.

ŚRĪMADBHAGAVADGĪTĀ-LAGHUKOŚA.—A concise dictionary of the Bhagavadgītā. By L. R. Gokhale, F.T.S. Pages 14 + 382 + 14. Price Rs. 10. 1944.

Along with the growing popularity of the *Gītā*, its literature is also growing every day. Several editions with varying aspects have been published in recent years. The present volume consists of the text along with the *padaccheda* of every word occurring in the text. Then comes a glos-

sary of almost all the words. It is very exhaustive. The author has tried to give us all possible relevant information about the various expressions occurring in the text and explanation of the important words. The author deserves our gratitude for his hard labour and useful contribution to the literature of the *Gītā*. Students of the *Gītā* will be very much benefited with the present edition.

SOME ANCIENT CITIES OF INDIA. By Stuart Piggott, F.S.A.
 Pages iv + 102. Oxford University Press, Calcutta.
 1945. Price Rs. 2.

This work under review is meant for those who want to have a reliable background to give their visits to ancient sites some historical significance. The cities described are representatives of different periods of Indian history. The accounts are based upon the personal experiences of the author and hence are limited to northern and western India.

The first chapter briefly introduces the general reader to the Indian Historical sites, and the second gives a nice summary sketch of the so-called Pre-Historic civilizations of Mohenjodaro and Harappa. The author records a hitherto little known fact that there is in the great Stupa Mound of Mohenjodaro, on a platform of brick twenty feet high, and in the AB mound at Harappa with its traces of a defensive wall and probable bastion turrets, the citadels of a ruler, be he emperor or priest-king.

In the remaining chapters Taxila, Muttra (? spelt till recently Mathura) Ajanta, Ellora, Mount Abu, the monuments of Delhi, Daulatabad, Fatehpursikri, and Agra are described.

• The descriptions are written in concise but clear and simple style and, without being scholarly, will undoubtedly equip a visitor—of whom there is no dearth these days, in the American forces,—with enough intelligent knowledge

to appreciate some of India's most important historical sites. The author has taken pains to make the volume as useful as he could within the short compass at his disposal by adding illustrations and notes for further reading. The print and get-up of the book are excellent.

ADVANCED HISTORY OF INDIA (HINDU PERIOD) By Prof. P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar. Revised and edited by Prof. Gurty Venkata Rao. 1942 Pp. xiv + 521. Published by the Andhra University. Price Rs. 8-8-0

This is the last work of Prof. Iyengar an erudite scholar of Andhra Desā and the credit of publishing it goes to the Andhra University. It could not be completed during his life-time, so when he died in 1931 Mr. Gurty Venkata Rao (Reader in History) took upon himself the task of revising the text thoroughly, rewriting certain portions and supplying certain omissions.

The work is, on the whole, not even a very comprehensive text-book on the subject, but on certain topics it gives clear and detailed accounts. He holds in particular distinctly un-orthodox views on the Pre-Aryan culture. So he says "The chief difference between the Dasyus and the Aryans was one of cult and not of culture or race." (p. 29).

The work is, however, well written when it describes the history of South India. The chapter on "cultural activities" (600 A.D. to 900 A.D.) covers 69 pages of commonly neglected but very essential matter.

There are no very new conclusions arrived at in the volume but the book is quite useful to our undergraduate classes in Ancient History. The University authorities are to be congratulated for publishing it and placing it in the hands of our students.

RACES AND CULTURES OF INDIA. By D. N. Majumdar.
Pp. 299. Published by Kitabistan, Allahabad. Price
Rs. 5-4-0.

The volume under review is a very useful work on Indian anthropology. Anthropological studies have advanced in India very much farther from the day when Risley published his classical work on the "*Peoples of India*." There is today a great and urgent need for our administrators, the police officers and even the teachers of schools and colleges, to take an informed interest in the study of Indian culture both primitive and advanced. It is high time that anthropology is made a subject for study also for all examinations which recruit men for the services. We are therefore, glad that the present work fully attains the object it has in view, namely, "to introduce readers to a subject the importance of which has yet to be properly evaluated." There is no attempt at being scholarly and comprehensive but the book succeeds in defining precisely the racial backgrounds of our cultural life, and is able to assess the respective roles of race and environment departing from the usual exclusive emphasis of ethnological materials in the study of social origins.

The preliminary results of many of these enquiries were already published by the author in the pages of scientific journals and periodicals. In April 1943 some of these chapters were delivered to the I.C.S. probationers and minor chiefs who received their training at Dehra Dun.

The public should profit by this introductory work by Dr. D. N. Majumdar for presenting so lucid and interesting an account of the subject in a nice get-up and print. The bibliography at the end should prove helpful to the advanced students also.

THE VAIṢṆAVOPANIṢAD-S. Translated into English on the basis of the commentary of Śrī Upaniṣad-Brahma-Yogin, by Śrī T. R. Śrinivasa Ayyangar, B.A., L.T., and Edited by G. Śrinivasa Murti, Honorary Director, Adyar Library. 1945 Pages xxxi + 498. Price Rs. 10.

This is the third volume in the series of English translations of the one hundred and eight Upaniṣads planned by the Adyar Library. The volume consists of the translation of fourteen Upaniṣads—Avyakta, Kalisampratāraṇa, Kṛṣṇa, Garuḍa, Gopāla-Tāpinī, Tārasāra, Tripād-vibhūti-Mahā-Nārāyaṇa, Dattā-treya, Nārāyaṇa, Nṛsimha-Tāpinī, Rāma-Tāpinī, Rama-Rahasya, Vāsudeva, and Hayagrīva. The admirable services of the Adyar Library can never be exaggerated. Under the supervision of its able Director, it has published fine texts and translations from time to time with the help of highly qualified scholars. The English translation of these Upaniṣads has been done with great success. It is literal, lucid and quite interesting. The translator has tried to be as near the original as possible. The only thing which I find missing here is an Index of the important words and topics. A glossary of the more important words would have added to the value of the publication.

RĀJADHARMA. By Rao Bahadur K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, Honorary Professor of Economics, Benares Hindu University. The Adyar Library series—No. 27, 1941. Pages xxv + 236. Price Rs. 3-8.

Rao Bahadur K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar is a well-known scholar who has been working in the Hindu Law and has undertaken the publications of several Hindu Law Digests. His efforts to bring out an edition of Lakṣmīdhara's *Kalpataru* is laudable. The book under review is a collection of a series of two lectures which Professor

Aiyangar delivered in the University of Mādras in 1938, as *Dewan Bahadur K. Krishnaswami Row Lectures*. The book is a prolegomena to Dharmaśāstra in which, among other matters, the inter-relations and canonical validity of both *Arthasāstra* and *Dharmaśāstra* are explained and elucidated. "An aim of the lectures now printed was to evoke and stimulate interest in a branch of study which was regarded for ages as of paramount importance for the upkeep of the social order. Other aims were to illustrate its use to the student of Indian history and sociology, to define its position among kindred studies, and to vindicate the value of the traditional method of approach to it, the neglect of which has been the fertile source of numerous dubious conclusions now in circulation." Here we also find a correct perception of the philosophic background of Hindu life and thought.

Professor Aiyangar has added separately copious notes to elucidate various facts occurring in the body of the text of the lectures. These are very useful. The Index at the end is also very carefully prepared. The book can easily be recommended to any student of Indian History and culture.

ŚUDDHA RAJA YOGA. By Śrī Hamsa Yogī. Published by the Śuddha Dharma Mandalam Association, The Śuddha
• Dharma Office, Mylapore, Madras, S. India. Pages
• xlix + 105. 1946. Price Rs. 5.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ŚRIMADBHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ. By R. Vasudeva Row. The Śuddha Dharma Office, Mylapore, Madras. Pages iv + 128. 1946. Price Rupees 3.

The *Śuddha Rāja Yoga* is the eighth book of the series. It consists of certain Sanskrit texts with their English translation and explanations. The whole subject is divided

into three main parts. The first part deals with the three preliminary requisities of Rāja yoga—Bhāvanā, Karma and Dhyāna. Through this one conquers one's lower nature. The second part deals with the Rāja-Yoga proper, which is aimed at, to attain contact with Paramātmā. In the third part we find the treatment of other details through which one can easily realise the *Svarūpa* of the Ātman. Besides, there are several Appendices devoted to the treatment of several important topics. The book is quite helpful to the beginners. The method of exposition is old and not so very lucid. Here and there we find several printing mistakes. It is most desirable that small booklets be published explaining important topics of this secret science.

The other booklet—*An introduction to the study of Śrīmad-Bhagavad-Gītā* is the fifth book of the same series. It is divided into seven sections, under four items of study—the nature of the goal to be attained, the mode of introspective discipline which leads to the goal, the character and equipment of the disciple aspiring to reach the goal, and the objective functioning by the aspirant in the external world, calculated to enable the disciple to comply with the needs of the introspective discipline leading to the goal. The author has selected relevant lines from the *Bhagavadgītā* and has explained them in English. The method of approach is somewhat new and is interesting to those who want to study the text from different angles of vision.

RIŚTASAMUCCAYA. By Durgadevacharya. Edited by Prof. A. S. Gopani, M.A. Ph.D., Published by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1945. Pages 176. Price Rs. 7-8.

SANDEŚARĀSAKA. By Kavi Abdul Rahman. Edited by Śrī Jina Vijaya Muni and Prof. Harivallabha Bhayani. Published by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavana, Bombay, 1945. Pages 124. Price Rs. 7-8.

The *Riṣṭasamuccaya* is the twenty first volume of the *Singhi Jaina series*. Dr. A. S. Gopani had submitted this work as a thesis for the Ph.D. degree to the University of Bombay. It is an important, precious, typical Prakrit work, composed in the Gāthā metre, of Durgadasa, a Digambara Jain writer. This work was composed in 1089 Samvat. The work is a very interesting one. 'Riṣṭa is a presage of oncoming death and the *Riṣṭasamuccaya* is a compendium of the *riṣṭas* which may be based on various signs seen in one's own body, or on the different events connected with the natural phenomena, or on the nature of dreams, or on a number of other artificial devices such as the number and nature of the letters which constitute the question about a *riṣṭa* put by a question."

It has got Sanskrit *Chāyā*, English translation of the text, critical introduction and notes with several Indices. Dr. Gopani has taken great pains to trace the origin and development of the theme from the earliest times both in the Jaina and non-Jaina traditions. He has made a comparative study of the topics and has produced admirable work. Both the author and the Vidya Bhavana deserve our hearty congratulations for this very useful work.

• The *Sandēśa-Rāsaka* is a poem containing 223 verses in different metres. From the study of its language it seems that the work was composed when Apabhramśa was passing through its last stage of decay and the new forms of vernaculars were gradually taking a definite shape. The work, as the very title shows, is a Sandēśakāvya of the *Rāsaka* type. It is a description of a lady of Vijayanagara separated from her lover who had gone to Stambhatīrtha sending her love-message through a traveller. The first

section is only introductory, the second deals with the main theme while the third is a description of the six *ṛtus*. The work is indeed very interesting. In addition to this, the fact that it is a work from the pen of a Muslim author is of no small interest. Though the poet is a Muslim weaver, he has followed the tradition of a Hindu Sanskritist writer throughout the poem. In his benedictory verses just like a Hindu he says—May He, who has created all this—the ocean, earth, mountain, trees and heavenly bodies, O wise ones! bestow upon you happiness. Bow down, O *nāgarikas*! to that creator to whom men, semi-gods and gods, the sun and the moon all pay their obeisance. The single work speaks highly of the poetic powers of the poet. Professor H. Bhayani deserves our hearty congratulations for his critical introduction, notes, etc., which have added to the worth of the book.

Vol. III]

MAY—AUGUST, 1946

[Parts 3 & 4

THE
JOURNAL
OF THE
GANGANATHA JHA
RESEARCH INSTITUTE



ALLAHABAD

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Published by
Mm. Dr. Umesha Mishra,
Ganganatha Jha Research Institute,
Allahabad.

Printed by K. Mittra, at
The Indian Press, Ltd.
Allahabad.

JOURNAL

OF THE

GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE

MAY—AUGUST, 1946.

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Vol. III]

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MEDITATION ON THE ISĀVĀSYOPANIṢAD

By K. C. VARADACHARI

I have always felt that Upaniṣads should be read as instructions in *Sādhana* rather than metaphysical statements about the Nature of Reality, though it must be well understood that no *sādhana* can proceed without a reality-view. Every Upaniṣad is a *Vidyā* and should be meditated upon as the Ancients used to do, rather than discussed about for the mere purposes of objective knowledge. This meditation leads to inward understanding, occult and profound of the subject matter however difficult of comprehension it may appear to be at the beginning. Meditation is also silent prayer, inward and deep and communion, a communion with reality in its depths rather than on its surface forms, merely, and as such it is something that passes into knowledge or con-sciring, or *śeṃuṣī bhakti-rūpa* (knowledge of the form of devotion). It is well-known that there is no Upaniṣad which enfolds so much of value and synthesis in the briefest compass other than the *Isāvāsyopaniṣad*. In meditating upon its meditable portion that is the final four verses (mantras—15 to 18) which is asked to be meditated upon, or used as Prayer-formula, I was singularly struck by the remarkable series of impressions registered in my consciousness. I am trying to share these medita-

tations on the Supreme Being, the 'I' of all beings and things, with all.

1. The first prayer : HIRAṆMAṬENA PĀTREṆA SATYA-SYĀPIHITAM MUKHAM.

TAT TVAMPŪṢANAPĀVRṆU SATYADHARMĀYA DRṢṬA-YE.

clearly reveals that the individual soul covered over by Ignorance, here described as the Passion-coloured (Golden) lid, is unable to see the Lord in everything outward. The earlier instructions in the sixth and seventh verses : *sarvabhūteṣu ca ātmānam* and *sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmani tiṣṭhan* and *sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmāivābhūt* : 'the self in all beings, 'all beings in the Self' and 'the Self as that which has become all beings,' are incapable of being realized or experienced through the senses, and even as the *Kenopaniṣad* has beautifully stated : *Yad vācā nabhyuditam yena vāgabhyudyate ; Yan manasā na manute yenābur mano matam ; yaccakṣuṣā na paśyati yena cakṣūmsi paśyati : yacchrotreṇa na śrṇoti yena śrotam idam śrutam : yat prāṇena na prāṇīti yena prāṇaḥ praṇīyate* : it is through the Self we see, hear, think, breathe, speak.

Thus the subject of all experiences is the Self, not only in respect of each individual but also in respect of all individuals. This Self is in all beings and it is this Self-nature that is to be known. It could only be known when the passion-coloured lid is removed. It is the Truth-Nature. Man aspires for the removal of this lid that prevents the realisation of truth-function or truth-nature. Every other function of the self, such as sensing, thinking, breathing and speaking is not the real function since they cannot intimate the original truth of the self. Thus it is that this Being, unseeable by the senses, is capable of being seen in a mind that is absolutely quiet and calm. A strong and impregnable calm is the necessity of the soul ; this may mean that there is much reserve strength of faith in the

truth nature to sustain any loss that the loss of passions might have caused. More fully this calm must be conceived as very difficult of arriving by means of any ignorant move or passion or will that is egoistic, and it must therefore appear that it would be incapable of being achieved by the individual out of his own ignorant volition or ideation or emotion. The mental peace or *prasāda*¹ that is stated to be possible to a soul that has got rid of all outward desires and crushed out all emotive and mental movements of the *citta*, is something attained through the practice of inhibition of the same constantly through *abhyāsa* and discrimination. It is true here that though the soul possesses all this practice and discrimination and has attained the necessary peace too and calm, contentless existence, there survives yet the egoism, the true lid, golden as it is stated, attractive and beautiful, and yet it is something that has to be removed. "This removal is stated to be possible only by or, through the Grace of God, Pūṣan, the Nourisher—Protector, the Supreme Godhead who is the One of whom the sages speak variously, because of different functions that He simultaneously discharges spontaneously, felicitously and through puissant Grace. This luminous Peace is a Presence of the Divine, different in kind in a sense from the preliminary unstable peace attained through one's own will and contra-will. This peace is a revelatory Peace, a permanent and abiding true peace-nature that is the foundational nature of the individual soul in its unity with the Divine.

It is interesting always to find a myth in keeping with or corresponding to this discovery of a depth that is essentially to be probed, for it is the problem of the nature of the individual self as to whether it can only arrive at a golden

¹ I have found many excellent writers feel chary of accepting the doctrine of Grace or Benevolence in the Upaniṣads, and who feel *Prasāda* to be merely mental calmness, illumined consciousness at best. But what is the necessity of Prayer or Hymn in Veda or Upaniṣad?

peace, impermanent and capable of being defeated, or a true peace permanent and incapable of any disturbances despite all these occurring. The *paurāṇic* analogue here is the story of *Hiraṇyakaśipu*, the golden-bedded² or gold-vestured or gold-coated being, a vital being (*titan*), mighty and dark with passion, who searched as no man or God did for the omnipervader *Viṣṇu*, who, he had heard, was the enemy of all egoedness, egoed-eyedness (*Hiraṇyākṣa*) greedy-eyed or greed-covered soul, of thieves or usurper-robbers of what really belongs to the Omnipervasive *Īśvara*. He, *Hiraṇyakaśipu*, even like his brother *Hiraṇyākṣa*, was an ectype of the Arch-demon dragon *Vṛtra*, the serpent-symbolized being who encompassed all the worlds, even as the other Vedic figures like *Vala*, *Pāṇis* were, and the *Purāṇic* *Naraka*, *Tāraka*, *Rāvaṇa* were. They made it impossible for the true nature to flow out. They sequestered Truth, confined it, penned it in the Cave (of the Heart) making it impossible for it to emerge out of it. In the Heart is hidden the soul and Deity of the size of the thumb, brilliant and eternal the self of all beings. It was His lid of passion or egoism that was hindering the perception of the Omnipervader whom his son, *Prahlāda*, his own higher *Buddhi*, despite all the tortures and punishments was proclaiming to be everywhere ; it was this that was prayed for to be removed. Perhaps it is as well that we should remember that there are differences between souls,—divisions that cut across our prejudices and castes perhaps ;—and souls are marked either *Āsura*, *Mānuṣa* and *Daiva* (Man being bi-valent either inclining to the *Asura* or *Deva*) or *sattva*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*. It is even possible to hold that each of the former may have three divisions as shewn in the latter ; thus *Asuras* may belong to the *sattva*

² In Egypt or Babylon, the temple of *Bāl* was provided with a huge golden-bedstead on which the God was laid even as in temples in South India at *Nights-Sayana Sevā*. Is it a worship of *Hiraṇyakaśipu* ? Or is it a symbol of the Doomed City and civilization ?

or *rājasa* or *tāmāsa* kinds even as the *Góds* may. So *Vibhīṣaṇa* and *Trijaṭā* among the *Asuras* were considered to be *sāttvika* *asuras* even as *Prahlāda* and *Mahābali* have belonged to the *sāttvika* *Asura-jāti*. The prayer then is addressed to the Divine as the One Lord of all creatures, *Prajāpati*, the father and parent not only of *Gods* and men but even of the *Asuras*. The prayer is necessitated by the ardent fury of the frustrated passion-governed soul which thought of itself as the Self.

It is in one sense true that what man has made by ignorance man may unmake by means of knowledge. But ego is not merely a nucleus of the divine effulgence but also a constellation of habits of thought and sense and volition and sentiment. It is this latter that is usually called the self or soul by many and it is this which modern psychology recognizes as the self or personality even as the purely rationalistic Buddhist schools conceived it to be, and therefore rightly denied its permanence. There is yet a truth in individuality which is not egoism which is entirely fundamentally a centre of Divine Being, a secret manyness of the Divine. It is this that is unreachable by thought and sense and volition because it is the universal that is uniquely individualised but that is egoed as a possessive Being. This secret could be wrested only by the Self, that is, the Divine. As we have already pointed out the truth becomes clear when we agree to consider that there are supramental or divinised beings, mental beings and effulgent vital beings. The first is a class by itself and has never probably suffered from this disaster of separation from the centre, the Truth, *Satya-dharma*, a separation resulting from the covering by the lid. It is only the human mental and the asuraic vital beings who are in need of this removal of the passionate separating lid, the lid of disjunctive diversity, the lid that makes it impossible to enter the inner being of itself. Confronted by the mystic truth that *Prahlāda*, the buddhi-awakened, buddha, the child of

manas, has brought, the joyful tidings of the Ever-present Omnipresent Reality of Spirit, Immortal and Consummate, (Puruṣa) the Asura, his vital egoistic father of great austerity, Hiranyakaśipu engages upon a severe test of the nature of the Ātman, which has been stated to be *aśnāvīram, śuddham, avraṇam, akāyam* (*Īśā. Up.* 8) all attributes which reveal That Spirit, Īśa, to be other than the body and other than the Ego of Hiranyakaśipu, which he has been proclaiming aloud and affirming with insolence as the Highest Being. It is thus that we have to read the prayer of the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* as the prayer of the illumined understanding, Buddhi of Prahlāda (Or is it the truth-seeking, experimenting ego of Hiranyakaśipu?) to the Real Nourisher, to remove³ the golden (glittering) lid of passion, even if it be by force as indeed it has to be done—for it is the *Rudra-granthi*, the knot of final death, dissolution of the egoism or the ego that releases therefore the self from the bondage to the material congeries, namely a private body. It ceases thereafter to be a separated entity with a separate being. It becomes illumined, luminously conscious of its central self in the Divine, and knows its true self to be the Supreme who is the Self of the Gods and all creatures, high and low. It is then that the Lord in the form of the wonderful Nara-siṃha (indeed a play on the word Puruṣottama), the lionine quality being shewn to illustrate the mystic symbol of the destruction of the elephant⁴ (*gaja*)—soul, by the lion the higher or superconscient vitality of the Seer⁵ emerges as the Purāṇa says with the *Om-kāra* (*Om* being the word that

³ The original contains the word *apāvṛṇu*=un-cover, which may well be done in any manner gently or rudely tear it off; there is a *dhvaṇi* as to *Vṛan*=to hurt or injure.

⁴ *Bhāgavata* VII. 20. 47 indeed uses this imagery of elephant to the soul and the lionine form is undoubtedly the āścarya Puruṣa, the Yakṣa of the *Kena*.

⁵ This vitality is *Vīryam* of the *kena*, : *ātmanā vindate vīryam vidyayā vindate amṛtam*.

is Brahman as the *Kaṭha* and *Muṇḍaka* and *Māṇḍūkya* say and as the *Bhagavad-Gītā* proclaims, and even as the *Īsāvāsyopaniṣad* equates it latter in the 17th mantra with the *Kratu*—Viṣṇu, the Lord of Sacrifice)—out of the Pillar, *sthānu*, (a *Kaṭhopaniṣad*-symbol which denotes the Pillar of Fire within, which, being aroused, destroys the Heart-knot) and tears apart the bowels and entrails of Hiraṇyakaśipu which stand for or reveal the coils of desire and worldliness and possessive existence for the private self. It is thus only that the heart-knot could be broken and all doubts dispelled about the individual congeries being the most ultimate unity of being or permanent existence. Thus it is that once for all the doubts could be removed or extinguished and the truth-being known and understood and entered as Lord Kṛṣṇa has stated. This break up of the heart-knot, this break up of the utter consecration to the material well-being and food-desire-enjoyment group leads to the Joyful Wisdom, the revelational immediacy of the Divine Illumination—Presence, which makes the Father of Prahlāda (or indeed thus may Prahlāda on behalf of his own deceased or rather released Spirit of his Father) pray to Narasiṃha, Puruṣottama “ O Nourshier ! O Sole Seer ! O Yama (Death) ! Sūrya ! O Prajāpati ! : Withdraw thy hot rays, gather up thy beneficent rays so that I may behold thy Most auspicious Form,⁶ and know through that that the thumb-sized Puruṣa indwelling as Self in the heart (of all) is identical with the Self in the Sun. This is the Āditya Hṛdaya, the secret of oneness in multiplicity; resolved in and by and through the experience of the Prahlādic-buddhi :—the Joyful Wisdom is this much alone.

• The most important impediment to self-realization is, as any one who is acquainted with the experience of the

⁶ It is the *Tad Vāna*, the *Tad Jala*, the *Ānanda*, the *Madhu*,

spiritual knows, the delusion that the body is the soul. Materialism (in modern terminology Behaviourism) can never accept the reality of spirit or soul. According to its reading the soul is but a congeries of impressions, feelings, affects, volitions and ideations and these are all referable to the interactions between the several chemical and physical processes within the physiological organism. Consciousness is an epiphenomenon, a resultant of these interactions within the organism. Or else it is a sort of energy that throws light on the processes backwards and forwards and thus a purposive instrument of the organism. It is a biological evolute. Whatever else it may be, according to Behaviourism it is not a permanent spiritual entity nor should it be construed as having a spiritual substance as its source or basis of which it is a quality or function. It is a bye-product, a useful bye-product. There is absolutely no evidence to show that there is any other substance than the perceived unity of sense or matter. This being the reading of materialism the question about the existence of the soul or spiritual essence becomes all important for any system of spiritual philosophy (Vedānta) or Religion.

Idealism no doubt has done yeoman service in the cause of establishing the priority of mind (consciousness) and its indispensability and the omni-effectiveness of Mind. But these conclusions it has arrived at through the abstract activity of thought or reason or intellection which distinguishes or extracts the principles or laws of thought or axioms or categories of experience from the mass of presented sensations, feelings, dispositions and instincts belonging to the changing flux which is characteristic of the universe of matter (sensory world). These ideas or reals or essences or principles or axioms or values that it has extracted or analysed from the '*A priori Synthesis*' (of Kant's *Metaphysics*) it has sought to unify or integrate or systematize into a universe with the

help of the principles of coherence and non-self-contradiction as between themselves. A reality so built up of these 'ideas' does indeed confer a permanence to the unity of thought, and may even be, in a truer measure, a reality of the mind—for really every thinking being feels himself to be a mind. But then this unity of reality in which the rational alone is real has been accepted to be just a "bloodless ballet of impalpable categories," whilst it did deliver the mind from the sensations, feelings and fleeting existence, it did not liberate the mind from itself, that is to say from its own structure, in order to permit activity or search or realization of that in the world. It could not satisfy the structure of experience which constantly overflows the categories of both abstract thinking and sensory being. Philosophy secured a permanence and even a type of peace but not that which satisfies even its own inward drive towards all-round acceptance of integral being. The absolute of the idealist certainly could not be called a self or a soul. Reactions in the shapes of radical empiricism, positivism, pragmatism and realisms of the critical and neo-varieties had indeed intervened as anticipated. But what was needed was not more materialism, but more of idealism and an acceptance of the fact that real progress should lead to a deeper and profounder truth of the self or spirit or mind than was made possible by intellectual idealism. The abstract activity of the intellect only protested against the sensory fleeting experiences, little knowing or discerning that the intellect itself is but a habit of being, and only the manufacturer of the permanent structure of matter against its own fleeting structure.

The mystic always attempted a higher type of abstraction through a process that combined the intellectual type of abstraction or negation with the process of psychological renunciation of the sensory. This *nivṛtti* or abstraction that is two-pronged enabled his Yoga to go beyond the

intellect itself to a state of being that might be called *nirvāṇa*—*vāṇa*-less, that is, without any type of *citta-vṛtti*. This further made it possible for him to discover the utter duality between the soul and its body, and therefore helped 'death' or 'psychical death'.⁷ This psychical death is not a mere symbolic or mimetic act of dying but a real dying to the body so as to live to the soul, and incidentally making the body an instrument awakened to its soul's real and ultimate destiny, as against the present tendency of making the soul awakened to the destiny of the body. It is a death in a deeper and more intensive form than the physical death (civil or municipal death) which is but the termination of one's body, a biological death. The delusion that the body is the soul can never be got over unless or until the individual can release the soul from the tentacles of matter and the body that is physically understood as the configuration of instincts, desires and ideations and purposes or cravings, and make it move out of and into the latter at will. No doubt the greatest assertion of the Mīmāṃsakas and others has been that unless we accept that there is a fundamental distinction between the body and the soul and predicate immortality or at least indestructibility to it, the injunctions of the Vedas that promise experiences in the heaven, world etc., will have no validity, a situation that is intolerable. But this is not enough. At least the Veda does intimate this 'unsheathing' as something devoutly to be wished for, for it speaks about a state of being of the Ṛṣis who knew fully and in experience of this absolute difference between the body and its soul or rather the soul and its bodies. This 'unsheathing' is an experience that is got in the state of ecstasy or integral absorption or concentric meditation and is explained as a siddhi (or to use the Buddhistic phrase 'iddhi') in Yoga (Hindu as well as

⁷ The sacrifice is a 'correspondential' death, surrender to God is a 'psychic death'—and one can die but once!

as Jaina). The jīvanmukta is one who at least knows and experiences the freedom of the soul in the body and this experience is not one merely of absolute control over the organs of sense and action and antaḥkaraṇa but a radical disjunction that is only short of a total abandonment. I do not hold that this is desirable or all that Yoga is aiming at, but this radical otherness of these components of the Organic is a thing that must first be learnt, and from this alone can arise knowledge and a being that entails a further step on the evolutionary unfoldment. This abstraction of the real psychic being not merely on the level of thought and mind but also on the Jāgrat level of waking consciousness and physical being is indeed very difficult. Many hold that this is dangerous. (So at least the ancient occult literatures hold). Without the guidance and grace of God or the Divine powers it will mean lot of pain and even death, that entails a new effort in another life. But without this knowledge being achieved and realized fully with the help of reason and emotion, and a dynamic awareness, the illusion of body-soul (dehātma-bhrama) is incapable of being finally and utterly rooted out. Till then we shall continue to be helpless against the onslaughts of radical empiricism and scientific materialism. Biological death does not and cannot perform this act for us, for it can only liberate us from the outer shell or coat of perceptible existence outworn by experience, but not the subtle sheath which is stated to carry forward our *saṁcita-karma*. That is precisely the reason why we have to choose the 'psychic death,' the death that means the business of realization of our 'otherness' out of love of true liberation. This is achieved by knowledge that even transcends abstract reason⁸ and is gnostic or supramental, or at least intuitive.

⁸ Rationalistic philosophizing is a necessary training in abstract thinking, even like mathematics. But on that necessity devolves another necessity, the necessity of execution or application of the truths

* Thus the primary necessity emerges, in whatever way we may think, for a definite and complete vindication of the principle of the difference between the individual soul and its body, and any attempt to refer it to any *pramāṇa* is almost to deny to the self what is promised to the mind. It breeds always the fear of a possibility of fall or illusion. The promise of divine knowledge that from that there is no fall or regress (*acyuta*-knowledge or *anāvṛtti*-ascent) can never be kept. The siddhas have always taken the view that truths of vedic experience ought to be experienced and ought to be taken seriously.

Thus we come to an important point in our meditation when we find that the primary test visualised by the seeking vital soul (*Hiraṇyakaśipu*) was the invocation to Death⁹ and even may we say a willingness to see the truth through, whether indeed the Divine is in oneself, a fact that would settle two things at one stroke. What the enlightened Soul, *Prahlāda*, knew and experienced through his own sufferings at the hands of the Egoistic matter-ridden being, is now being questioned radically by the latter.

so learnt and experienced in the rarified atmosphere of pure intellection. The need is great especially in a materialist age. And all great applications have had happened in the ages of materialism. Abstract thinking does double-duty. It does duty to materialism as well as to spiritual evolution. In an age of materialism it discovers the principles of physical or biologic existence, and in an age of mysticism it discovers the principles of spiritual being. In the one case it helps the general ascent to the deep and fundamental core of reality submerged by materialistic emphasis and in the other case it helps the application of the higher principles in order to discover the secret depths of matter. It is thus a mediator. But in so doing it also generally undergoes transformation and appears to have ascended to the highest limits of its possibilities in concrete thinking. For the truth of abstraction lies in its effective appreciation of unities that link up the two domains, the heaven and the earth in Vedic terminology, by belonging to neither absolutely. Its is a thankless task. Its own goal will always fall short of experience or the superamental being, the Synthesis where in the Soul and matter are the real to each other and are found even to display a close integrality or togetherness in every respect.

⁹ It is well-known that the mantras 16-18 of the *Iṣa* are recited at the time of cremation, or after death. So is the *Nāciketa* mantras "*Triṇāciketa* . . ."

This is the cult of the intrepid warrior. A warrior in battle is prepared to die for some duty, or principle or loyalty. This preparedness to die is an actual asset in the solution of the problem of soul-body delusion. The 'psychical death' is effected at the very moment of the will to die in order to live. That it is a crude method and even a violent method does not vitiate the fact that it is a method. In the second chapter of the *Gītā*, Bhagavān Śrī Kṛṣṇa teaches the most important truth that the soul is unborn and that the body is perishable and is a coat that is worn and cast off when it has served the purpose, and even if the soul were but perishable it is better to die for a cause that is ultimate or for the sake of ordained kṣātradharmā. The metaphysical implication underlying this counsel is to get over the *bhrama* that visits even very advanced souls, like Śrī Arjuna, not only in respect of oneself but also in respect of other selves or souls. Further it is necessary to experiment with truth for the sake of absolute knowledge. Thus the kṣatriya-dharma prepares for the brāhmaṇa-dharma of total and absolute consecration that is not vitiated in the least by the delusion that the body is the soul. Wherefore the brāhmaṇa is a sacrificer and lives in the spiritual universe in all its manifold planes of creatures, men, elements, fathers, gods and the One Divine whose these are, in Whom all these exist and Who dwells in each and every one of these. The kṣatriya-solution is a rājasic and vital pronouncement and experiment whereas the brāhmaṇic-solution is a mental and intuitive pronouncement of the same truth because if we understand the truth we shall see that not until one had been a kṣatriya could such a one become a brāhmaṇa. • This is also the reason why in the earliest literature the Veda and Upaniṣads, the problem of the spiritual universe was solved by the great kṣatriya kings and taught by them, for they were fully cognizant of this fundamental need to know the relationship between the body and soul

and the One Spirit. That is also the reason why they became breeders of the true knowledge of Sāṅkhya, discrimination. That this truth was not the only prerogative of the kṣatriyas can well be shewn, but that is not to our purpose. Spiritual knowledge starts with the discrimination of the soul as different from the body, and this is something that is to be learnt integrally by the will to perish and to dare and for the sake of the knowledge of spirit or self. The dehātmabhrama cannot be liquidated in any other way. Tapasyā, (mortification) suffering, crucifixion, brahmacharya and others all indicate the stages of this unsheathing that takes place gradually in Yoga. That is also the reason why Hiraṇya-kaśipu was an Emperor, and why it was his business to solve once for all the truth about the self and even the nature of the supreme soul or Divine Godhead. The fifteenth Mantra clearly indicates the prayer to the Nourishing Lord of all, and the soul, to tear away this veil of delusion, the delusion that prevents the realization of the true nature of the Spirit. That this spirit is immortal, moving and capable of tenanting many kinds of bodies is all intimated by the verse seventeen : vayuranilam amṛtam. That it is sukram, avraṇam, aśnāvīram, śuddham, apāpaviddham, etc. is shewn earlier in the eighth mantra. But all these do not reveal much. Siddhis even may appear to reveal the possibilities of the material existence only rather than the nature of the Spirit that is other than it. Obviously then when the search for the Divine took place He could not be caught any where by Hiraṇyakaśipu, for it is naïvely remarked by the Purāṇa that the Divine entered into His nose. Is it not as the *Kenopaniṣad* states by the Divine that one smells or knows or hears? The psychic death was sure to come, but not until one is prepared for the worst does it pass off lightly, or joyously illuminating the interiors and revealing the separateness by dismissing or sublating the delusion. Otherwise the worst must be

faced many times. The truth of intelligence is that it is 'ekasantagrāhi,' whereas ignorance is 'anekasantagrāhi'. The former requires no repetition the latter does. Prahāda did not need repetition for he was buddhi, Hiraṇyakaśipu was instinct and needed all the violence of the spiritual to overcome its inward resistance. It is true that modern mystics and other generous souls who think that theoretical philosophizing and acceptance of idealism or absolutism insufficient will find that all that has been written above merely clarifies the mystic sincerity and will scare away only drawing-room philosophers. For others it is a welcome adventure in the spaces of spirit which will resolve the many controversies of philosophers and make for honest experience and practical spirituality. That does not mean that we need to bid good-bye to philosophizing. As already pointed out it is the business of this dynamic experiment in Vedāntic knowing (Sāṅkhya-Yoga in the language of Śrī Kṛṣṇa), to lift up the understanding from the barren constructs of superficial abstractions. We can then proceed to see in the next two mantras the same illumined consciousness that has beheld the One Unity of all Godheads and its own self, now resolves to offer up itself in utter consecration for the sake of an integral transformation. The self or soul is immortal, an immortal portion of the Divine, a truth, which has no fixed habitation nor are its bodies permanent. The truth has been learnt that the self is other than the body (*Śarīra*). For it is a truth that a body is an instrument of a self which exists by reason of the soul or self within, which utilises it and enjoys it for some occult purpose or secret delight; and there is no particular reason to hope that these purposes are either eternal or permanent delights, though delight be the very nature of the Self-delight that enjoys the Oneness as well as secret manyness, or manyness and its secret oneness, being as well as becoming, which are just the conceptual representations of this two-

fold delight of Transcendent Being. Now the sacrifice of the self or one of its manynesses is sometimes held to be a necessity, a necessity of the truth of the former occult knowledge. Sacrifice or the Rite of Sacrifice is a total consecration to the Divine Lord of all Enjoyments and offering and not, as is usually held, a renunciatory act, an act that merely breathes the air of denudation however free from inward sorrow at non-possession of that which was possessed. The Body it is that is to be offered along with the inward self to the Supreme One Being, the Omnipervader *Īśa*. It is by this act, apparently of a total surrender of all possessions (as is intimated in the very first mantra of the *Īśa*: *tyaktena bhukṣjīthā*), that the fullest riches of the transcendent kind (*rāyi*) (*Śreyas* of the *Kaṭha* and the *Gītā*) are attained. Thus it is that the awakened soul, seeking the fullest sovereignty and empire resolves upon the Great Rite and conquest of the *Viśva* through sacrifice. This sacrifice is sometimes called the *Viśvajit* sacrifice or the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice. In these sacrifices the gifts or *dakṣiṇā* are to be one's fullest possessions. The *Viśvajit* sacrifice of *Vājaśravas* father of *Naciketas*, or the *Aśvamedha* of *Mahā Bali* is the greatest sacrifice, in this sense that it has a great mystic meaning: He who would possess (the) All must lose all or give or give away all other possessions and not "give up all." to others. This was the *pratijñā*, the resolution or resolve of the sacrificer who had awakened to the Joyful Wisdom (*Prahlāda*). And it is clear that it would not have been a complete sacrifice but for the coming of *Vāmana*, the Dwarf-brāhmaṇa, who claimed the three feet by His measure, as Lord of the Three Feet being the Fourth as *OM* (*A U M*) interpreted as Earth (*Vaiśvānara*) as Midatmosphere (*Taijasa*) (the subliminal abode of the *rajas*) and the Heaven (the *Prajña* the individual soul of *Bali*).¹⁰ The name *Vāmana* is used in

¹⁰ cf. *MĀNDUKYA*; *MUNḌAKA*, etc. *Upaniṣads*, *Bh. Gītā*, *Munḍ.* instructs that the *OM* should be made the bow and the target, the Brah-

the *Kāthopaniṣad* in respect of the indwelling Dweller in the Heart-Cave, He who is the knower of past and present and future; He who is the Lightning corresponding to the Heart, of the *Kenopaniṣad* and the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*. Thus come forth the wonderful words of the Mantra 17: OM *Krato* (Viṣṇu, Vāmana, Lord of Sacrifice) *smara* Kṛtagam *smara* (Remember, remember that which was done); that is, says Sri Venkatanātha, "Please fulfil or complete this my sacrifice by acceptance of my surrender, by thyself coming and establishing thy Feet within me and making me thine own, even as Ālvar Śaṭhakopa has stated by making me his sandlals." That is, "Lead me thyself O Immortal Flame of Sacrifice! Thou knower of the Occult Paths! Chief of Gods! Agni! by cutting out all the devious ways of sin and ignorance," even as the next Mantra (which is found in all the Vedas) runs.

The self is offered to its natural Lord—the Īśa, now known as Sacrifice, *Kratu*, now Vāmana, the Brāhmaṇa-dwarf who is indeed He who has as His eyes the Sun and Moon, and is the internal Ruler as Antaryāmi, and is the Death which is the Gate to fullest plenitude of Being. Thus we find that the last verse: *Agne naya śūpathā rāye . . .* really is a fulfilment of the Sacrifice of man's ego which has three steps, involving a triple transformation as Sri Aurobindo states of the Vital, mental and the material represented by the great asuras, who belong to One single family¹¹, Hiraṇyakaśipu-Hiraṇyākṣa, Prahlāda and Mahābali, from which results an awakened sense of union (identity) with Truth, Satya, next a revelation of the Oneness of the self

man and the soul as the arrow. By whom should it be released or aimed? Surely by the mind or the Divine who comes out with Omkāra—Narasimha came out with Omkāra and aimed the soul of Hiraṇyakaśipu.

¹¹ Hiraṇyakaśipu's son is Prahlāda, his son is Virocana (the disciple of Prajapati of the *Upa.*) and his son is Mahābali. Virocana held Annam to be Brahman and was satisfied with that truth according to the Upaniṣads.

of each and the self of every thing else and all, and finally (thirdly) a quiet separation from the transitory which entails the sacrifice, the unique sacrifice that has as its aim the conquest of the Viśva (the waking consciousness, the *Jāgrat*), for the spiritual transcendent existence which has been separated by three steps of the deep subconscious, unconscious and subliminal. It is only through such precarious filtrations that our actions are being governed by the Superconscious to our knowledge. It is the conquest of the Vaiśvānara, (the Nāciketa-fire of the *Kāthopaniṣad* and the Agni of the *Agnirahasyopaniṣad* of the *Śatapattha Brāhmaṇa*) which is invariably completed by the Divine's acceptance in person of the intimate identity that is the reality-function between the indwelling seer and the super-conscious Universal. It is this utter and total acceptance that is usually spoken of as the realization of the establishment of the Seat of Brahman in the Heart, the achievement of the Ānanda, the Rasātala of Mahābali. It is this beatitude that has been stated to be the result of a complete surrender. It is as it were the shifting of the centre of action from the individual ego to the Universal Person, the Cosmic and supraconscious supracosmic Divine. It is not without significance that the Seer Priest who officiates at the sacrifice of Mahābali is Śukra¹² (*Iśa.* 8) for on the path of real and fundamental divine evolution the Leader, the Sacrificer, Priest, every part of the process of ascension, passing on, transformation is achieved by the Divine for the Divine and in the Divine, the individual soul playing the part of a quiet aspiring flame, fed and lifted up unto union.

¹² Śukram, Śukra is stated to be the Priest—Teacher of the Asuras and Uṣanas is stated to have been the first priest who new the art of resuscitation of the Dead. In another sense He is the Deity himself, the Pure Radiant Being who as it were speaks a double voice but correctly leads all the same, for in man is the flame of true freedom and in freedom should man seek the Divine, for therein alone is available the true delight of the many consummating in Oneness-there primal secret reality.

Surrender or Śaraṇāgati Vidyā is stated to have six steps : ānukūlyasya Saṅkalpa (willing the helpful to ascent); Prātikūlyasya Varjanam (renouncing the obstructive); gopṭṛtva-varaṇam (electing the Goal); Mahāviśvāsa (radical faith in the Divine); Ātmanikṣepa (placing of the self at the feet of God); and Kārpaṇya (complete dependence involving a feeling of helplessness without the Divine). We can see in these four mantras of the *Īsāvāsyopaniṣad* (15-18) these six in some form : in the 15th verse—‘Satyadharmāya dṛṣṭaye’ refers to this willing of the helpful (i); whereas the prayer to the Divine Nourisher (Pūṣan) to uncover the golden lid that covers the face of Truth is the renunciation of the obstructing forces (ii); the 16th mantra in its first part “Tat te rūpam kalyāṇatamam paśyāmi” is the wish of the votary to see the Divine auspicious form and thus forms the third step (iii); whereas the belief that the self of the worshipper and that of the Solar Orb is the expression of the great faith in the Omni-selfness of God, the mahāviśvāsa (iv); in the 17th verse we have the expression of the Ātmanikṣepa, surrender (Kṛtam) or sacrifice of the immortal soul (vāyur anilam amṛtam), so that its body of karma is turned to ashes (bhasmāntam śarīram) and it is uplifted by the Divine as Om and Sacrifice (Kratu) or Divine Will, and the repetition of the words Kṛtam smara merely affirms the total dependence on the Divine to help, a state of extreme helplessness of a soul that has given up all its being and existence to the Divine, whose only prayer is ‘Na-maḥ’ (Not I but Thee) (18th verse). This is the state of Kārpaṇya (ekānta-bhakti, akīrcanyatva, avyabhicāra-bhakti). All these six states of the soul are but deepening stages in the Soul’s entry into the Divine but at every stage of the Divine’s help it is that is being sought and not that of the limited and restricted and ignorant ego. Here too we find that knowledge of the Divine Oneness and All-ness it is that governs from the first actions of sacrifice of the self.

Thus Śaraṇāgati is a dynamic Sacrifice¹³ and in it is comprised the aśvamedha, the puruṣamedha and the Brahmedha, sacrifice of the senses, out-ward-moving and extravert ; sacrifice of the ego as a circumscribed and limited or private being apart from and in conflict with the All, a possessive and egoistic entity ; and the realisation of the Leadership of God the Omnipervasive Super-conscient Being in every fibre.

To conclude this meditation I may point out in the first instance how the integral mind works with respect to the spiritual universe. The spiritual universe is the eternal universe in a sense, for, from it proceeds all types of presentation in space-time-events. The whole literature of the Hindu, or for that matter of any true religious community or philosophy is to be interpreted correspondentially as my friend Dr. Mohan Singh states from multiple stand-points, that is, from the ādhibhautikā, ādhyātmikā and ādhidaiva aspects. Each of these divisions may find further sub-divisions. And they may be called the Vedic, Brāhmaṇic, Upaniṣadic, Aitiḥāsic, Paurāṇic and Āgamic. The failure of modern philosophers to go behind to the bed-rock of spiritual experience is so clearly patent in their writings which despite their learning and scholarship (on which they pride themselves) that we are likely to miss the truth of the spiritual universe. There is an eternity streaming through the temporal, and a temporal

¹³ It is a very strange coincidence that Mahāyāna Buddhism pitched upon the name Vairocana (son of Virocana ? Viṣṇu) as the name of the ĀdiBuddha, since Vairocana is the name of Mahābali, the mahāprājña, the sole enjoyer of the Divine Bliss-nature, as a consequence of the Great Sacrifice which not merely concluded with the physical rite but the psychological surrender. It is because rites have a tendency to become severed from the psychological that all objectifications have a tendency to limit, pervert and derealise the meaning, the psychological. Thus it is necessary to rescue the meaning which alone can help the movement upward and form the basis of any true endeavour. It must however be all the time understood that the fact of this occurrence of disruption or disunity cannot be the cause for a wholesale condemnation of all objectivity and expression of the psychological truths.

that reveals the eternal, and this intermingling in the process of civilization, through poetry, art, sculpture, dance and philosophy and sciences, clearly portends so simple intellectual understanding. On the contrary rationalism has tended to be dogmatic and has ceased to see the confusion into which its own analyses have landed it. Spiritual understanding or gnostic being will clearly interleave the historical with that which is suprahistorical and grant meanings not available in the one or the other exclusively. The fundamental manner of interpretation was long ago envisaged in the Brāhmaṇic literature, but we have grown so much intellectual these days that we have been for a long time unaccustomed to see more than one aspect at a time and this seeing of one aspect did the trick of depriving us of the fruits and visions of the entire reality : To quote the *Īsā.* (9.) again “Andham tamaḥ pravāsanti Ye’vidyām upāsate tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u vidyāyām ratāḥ (See also the 12th mantra). Thus it is necessary to interpret the whole body of literature as an organic whole. This is undoubtedly difficult and may lead to lot of confusion and may be called Research in the strict and literal sense of the term, but this is not the research that will get the applause of the savants and scholars of the present day. It means the seeing of things temporal and eternal in one sweep and this one is forced to say ‘sadly’ is possible only to one supramentally awakened to the deep and foundational unity of the two by a radical experience.

INDIAN MARTIAL TRADITION

By V. R. RAMACHANDRA DIKSHITAR

Introductory

THE late lamented Maxmüller did a distinct service to the cause of indology by the translations of the Sacred Books of the Hindus and by his own original contributions on Indian History, culture and civilisation. But at the same time most accidentally he committed one or two mistakes for which we are at present paying rather a heavy price. He was the first to propound a theory of Aryan race,¹ surely a pigment of his imagination. It caught like wild fire and various ingenious theories of race, and race origins, superiority of the Aryan or inferiority of the Dravidian or *vice versa* cropped up in the horizon of indological fields with the result that we are now fighting endlessly by bringing unnecessarily the imaginary race theory to the forefront. The fact is there were no races, Aryan or Dravidian, unhappily confused with the rich streams of Aryan and Dravidian cultures. A happy parallel is afforded by the fact that we can speak of an Anglo-saxon or Latin culture but not of Anglo-saxon or Latin races.

• The other mistake more germane to our subject is that the Hindus did not believe in the reality of this world, looked upon things including our very existence as unreal, illusory, whatever may mean that significant expression *Māyā* in Sanskrit. This idea of the world and its activities being

¹ Max Müller—*Chips from a German Workshop* (new edition) Vol. I Preface p. IX ; • *Biography of words and Home of the Aryans*, Appendix IV. p. 245.

Māyā, or a share and a delusion belongs to the region of philosophy and not even religion. The intellectuals of the Hindu community who spent their time in the forests speculating on the life here and hereafter evolved systems of philosophy which find expression in the numerous Upaniṣads and literature of the post-Upaniṣadic period. From the vast ocean of literature reflecting philosophical ideas and doctrines, our scholar Maxmüller wrote that the Hindus were mainly a community of philosophers whose mind was bent towards the other world, and who did not attach any importance to things mundane.

This is unfortunately incorrect. The term Hindus is a mysterious term. The ancient lawgivers distinguished four major castes and a number of minor castes framed mainly after their respective occupations. The philosophical school was the monopoly of the few, catering to the intellectual community which was designated the Brahmana community. Even here a choice few gave themselves to a reflection of such theories while others who shared with the king, the weal or woe of the kingdom, were worldly-wise. What about the families which were hereditary Purohitas to different rulers and what about the families whose members served the state as councillors, ministers, judges and even commanders like Droṇācārya of epic fame is an interrogation for answer. The philosophy did not affect the life and career of members of the ruling caste, trading caste, or peoples caste consisting of agriculturists, carpenters, masons, barbers, washermen, and so forth. These formed the bulk of the community through the ages. They never worried about one god or a multiplicity of gods. They knew their duties and adhered to them irrespective of consequences. The Hindu ideal was known *svadharma* i.e., each person in his station. This prevented two things—competition and survival of the fittest. That is the beauty of Hindu civilisation.

A Military Caste

Yet another characteristic of the Hindu civilisation was setting apart a whole caste for military duties.² This was the Kṣatriya caste. It was the ruling caste. Only a Kṣatriya could be a ruler and none else. If any member of other communities became a King, this could be only due to very peculiar circumstances, and he was to be given Kṣatriyahood and consecrated then as a ruler. Ever since man was born, he was a fighter, born of psychological impulses.³ It is true of all tribes and of all nations. It is also true of India. As I shall show in the sequel Indian martial tradition begins with the Vedic period and has a continuous history to the present day. While intellectuals were speculating in the realm of philosophy in forests and caves, life went on in the cities and towns, in capitals and forts, in the plains and on the river banks. Life included a warrior's life. The element of permanence and endurance in Hindu culture is their genius to set apart a whole community for warfare. It was itself a standing army of the country. Every Kṣatriya was a Knight by himself. He fought and fought relentlessly to save his country and religion. By having a separate warrior caste, the peace of the country or communities engaged in other pursuits of life was not affected. The normal life went on.⁴ There was no disturbance of the economic equilibrium. There was no want of food. There was no necessity for planning a new world order. For the old order was not affected in the least. It was not a peoples' war.⁵ It was certainly a war in which the King representing the whole nation plunged. Its defeat or victory affected the state as a whole. By a peculiar social device the nation's represent-

² See Dikshitar, *War in Ancient India*, ch. II, sec I.

³ *Ibid.* ch. I.

⁴ For example, see Megasthenes' *India*. Meccrinde Fig. 1.

⁵ This I have dealt in greater detail in my paper to the *Aryan Path*. *Some Concepts of War in Ancient India*.

atives who were the great Kṣatriya community went to the field of battle to decide the nation's destiny. That is why Megasthenes who was an ambassador to the court of Pataliputra, the capital of Candragupta Maurya about 320 B.C. has left a valuable record : "Nor would an enemy coming upon a husbandman at work on his land do him any harm, for men of this class being regarded as public benefactors are protected from all injury."

While it is largely true that only the warrior caste fought our battles, sometimes soldiers were recruited from other communities also. If a war is of a prolonged character and if the resources in men and material were diminishing, then recourse was had to enlist soldiers from the people-caste. These were mercenary soldiers in the sense they were hired for a particular purpose and disbanded afterwards. In those days the success of the army depended on its numerical strength. Hence the levy. But there is no evidence that there was a general conscription at all ; though there is some evidence of conscription of wealth⁶ from wealthy communities for war purposes.

If we approach India's martial tradition with this background, then we can get a correct perspective of the whole. In the Vedic age the King was a member of the warrior caste and he was helped in his military functions by members of his caste, who enjoyed the rank of nobility. Their main duty was readiness for war. The bow is the main weapon of this age. Every noble was instructed in the art of war which was then the science of the bow.⁷ One feature of these Hindu wars was that the King led the host to the field. He was in the front rank and inspired his troops by his magnetic personality to fight to the end. Sudās⁸ a powerful Vedic monarch had to fight a confederacy of ten

⁶ *Mbb. Śānti.* 71-72 : 87. 35-39.

⁷ *Vedic Index* : I. pp. 388-89.

⁸ *Rg. Veda* : VII 18. 8. 9.

kings. We can well nigh imagine the nature of such a conflict. We meet here and there with battle hymns in Vedic literature, for instance, the *R̥g Veda*. VII. 18.

Laws of War

But it was in the epic age that the foundations of Indian martial tradition were truly laid. It was now the morale of the Indian army that was exhibited to the utmost possible extent. There are several quotations in the *Mahābhārata* which indicate the high sense of discipline and keenness of spirit pervading the Hindu army. Every soldier elected duty and glory at the cost of life.⁹ His duty was to fight and die in battle. A coward only die of sickness in his house. Nothing is nobler than enter the field when challenged to fight, unmindful of the consequences. It made no difference with the epic warrior whether he killed or was killed in the battle.¹⁰ To retreat is to bring ignominy to his family and country. Fight to the death or to the complete victory brought glory to the family and country. Further glory was to find a place in India's heaven. Whatever be the caste or status of the enemy he must be attacked. It is the veritable law of warfare. If a soldier who goes to a battle dies fighting he was accorded the funeral service due to a warrior. But the death of such a hero should not be mourned or lamented. On the other hand one should be glad of it and proud of it.

The epic soldier was not the indiscriminate mercenary warrior recruited for the moment, disbanded afterwards. Every soldier had his fixed salary and a permanent employee of the state. When there was a call for arms, he went out in all glee. In peace time he enjoyed life with his family drawing the same salary. Adequate compensation amount-

⁹ See, for instance, *Mhb.* V. 74. 23.

¹⁰ *Mhb.* *Udyoga*: 72.4.

ing to pension was given to the family of the soldier who fell in the field with his boots,¹¹ to use the modern phrase. The wounded and disabled were taken to the camp and treated by expert physicians and surgeons.¹²

Notwithstanding his enthusiasm and love of glory the epic soldier did not indulge in indiscriminate and reckless fighting. Even here he had a plan. His camp which looked like a city was self-sufficient. There were certain rules which he observed even when the action was hottest. There was no fighting during nights.¹³ Every morn opened with music and the chiefs met to decide the particular array and its commander for the day. At sunset the arms were down and all returned for rest. Though there are examples where these rules were not strictly observed, still the rule was there and ordinarily followed. Some of the laws of war were :—

- (1) Non-combatants were not to be molested.
- (2) The disabled and those who ask for mercy were not to be attacked.
- (3) The weaponless and defenceless should not be molested.
- (4) The retreating should not be attacked.
- (5) Barbed and poisoned arrows should not be used.
- (6) The subdued soldier to be reinstated and the conquered people should not be disturbed from the observance of their own laws and customs.
- (7) There was to be fighting between equals.
- (8) Women, children, ambassadors and cows were not to be touched.

¹¹ *Mbb. Śānti.* 86. 24-5.

¹² *Ibid.* 95. 17-18.

¹³ See Dikshitar; *War in Ancient India* p. 75. .

(9) Corn fields, fruit and flower gardens were left unmolested.

(10) Incendiarism is to be condemned.

Viewing this code of war as a whole, we find that wars generally did not affect the progressive and civilised elements of the state. Wars were certainly fought at any cost but not with any method. These principles were the governing motives of wars indulged by the Mauryan and Gupta emperors. Aśoka regretted his action at Kalinga where thousands of innocents were slaughtered in the unrighteous war which he engaged. In fact Kauṭalya the celebrated author of the *Arthaśāstra*,¹⁵ a rare work on polity, postulates three kinds of war—Dharma vijaya (righteous warfare), Asura vijaya (unrighteous warfare with no regard to the laws of war), and lobha vijaya (due to greed of territory, women and property). The last two are condemned in unequivocal terms. Samudragupta's and Harṣa's wars were actuated by a sense of glory and pride, the object of which was to win the heaven.¹⁶ It was something religious in character and spiritual in outlook.

South Indian Tradition

If this were true of the North Indian tradition, the tradition of the south is much more vivid and awe inspiring. Our principal authority for South Indian tradition is the Śaṅgam literature of the Tamils. The classics are full of warfare. The ancient Tamils were much more fierce, chivalrous and valorous. As we shall see even their womenfolk were animated by martial spirit and helped their kith and kin in winning battles. There is a technical term Tumbaittinai.¹⁷ According to this concept when a chief or

¹⁴ *Ibid.* Ch. II. sec. ii.

¹⁵ *Arthaśāstra*. Bk II. 1.

¹⁶ See the legends in the coins of Samudragupta.

¹⁷ *Puṇḍarīk Vēṇḍamālai*. VII Paṭalam.

a warrior was attacked from all sides by the throwing of darts and spears at him, still he remained undaunted. The weapons would have pierced the different parts of his body and still he went on fighting. A certain weapon had cut his body twain. Even then the cut body did not fall on the ground but it was still in heroic action and movement. This state is called technically *aṭṭai āḍutal*.¹⁸ In Kannada the cut body is called *aṭṭe* and Telugu *aṭṭa*. In Tamil it is *aṭṭai*.

The old tradition was that the king himself fought the enemy and when it was found that the chief was declining in strength then a commander rushed to his aid and carried on the battle much more vigorously. If during the course of the fight, the enemy king who rode an elephant, fell down with his elephant, the warriors killed the fallen foe and engaged themselves, in a dance called *amaḷai*.¹⁹ This is to do honour to the dead chief and to celebrate also their victory. When once the chief fell dead, the army generally retreated but the conquering king recklessly attacked the soldiers in retreat and slew them (*nūlilāṭṭu*).²⁰

There were warriors again who being wounded either on the face or chest would deem it derogatory to survive that feat and would further ulcerate the wound and end their lives. This is called *marakkānji*.²¹ After the battle was over, it was a custom for the wives of heroic soldiers to enter the field in search of their husbands. When once she saw her husband in a pool of blood with darts struck on his breast, and about to die, she drew back the weapon and drove it into her body so that she may not survive him. Still another custom was for the woman to closely embrace the dying head of her husband to her breasts and

¹⁸ *Tol. Porul sūtram* 71. Naccinār Kinyar gloss.

¹⁹ *Tol. Porul sūtram* 72.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Tolkāppiyam*: Puṇa Hipaiyiyal.

forehead and continue in that state of sadness until the last breath of her life went out.

Tamil land could boast of not only heroic housewives but also of heroic mothers. They have disproved the appellation weaker sex given to them. In the Tamil work *Puranānūru*, a composition of about two centuries before Christian era, there are passages²² which go to prove to the hilt the heroism and glory of Tamil Warrior-women. Ōkkūrmāsāttiyār, a poetess, is all praise to a noble woman who was the mother of only one son and who sent that son to the field of battle in response to a call. The lady dresses his hair which was a tuft and presented him with all armour. Her parting words were "Your father and grand-father fell heroically in battle. My hope and prayer is that you should follow their example. Go and fight to the end as befits a youngman."

Another poem says that when a heroic mother heard the heart-rending news that her son lost his courage in action and had retreated, her blood boiled with indignation. She vowed that if that were a fact, she should cut off her breasts with which she suckled him. With this determination she went out to meet the retreating son, with a sword in hand; she could not meet him. So she made a search in the field and found her son's body cut in twain. At this her happiness was greater than that she had at his birth.²³

Instances of this may be multiplied. We may refer to one other sample of the Tamil heroism. That is what one calls head offering.²⁴ It was a practice in those days to invoke the aid of the war goddess on the eve of an expedition. The goddess was pleased, according to the belief of the times, with sacrifices of goats, buffaloes and even

²² *Puram*, 279.

²³ *Puram*, 277.

human beings. But one curious practice of the Tamil soldiers was to go to the altar, stand before the diety, cut their heads themselves with swords, place the cut heads at the altar, when the cut trunk stands firm raising both hands in prayer. This sentiment may be crude and all the same it indicates the intense feeling on the part of the Tamil soldier, his courage and boldness without caring in the least for his life.

Side by side with humane treatment meted to the enemy, the Tamil kings more often showed themselves inhumane. For there are instances where the bloodthirsty warriors quenched their thirst of vengeance by ploughing the roads and streets with asses and donkeys and sowing seeds of castor, cotton and other cereals. It is said even the houses of gods were not spared.²⁵ The use of fire to buildings and looting of the property were also not uncommon. Sometimes the defeated king was captured and put to death. These soldiers went by the name of *maṛavar*, who were fierce-looking, and full of martial spirit and valour. There is still a *maṛavar* tribe in the present Ramnad district and these are perhaps the descendants of the old martial tribe.

The Rajput Tradition

The Hindu warriors who are from A.D. 800 known as Rajputs had to fight for another eight hundred years more against the invading Mohammedans. These Rajputs were the lineal descendants of the ancient Kṣatriya stock and endeavoured their best not to give a holding to the new invader. When Mahomed Kasim invaded Sind, Raja Dahir of Sind collected a large force and marched to oppose him. Though he received a severe arrow wound, still 'he charged in the most gallant manner

²⁵ Kalinga *Hupparani*, 15, 392.

into the midst of the Arabian horse where he died like a hero.²⁶ Again when Mohamed Ghorī led his expedition, he was attacked by as many as one hundred and fifty Rajput princes who rallied under the banner of Prithvi Raj "having sworn by the water of the Ganges, that they would conquer their enemies, or die martyrs to their faith." In the course of a letter addressed to Mahomed they said: "it were better, then, you should repent in time, of the rash resolution you have taken, and we shall permit you to retreat in safety; but if you have determined to brave your evil destiny, we have sworn by our gods to advance upon you with our rank-breaking elephants, our plain-trampling horses, and blood-thirsting soldiers, early in the morning to crush the army which your ambition has led to ruin²⁷."

There were two battles at Taraori, near Karnal. In the first Ghorī was beaten. But in the second battle Prithvi Raja was defeated and captured and put to death.²⁸ Then later when Baber came to establish the Mughal empire, Rana Sangha of Mewar²⁹ offered a heroic resistance as his descendant Pratapa Singh later fought against the great Akbar. Though Akbar and Shah Jahan were diplomatic enough to enlist these gallant soldiers in their army and use them to fight against their enemy, there were Rajputs who would not suffer the disgraceful deeds of the foreigner. They attacked Aurangzeb though not with much success. In the meantime in Mahārāṣṭra, Śivājī rose to power. He saw how Hindu religion was in danger and his country almost a lost dominion. His tactics were too much for the Mughal Emperor. All his plans to capture this great leader failed. The Mahrattas made a last effort and

²⁶ Briggs: *History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power*, Vol. IV, pp. 406-409.

²⁷ Briggs: *op. cit.* Vol. I, pp. 174-179.

²⁸ C. H. I. III, p. 40.

²⁹ C. H. I. IV, pp. 16-17.

a bold bid in the 18th century for the dominion of India fired by martial qualities. But it was too late. The tottering Mughal empire passed on slowly but surely to the hands of the East India Company.

Military Races of Modern India

The Mutiny of 1857 has been called the Great Indian Mutiny, but really speaking it was an unfortunate circumstance in certain parts of the country, while other parts rallied to the standard of the British to put it down with all their might. A serious outbreak took place only in Delhi and Oudh, Cawnpore and Central India.³⁰ In other provinces it was more an incident of a negligible character. Whatever it was, it did a disservice to our country. It made the great Bengal Army disappear³¹ with a few exceptions. It made the British to lose the confidence of the Indian to some extent. By loyal and faithful service after the mutiny our soldiers all over India have earned the gratitude of army officers and commanders. That is why today large numbers are being recruited. For trust alone begets trust.

Let me take up the Punjab. From the Mutiny down to the present day the hardy races of the Punjab—the Rajput Dogra, the Punjabi Mohamedans, the Sikhs and the Jats have been associated with the British Army and have displayed wonderful skill and splendid enthusiasm. The Dogras are, according to Major G. F. MacMunn, the most valued of all soldiers. They are Brahmins, Rajputs, Jats and the like who retain the old Aryan religious faith and habits.³² They are also enlisted to the Imperial Service Troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Pathāns in the Indian Army come mostly from within the British border or

³⁰ Thompson and Garratt: *Rise and fulfilment of British rule in India*, pp. 435-446 and Macmunn: *Armies of India*. Ch. III.

³¹ *Ibid.* 449-450.

³² *The Armies of India* p. 143.

between the administered border and the Afghan frontier. Also the Duranis come to our ranks especially the cavalry. To these may be added the Hazaras enlisted chiefly in the Baluchistan regiments, besides the Baluchis themselves.

The military services of the Sikhs are too widely known. Whether raised before the Mutiny or after, the Sikh regiments are equally famous. What is said of the Sikhs is also true of the Jats. Major MacMunn writes "As a fighting man, his slow wit and dogged courage give him many of the characteristics of the British soldier at his best."³³

During the Great War I more than one half of the Indian army was drawn from the Punjab, and their achievement was very remarkable. The Lahore and Meerut Divisions which were sent to France in the Autumn of 1914 played an heroic part. True to their traditions of loyalty and self-sacrifice the Indian soldiers felt as they feel today that that war was their war. The strongest appeal to a Punjabi (this is true of every Indian also) is, it is said, one to his *izzat* (honour), especially in protecting their hearths and homes. The warrior is easily roused. To this may be added the splendid war services of the Punjab Native States during the Great War and in the last Global War. This gallant record which keeps Indian martial tradition unimpaired has earned for the Punjab as the shield, spearhead and sword-hand of India.³⁴ The same military bearing and dash and daring of a fighting caste are noticed in other Rajputs who hold practically all the great States of Rajputana, Kathiawar and a great part of Central India. This is equally true of the Muhammedans of Rajputana and as well as of the descendants of Maratha conquerors—Scindia, Gaikwar, Holkar and others in the West and central India. The Mahrattas claim to be Rajputs of the Agnikula persuasion. "They

³³ *Ibid.* p. 139-40.

³⁴ *India as I knew it* by Sir Michael O'Dwyer (1921) (Ch. XV).

have long served with credit and distinction in the Bombay Army." They are famous for their wiriness and endurance.

The next military race of importance are the Gurkhas of Nepal and the Garhwali (a hill tribe) west of Nepal. There are many battalions of Gurkhas in the service, the enlistment dating from the Nepal War. Among the many good qualities of the Gurkhas is the intensity of camaraderie that exists between them and their officers as also between them and the British troops. The Gurkhas are born soldiers. The Garhwalis dress themselves in Gurkha style of rifle uniform with kilmarnock cap. They are deemed to be of "considerable fighting value."

Races of the Carnatic

Madras is generally put down as an "Unmilitary" province with a few exceptions like the men of the Coorg hills and Moplahs of Malabar. But the army of the Madras Presidency otherwise named the Coast Army had done its services in the most satisfactory manner. The Tamils like the Kallar and Maravar and the Muhammedans of Tamil districts, the Velamas and Rachewars of Andhradesa are also enlisted. The value and history of the Madras sepoy require a special treatment. It was the French who recruited originally Indian sepoys and gave them a quasi-European training. Then the English began to use this valuable material. The sepoys were at first termed peons. The First Commander-in-Chief of the Company's army in our Presidency, Major Stringer Lawrence was struck by the efficiency and valour of Madras sepoys in the battle at Cuddalore in 1748 against the French, the siege of Arcot 1751 and the battle at the Golden Rock near Trichinopoly 1753.³⁵ So with the reorganisation of the Madras Army in 1763 the number of the sepoy battalions

³⁵ H. H. Dodwell : *Sepoy Recruitment in the Old Madras Army* Ch. II.

was increased. The sepoy's were promoted as Naiks, Havildars and Jamadars.

One of the battalions known as Baillie-Ki-Paltan³⁶ (1759-1930) named after Lt. William Baillie who commanded it from 1765 to 1771, showed their gallantry at Chengamah with Hyder Ali in 1767. Whether at the battle of Assaye (1803) or in China (1840-41) the Madras troops showed spirited behaviour and won great credit, let alone the First and Second Mysore Wars. In the Great War (1914-18) South India's contribution was no less important. The 88th Carnatic Infantry and the 83rd Wallajabad Infantry along with others won great distinction.³⁷

If we only turn to the recent world war we have a brilliant record of achievements. In North Africa it was the Indian Army that smashed the enemy completely and won world-wide distinction. Our army won glory in the fields of Italy advancing against great odds. Thus the sum total of Indian martial tradition is to fight to the end, and even to sacrifice one's life, if need be, for the cause of the crown and the country.

³⁶ Baillie-Ki-Paltan by Lt. Col. H. F. Murland, Higginbothams, 1932.

³⁷ C. S. Srinivasachari, *New Review* 1941, pp. 367-385.

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN COSMETICS AND PERFUMERY—THE GANDHAYUKTI SECTION OF THE VIṢṆUDHARMOTTARA AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER TEXTS ON THE GANDHAŚĀSTRA

By P. K. GODE

IN my studies in the History of Indian Cosmetics and Perfumery (*Gandhaśāstra*) so far published, I have analysed and made use of the following Sanskrit texts on the *Gandhaśāstra* :—

- (1) Two special treatises on the *Gandhaśāstra* (composed between c.A.D. 1300 and 1600) discovered by me, viz. (i) *Gandhasāra* of Gaṅgadhara and (ii) *Gandhanāda* with Marathi Commentary.¹
- (2) The chapter called “*Gandhādhikāra*” of a work on erotics called the *Nāgarasauvasva* by a Buddhist author Padmaśrī (About A.D. 1000).²
- (3) The *Gandhayukti* section of the *Āgṇipurāṇa* (Between A.D. 800 and 900).³
- (4) The *Gandhayukti* section of the *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* of Varāhamihira (c.500 A.D.).⁴

The above sources prove beyond challenge the history of the *Gandhaśāstra* literature for more than 1500 years, though unfortunately the texts on this subject which have come down to us are few and fragmentary. It should, therefore, be our endeavour to link up every new source with the texts referred to above to enable us to have

¹ *Vic Journal of the Bombay University*, Sept. 1945, pp. 44-52; *New Indian Antiquary* Feb-March, 1945, 185-193.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

³ *Ādyar Library Bulletin* Vol. IX. (Part 4.) 1945, pp. 143-151.

⁴ *Bhāratīya Vidyā*, July-August, 1945, pp. 149-156.

a connected view of the history of the *Gandhaśāstra* from the remotest antiquity to the present day.

I propose here to deal with the *Gandhayukti* section of the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* (Khaṇḍa II, chap. 64—pp. 220—221 of Venkatesvar Press Edition, Bombay). This section reads as follows :—

“॥ पुष्करडवाच ॥

A 20 शोधनं वसनं चैव तथैव च विरेचनम् ।

भावनं चैव पाकश्च बोधनं धूपनं तथा ॥ १ ॥

A 21 वासनं चैव निर्दिष्टं कर्माष्टकमिदं शुभम्⁵ ।

कपित्थबिल्वजम्बाअबीजपूरकपल्लवैः ॥ २ ॥

A 22 कृत्वोदकं तु यद्द्रव्यं शोधितं शौचितं तु तत् ।

तेषामभावे शौचं तु मृतदर्शाम्भसा भवेत् ॥ ३ ॥

तदभावे तु कर्तव्यं तदा मुस्ताम्भसा द्विज ।

शुष्कं शुष्कं पुनर्द्रव्यं पञ्चपल्लववारिणा ॥ ४ ॥

• प्रक्षालितं चाप्यसकृद्वसितं तत्प्रकीर्तितम् ।

पञ्चपल्लवतोयेन क्वाथयित्वा पुनः पुनः ॥ ५ ॥

⁵ Compare the *Six* processes of manufacturing cosmetics mentioned in the परिभाषाप्रकरण of the गन्धसार of गङ्गाधर in the following verse :—

भावनं पाचनं बोधो वेधो धूपनवासने ।

एवं षडत्र कर्माणि द्रव्येषूक्तानि कोविदैः ॥ ६ ॥

Here I shall compare the verses on गन्धयुक्ति in the विष्णुधर्मोत्तर with those found in the अग्निपुराण (Venkateswar Press, Bombay). Chapter 224 (verses 19-42). [A 20=*Agnipurāṇa* Chap. 224 verse 20 and so on] :—

A 20—शौचंमाचमनं राम तथैव च विरेचनम् ।

भावनं चैव पाकश्च बोधनं धूपनं तथा ॥ २० ॥

A 21—वासनं चैव निर्दिष्टं कर्माष्टकमिदं स्मृतम् ।

कपित्थबिल्वजम्बाअकरबीरकपल्लवैः ॥ २१ ॥

A 22—कृत्वोदकं तु यद्द्रव्यं शोधितं शोधनं तु तत् ।

तेषामभावे शौचं तु मृगदर्शाम्भसा भवेत् ॥ २२ ॥

द्रव्यं संशोषितं कृत्वा चूर्णं तस्य तु कारयेत् ।
 हरीतकीं ततः पिष्ट्वा पञ्चपल्लववारिणा ॥ ६ ॥
 तेन पथ्याकषायेण तच्चूर्णं भावयेत्सकृत् ।
 शोषितं शोधयेदेतद्विरेकं तत्प्रकीर्तितम् ॥ ७ ॥
 ततस्तु गन्धद्रव्येण यथेष्टं कुङ्कुमादिना ।
 भावयेत्तेन तद्द्रव्यं भावना सा प्रकीर्तिता ॥ ८ ॥
 तेनैव भावयेद्द्रव्यं पञ्चपल्लववारिणा ।
 आश्वत्थेनैव तेनाथ द्रव्यं राम तथास्तु तत् ॥ ९ ॥
 मृदा पिहितसत्त्वौ तु मृण्मये भाजनद्वये ।
 विपचेत्तु विब्रूमाग्नावतंभूमः पुनः पुनः ॥ १० ॥⁶
 तावेव क्वाथयेत्तावत्तत्रैवानुगतो रसः ।
 एतत्पाकविधानं ते पञ्चमं परिकीर्तितम् ॥ ११ ॥
 ततस्तु भावनाद्रव्यं कल्कपिष्टं नियोजयत् ।
 कल्कपिष्टे तथा द्रव्ये बोधनं परिकीर्तितम् ॥ १२ ॥
 ततस्तु पूजयेद्द्रव्यं⁷ पूर्वमेव तु पथ्यया ।
 ततस्तु गुरुशुक्तिभ्यां चन्दनागरभिस्ततः ॥ १३ ॥

* The *Gandhasāra* mentions different varieties of पाक such as—(1), पुटपाक, (2) गर्तपाक, (3) वेणुपाक, (4) दौलापाक, (5) खर्परपाक, (6) बैजधूरपाक, (7) कालपाक (See verses 8-17 of परिभाषाप्रकरण of गन्धसार—B.O.R. Institute MS in the Raḍḍi Collection). The पुटपाक and गर्तपाक are described in the गन्धसार as follows :—

“पंचपत्रपुटाबद्धं मूलिलप्तं चांगुलोज्जतम् ॥ ८ ॥

पचेत्क्वारीशके वह्नी पुटपाकोऽयमीरितः ।

गर्ते पात्रं गंधगर्भं कृत्वा पूर्य मृदावटम् ॥ ९ ॥

प्रज्वाल्योग्निस्तदुपरि गर्तपाको भवेदयम् ।”

⁷ The aromatic ingredients (गन्धद्रव्य) mentioned by Varāhamihira in the गन्धयुक्ति section of the *Bṛhat-saṁhitā* (c. A. D. 500) are :—“पत्रं तुरष्क कालतगरैः”, इकुल, चम्पक, जाती, त्वक्, अतिमुक्तक, कुस्तुम्बुर, शलपुष्पा, कुन्दुरक, नख, प्रियङ्गु, गुडनख, गुग्गुलु, वालक, लाक्षा, मुस्ता, मांसी, चन्दन, हरीतकी, शङ्खधनद्रव, शैलक, श्रीसर्ज, उशीर, सज्जमैला, “मृगकपूर”, कपूर, व्याघ्रनख, सृङ्गा, अगुरु, दमनक, तगर, चौर, मलय, कस्तूरिका, शैलेय, सर्जरस, धीवासक, रोध्र, हिङ्गुल, केसर, राला, मरिच, जातीफल, ताम्बूल, पूगफल, कङ्कोल, लवलीफल,—I note here articles in the *Hobson-Jobson* (1903) on a few of the above ingredients :—Pages 152-153—*CAMPHOR*

कर्पूरमृगदर्पाभ्यां ततश्चैनं धूपयेत् ।
 इत्येतद्वासनं नाम कर्म तद्विहितं मया ॥ १४ ॥
 ततस्तु गुलिकां कृत्वा यथाकाममतन्द्रितः ।
 पुष्पैर्बकुलजातीनां तथान्येषां सुगन्धिभिः ॥ १४ ॥
 छायासु शोष्यमाणस्य वासना क्रियते तु या ।
 वासना सा विनिदिष्टा कर्मेतच्चाष्टमं शुभम् ॥ १६ ॥
 कर्माष्टकमिदं कृत्वा वचां पिण्डनिभां तथा ।
 मुस्तं शैलेयकं वापि सेव्यं वा द्विजसत्तम ॥ १७ ॥
 शोवपेद्गान्धिको विद्याद्यथावत्कर्म सेत्स्यति ।
 निर्यासानां च पुष्पाणां कर्माष्टकमिदं शुभम् ॥ १८ ॥
 विदुषा नैव कर्तव्यं कार्यमन्यत्र भार्गव ।
 अशोधितंस्तथा धूपाः^८ कार्या द्रव्यैर्यथाविधि ॥ १९ ॥
 अतः परं तु ते योगान्कांश्चिद्वक्ष्यामि ताञ्छृणु ।
 A 23 नखं कुण्डं घनं मांसी स्पृक्वा शैलेयकं जलम् ॥ २० ॥
 तथैव कुंकुमं लाक्षा चन्दनागुरुणी नतम् ।
 A 24 सरला देवकाष्ठं च कर्पूरं कान्तया सह ॥ २१ ॥
 बोलं कन्दूरकश्चैव गुग्गुलुः श्रीनिवासकः ।

—usages recorded are :— c.A.D 340 (*Caphura*, c.A.D. 940 (*Camphor*), A.D. 1298 (*Camfera*), etc.

Page 913-914—TEMBOOL—usages recorded are from A.D. 1298 (*Tembul*) onwards.

Page 599—MUSK—(कर्पूरी) usages :—c.A.D. 390 (*muscus*) mentioned by St. Jerome; c.A.D. 545 (*Musk* animal) etc.

Pages 789-790—SANDAL (चन्दन)—Usages:—Sandalwood (c.A.D. 545) onwards.

Page 499—LAC (लाक्षा)—usages :—Lac-dye (c.A.D. 80-90) mentioned in *Periplus*.

⁸ The *Gandhanāda* (folios 45-47 of B.O.R.-I. MS) describes the manufacture of different kinds of धूप, with fanciful names such as अनंगसुन्दर, कोलाहल, कुमारधूप, etc. The *Gandbasāra* also describes the preparation of धूप, (Vide folios 12-15 of B.O.R.I. MS of *Gandbasāra*).

A 23 नखं कुण्डं घनं मांसी स्पृक्कशैलेयकं जलम् ।

तथैव कुंकुमं लाक्षा चन्दनागुरुनीरदम् ॥ २३ ॥

A 24 सरलं देवकाष्ठं च कर्पूरं कान्तया सह ।

वालः कुन्दूरकश्चैव गुग्गुलुः श्रीनिवासकः ॥ २४ ॥

- A 25 सह सर्जरसेनेयं धूपद्रव्यैकविंशतिः ॥ २२ ॥
धूपद्रव्यगणादस्मादेकविंशत्येच्छया ।
- A 26 द्वे द्वे द्रव्ये समादाय सर्जभागे नियोजयेत् ॥ २३ ॥
नवे पिण्याकवल्यैः संयोज्य मधुना तथा ।
- A 27 धूपयोग्या भवन्तीह यथावत्स्वेच्छया कृताः ॥ २४ ॥
त्वचं जातीफलं तैलं कुङ्कुमं ग्रन्थिपर्णकम् ।
- A 28 शैलेयं तगरं काष्ठं ताम्बूलं तगरं तथा ॥ २५ ॥
मांसी सरावकुष्ठं च नवद्रव्याणि निर्दिशेत् ।
- A 29 एतेभ्यस्तु समादाय द्रव्यं तत्र यथेच्छया ॥ २६ ॥
मृगदर्पयुतं स्नानं कार्यं कन्दर्पवर्धनम् ।
- A 30 द्रुक्सुरानलदैस्तुल्यैर्बाल्यकारसमायुतैः ॥ २७ ॥
स्नानमुत्पलगन्धि स्यात्सतैलं कुङ्कुमैर्युतम् ।
- A 31a जातीपुष्पसुगन्धि स्यात्तगरार्धेन योजितम् ॥ २८ ॥
बालकाञ्चनसंयुक्तं पाटलाकुसुमायते ।
- A 31b स व्यापकं स्याद्वकुलैस्तुल्यगन्धिमनोहरम् ॥ २९ ॥
नालिकावंगसहितं कुट्टिपादेन चार्थकम् ।
- A 25 सह सर्जरसेनैवं धूपद्रव्यैकविंशतिः ।
धूपद्रव्यगणादस्मादेकविंशत्येच्छया ॥ २५ ॥
- A 26 द्वे द्वे द्रव्ये समादाय सर्जभागे नियोजयेत् ।
नखपिण्याकमलयैः संयोज्य मधुना तथा ॥ २६ ॥
- A 27 धूपयोग्या भवन्तीह यथावत्स्वेच्छया कृताः ।
त्वचं नाडीफलं तैलं कुङ्कुमं ग्रन्थिपर्णकम् ॥ २७ ॥
- A 28 शैलेयं तगरं क्रान्तां चोलं कर्पूरमेवं च ।
मामीं सुरां च कुष्ठं च स्नानद्रव्याणि निर्दिशेत् ॥ २८ ॥
- A 29 एतेभ्यस्तु समादाय द्रव्यत्रयमथेच्छया ।
मृगदर्पयुतं स्नानं कार्यं कन्दर्पवर्धनम् ॥ २९ ॥
- A 30 त्र्यङ्गमुरानलदैस्तुल्यैर्बाल्यकारसमायुतैः ।
स्नानमुत्पलगन्धि स्यात् सतैलं कुङ्कुमायते ॥ ३० ॥
- A 31 जातीपुष्पसुगन्धि स्यात्तगरार्धेन योजितम् ।
मद्वयात्मकं स्याद्वकुलैस्तुल्यगन्धिमनोहरम् ॥ ३१ ॥

द्विकेसरं वेणुपादं कुन्दपुष्पायते तथा ॥ ३० ॥
शैलपादार्थसंयुक्तं व्यक्तं मदनकं भवेत् ।

A 32 मञ्जिष्ठा तगरं बालं द्वयं व्याघ्रनखं नखम् ॥ ३१ ॥
गन्धपत्रं च विन्यस्य गन्धतैलं^९ भवेच्छुभम् ।

A 33 तैलं निष्पीडितं राम तिलैः पुष्पाधिवासितैः ॥ ३२ ॥
वासना पुष्पसदृशं गन्धेन तु भवेद्द्रुतम् ।
पूर्ववच्छोधयित्वा तु मुस्तं सेव्यं वचां निशाम् ॥ ३३ ॥
अभीष्टमन्यत्कलुषं यथावदनुलेपयेत् ।
उद्धृत्य चन्दनादि च शोधनं वमनं तथा ॥ ३४ ॥
वर्जयित्वा विरेकं च शेषकर्माणि कारयेत् ।
तद्वा भवति धर्मज्ञ वर्णकं त्रिदिवप्रियम् ॥ ३५ ॥
पटवासांसि कार्याणि वर्णकैः श्लक्ष्णचूर्णितैः ।
A 34 एलालवङ्गककूलजातीफलनिशाकराः ॥ ३६ ॥
जातिपत्रिकया सार्द्धं स्वतन्त्रं मुखवासकम् ।

^९ Compare the चम्पकगन्धितैल, mentioned in the गन्धयुक्ति section of the *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* (c.A.D. 500):—

“मञ्जिष्ठया व्याघ्रनखेन शुक्त्या
त्वचा सकुष्ठेन रसेन चूर्णः ।
तैलेन युक्तोऽर्कमयूखतप्तः
करोति तच्चम्पकगन्धितैलम् ॥ ६ ॥

This verse has been incorporated in the *Gandhasāra* (Folio 8 verse 24 of B.O.R.I. MS).

As regards “मृगदर्पयुतं स्नानं”, mentioned in verse 27 of the विष्णुधर्मोत्तर, (गन्धयुक्ति) compare the following verse of नागरसर्वस्व (गन्धाधिकार):—

“त्वगगुरुमुस्तकतगरं चौरशठी ग्रन्थिपर्णकनखं च ।
कस्तूरीसंयुक्तं स्नानीयं तत् प्रशस्यते सद्भिः ॥ १२ ॥

—स्नानीयचूर्णवासः ।”

A 31 मञ्जिष्ठा तगरं चीलं तद्वच्चं व्याघ्रनखं नखम् ।
गन्धपत्रं च विन्यस्य गन्धतैलं भवेच्छुभम् ॥ ३२ ॥
A 32 तैलं निष्पीडितं राम तिलैः पुष्पाधिवासितैः ।
वासनात्तत् पुष्पसदृशं गन्धेन तु भवेद्द्रुवम् ॥ ३३ ॥
एलालवङ्गककूलजातीफलनिशाकराः ।
जातिपत्रिकया सार्द्धं स्वतन्त्रा मुखवासकाः ॥ ३४ ॥

- A 35 कर्पूरं कुङ्कुमं कान्तं मृगदर्पं हरेणुकम् ॥ ३७ ॥
कक्कोलैलालवङ्गं च जातीकोशकमेव च ।
- A 36 द्रुक्पत्रं त्रुटिमुस्तं च लताकस्तूरिकं तथा ॥ ३८ ॥
कण्टकानि लवङ्गस्य फलपत्रैश्च जातितः ।
- A 37 कटुकं च फलं राम कर्षिकाण्डां प्रकल्पयेत् ॥ ३९ ॥
तच्चूर्णे खदिरं सारं दद्यात्तुल्यतुलापितम् ।
- A 38 सहकण्यारमेनास्य कर्तव्या गुलिकाः शुभाः ॥ ४० ॥
मुखे न्यस्ताः सुगंधास्ता मुखरोगविनाशनाः ।
- A 39 पूर्वं प्रक्षालितं सम्यक्पद्मपल्लववारिणा ॥ ४१ ॥
शक्त्या तु गुलिकद्रव्यैर्वसिकं मुखवासकम् ।¹⁰

¹⁰ Compare the following verses on मुखवास in the गन्धाधिकार of नागरसर्वस्व (p. 12 of Tripathi's Edition, Bombay, 1921).

“जातीफलकस्तूरीकर्पूरं चूतवारि-संस्थितम् ।
धूपितमगुरुकशिल्लकमधुगुडसितैश्च मुखवासः ॥ ७ ॥
क्रमवर्धितं त्वगेला मांसी शठयगुरु कुङ्कुमं चापि ।
धनचन्दनजातीफललवङ्गकङ्कोलकर्पूरम् ॥ ८ ॥
अष्टांशवंशरोचनमुकलितमतिस्वल्पशर्करामहितम् ।
पिष्ट्वा सहकाररसैर्मुखवासो भूमिपालानाम् ॥ ९ ॥

See also ताम्बूलभोग (p. 85 of मानसोद्भास, Vol II, G.O.S., Baroda, 1939).
Verses 974-976 refer to a गुटिका prepared of खदिरकाथचूर्णं, कस्तूरिक्षोदं,
कर्पूररजस्, श्रीहृण्डकल्क etc.

- A 35 कर्पूरं कुङ्कुमं कान्तं मृगदर्पं हरेणुकम् ।
कक्कोलैलालवङ्गं च जातीकोशकमेव च ॥ ३५ ॥
- A 36 त्वक्पत्रं त्रुटिमुस्तौ च लतां कस्तूरिकां तथा ।
कण्टकानि लवङ्गस्य फलपत्रैश्च जातितः ॥ ३६ ॥
- A 37 कटुकं च फलं राम कर्षिकाण्युपकल्पयेत् ।
• तच्चूर्णे खदिरं सारं दद्यात्तुल्यं तु वासितम् ॥ ३७ ॥
- A 38 सहकाररसेनास्मात् कर्तव्याः गुटिकाः शुभाः ।
• मुखन्यस्ताः सुगंधास्ता मुखरोगविनाशनाः ॥ ३८ ॥
- A 39 पूगं प्रक्षालितं सम्यक्पद्मपल्लववारिणा ।
शक्त्या तु गुटिकाद्रव्यैर्वसितं मुखवासकम् ॥ ३९ ॥

A 40 कटुकं दन्तकाष्ठं च गोमूत्रे वासितं त्र्यहम् ॥ ४२ ॥
कृतं च पूगवद्राम¹¹ मुखसौगन्ध्यकारकम् ।

A 41 त्वक्पश्ययोः सभावंशौ सितभागार्धसंयुतौ ॥ ४३ ॥
नागवल्लीसमो भाति मुखवासो मनोहरः ।

कटुकफलनताम्बुत्वक्त्रुटिव्याधिपत्रै—

नलदनतसुराभिस्तुल्यभागान्वितानि ।

द्विगुणितकृतमात्राप्रतिकल्लोलसैभ्यैः

शशिरसरसभोऽयं गन्धपत्रं विदध्यात् ॥ ४४ ॥

निहितमिदमनर्घं कर्णपत्रं युक्त्याः

शमयति विविधानि श्रोत्रपालीगदानि ।

अपरमपि च यावत्काममामोदमत्तुं

भ्रमदलिपटलेन व्याप्यते वक्त्रभागः ॥ ४५ ॥

इति श्रीविष्णुधर्मोत्तरे द्वितीयखण्डे मा० सं० रामं प्रति पुष्करोपाख्याने गन्ध-
पुक्तिर्नाम चतुष्पष्ठितमोऽध्यायः ॥ ६४ ॥

The above chapter is preceded by chapter 63 called
“भोज्यकल्पनाकथनम्” and is followed by chapter 65 called
“राजधर्मवर्णनम्”

¹¹ Compare the description of पूगवास in नागरसर्वस्व (c.A.D.1000)

“कुष्ठतगरजातीफलकर्पूरलवङ्गकैलाभिः ।

वरतनु वासय शीघ्रं पूगफलं भूमिपालानाम् ॥ ११ ॥

The सुश्रुतसंहिता (सूत्रस्थान,) Chap. 46, verses 201-204 refers to पूगवास
and its ingredients (See p. 441 of Vol. I of Marathi Trans. by
Krishnashastri Phadke, Bombay, 1921):—

“कफपित्तहरं रुक्षं वक्त्रक्लेदमलापहम् ।

कषायमीषन्मधुरं किञ्चित्पुगफलं सरम् ॥ २०१ ॥

जातीकोशोऽथ कर्पूरं जातीकटुकयोः फलम् ।

कक्कोलकं लवङ्गं च तिवर्तं कटु कफापहम् ॥ २०२ ॥

लघु तृष्णापहं वक्त्रक्लेददौर्गन्ध्यनाशनम् ।

सतिवर्तः सुरभिः शीतः कर्पूरो लघुलेखनः ॥ २०३ ॥

तृष्णायां मुखशोषे च वैरम्ये चापि पूजितः ।”

A 40 कटुकं दन्तकाष्ठं च गोमूत्रे वासितं त्र्यहम् ।

कृतं च पूगवद्राम मुखसौगन्ध्यकारकम् ॥ ४० ॥

A 41 त्वक्पश्ययोः सभावंशौ शशिभागार्धसंयुतौ ।

नागवल्ली समो भाति मुखवासो मनोहरः ॥ ४१ ॥

In the foregoing extract on गन्धयुक्ति from the *Viṣṇudharmottara* I find verses 20 to 41 on गन्धयुक्ति from chapter 224 of the *Agnipurāṇa*. To enable scholars to mark the few textual variants I have reproduced the verses from the *Agnipurāṇa* below the footnotes as I found them in the printed edition of this Purāṇa (Venkateswar Press, Bombay). The following table will, however, show at a glance the relation of the *Gandhayukti* verses of the *Agnipurāṇa* with those in the *Gandhayukti* chapter of the *Viṣṇudharmottara* :—

विष्णुधर्मोत्तर Khaṇḍa II Chapter 64 (गन्धयुक्ति)	अग्निपुराण Chap. 224 (राजधर्म)	वि० ध० Kh. II Chap. 64 (गन्धयुक्ति)	अग्निपुराण Chap. 224 (राजधर्म)
Verse 1	A 20	Verse „ 23 ^b	A 26
„ 2	A 21	„ 24 ^a	A 27
„ 3	A 22	„ 25 ^a _b	A 28
„ 4		„ 26 ^a _b	A 29
„ 5		„ 27 ^a _b	A 30
„ 6		„ 28 ^a _b	—A 31a }
„ 7		„ 29 ^a _b	—A 31b }
„ 8		„ 30	
„ 9		„ 31 ^a _b	A 32
„ 10		„ 32 ^a _b	A 33
„ 11		„ 33 ^a _b	
„ 12		„ 34	
„ 13		„ 35	
„ 14		„ 36 ^a _b	A 34
„ 15		„ 37 ^a _b	A 35
„ 16		„ 38 ^a _b	A 36
„ 17		„ 39 ^a _b	A 37
„ 18		„ 40 ^a _b	A 38
„ 19		„ 41 ^a _b	A 39
„ 20 ^b	A 23	„ 42 ^a _b	A 40
„ 21 ^a _b	A 24	„ 43 ^a _b	A 41
„ 22 ^a _b	A 25	„ 44 ^e	
„ 23 ^a _b		„ 45	

The above table gives an impression that the *Gandbayukti* verses of the *Agnipurāṇa*, which are about half of the *Gandbayukti* verses of the *Viṣṇudharmottara*, have been borrowed by the *Agnipurāṇa* from the *Viṣṇudharmottara*.

I cannot say if both these Purāṇas have borrowed their *Gandbayukti* verses from an earlier common source. We must hunt up the *Gandbayukti* texts in other Purāṇas and correlate them with those in the *Brhatsambhitā*, *Viṣṇudharmottara*, *Agnipurāṇa*, *Nāgarasarvasva*, *Gandhasāra*, *Gandhavāda* etc. In this way alone we can put the history of the *Gandhasāstra* on a secure basis.

Gaṅgādhara in his *Gandhasāra* tells us that the *Gandhasāstrā* is helpful in the worship of gods (देवानां शुभगंधधूपसहितस्यार्चाविधेरर्पकम्). This statement is corroborated by the references to perfumes prescribed for religious worship. I note below the following extracts from the *Kālikāpurāṇa* (*Venkaṭeśwar Press, Bombay*, śaka 1829—1907) which describe the perfumes to be used for such worship :—Chapter 73 (folio 189)—Description of गन्ध to be used for the worship of goddess—

“गन्धं च सम्यक् शृणुतं पुत्री बेतालभैरवी ।

चूर्णीकृतो वा घृष्टो वा दाहाकर्षित एव वा ॥ ३७ ॥

रसः सम्मर्दजो वापि प्राण्यगोद्भव एव वा ।

गन्धः पञ्चविधः प्रोक्तो देवानां प्रीतिदायकः ॥ ३८ ॥

गन्धचूर्णं गन्धपत्रं चूर्णं सुमनसस्तथा ।

प्रशस्तगन्धयुक्तानां पत्रचूर्णानि यानि तु ॥ ३९ ॥

तानि गन्धवहानि स्युः स गन्धः प्रथमः स्मृतः ।

घृष्टो मलयजो गन्धः स चूर्णीकृतमेरुणा ॥ ४० ॥

अगुरुप्रभृतिश्चापि यस्य पंकः प्रदीयते ।

गन्धो दृष्ट्वा मघृष्टोयं द्वितीयः परिकीर्तितः ॥ ४१ ॥

देवदार्वगुरुर्बृह्मशालशैरान्तचन्दनाः ।

प्रियादीनाञ्च यो दध्वा गृह्यते दाहजो रसः ॥ ४२ ॥

स दाहाकषितो गन्धः तृतीयः परिकीर्तितः ।

सुगन्धकरबीबिल्वगन्धीनि तिलकं तथा ॥ ४३ ॥

प्रभृतीनां रसो योसौ निःपीड्य परिगृह्यते ।

स सम्मर्दोद्भवो गन्धः सम्मर्दज इतीष्यते ॥ ४४ ॥

मृगनाभिसमुद्भूतः तत्कोषोद्भव एव वा ।

गन्धः प्राण्यंगजः प्रोक्तो मोददः स्वर्गवासिनाम् ॥ ४५ ॥

कर्पूरगन्धसाराद्याः क्षोदे घृष्टे च संस्थिताः ।

चन्द्रभागादयश्चापि रसे पङ्के च संगताः ॥ ४६ ॥

गन्धसारं सर्वरसं गन्धादौ च प्रयुज्यते ।

मृगनाभिर्भवेद् घृष्टश्चूर्णोप्यन्यस्य योगतः ॥ ४७ ॥

एवं सर्वं तु सर्वत्र गन्धो भवति पञ्चधा ।

घृष्टादिभावादप्योन्यं गन्धः प्रीतिकरः परः ॥ ४८ ॥

गन्धस्य विस्तरो भेदः प्रोक्तः कालीयकादयः ।

सर्वः पञ्चविधेष्वेव प्रविष्टो भवति क्षणात् ॥ ४९ ॥

गन्धो मलयजो यस्तु दैवे पित्र्ये च संमतः ।

तस्य पङ्को रसो वापि चूर्णो वा विष्णुतुष्टिदः ॥ ५० ॥

सर्वेषु गन्धजातेषु प्रशस्तो मलयोद्भवः ।

तस्मात्सर्वप्रयत्नेन दद्यान्मलयजं सदा ॥ ५१ ॥

कृष्णागुरुः सकर्पूरः सहितो मलयोद्भवैः ।

वैष्णवी प्रीतिदो गन्धः कामाख्यायाश्च भैरव ॥ ५२ ॥

कुङ्कुमागुरुकस्तूरीचन्द्रभागैः समीकृतैः ।

त्रिपुराप्रीतिदो गन्धस्तथा चण्ड्याश्च शस्यते ॥ ५३ ॥

दैवतोद्देशपूर्वेण गन्धं संपूज्य साधकः ।

दैवायेष्टाय वितरेत्सर्वसिद्धिप्रदं सदा ॥ ५४ ॥

गन्धेन लभते कामान् गन्धो धर्मप्रदः सदा ।

अर्थानां साधको गन्धः गन्धे मोक्षः प्रतिष्ठितः ॥ ५५ ॥¹⁸

* 18 Gangādhara in his *Gandhasāra* calls the गन्धशास्त्र as त्रिवर्षफलद i.e. fulfilling the three ends of human life viz. (1) धर्म, (2), अर्थ and (3) काम, He also calls the गन्धशास्त्र as “देवानां...अर्चाविधेरपकम्” i.e. useful for the

The foregoing description of the different *gandhs* and their application in the worship of deities is sufficiently informative. *gandh* is one of the five accessories of religious worship mentioned by the *Kālikāpurāṇa* in the line “गन्धं पुष्पं च धूपं च दीपं नैवेद्यमेव च” (chap. 73, verse, 101) and also described at length in the same context. Of the two items of religious worship (अर्चाविधि) viz., “गन्धधूप” mentioned by the *Gandhasāra* I have already recorded above the testimony of the *Kālikāpurāṇa* about *gandh*. I shall now record its description of धूप and its varieties as used in worship. This description reads as follows:—

Chap. 73 (folio 192):—

“एवं वा कथितो दीपो धूपं च शृणुतं सुतो ।
 नासाक्षिरन्ध्रमुखदः सुगन्धोत्तिमनोहरः ॥ ३२ ॥
 दह्यमानस्य काष्ठस्य प्रयतस्येतरस्य च ।
 परागस्याथवा धूमो निस्तापो यस्य जायते ॥ ३३ ॥
 स धूप इति विज्ञेयो देवानां तुष्टिदायकः ।
 राशीकृतैर्न चैकत्र तैर्द्रव्यैः परिपूजयेत् ॥ ३४ ॥
 ओवाग्निवत्तप्तां कृत्वा न तत्फलमवाप्नुयात् ।
 श्रीचन्दनं च सरलः शालः कृष्णागुरुस्तथा ॥ ३५ ॥
 उदयः सुरथस्कन्दो रक्तविद्रुम एव च ।
 पीतशालः परिमलो विमदीकाशस्तथा ॥ ३६ ॥
 नमरुर्देवदारुश्च बिल्वसारोऽथ खादिरः ।
 सन्तानः पारिजातश्च हरिचन्दनवल्लभौ ॥ ३७ ॥
 वृक्षेषु धूपाः सर्वेषां प्रीतिदाः परिकीर्तिताः ।
 अरालः सह सूत्रेण श्रीवासः पट्टवासकः ॥ ३८ ॥
 कर्पूरः श्रीकरश्चैव परागः श्रीहरामलौ ।
 सर्वोषधीव ज्ञातीव वराहश्चूर्ण उत्कलः ॥ ३९ ॥

worship of Gods. This statement corresponds to the statement of the *Kālikāpurāṇa* गन्धे मोक्षः प्रतिष्ठितः :

It will thus be seen that *gandhasāra* is useful for fulfilling the four ends of human life, viz., धर्म, अर्थ, काम and मोक्ष.

जातीकोषस्य धूपं च गन्धः कस्तूरिका तथा ।
 क्षौदे वृत्ते च गदिता धूपाः एते उदाहृताः ॥ १४० ॥
 यक्षधूपो वृक्षधूपः श्रीपिष्टोऽगुरुभर्भरः ।
 पत्रिवाहः पिण्डधूपः सुगोलः कण्ठ एव च ॥ ४१ ॥
 अन्योन्ययोगा निर्यासा धूपा एते प्रकीर्तिताः ।
 एतैर्विधूपयेद्देवान्बूमिभिः कृष्णवत्सना ॥ ४२ ॥
 येषां धूपोद्भवैर्घर्षिस्तुष्टि गच्छन्ति जन्तवः ।
 निर्यासश्च परागश्च काष्ठं गन्धं तथैव च ॥ ४३ ॥
 कृत्रिमश्चेति पञ्चैते धूपाः प्रीतिकराः पराः ।
 न यक्षधूपं वितरेन्माधवाय कदाचन ॥ ४४ ॥
 न रक्तं विद्रुमं मह्यं सुरथं कद्रिलं तथा ।
 यक्षधूपः पुत्रिवाहः पिण्डधूपः सुगोलकः ॥ ४५ ॥
 कृष्णागुरुः सकर्पूरो महामायाप्रियः स्मृतः ।
 वृक्षधूपेन वा देवीं महामायां¹³ प्रपूजयेत् ॥ ४६ ॥
 मेदोमज्जासमायुक्तान्न धूपान्विनियोजयेत् ।
 परकीयांस्तथाघ्रातांस्तेपि कृत्याभिर्मर्दितान् ॥ ४७ ॥
 पुष्पं धूपं च गन्धं च उपचारांस्तथापरान् ।
 घ्रात्वा निवेद्य देवेभ्यो नरो नरकमाप्नुयात् ॥ ४८ ॥
 न भूमौ वितरेद्धूपं नासनेन घटे तथा ।
 यथा तथाधारगतं कृत्वा तद्विनिवेदयेत् ॥ ४९ ॥
 रक्तविद्रुमशाली च सुरथः सूरलस्तथा ।
 सन्तानको नमेरुश्च कालागुरुसमन्वितः ॥ १५० ॥

¹³ Cf. the use of incense in Egyptian sacrifice as illustrated by a wall-painting in the *Tomb of Two Sculptors (about 1400 B.C.) No. 92—A sacrifice to the Gods—Neb Amūn accompanied by his mother, Thepu, pours oil of incense over braziers filled with offerings, among which hot coals have been scattered, thus causing the oil to be ignited. The flames are to be seen against the papyrus mat which holds the four jars of ointment. A formula records the presenting of incense and sacred gum to Amūn, Osiris, Anubis and other deities. A servant assists the performance of the ceremony. (See pp. 34-35 of *Egyptian Wall-Paintings from Tombs and Palaces of the XVIII and XIX Dynasties (1600-1200 B.C.)* Metropolitan Museum of New York, 1930).*

जातोकोषाक्षसंयुक्तः धूपः कामेश्वरीप्रियः ।
 त्रिपुण्यायास्तथैवायं मातृणामपि नित्यशः ॥ १५१ ॥
 सर्वेषां पीठदेवानां रुद्रादीनां च पुत्रक ।
 एष वां कथितो धूपः श्रुतं नेश्वरञ्जनम् ॥ १५२ ॥
 येन तुष्यति कामाख्या त्रिपुरा बैष्णवी तथा ।

चतुर्वर्गप्रदो धूपः कामदं नेश्वरञ्जनम् ।
 तस्माद्वयमिदं दद्याद्देवेश्यो भविततो नरः ॥ ६१ ॥'

The above discourse on the use of धूप in religious worship may now be compared with the following section called धूपभोग¹⁴ in the मानसोल्लास of the Cālukya King Someśvara (c.A.D. 1130):—

“अधुना धूपभोगोऽयं वर्ण्यते सौरभोत्कटः ।
 लाक्षा गुग्गुलु कर्पूर रालकुण्डुहसिलहकम् ॥ ९७ ॥
 श्रीखण्डं दारु सरलं लघुकोष्ठं च वालकैः ।
 ण्सीकुङ्कुमपथ्या च (श्च) कस्तूरीपूतिबीजकैः ॥ ९८ ॥
 शङ्खनाभिनखैश्चैव सितामधुघृतं गुडः ।
 समान्येतानि चूर्णानि द्रवद्रव्यं विहाय च ॥ ९९ ॥
 द्विगुणं लघुकर्पूरं चूर्णधूपोऽयमुत्तमः ।
 एतान्येव हि सिलहेन मिश्रयेन्मधुसर्पिषा ॥ १०० ? ॥
 गुडेन पिण्डयेत्पश्चात् पिण्डधूपो वरो मतः ।
 द्रव्याण्येतानि तोयेन पिष्टानि मधुसर्पिषा ॥ १ ॥
 वर्तिरूपाणि शुष्काणि वर्तिधूपो मनोहरः ।
 रीतिरूपमयो वापि सुवर्णघटितोऽयं वा ॥ २ ॥
 खगो वाऽपि मृगो वाऽपि सरन्ध्रः सम्पुटात्मकः ।
 अङ्गारगर्भिते (तो) पिण्डेनान्वितो धूपमुद्गिरेत् ॥ ३ ॥
 मुखकर्णादिभिश्छिद्रैः पिण्डधूपे त्वयं क्रमः ।
 अङ्गारगर्भिते पात्रे चक्रदण्डेन संयुते ॥ ४ ॥
 विकिरेद्धूपचूर्णं तद्वारं वारमिति क्रमः ।
 दन्तेन रचिते श्लक्ष्णे सुपात्रे बहुदण्डकैः ॥ ५ ॥

¹⁴ Vide pp. 144-145 of *Mānasollāsa* (G.O.S. Baroda, 1939), Vol. II,

दण्डेन वा समायुक्ते धूपने सूचिसंयुते ।
 सूचिकाम्रे विनिक्षिप्य वर्त्ति सन्धुष्य बह्विना ॥ ६ ॥
 स्थगयेत्सम्प (म्पु) टेनाथ रन्ध्रैर्धूपो विनिसरेत् ।
 करण्डं दण्डसंयुक्तं पाणिना परिवर्तयेत् ॥ ७ ॥
 आत्मनोऽपि मुखं क्वापि प्रेयसीवदनेषु वा ।
 करण्डकमदण्डं तु धूपवर्त्तिसमन्वितम् ॥ ८ ॥
 अंशुकान्तं क्षिपेद्वापि स्त्रोम्पके वाऽपि निक्षिपेत् ।
 धूपयेत् शुभां शय्यां वसनेनावगुण्ठिताम् ॥ ९ ॥
 पञ्जसंघातवासांसि पिण्डकैश्चूर्णकैरपि ।
 गृहं च पिहितद्वारं निरोधितगवाक्षकम् ॥ १० ॥
 धूपयेद्बहलैर्धूपैः पिण्डधूमसमुद्भवैः ।
 विलासचतुराणां हि नृपाणां च विनोदिनाम् ॥ ११ ॥
 धूपभोगोऽयमाख्यातः सोमेश्वरमहीभुजा ।
 भूलोकमल्लदेवेन धूपभोगोऽयमीरितः ॥ १२ ॥

The *Gandhasāra* of Gaṅgādhara states that the *Gandhasāra* or science of cosmetics and perfumery contributes to the pleasures of kings (राज्ञां तोषकरम्). This remark is substantiated by the above section on धूपभोग composed by a king himself who expressly states that it is meant for royal use (विलासचतुराणां हि नृपाणां च विनोदिनाम् । धूपभोगोऽयमाख्यातः etc.).

While the sections on *Gandhayukti* in the *Viṣṇudharmottara* and the *Agnipurāṇa* describe the manufacture of cosmetics and perfumery, the extracts from the *Kālikāpurāṇa* and the *Mānasollāsa* (c. A.D. 1130) illustrate the use of perfumes in sacred and secular spheres of Hindu life in medieval India (between A. D. 600 and 1300). Before we attempt a treatise on the history of Indian *Gandhasāstra* it is necessary to exploit fully all available sources which contain references to the *Gandhasāstra* either on its technical or cultural side. My own studies in the history of the *Gandhasāstra* so far published have been designed with a

view to providing enough material to other scholars who want to pursue this subject further on the strength of new sources, either Sanskrit or non-Sanskrit. The identification of the several aromatic ingredients mentioned in the texts on the *Gandhaśāstra* will have to be studied both from the technical and historical points of view but I must leave this subject to more competent students of this subject than myself. My own interest in this subject is purely historical and cultural.

MṚCCHAKAṬIKA—A STUDY IN TIME ANALYSIS

By K. R. PISHAROTI

AMONGST the three dramatic unities of action, of character and of time, the least attended to by dramatists is the unity of time. In this respect the author of the *Mṛcchakaṭika* stands unique. He has observed the unity of time to a remarkable extent ; not only that, he has deliberately used a peculiar mode of time treatment, which has come to be known as *double time theory* in Shakespeare dramatic criticism.

The drama¹ opens at nightfall. The Vidūṣaka states that it is already dusk and he dares not venture out then into the public thoroughfare full of *Gaṇikās*, *Viṭas* and *Cetas*.² Again, Vasantasenā evades Śākāra successfully, thanks to the growing darkness, the intensity of which is stressed also by Viṭa and by Śākāra³. Thus the scene takes place in the early part of the night, and it comes to a close with the rise of the moon⁴.

The second act begins early in the morning as clearly indicated by the reference to bathing and *Deva-pūjā*⁵; the

¹ The references given here are to the 1910 edition of the text, issued by the *Nirnayasagar Press*, Bombay.

² Vide, p. 11.

अन्यच्चैतस्यां प्रदोषवेलायां राजमार्गे गणिका विटाश्चेटाः राजवल्लभाश्च पुरुषाः संचरन्ति ।

³ Vide p. 26.

शकार—भाव, भाव, बलीयसी खल्वन्धकारे माषराशिप्रविष्टेव मसीगुटिका दृश्यमानेव प्रणष्टा वसन्तसेना ।

विटः—अहो बलवानन्धकारः । तथा हि cf. verses 33, 34 also verse 35.

⁴ Vide p. 41.

चारुदत्त-मैत्रेय भवतु । कृतं प्रदीपिकाभिः । पश्य verse 57.

⁵ Vide p. 45.

••(उपसृत्य) चेटी-मातादिगति स्नात्वा भूत्वा देवतानां पूजां निर्वर्तय इति । वसन्तसेना—चेटी, विज्ञापय मातरं 'अहं न स्नास्यामि । तद्ब्राह्मण एव देवपूजा निर्वर्तयतु इति ।

incidents described here take place *presumably*⁶ the very next morning, as the love-lorn condition of Vas^o and the reference to *nyāsa* suggest⁷; and it must have come to a close early in the forenoon itself. The two incidents of the gamble⁸ and the elephant⁹ are introduced to serve as a *make believe* of the passage of a longer period of time for the act. Really the incidents could not, however, have occupied more than an hour or so and take place, we may say, between 8 and 10 A.M. On the same day Act III opens late in the first half of the night, past, however, the usual time for retiring as evidenced by the stage direction¹⁰ and closes just before before day-break¹¹.

Some definite interval of time must have elapsed, it may be argued, between Acts I and III. The first Act begins in the evening and, passing through a very dark dusk, ends with the rise of the moon¹². This means it takes place a couple of days after the full moon, so that it might begin in darkness and end with the rise of the moon. The third Act describes the setting of the moon somewhere about

⁶ The listlessness of Vasantasenā certainly indicates that this act follows immediately the incidents of the previous evening.

⁷ Vide p. 45.

मदनिका-किमत एव संलंकारः तस्य हस्ते निक्षिप्तः ।

⁸ This is important, since he helps to rescue Vas., when she was left for dead after strangulation by Śakāra. This character has to play an important part in the resolution of the story.

⁹ This serves an important purpose from the point of view of emotion delineating. The introduction of the *Prāvaraka* inflames her love longings and she rushes up the terrace to have a look at him.

¹⁰ Vide p. 72.

(निद्रां नमटयन् 'तं तस्य स्वरसंक्रम' इति पुनः पठति' विदूषकः—अपि निद्राति भवान् इत्यादि ।

¹¹ Vide p. 74.

चारुदत्तः—अहमपि कूर्तशौचः सन्ध्यामुपासते ।

¹² Vide reference given in note 4 *ante*.

midnight,¹³ and it means that this act takes place a few days after the New moon day. Hence apparently there must be assumed an interval of about a *paśa*, or a fortnight, between these two Acts.

This assumption is not, however, justified by the situation presented. In the first place there is, indeed, no reason, expressed or understood why Cārudatta should not have been relieved of the burden of the *Nyāsa*. In the second place, that it is a *nyāsa* has been categorically stated¹⁴; it is also stated that the residence of Cārudatta is no safe place for keeping it¹⁵, and Cārudatta informs Vidūṣaka that it is not for a *long period*.¹⁶ And lastly, leaving the *nyāsa* with Cārudatta is certainly creating a source of worry and anxiety for him, and Vasantasenā would be the last person to do so. The purpose with which Vasantasenā leaves her ornaments with Cārudatta is not to safeguard them—for, notice, Vasantasenā could, indeed, have carried them with her at once, because Cārudatta was escorting her,—but to leave open an opportunity to meet him again¹⁷. Again, Cārudatta directs that Vidūṣaka is to safeguard it during night and Vardhamānaka, during day time¹⁸.

¹³ Vide p. 73 :

शार्वालिकः—(नभो विलोक्य) अये कथमस्तमुपगच्छति स भगवान् मृगाङ्कः ।
तथाहि—

वनपटलतमोनिहृद्धतारा रजनिरियं जननीव संवृणोति ।

¹⁴ Vide p. 40.

वसन्तसेना—पुरुषेण न्यासा निक्षिप्यन्ते न पुनर्बोहेष ॥

चारुदत्तः—धिङ्मूर्ख, न्यासः खल्वयम् ॥

¹⁵ Vide p. 9.

चारुदत्तः—अयोग्यमिदं न्यासस्य गृहम् ।

¹⁶ Vide p. 40.

चारुदत्तः—अचिरेणैव कालेन ।

¹⁷ Vide p. 45 : the last two sentences ; vide also p. 93.

¹⁸ Vide p. 41.

चारुदत्तः—इदं च सुवर्णभाण्डं रक्षितव्यं त्वया रात्री वर्षमम्बकेन विव । ।

When this is read with the statement of Vardhamānaka¹⁹, the normal conclusion is that Act III follows close upon Act I, and the statement of Vidūṣaka²⁰ indicates that he is yet to accustom himself to safeguarding a trust. The character of Cārudatta is such that he should return it at the earliest possible opportunity, and the motive of Vasantasenā requires that she should go and claim it at the earliest possible opportunity and thus have the pleasure of meeting him again. Thus the nature of the situation presented does not justify the assumption of a *pakṣa* between Acts I and III. Of course, the painting of the picture of Cārudatta²¹ does not necessitate any long interval of time at all, for a practised artist could easily paint a picture, particularly when it is intended not for public exhibition, but for self-satisfaction²².

Besides, no interval could reasonably be supposed to exist between Acts I and II or between Acts II and III. The opening of Act II²³ indicates that it naturally enough comes the morning after the events of Act I. Act I describes the first meeting of Cārudatta and Vasantasenā, and Act II describes the natural result thereof, and the love-lorn condition²⁴ of Vasantasenā is emphasised by the revelation

¹⁹ Vide p. 72.

चेष्टः—आर्य मैत्रेय, एतत् सुवर्णभाण्डं मम दिवा तव रात्रौ च । तद्गुहाण ।

²⁰ Ibid.

विदूषकः—अद्यापि एतत् तिष्ठति । किमत्रोज्जयिन्यां चौराणि नास्ति यः एतं दास्याः पुत्रं निद्राचौरं नापहरति ।

²¹ Vide p. 85 : opening sentence.

²² Note, for instance, Śakuntalā and Ratnāvalī do it in a trice.

²³ Vide p. ?

चेष्टी—एवार्था हृदयेव किमपि अलिखन्ती तिष्ठति ।

This is the only interpretation possible. Vas. must be *ruminating* over her meeting with Cār. the previous evening. Such an attitude would be out of place, if this scene were to take place some *dāyas* hence.

²⁴ Compare the last few sentences of Act II, p. 67.

of certain traits of Cārudatta²⁵ by other incidents which emphasise his greatness and which, therefore, steep her all the more in pangs of love. She tries to get relief for her love-sick condition by painting a picture of Cārudatta, and it is with this that Act IV opens²⁶. The assumption of any interval between Acts I and II or between II and III is, therefore, out of tune with the incidents described therein, and it is particularly so with reference to emotion delineation.

Thus from the point of the development of theme and of emotion no interval could exist between Acts I and III. And this, therefore, raises the question : how to reconcile the description of the rise of the moon in Act I²⁷ with the description of the setting of the moon in Act III²⁸, descriptions which are appropriate in the particular contexts ? There is probably a *lacunae* in the text²⁹, which is only too well indicated ; or, we may assume, it is a particular dramatic device deliberately introduced by the poet to produce the impression of the passage of a longer period of time to enhance the effect of emotion delineation—a method which Shakespeare has successfully used and which in Shakespearian criticism is termed *double time* theory.

²⁵ Vide p. 58.

संवाहकः—यस्तादृशः प्रियदर्शनः . . . शरणागतवत्सलश्च ।

Vide also p. 60.

संवाहकः—पृथिव्यां त्वमेको जीवति । शेषः पुनः जनः इवसति ।

²⁶ Vide p. 85, note the opening sentence of Act IV.

चेटी—एषार्या चित्रफलकनिषण्णदृष्टिर्मदनिकया सह किमपि मन्त्रयन्ती तिष्ठति ।

Presumably, the painting must have been finished the previous evening, after Vas. sees Cār. walking along in broad day-light, as indicated in the last sentences of Act II.

²⁷ Vide the verse quoted in note 4 *ante*.

²⁸ Vide text quoted in note 13 *ante*.

²⁹ Compare for instance verse 57 and the text following. Vid. says that there is no oil in the house for a light and then Cār. peeps out and finds that the moon has risen and in the next *Cūṛṇika* he says—

Act IV begins early the third morning. Vidūṣaka reaches the residence of Vasantasenā and hands over *Ratnāvalī*, as desired by Cārudatta at day break³⁰ after the theft. Vidūṣaka must be reaching her house after the morning has well advanced and after Śārvalika has gone and offered the stolen ornaments to his beloved Madanikā³¹. Towards the close of the act, Vidūṣaka returns to Cārudatta with the message that Vasantasenā would visit him at dusk³² the same evening; and, indeed, Vasantasenā prepares to start for the residence of Cārudatta immediately Vidūṣaka leaves³³.

Act V is in continuation of Act IV. For, in the first place, there is the echo of the words of Vasantasenā with reference to the *Akālavarṣa*³⁴; secondly, Cārudatta is uneasy

Then he re-enters his house. The information given clearly shows that the residence of Vas. was away from that of Cār. and he certainly could not conduct himself thus. It is patent that there is a *lacunae* here. May be in the portion lost, there is some indication, regarding the period of the *nyāsa*.

³⁰ Vide the last sentence in Act III. Vid. starts at day-break and Cār. proceeds to discharge his morning rites.

³¹ This is the main theme of the first part of the Act.

³² Vide p. 112.

वसन्तसेना—अहमपि प्रदीपे अयं प्रेक्षितुमागच्छामि इति ।

³³ Compare the statement of Vas.

हृदये हारं गृहीत्वा क्षीप्रमागच्छ ।

This suggests not merely the eagerness of Vas. to start for the residence of Cār., but also it is time to start. This, then, forins deliberate statement made to bridge over the time difficulty.

³⁴ Vide p. 113, Verse 33 :

चेटी—उन्नमत्यकालदुर्दिनम् ।

वसन्तसेना—उदयन्तु नाम मेघा भवतु निशा वर्षतिमिरं पततु ।

Cf. also p. 114.

चारुः—उन्नमत्यकालदुर्दिनम् । . . . अकालिकं दुर्दिनमन्तरिक्षम् ।

Cf. also p. 123.

विदूषकः—भो अपि जानासि ईदृशे दुर्दिने आगतेति ।

that Vidūṣaka has not yet returned and thirdly³⁵, Vidūṣaka on his return, makes his own comment on the attitude of Vasantasenā³⁶ and her accepting Ratnāvalī³⁷. Soon after³⁸, Vasantasenā enters the house of Cārudatta, after some parley with the Viṭa³⁹, in consonance with her promise⁴⁰. The reference made by Cārudatta to the rainbow⁴¹ shows that the act closes before nightfall.⁴²

³⁵ Vide p. 115.

चिरं खलु कालो मंत्रेयस्य वसन्तसेनाया सकामं गतस्य नाद्याप्यागच्छति ।

³⁶ Vide p. 115.

विदूषकः—न तथाहं भणितः 'आर्य मंत्रेय विश्राम्यतां मल्लकेन पानीयमपि पीत्वा गम्यतामिति ।

This is a clear statement, showing that Vidū. must have taken only the minimum time at the residence of Vas. ; and the nature of his mission is clear indication that he could not have tarried on the way.

³⁷ Vide p. 116. Note the conversation between Cār. and Vidū. ; also the statement of Vidū. on p. 118.

विदूषकः—भणितं च मया भण चाहदत्तं अद्य प्रदोषे मयाभ्रागन्तव्यमिति । तत्तर्कयामि रत्नावल्यापरितुष्टा परं याचितुमार्गमिष्यतीति ।

This would show that *Pradoṣa* is yet to be.

³⁸ Immediately after the statement quoted in the note *ante*, Ceṭa enters to announce Vas.

³⁹ The conversation between Vidū. and Ceṭa could be justified only on the ground of *doubling time*, for the humour is feeble and delay is inappropriate.

⁴⁰ Note Vas. has come true to the appointed time : vide p. 124, verse 14 :

• मेघैर्वृत्तश्चन्द्रमाः

• Also verse 15.

मार्गं रुणद्धि कुपितेव निशा सपत्नी ।

Also verse 17.

हरति करसमूहं खे शशाङ्कस्य मेघः ।

⁴¹ Vide p. 135.

चारु—अये इन्द्रधनुः । प्रिये पश्य, पश्य ।

⁴² It is interesting to notice the reference to the moon. This is quite consistent with what is mentioned in Act III. Note here also the *make believe* of the passage of time is introduced through a long conversation between Vas. and Viṭa.

Cārudatta has necessarily to send Vidūṣaka at break of day to Vasantasenā on account of the loss of the *nyāsa*; and Vasantasenā need reach the residence of Cārudatta only in the evening. Yet the incidents of Acts IV and V are described as run on ones. The undramatic description of the palatial residence of Vasantasenā the inaptly long conversation between Ceṭa and Vidūṣaka, interlaced with some with and humour, and between *Vīta* and Vasantasenā, describing thunder and rain,—these, we believe, have been *deliberately* introduced by the poet to serve as a *make-believe* for doubling time and thus bridge over the time difficulty.

The incidents described in the Acts VI—X take place the day following Acts IV and V. Act VI opens with the maids waking up⁴³ Vasantasenā at the house of Cārudatta⁴⁴ and herself getting ready to go to Cārudatta in the *Puṣpakaraṇḍaka* garden, as desired by him⁴⁵; and the first stage closes with Vasantasenā getting into a conveyance and starting thither⁴⁶. Act VII opens with Cārudatta in the *Puṣpakaraṇḍaka* garden awaiting Vasantasenā⁴⁷ and growing anxious over her continued delay; and it closes with the arrival of his conveyance, not carrying Vasantasenā, as he expected, but the escaped royal prisoner

⁴³ Vide p. 136 opening sentences.

चेटी—उत्तिष्ठतु, उत्तिष्ठतु आर्या। प्रभातं संबृत्तम्।

⁴⁴ Vide the conversation between Vas. and Ceṭi, p. 137. This is also clear from the present she makes to the son of Cāru.

⁴⁵ Vide the opening sentences of the act. Notice, however, one sentence therein :

चेटी—योजय रात्रौ प्रवहणं वसन्तसेना गच्छतु।

Presumably there is a different reading.

⁴⁶ Vide p. 143.

वसन्तसेना—(दक्षिणाक्षिस्पन्दनं सूचयित्वा प्रवहणमधिरुह्य)

⁴⁷ Vide p. 159: the opening sentences of Act VII. Cāru. is already in the *Puṣpakaraṇḍaka* garden, but Vas. is yet to reach there.

Āryaka⁴⁸: Disappointed, Cārudatta returns home⁴⁹, when he meets the *Bhikṣu*, entering the garden⁵⁰. Act VIII opens with the entrance into the garden of the latter⁵¹ and the conversation between himself and Śakāra. Before long Vasantasenā comes into the garden in the conveyance of Śakāra⁵², refuses the advances of Śakāra and is strangled by him⁵³. This act, therefore, takes place in continuation of Act VII. Act IX opens with Śakāra, lodging a case before the magistrates that Cārudatta has murdered Vasantasenā⁵⁴. This is in continuation of the preceding Act; for Vidūṣaka, who has been sent by his master Cārudatta to return to Vasantasenā the ornaments presented by her to Rohasena⁵⁵ before she left his place that morning, hears on his way, that Cārudatta has been taken before the magistrates⁵⁶, and so he says that he would go first to the court before proceeding to Vasantasenā⁵⁷. The trial must, therefore, have taken place about midday.

⁴⁸ Vide p. 160, verse 5.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*: verse 9.

अपश्यतोद्य कान्तां तां वामं स्फुरति लोचनम् ।

अकारणपरित्रस्तं हृदयं व्यथते मम ॥

⁵⁰ *Ibid*. the passage following :

कथमभिमुखं अनाभ्युदयिकं भ्रमणकदर्शनम् ।

⁵¹ Vide p. 163. Compare the opening stage direction.

⁵² Vide p. 171 : Compare the stage direction in line 2.

⁵³ Vide p. 188.

(नाट्येन कण्ठे निपीडयन् मारयति)

⁵⁴ Vide pp. 199-200 : the opening soliloquy of Śak.

⁵⁵ Vide p. 219, line 1.

आर्यं मैत्रेय, वसन्तसेनयात्मनो लंकारेणालंकृत्य जननी सकामं प्रेषितः ।

अस्याभरणं दातव्यं न पुनर्गृहीतव्यम् । तत् समर्पय ।

⁵⁶ *Ibid*.

प्रियवयश्चारुदत्तोधिकरणमण्डपमाहृतः ।

⁵⁷ *Ibid*.

तत्र खलु अल्पेन कारणेन भवितव्यम् । तत् पश्चात् वसन्तसेनासकामं गमिष्यामि । अधिकरणमण्डपं तावत् गमिष्यामि ।

Act X opens with Cārudatta, found guilty⁵⁸ and sentenced to be speared⁵⁹, being taken away by the *Caṇḍālas* to the place of execution⁶⁰. Vasantasenā after rescue is being escorted by the Bhikṣu to Cārudatta⁶¹, when she hears the hue and cry in the streets⁶² and the beating of the drums, announcing an execution⁶³. On hearing that Cārudatta is the victim of the day⁶⁴, she rushes to the place of execution⁶⁵ and effects timely rescue⁶⁶. Hence all the five Acts, VI-X, take place on the fourth day after the story is set in motion. The distribution of the incidents of a single day into five different Acts may or may not be justifiable from the dramaturgical point of view⁶⁷; but it serves as a *make-believe*, as before, to justify not merely the *laws delays*, but more the political fiasco of a revolution and a counter-revolution, against the back ground of which is the love theme worked up.

⁵⁸ Vide p. 225, verse 39.

⁵⁹ Vide p. 225.

येनार्थकल्पवर्तकारणात् वसन्तसेना व्यापादिता तं... दक्षिष्मन् नित्वा शूले भङ्गत् ।

⁶⁰ Vide p. 226.

अधिकरणकः 'कः कोत्र भोः चण्डालानां दीयतामादेशः ।

Also p. 227 : the opening stage direction.

⁶¹ Vide p. 245.

भिक्षुः—कुत्र त्वां नेष्यामः ।

वसन्तसेना—आर्यचारुदत्तस्येव गेहम् ।

⁶² Vide p. 246.

भिक्षुः—किंतु खलु एष राजमार्गे महान् कलकलः श्रूयते ।

⁶³ *Ibid* : speeches following.

⁶⁴ *Ibid* :

उपासिके त्वं किल चारुदत्तेन मारितासीति चारुदत्तं मारितुं गीयते ।

⁶⁵ Vide p. 247. cf. the first two speeches.

⁶⁶ Vide p. 248.

भिक्षुः वसन्तसेना च—आर्य, मा तावत् । आर्याः एषाहं मन्दभागिनी यस्याः कारणादेषः व्यापाद्यते ।

⁶⁷ Compare for instance *Nāṭyaśāstra*, or *Daśarūpaka* or *Nāṭaka-Lakṣaṇa-kosa*. These state that an act contains the incidents taking place

The *Mrcchakatika*, then, dramatises the incidents taking place within the space of about 72 hours—from the nightfall on one day to the afternoon on the fourth day following.

Act I 1st day—Evening.

„ II 2nd „ —Forenoon.

„ III 2nd night—About midnight and later.

„ IV 3rd day—Forenoon.

„ V „ „ —Afternoon.

Act VI 4th „ —Morning.

„ VII „ „ — „

„ VIII „ „ — „

„ IX „ „ —Forenoon—latter half.

„ X „ „ —Midday and after.

It is thus a *run-on* drama, and so far as time treatment is concerned, there is, as we have interpreted it, the deliberate introduction of *double time* primarily for heightening emotion affect. In which respect the *Mrcchakatika* stands unique in the whole range of Sanskrit literature.

in a day. If the texts here are interpreted in the light of the construction of these last five acts, we have here a statement of the most that an act can represent: that is to say they lay down the upper limit. But another statement in NS., lays down that an act must represent the incidents of a day and if they could not be so represented the remainder may be introduced in the interlude. Hence it would appear that rules of dramaturgy insist on the representation of the incidents of a day in an act. And this would mean that the practice of at least one dramatist is against this injunction. And now there is a problem of chronology: did the author of this drama live before or after the author or compiler of *Nāṭya Śāstra*—a subject which we might discuss on a later occasion.

NĀRĀYAṆA KUMBHĀRĪ, HIS WORKS AND DATE

By SADASHIVA L. KĀTRE

THE *Scindia Oriental Institute*, Ujjain, possesses two MSS of a work entitled *Prāyaścittamālikā* or *Śranta-prāyaścittārthamālikā* or *Sukṛtārthamālā*. The first¹, viz. Accession No. 157, consists of 65 folios of the size 11 × 4½ inches and is dated. The other², viz. Accession No. 2173, contains 73 folios of the size 9½ × 4½ inches, has obviously lost one concluding folio and is consequently not dated. Both the Mss are in good condition and have been written in dark black ink, legibly but incorrectly at several places, by anonymous scribes.

The work deals with the topic of expiation to obviate evil arising from irregularities occurring in the performances of sacrificial rituals. It has only two chapters (= Sāras), the first of which confines itself to the section of Homa and the second to that of Iṣṭi.

The author cites several authors and works in the course of his treatment and generally supplements the citations with his own vṛtti thereon. Among the authorities cited by him I could trace the following :—

अजस्रपटल, अत्रि, अनन्तदेवीय ग्रन्थ,³ अनन्तदेवीय प्रायश्चित्त,³ आचार्यवचन, आपदेवीय ग्रन्थ,³ आपस्तम्ब, आपस्तम्बग्रन्थ (कृष्णभट्टस्य),⁴ आलेखन, आशीचनिर्णय-

* ¹ *Catalogue of Oriental MSS, Ujjain, Part I* (1936), P. 15 Serial No. 362. Folio references are to this MS throughout.

² *Ibid*, p. 30, serial No. 768. This MS, too, has almost identical readings everywhere.

³ The works of Āpadeva and Anantadeva are cited at several places.

⁴ ".....इति स्मार्तीपनामकविश्वनाथमहोदयः स्वग्रन्थे स्वग्रन्थप्रारम्भे बुध्दमन्त्रस्यागबोरपि विपरीत— प्रायश्चित्तां लिखितमिदम् । एतस्य मूलं मोल्लोपनामककृष्णभट्टस्य आपस्तम्बग्रन्थे दृश्यम् ।...." (—F. 30^a),

".....इदमापस्तम्बविषयं मोल्लोपनामककृतग्रन्थे ।" ".....(—F. 30^b).

This Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa Molha appears to be the father of Tryambakabhaṭṭa Molha (vide Footnote 7), although his authorship of any work is not recorded by Aufrecht or Kane.

ग्रन्थ (जीवदेवीय),⁵ आश्मरथ्य, आश्वलायन, आश्वलायनसूत्र, आश्वलायनसूत्रवृत्तिकार, उद्द्योतग्रन्थ, ऋग्विधान, कठाः, कर्पादिभाष्य, कथ्यट, कमलाकरभट्ट, कात्यायन, किराताजुनीय, कुतूहल, कुवलयानन्द, कूर्मपुराण, (मोल्होपनामक—) कृष्णभट्ट, केशव, कौषीतकी श्रुति, गीता, गृह्यवृत्ति, गृह्याग्निसागर or गृह्याग्निसार, गोभिल, गौतम, चन्द्रिका, छन्दोगपरिशिष्ट, जनकादयः, जीवदेवीय आशौचनिर्णयग्रन्थ, तोरोरुद्रदेव,⁶ त्रिंशच्छ्लोकी, त्रिंशच्छ्लोकीव्याख्यान, त्रिकाण्ड or त्रिकाण्डमण्डन, त्रिकाण्डीय, (मोल्होपनामक—) त्रयम्बक⁷, दक्ष, दानसूत्र, दिनकरोद्द्योत,⁸ देवत्रात, देवयाज्ञिक, देवाजानीयग्रन्थ, धूर्तभाष्यकार, निर्णयनिबन्धसार, नृसिंहकारिका, न्यासकार, परिभाषा-कुतूहल, पर्वनिर्णयदीप, पारिजात, पृथ्वीचन्द्रोदय, प्रतापनारसिंह, प्रयोगपारिजात, प्रयोगसूत्र, प्रायश्चित्त (अनन्तदेवीय), प्रायश्चित्तकुतूहल,⁸ प्रायश्चित्तचन्द्रिका, प्रायश्चित्तदीप, प्रायश्चित्तदीपिका, प्रायश्चित्तप्रदीप, प्रायश्चित्तप्रदीपिका, प्रायश्चित्तसंग्रह, प्रायश्चित्तसूत्र, हस्त्रारदीय, बोधायन, बौधायन, ब्रह्माण्डपुराण, ब्राह्मण, भट्टाः, भरद्वाज, भारद्वाज, भारद्वाजीयभाष्य, भाष्य, मण्डन, मण्डनमिश्र, मदनपारिजात, मनु, मरीचि, महाभारत, माधकाव्य, माधव, मीमांसा, मोल्होपनामक कृष्णभट्ट and त्रयम्बक, यम, याज्ञवल्क्य, रामकृष्ण, रामाण्डार, रुद्रदत्त, रुद्रदेव तोरो⁹, लघुहारीत, लोगाक्षि, वल्लिपुराण, वरदराज, विधिसंग्रह, (स्मार्तपनामक—) विश्वनाथभट्ट,⁹ विष्णु, विरहणसूत्र, वृत्ति, वृत्तिकृत्, वैश्वनाथीय, शतद्वयीव्याख्या, शातातप, शुक्लग्रन्थ, शुल्बग्रन्थ, शूलपाणि, सायणाचार्य,

⁵ “....अथ जीवदेवीयाशौचनिर्णयग्रन्थे च etc.”(=F. 46^b).

⁶ There is only one citation from Toro Rudradeva's *Pratāpanārasimha* and it occurs in both the MSS after the conclusion of Chap. 1 and before the commencement of Chap. 2 !

⁷ “...इत्यवदानोपरि अवदानपतने संसर्गे च प्रायश्चित्तम् । इदं मोल्होपनामकत्रयम्बकग्रन्थे ।” (F. 34^a.) This Tryambaka Molha appears to be identical with Tryambakabhāṭṭa Molha of Benares mentioned by Aufrecht (*Catalogus Catalogorum*, I, P. 241^a, II, P. 51^b) and Kane (*History of Dharmasāstra*, I, P. 701^b) as son of Kṛṣṇabhāṭṭa Molha and author of many works on Dharmasāstra and sacrificial ritual.

⁸ The *Dinakaroddyota* and the *Prāyaścittakutūhala* are cited at numerous places, sometimes under the abbreviations “Uddyota” and “Kutūhala” respectively.

⁹ Vide Footnote 4 above. This Viśvanāthabhāṭṭa Smāita may be identical with Viśvanāthabhāṭṭa, son of Narasimha Dikṣita, who wrote the *Śrāntapṛāyaścittacandrikā* on the sacrificial ritual belonging to the Baudhāyana branch of Black Yajurveda. Vide R. L. Mitra : *Notices of Sanskrit MSS*, Vol. I, p. 88, No. 165 and Aufrecht : CC, I, pp. 584^b, 677^a, II, pp. 161^b, 231^a.

सिद्धान्तभाष्य, स्कन्द, स्मार्तदीपिका (मत्कृता), स्मार्तोपनामक विश्वनाथभट्ट, स्मृति-
भास्कर, स्मृतिसंग्रह, स्मृतिसार, स्मृत्यर्थसार, हारीत ।

• The *Parvanirṇayadīpa*, reproduced in full at the commencement of Chap. 2, is a small treatise in 33 verses, supplemented by a brief commentary, and was composed by the author's own maternal grandfather named Rāmakṛṣṇa¹⁰.

The author records details regarding himself in the following passages and colophons :—

Chap. 1 Beginning

..... नरसिंहाकृते विष्णो ! त्वत्कृतिं वर्णयामि किम् ।

अभक्तभक्तयोर्नित्यं कौपीनधनदो ह्यसि ॥ १ ॥

अत्रापरातुल्ययोगितालंकारः..... अभेदरूपकालंकारः
इत्यस्मिन् श्लोकेऽलंकारनिरूपणम्, अत्राद्यपद्ये सगणः, तस्य फललक्षणं—'देशाटनं
सोऽन्तगुः' । देशोद्देशे ग्रन्थप्रसिद्धचर्यं सगणोऽत्र योजितः, तथापि नरसिंहदेवतावाञ्छकत्वात्
सगणफलदोषो नास्त्येव ।

..... लक्ष्मीनृसिंहं वन्देऽहं सत्यपूर्णं गुहं तथा ।

नीरानृसिंहौ पितरौ कुम्भारीत्युपनामकौ ॥ १ ॥

देवार्थं सुफलार्थं च प्रायश्चित्तार्थमालिका ।

नारायणेन क्रियते स्वल्पज्ञानाग्निहोत्रिणे ॥ २ ॥

¹¹ पण्डितैर्विष्णुसंकाशैर्मालिकेयं तु कुब्जका ।

विरला सरला कार्या स्वात्मभूषणकाङ्क्षया ॥ ३ ॥

श्रीसूर्यादिमुदेवता मणिमयी श्रीविष्णुमेवैङ्किता

स्वाज्येनोज्ज्वलिताग्निहोत्रिभिरलं वेदादिसद्गुम्फिता ।

द्रष्टृणां सुखदा हुताशनमखैर्विप्रैः सदा मन्त्रिता

प्रायश्चित्तसुमालिका नरहरे ! धार्या त्वया सर्वदा ॥ ४ ॥

न श्रीतीयविचारकौशलमथो नो व्याकृतौ नैपुणं

नो मे गौतमभट्टशास्त्रसुगतिर्नाप्युत्कटोपासना ।

एवं सत्यपि चापलं विदधतो युक्तोपहासार्हता

श्रोतव्यं गुणिभिस्तथापि कृपया कीरोक्तिवन्मे वचः ॥ ५ ॥

¹⁰ ".....निरूप्य होमकृत्यानि त्विष्टिकृत्ये निरूप्यते । मातामहैर्बुधैः पूर्वं रायकृष्णामिधैः
कृतः ॥ पूर्वनिर्णयदीपोऽयमिष्ट्यर्थं स प्रकाशयते, कर्मपुराणे-दर्शं च पौरुषभासं च ये यजन्ति द्विजातयः
।.....पूर्वनिर्णयदीपोऽयं रामकृष्णप्रकाशितः । समर्पितोऽस्तु हरये प्रकाशाय सतां मुदः ॥....."
Vide (Folios 44^a—46^a).

¹¹ This and the subsequent four verses are found repeated elsewhere, too, in the work,

गुणिभिर्मेषसंकाशैर्महाक्यं क्षारजीवनम् ।

तत्पीत्वा मधुरं कृत्वा वृष्टिः कार्यर्यसिद्धये ॥ ६ ॥

इष्टान् शिष्टान्यज्ञकारांश्च पृष्ट्वा ग्रन्थान्दृष्ट्वा शुक्लदेवादिसंघट्टनं ।

सद्व्यक्त्योक्तिर्लिख्यते श्रौतयुक्ता नाहं कर्ता प्रेरको यज्ञमर्ता ॥ ७ ॥

अस्य व्याख्या.....एवं च उक्तरूपसिद्धिः । .

नीरातटस्थेन विनायकेन विघ्नालिहन्त्रा कुलदैवतेन ।

लक्ष्मीनृसिहेन मयि स्थितेन सुप्रेरितोऽहं च तथा करोमि ॥ ८ ॥

Chap. 1 End

नोल्लिख्यतेऽत्र बाहुल्यं ग्रन्थविस्तरतो भयात् ।

प्रायश्चित्तविशेषार्थं ग्रन्थानन्यान्विलोकयेत् ॥

दक्षोद्भवेशमृडजातटवासिना हि कुम्भार्युपाभिधनृसिहतनूद्भवेन ।

नारायणेन सुकृता सुकृतार्थमाला स्वीकृत्य-तान्तु विबुधाः फलदा भवन्तु ॥

इति प्रायश्चित्तहोममालायाः प्रथमः सारः समाप्तः ॥

Chap. 2 Beginning

.....श्रीनृसिंह नमस्कृत्य श्रीनृसिहात्मजोऽधुना ।

इष्टियोग्यामहं कुर्वे प्रायश्चित्तार्थमालिकाम् ॥

• निरूप्य होमकृत्यानि त्विष्टिकृत्यं निरूप्यते ।

.....

Chap. 2 End

इति श्रीमद्गोदावरीतीरविराजमानशालिवाहनशकस्थानक्षेत्रप्रतिष्ठाननिवासिना कुम्भारीनरसिंहार्यसूनुना श्रीनृसिंहपरायणनारायणेन विरचितायाः प्रायश्चित्तार्थमालिकाया द्वितीयः सारः समाप्तोऽयमिष्टिप्रकरणे¹² ॥ श्रीनृसिंहार्पणमस्तु ॥.....

.....कर्मकाण्डं समालोक्य श्रुतिस्मृत्युदितं तथा ।

बहुग्रन्थानुसारेण कृतोऽयं ग्रन्थसंग्रहः ॥

तस्मादत्र विवेकजैर्बुद्ध्या संशोध्यतां बुधैः ।

कृतोऽयं ग्रन्थसंमेलः प्रीतः स्यान्नरकेसरी ॥

आश्विनमासे शुक्लपक्षे तिथौ प्रतिपदायां बुधवासरे संवत् १८८२ शके १७४७¹³

Evidently the author comes of a learned family, surnamed Kumbhārī, which appears to be one of Deśastha Brāhmaṇas of Mahārāṣṭra, residing at the celebrated city

¹² Here breaks the other MS (Accession No. 2173).

¹³ This is evidently the date of the anonymous scribe of the MS Accession No. 157.

of Pratiṣṭhāna or Paṭhan on the banks of Godāvārī in the Deccan. His own name is Nārāyaṇa and his father's and mother's Nṛsiṃha and Nirā respectively. The joint deity Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṃha and a shrine of Gaṇeśa on the banks of Nirā, a sub-tributary of Kṛṣṇā, appear to be his family-deities. Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṃha further appears to be the deity of his special attachment and he has cited the same illustratively in the Saṅkalpas etc. noted in his work as the deity for the satisfaction whereof the various sacrificial rituals are to be performed. From his vṛtti on the opening verse he seems to have expected his work to circulate extensively in the country. The fact of his maternal grandfather having composed the *Parvanirṇaya-dīpa*, a work connected with sacrificial rituals, has already been noticed above. This fact combined with several minor evidences visible in the body of the work shows that the author's family was one of hereditary Agni-hotrins or, at least, was hereditarily connected with experts in sacrificial ritual. 'Satyapūrṇa' (= lit. Full of Truth) might be the name of the author's Guru to whom obeisance is made in a verse cited above, or the word might have been used only adjectively.

The author's date can be fixed within reasonable limits in the light of external evidence. The lower limit for the same is furnished by the date (Āśvina, Sāmvat 1882 = c. September, 1825 A.C.) recorded at the close of our MS Accession No. 157, obviously as the scribe's date. As the author quotes Appayya's *Kuvalāyānanda* (c. 1600 A.C.)¹⁴, Kamalākara-bhaṭṭa (c. 1610-1640)¹⁵, the *Dinakaroddyota* which was commenced by Dinakarabhaṭṭa (c. 1575-1640)¹⁶, but completed by Gāgābhaṭṭa (c. 1620-1685)¹⁷, Āpadeva (c. 1600-

¹⁴ P. V. Kane : *History of Alankāra Literature*, P.CXXXI.

¹⁵ P. V. Kane : *History of Dharmasāstra*, I, P. 437.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, Pp. 561^b, 702^b.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, P. 742^a.

1650)¹⁸, Anantadeva (1650-1675)¹⁹, Jivadeva (1650-1700)²⁰, the *Grhyāgnisāgara* (1640)²¹ of Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa Ārde, the *Prāyaścittakutūbala* of Raghunātha Navahasta or Navāthe (1675-1712)²² and Toro Rudradeva's *Pratāpanārasimha* (1710-11)²³ he is certainly later than 1711. Thus his *Prāyaścittamālikā* must have been composed between the period 1711 and 1825 A.C. This period of over a century would be minimised to a certain extent if a MS of the work bearing an earlier scribe's date is brought to light.

On Folio 3 of our MS Accession No. 157, the author says : "होमादौ संकल्पविधयस्तु मत्कृतस्मार्तदीपिकायां द्रष्टव्याः...." This shows that he had composed another work named *Smārtadīpikā*. This *Smārtadīpikā* is undoubtedly identical with its namesake represented by a fragmentary palm-leaf MS of 39 leaves in Telugu script preserved in the Tanjore Library.²⁴ As per extracts furnished in the Tanjore Catalogue, the work begins : "श्रीगणाधिपतये नमः ॥ अथाश्वलायनानां सुखावबोधाय नारायणीयादिग्रन्थानवलोक्य लक्ष्मीनृसिंहं नत्वा स्मार्तदीपिकां वक्ष्ये ॥ ब्रह्मणे दत्त्वा.... मर्गिं विसृज्य मानुषीं कन्यां विधिना विवाहयेत्पुत्रपौत्रवान् भ.... whence breaks the incomplete MS. We have seen above that

¹⁸ *Ibid*, P. 682^a.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, Pp. 452, 453.

²⁰ *Ibid*, P. 699^b.

²¹ Vide my paper *Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa Ārde, his works and Date* published in the *Bhāratiya Vidyā*, Vol. VI, No. 4, April 1945, Pp. 74-86, p. 76, where the exact date (viz. Caitra, Samvat 1697 = c. April 1640 A.C.) and place (viz. Bhāgānagara) of composition of the *Grhyāgnisāgara* have been brought to light probably for the first time. In the same paper (p.86) I have also noted that Nārāyaṇa Kumbhāri is the only author as yet known to me who cites Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa Ārde as an authority.

²² Vide P. K. Gode's several papers on this author, especially *Raghunātha, a Protégé of Queen Dīpābāi of Tanjore, and his Works*, published in the *Journal of the University of Bombay*, Vol. X, Part 2, pp. 132-140.

²³ P. V. Kane : *History of Dharmasāstra*, I, pp. 585^a, 733^b.

²⁴ *Descriptive Catalogue of Tanjore Sanskrit MSS*, Vol. XVII, serial No. 12030, pp. 7911-12.

Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṃha was the family-deity or deity of special attachment of Nārāyaṇa Kumbhārī, the author of the *Prāyaścittamālikā*. Hence the author's obeisance to the deity at the commencement of the *Smārtādīpikā* contained in the Tanjore MS proves its identity with the *Smārtadīpikā* composed by Nārāyaṇa Kumbhārī. The remark of the editor of the Tanjore Catalogue that "the author mentions Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṃha as his Guru" is, obviously enough, incorrect.

The *Smārtadīpikā* evidently deals with the ritual of the Āśvalāyanas. Attempts should also be made to trace out a complete old MS of this work which might enable us to fix the author's date more precisely and might also throw further light on his personality and works.

THE FIVE PROVISIONAL DEFINITIONS OF
VYĀPTI (VYĀPTIPANĀKA)
IN GAṆGEŚA

By TARA SANKAR BHATTACHARYA

(Continued from Vol. III Pt. 2, P. 188)

BUT the upholder of the view that non-existence, in the middle term, of location pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, defines vyāpti (the first provisional definition under discussion), thinks that, in the inference, it is a substance, as it has existence other than that of quality and action, the middle term is specific existence which extends to the major term, substance-hood, through the relation of substratum-hood (anuyogitā) as determined by specification and existence. So, according to this view, the relation determining the middle term, in this inference, is substratum-hood as determined by specification and existence and, in this relation, the middle term, specific existence, exists only in the major term, substance, and in nothing else. And as a result of this, the existence pertaining to the substratum of the negation of the major term, is to be negated, in the middle term, through the relation of selfsameness whose term is the middle term as determined by the relation determining the middle term, the further qualification of the term being determined by the substratum-hood of the essence of the middle term, being unnecessary. For the relation determining the middle term, in this case, is substratum-hood as determined by specification and existence and the negation of existence pertaining to quality and action (which are the substratum of the non-existence of the major term) exists in the middle term, specified existence, in the relation of selfsameness whose term is specific existence, as

determined by the relation of substratum-hood determined by specification and existence.

Thus, the definition succeeds, even when the existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, is negated through that relation of selfsameness which has for its term the middle term as determined by the relation determining its essence. But objection may be raised against this view that, considered in this light, the definition applies to the fallacious inference, it has jar-hood, as it has the duality of jar-hood and the negation of jar-hood. In this inference the relation determining the middle term is collective extensity. Now in this wrong inference the definition is alleged to apply, because in the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, the middle term is negated in the relation of collective extensity. The reason again of this non-existence of the middle term in the substratum of the non-existence of the major, is that the substratum of the non-existence of jar-hood cannot possess collectively jar-hood and the negation of jar-hood, just as the jar is not both the jar and the cloth.

The reply of Mathurānātha to this objection is that, in such a case, the middle term is to be qualified by the co-presence of the major term in the relation determining the middle term. And, in support of this, he quotes Raghunātha who, in his *Didhiti*, says that the co-presence of the major term, in the relation determining the middle term, is necessary in determining Vyāpti.

Now combining this new qualification with that under discussion, the definition amounts to this: Invariable concomitance is the co-presence of the middle term with the major term in the relation determining the middle term plus the negation, in the middle term, of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, in that relation of selfsameness whose term is exist-

ence or location as determined by the relation determining the essence of the middle term. Adorned by these adjuncts the definition is applicable to all cases of inference whose major term is not universally present.

Let us now see how the definition, understood in this sense, is inapplicable to the fallacious inference, it has jar-hood, as it has the duality of jar-hood and the negation of jar-hood. Here the relation determining the middle term is collective extensivity. In this relation co-presence of the duality of jar-hood and the negation of jar-hood with the major term jar-hood, is impossible, as jar-hood and the negation of jar-hood collectively cannot exist in the substratum of jar-hood. Hence the definition does not apply to this fallacious inference.

Thus, according to Mathurānātha, the first definition should be conditioned by so many adjuncts, in order that it may be applicable to all cases of inference except the *Kevalānvayī*. But before he passes on to the second definition, he gives us the views of two other teachers who also arm the definition in such a way as to make it applicable to all cases of inference, except those which have their major term universally present. According to the first of these views, the negation, through the relation of selfsameness, of the substratum-hood pertaining to the middle term, as determined by the relation and essence determining it, in the substratum in which the negation of the major term, as determined by the relation and essence determining it, completely extends, through the relation of selfsameness, determines *vyāpti*. To put it summarily, invariable concomitance is the non-existence, in the relation of selfsameness, of the entire substratum pertaining to the middle term, in the substratum of the non-existence of the major term. And from this angle of vision, when we consider the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke, all the substrata of smoke are negated, through the relation

of selfsameness, in lakes etc., which are the substratum of the non-existence of the major term.

But when we take a fallacious inference like, it₂ has smoke, as it has fire, the definition, in the above sense, does not apply. For the substratum of the non-existence of smoke may be iron-ball in which, the iron-ball on which fire exists, is not negated and thus there is not the negation of the entire substratum-hood of the middle term, in the locus of the non-existence of the major term.

It is now our task to explain the second one of the two views mentioned. Invariable concomitant is that middle term which is the entire substratum-hood of its substratum, as determined by the relation and essence determining it, and in which there is the negation of the substratum-hood of the non-existence, through the relation of selfsameness, of the major term as determined by the relation and essence determining it. To put it in simpler terms, in the entire substratum-hood of the middle term (the middle term here is determined by the relation and essence determining it), there should be the non-existence of the substratum-hood of the negation of the major term (the major term is also determined by the relation and essence determining it and is negated in the relation of selfsameness); such a middle term is an invariable concomitant. Let us see the application of it in the correct inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. The substratum of the middle term, smoke, is hill, field, kitchen, etc. The substratum of the non-existence of the major term, fire, is lake, cloth, etc. Now the substratum-hood of lake, cloth, etc., is not the substratum-hood of hill, field, kitchen, etc. Hence smoke is the concomitant of fire.

One important point may be noted in this connection. The definition, in the sense just now described, applies also to inferences whose major term is present in a part of the substratum of the middle term, but is completely

extensive everywhere else. Consider, for example, the inference, it has the negation of monkey—conjunction, as it is existence. Here the middle term is existence and the major term is the negation of monkey-conjunction. The substratum of existence is, substance, attribute and action. In the entire substratum-hood of these three, there is the negation of the substratum-hood of the negation of the negation of monkey-conjunction, as the negation of the negation of monkey-conjunction has for its substratum monkey-conjunction and the substratum-hood of monkey conjunction is not the entire substratum-hood of substance, quality and action. Hence existence is the invariable concomitant of the negation of monkey-conjunction.

We have given, by this time, the main ideas of Mathurānātha's comments on the first provisional definition of Vyāpti. But before we take up the second, let us indicate, in brief, Jagadīśa's interpretation of the first definition. Jagadīśa in his '*Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūḱa*'²⁹ adopts a line of interpretation, which has, on occasions, a close similarity to Mathurānātha's. We have seen that, according to Mathurānātha, the negation of the major term, in the first provisional definition of Vyāpti, has its counterpositive determined by the relation and essence determining the major term. Similarly, Jagadīśa says that the major term, as determined by the relation and nature in which it exists, is negated and the substratum of this negation has non-existence in the middle term.³⁰ And as Mathurānātha shows that the definition applies even to the infer-

²⁹. A copy of the manuscript of this commentary, written in Bengali characters, has been discovered by Professor D. C. Bhattacharya, my colleague in the Hooghly Mohsin college. Professor Bhattacharya has kindly allowed me to make use of this manuscript.

³⁰. Yena sambandhena rūpeṇa vā sādhyatā, tat sambandhena yastu tad-rūpāvacchinnābhāvastatvadavṛttitvam (*Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūḱa*).

ence, it has monkey-conjunction, as it is this-tree, when only that substratum in which the negation of the major term³¹ completely extends, has non-existence in the middle term, so Jagadīśa points out that the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, monkey-conjunction, as determined by the relation of complete extensity, is negated in this tree which has monkey-conjunction in the relation of partial extensity.

Thirdly, both Mathurānātha and Jagadīśa think that the relation determining the substratum of the negation of the major term is selfsameness. Jagadīśa, of course, directly does not say that this relation is selfsameness, but the meaning of what he says, in this connection, clearly points to that direction. He says that the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is to be taken in that relation which is the determinant of the negation of the major term as a generic attribute.³² But as a generic attribute is negated in its substratum only in the relation of selfsameness, it can be said that the relation determining the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is the same.

But the difference is often between them with the choice of examples. Thus Mathurānātha shows that the definition does not apply to an anvaya-vyatirekī inference,³³

³¹ Here the major term is determined by the relation and essence determining it and its negation exists in its substratum in the relation of selfsameness.

³² sādhyābhāvavattvañceha (niruktasambandhāvacchinna) sādhyavattāgraha-virodhitāvacchedaka-sambandhenaiva grāhyam. (*Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūkha*).

³³ Three kinds of inferences are distinguished in the Navya-Nyāya:

(1) kevalānvayī (Purely affirmative)

(2) kevala-vyatirekī (Purely negative). This kind of inference has no other similar instance, i.e., in it the major term does not extend beyond the minor term and the negation of the middle term is the negation of the major term. In the inference, the earth has the difference of others as it has earth-hood, both earth-hood and difference of others are negated, for example, in water.

like, it has fire, as it has smoke, when the major term, as determined by the relation and essence determining it, is not negated. Jagadīśa, on the contrary, points out that, when the major term, as determined by the relation and essence in which it exists, is not negated, the definition is inapplicable to a kevala-vyatirekī inference like, the earth has the difference of others, as it has earth-hood (for in this inference, the relation determining the major term, difference of others, i.e., mutual negation of others, is selfsameness. If the major term is to be negated through some other relation, say inherence, then the definition fails, as the major term, mutual negation of others, exists only in the relation of selfsameness and not in the relation of inherence). Again Mathurānātha shows that if the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is not determined by the relation of selfsameness, then the definition does not apply to the inferences, it has quality, as it has knowledge, and it has existence, as it has generic attribute. But Jagadīśa opines that the definition is invalidated in the inference, it has the difference of the jar, as it has cloth-hood, when the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is determined by any kind of spatial relation (daiśika-Viśeṣaṇatā).³⁴

• But the most striking difference between them appears with regard to the existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term. We have seen that, according to Mathurānātha, such existence is to be

(3) Anvaya-vyatirekī (Both affirmative and negative).

In this inference both the major term and the non-existence of the major term extend beyond the minor term. Fire, for example, extends to kitchen and the non-existence of fire to lake (consider the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke).

For these distinctions, Vide *Tarkāmṛta* of Jagadīśa.

• ³⁴ Tatra ghaṭatvādi svarūpasya sādhyābhāvasya daiśika-viśeṣaṇatayā adhikaraṇatvāprasiddheḥ (as jar-hood, which is the negation of the difference of the jar, does not exist in its substratum in any kind of spatial relation). *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayīkha*.

determined by the relation determining the middle term. Jagadīśa, on the contrary, points out that the definition is frustrated in the inference, it has existence, as it is a substance, taking the relation, determining the middle term, to be the determinant of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term.³⁵ We have also seen how Mathurānātha replies to this objection by qualifying the definition with fresh adjuncts.

Thus objections raised by Jagadīśa against the first definition are answered by Mathurānātha who, by appropriate qualifications, makes the definition applicable to almost all cases of inference except the kevalānvayī. And this shows that Mathurānāth's comments on the first provisional definition of vyāpti are more comprehensive than Jagadīśa's. But we have sufficiently explained Mathurānātha's position with regard to the first definition. So let us now pass on to the second provisional definition and try to understand its import.

II

The second definition runs as follows :—The negation, in the middle term, of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, which (the non-existence of the major term) exists in a substratum which is different from the substratum of the major term, determining invariable concomitance or vyāpti (sādhyavad-bhinna-sādhyābhāva-vadavṛttitvam). Let us see how this definition applies to the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. The substratum of the major term fire is hill, kitchen, field, yard, etc. The substratum different from these is, for example, the lake. In the lake there is the non-existence of the

³⁵ Sādhyābhāva-vati hetutāghāṭakatvena sambandhena tatā vṛtti-stadabhāvasyoktau ca sattāvān dravyatvātādītīyādou tathā sattādyabhāva-vati sāmānyādou hetutāghāṭaka samavayāditi sambandhena vṛtter-āprasiddheh. *Ibid.*

major term, fire. Existence pertaining to the lake is negated in smoke. Hence the definition applies to this inference.

• The necessity of this second definition is, according to the earlier logicians,³⁶ to fill up the gap in the first definition. The first definition is supposed to fail in an inference like, it has monkey-conjunction, as it is this tree, in which the major term is present in a part of the substratum of the middle term. The second definition is considered to remove this defect. Let us see how the second definition applies to this inference. The substratum of the major term, in this case, is the support of monkey-conjunction, and here it is this tree. The substratum, different from this tree, is quality, etc., on which the monkey cannot sit. Non-existence of the major term, monkey-conjunction in quality, etc., has for its substratum quality, etc. Existence pertaining to quality, is negated in the middle term, this tree. Hence this tree is the invariable concomitant of monkey-conjunction.

Thus, according to the earlier logicians, the second definition applies to the inference in which the major term is of partial extensity. And as the first definition does not apply to it, the second is indispensable. Raghunātha's explanation of the necessity of the second definition is also the same. But Mathurānātha thinks that the first definition is not frustrated in this case, if the substratum of the negation of the major term is undetermined by anything else (*niravacchinna-adhikaraṇatā*). Hence his explanation of the necessity of the second definition is a bit different. He opines that the substratum of the negation of the major term, as undetermined by anything else, is very difficult to find out. Hence the second definition, which applies to the above inference easily, is formulated.

Now as to the proper meaning of the second definition, Mathurānātha points out that the earlier logicians (the logi-

³⁶ The reference is to the *Mithilā School*.

cians of Mithilā) misinterpreted it. According to them the definition means that vyāpti is the negation, in the middle term, of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, which is different from the substratum of the major term. But if this meaning is accepted, then the expression, the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, becomes superfluous. For the negation of existence pertaining to the substratum which is different from that of the major term and the negation of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, which is different from the substratum of the major term, are equivalent.

Hence the proper interpretation, according to Mathurānātha, of this second definition should be the following: vyāpti is the negation, in the middle term, of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, which (the non-existence of the major term) exists in a substratum which is different from the substratum of the major term. Now the first definition was the negation of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term. Hence, in the second definition, existence in a substratum which is different from the substratum of the major term, is added. And this addition saves the definition from being frustrated in the inference, it has conjunction, as it has substance-hood. For here the major term is conjunction; the substratum of conjunction is substance; the substratum different from substance is quality, action, etc.; the negation of conjunction exists in quality, action, etc., the substratum of the non-existence of conjunction in quality, action, etc., is quality, action, etc., (and not substance, as the difference of substrata makes the negation different); existence pertaining to quality, action, etc., is negated in the middle term, substance-hood.

But the first definition does not apply to this inference. For the substratum of the non-existence of the major term

conjunction, is quality, action, etc., and also substance (as there may be a substance in a distant part of the globe, with which some other substance may not be conjoined), and, in the middle term, substance-hood, existence pertaining to substance is not negated.

Thus the proper meaning of the second definition is that vyāpti is the negation, in the middle term, of existence determined by the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, which exists in a substratum different from that of the major term. Now here the expression "non-existence of the major term" is unavoidable; for the definition, without this, will not apply to any correct inference and thus will be involved in the fallacy of *asambhava* (absolute absurdity or impossibility). Let us take the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. The major term, in this case, is fire. The substratum of fire is the hill, kitchen, field, etc. The substratum different from the hill, kitchen, etc., is the lake. Existence determined by the lake may be substance-hood, as the lake is a substance. The substratum of substance-hood may be the hill. Existence pertaining to the hill is not negated in the middle term smoke, as smoke exists on the hill. Hence the definition is faulty.

Similarly, "the major term" in the expression "non-existence of the major term" saves the definition from the fallacy of *asambhava*. For the definition, minus this "major term," is the negation of existence determined by the substratum of the non-existence of the negation existing in the substratum different from the substratum of the major term and in this sense it does not apply to the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. Let us explain this. The major term, in this inference, is fire. The substratum of fire is the hill, kitchen, field, yard, etc. The substratum different from these is the lake. Existence determined by the lake is substance-hood. The negation existing in the substratum different from the substratum of the major term, is the

negation of substance-hood in the substratum different from the substratum of the major term, i.e., we are to get the negation of the negation of substance-hood. The negation of the negation of substance-hood is substance-hood. Hence substance-hood, in this case, may be called, a positive negation. And a positive negation being not different with the difference of substrata, the hill may be the substratum of this substance-hood which also exists in the lake. Existence pertaining to the hill is not negated in the middle term smoke, as also exists on the hill. Hence the definition does not apply to this inference.

Thus on the theory that a positive negation does not differ in different substrata, the major term of the non-existence of the major term, in the second definition, is significant and extricates the definition from the charge of asambhava. But it may be objected that the definition is guilty of narrowness, as it does not apply to the inference, it has the negation of either the conjunction of space in the jar or jar-hood, as it has space-hood, if the theory that a positive negation does not differ in different substrata, is accepted. For the major term, in this inference, is the negation of either the conjunction of space in the jar or jar-hood; the conjunction of space in a jar exists in the jar and space; jar-hood exists in the jar; hence the alternative of these two exists on the jar and space; but the negation of this alternative, i.e., either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood, exists everywhere excepting the jar; hence the substratum of the major term is everything excepting the jar; the substratum different from everything excepting the jar, is the jar; the non-existence of the major term existing in the substratum different from the substratum of the major term is the negation of the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood existing in the jar, i.e., conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood existing in the jar; the substratum of con-

junction of space in a jar or jar-hood existing in the jar is the jar and space ; existence pertaining to space is not negated in the middle term space-hood. Hence the definition is narrow being inapplicable to this case.

The reply of Mathurānātha to this objection, perhaps, is not quite to the point. He says that the second definition has been formulated on the theory that the negation of negation is a separate negation and that negation is different in different substrata. And from this point of view the above objection is baseless. For the negation of negation being an additional negation and negation differing in different substrata, the negation of the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood existing in the jar, which is different from the substratum containing the major term, is an additional negation and varies with the variation of substrata and therefore does not exist in the middle term space-hood in which exists the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood. Here the negation of the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood, has for its counterpositive, the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood and the substratum of this counterpositive is opposed to that of its negation (*pratiyogi-vyadhikaraṇa*). And conversely the negation of the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood and the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood, are separate negations, because they are not co-existent but are present in opposed substrata. Thus the rule that a negation is different in different substrata is not true in all cases. Where the co-existence of the negation and its counterpositive and the opposed substratum-hood of the counterpositive appear to be the same, there and there only the negation is to be held to be different in the conflicting substrata, otherwise two contradictions become similar. Let us explain this by a concrete example. The

negation of conjunction may exist in a (distant) substance and conjunction also obtains between substances. Hence substance is a substratum in which conjunction and its negation co-exist. Quality, again, is a substratum in which conjunction is always negated, as conjunction holds only between substances. Thus quality is an opposed substratum of conjunction. Hence the negation of conjunction in substance must be different from the negation of conjunction in quality. One important point is to be remembered in this connection. The negation of conjunction in substance is only partial and not complete, whereas the negation of conjunction in quality is complete. Only in such cases the negation is different in the two substrata.

Thus the charge against the second definition, that it is guilty of narrowness, falls, on the theory that the negation of negation is also a negation and negation differs in different substrata. Hence, every term in the second definition has its own significance and nothing in it is superfluous.

But the question may be asked: Is the second definition applicable to all cases of non-kevalānvayī inference³⁷? And if so, what is the necessity of the third definition? Raghunātha (*Vyāpti-pañcaka-dīdhiti*) replies to this by saying that though the second definition applies to the inferences, it has monkey-conjunction, as it is this tree and it has conjunction, as it has substance-hood, yet in the latter, we have to uphold the theory that negation is different in different substrata. In other words, we assume that the negations of conjunction in quality, action, and substance are all different and separate and on this assumption we can show that the second definition is not narrow. But this view is not unanimously accepted. Some are of opinion

³⁷ Gaṅgeśa says that none of the five provisional definitions applies to the kevalānvayī inference. We shall explain this at the end of this chapter.

that a negation which is partially present in a substratum and completely in another, differs in these conflicting substrata, but in other cases the negation does not vary with the variation of substrata. Others again hold that a positive negation does not differ in different substrata. A third view thinks that the negation of negation is a separate negation in every case. A fourth theory, on the contrary, asserts that only the negations of the negation of asymmetrical things like, the conjunction of space in a jar and jar-hood, are separate negations, for jar-hood and conjunction of space in a jar never come under the same category. But the negations of the negations of similar things like, jar-hood and substance-hood, are not separate negations. In view of this divergence of opinion, the third definition is formulated, for this definition well applies to the inference, it has conjunction, as it has substance-hood.

III

Let us now explain the third provisional definition of vyāpti and see how it applies to the inference, it has conjunction, as it has substance-hood. Invariable concomitance is the non-co-existence, with the middle term, of the mutual negation whose counterpositive is the substratum of the major term (sādhya-*pratiyogikānyonyābhāvā-sāmānādhikaraṇyam*). In other words, vyāpti is the negation, in the middle term, of existence pertaining to the substratum of the mutual negation whose counterpositive is the substratum of the major term. To put it briefly, the negation, in the middle term, of existence determined by a substratum other than that of the major term, determines vyāpti. Now in the inference, it has conjunction, as it is substance-hood, the major term is conjunction. The substratum of conjunction is substance. The mutual negation or difference of substance exists in quality, action, etc. Existence pertaining to quality, action, etc., is negated in

the middle term substance-hood, for substance-hood exists in substances and nowhere else. Hence the definition well applies to this inference even without the assumption that negation differs in different substrata.

Thus, according to Raghunātha, the third definition is formulated, because there is no definite and universally accepted proof that negation differs in different substrata. Jagadīśa also thinks that the necessity of the third definition lies in the view that the same negation may exist in different substrata,³⁸ i.e., in the view that negation is not different in different substrata.

Mathurānātha also agrees with Raghunātha that there being no definite proof that negation differs with the difference of substrata, the third definition has been devised. Let us now explain Mathurānātha's comments on the third definition. The third definition means that the negation, in the middle term, of existence pertaining to the substratum of the mutual negation whose counterpositive is the substratum of the middle term, is invariable concomitance. Here the mutual negation is to be qualified by non-existence in the counterpositive. In other words, the mutual negation or difference which does not exist in the counterpositive is to be accepted. For this will save the definition from the fallacy of *asambhava*, even when the middle term exists in the substratum of that mutual negation of the substratum of the major term, which has its counterpositive determined by an essence relating to number. Let us try to understand this with the help of the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. In this inference, if the mutual negation of the substratum of the major term is not qualified by non-existence in the counterpositive, then the definition is involved in the fallacy of *asambhava*.

³⁸ Vide the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūkeha* of Jagadīśa: *atra prati-yogimadanyatrapaveśāpekṣayā navya-lakṣaṇamāha*.

in the following way : The major term, here, is fire ; the substratum of the major term is the substratum of fire ; mutual negation whose counterpositive is the substratum of the major term is the difference or mutual negation of the substratum of fire ; and when we say that there is the difference of both the substratum of the major term and the jar, the substratum of the major term is also a counterpositive of the difference of both the substratum of the major term and the jar ; hence by the mutual negation or difference whose counterpositive is the substratum of the major term, it may also imply that there is the mutual negation of both the substratum of the major term and the jar ; the substratum of the difference of both the substratum of the major term fire and the jar may be the hill, as the hill is not both the substratum of fire and the jar, *i.e.*, the hill is not both the hill and the jar ; existence pertaining to the hill is not negated in smoke ; hence the definition does not apply to this simple case and, therefore, to no case and as such is guilty of the fallacy of *asambhava*.

But if the difference of the substratum of the major term, in the above inference, is qualified by non-existence in the counterpositive, then the definition is not involved in the fallacy of *asambhava*. To explain this : The major term is fire. The substratum of fire is the hill, yard, field, kitchen, etc. The difference, whose counterpositive is the substratum of the major term, is the difference of the hill, etc. This difference is qualified by its non-existence in the counterpositive, *i.e.*, the difference does not exist in the hill, etc. The substratum of this difference, then, is different from the hill, etc. The substratum different from the hill, etc., is the lake. Existence pertaining to the lake is negated in smoke. Hence the definition applies to this inference. In this instance the definite assertion that the difference of the substratum of the major term fire, should not exist in its counterpositive, prevents the counterpositive of the difference

to be both the substratum of the major term, i.e., the hill, and the jar. For the difference of the substratum of the major term, i.e., of the hill, does not exist in the hill, while the difference of both the hill and the jar exists on the hill.

Thus the mutual negation of the substratum of the major term is to be qualified by non-existence in the counter-positive if the third definition is to be freed from the fallacy of *asambhava*. But in that case the definition does not apply to an inference whose major term exists in different substrata. Consider, for instance, the stock inference, the hill has fire, as it has smoke. The major term fire, in this case, exists in different substrata like the hill, field, kitchen, yard, etc. Taking yard to be the substratum of the major term, its difference or mutual negation, not existing on it, may exist on the hill. Existence determined by the hill is not negated in smoke, and, therefore, the definition does not apply to this inference.

Now Raghunātha supposes this defect to be inherent in the third definition, and, according to him, the fourth definition is formulated to remove this defect. Mathurānātha also thinks that the third definition suffers from this defect in addition to the other defect of its inapplicability to the *kevalānvayī* inference. But he thinks that this defect is not impossible to be removed. If the difference or mutual negation of the essence determining the substratum-hood of the major term is taken, instead of the difference of the substratum of the major term, then existence pertaining to the substratum of the difference of the essence determining the substratum-hood of the major term, is negated in the middle term of the inference, the hill has fire, as it has smoke. For the difference of the essence determining the substratum-hood of the major term fire, exists in the lake and existence determined by the lake is negated in smoke.

IV

However, the fourth definition is formulated, according to both Raghunātha and Mathurānātha, in order that it may be applicable to an inference whose major term exists in a plurality of substrata. Let us explain the fourth provisional definition of vyāpti. Invariable concomitance is the existence, in the middle term, of the counterpositiveness of the negation which exists in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term (sakala-sādhyā-bhāvavanniṣṭhābhāva-pratīyogitvam). In simple words, when the middle term is negated in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term, we have vyāpti. This definition applies to an inference in which the major term has a plurality of substrata. Consider, for example, the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. Here the major term is fire. All the substrata of the non-existence of fire are all the objects like the lake, cloth, etc. The negation existing in all these is the negation of smoke, as smoke does not exist in any substratum of the negation of fire. The counterpositive of the negation of smoke is smoke itself. The counterpositiveness of smoke, lastly, is undoubtedly present in the middle term smoke. Thus the definition well applies to this inference.

But the definition is too-wide, if the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is not qualified by "all." Minus this qualification, the definition is existence, in the middle term, of the counterpositiveness of the negation which exists in the substratum of the non-existence of the major term. But the definition, in this form, applies, as both Raghunātha and Mathurānātha point out to the fallacious inference, it has smoke, as it has fire. Hence the qualification is indispensable.

But the definition, even stated as it is, applies to the fallacious inference, it is a substance, as it has existence and, to remove this superfluity, Mathurānātha suggests that the

essence determining the counterpositive of the negation which exists in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term, should be the same as the essence determining the middle term. Let us see how the definition is too-wide being applicable to the fallacious inference, it is a substance, as it has existence. The major term, in this inference, is substance. All the substrata of the non-existence of substance are quality, action, etc. The negation existing in quality, action, etc., is the negation of existence of those other than quality, action, etc. The counterpositive of the negation of existence of those other than quality, action, etc., is the existence of those other than quality, action, etc. The counterpositiveness of the existence of those other than quality, action, etc., exists in the middle term, existence, as existence of those other than quality, action, etc., i.e., specific existence, is not an addition to existence, but is included within existence.

But if the essence determining the counterpositive of the negation existing in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term, is the same as determining the middle term, then the definition does not apply to the above inference. Let us explain this. The counterpositive of the negation existing in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term, in the inference, it is a substance, as it has existence, is the existence of those other than quality, action, etc. Here we get two essences, viz., the essence of those other than quality, action, etc., and the essence of existence. But the essence determining the middle term, existence, is only one. And as two cannot be equal to one, the definition does not apply to this case.

Thus, the essence determining the counterpositive of the negation existing in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term, is the same as the essence determining the middle term. Now this counterpositive, says Mathurānātha, is to exist through the relation deter-

mining the middle term, otherwise there arises the fallacy of a too-wide definition. Consider, for example, the inference, it is a substance, as it has existence. The substrata of the non-existence of the major term substance are quality, action, etc. existence is negated in quality, action etc., through the relation of conjunction. The middle term also is existence. Hence the definition applies to this fallacious inference and is too-wide.

But if the counterpositive of the negation existing in quality, etc., is determined by the relation of inherence, which is the relation determining the middle term, then the definition does not apply to this fallacious inference, for in quality, action, etc., there can never be the negation of existence through the relation of inherence.

In the next place, Mathurānātha suggests that the negation of the major term, in the fourth definition, should have its counterpositive determined by the relation and essence determining the major term, in order that the fallacy of *asambhava* may be avoided. Let us take the inference, the hill has fire, as it has smoke. The major term is fire. The negation of the major term is the negation of fire. Now if fire is not determined by the relation and essence in which it exists as the major term, then it may be kitchen-fire. The substrata of the negation of kitchen-fire are the hill, yard, field, etc. The counterpositiveness of the negation existing in the hill, etc. cannot exist in the middle term smoke, as smoke exists in the hill, etc. Hence the definition does not apply to this simple inference. But if fire is taken as determined by the relation and essence determining the major term, then the substrata of the negation of fire as fire (the essence determining fire) and through the relation of conjunction are the lake, etc. Smoke does not exist in the lake, etc., and smoke is the middle term. Hence the definition applies to the inference and as such is not involved in the fallacy of *asambhava*.

But it may be objected that, though the definition does not commit the fallacy of *asambhava*, yet it is too-narrow being inapplicable to the inference, it has monkey-conjunction, as it is this tree. For the substratum of the negation of the major term, monkey-conjunction, is also this tree and the negation existing in this tree, certainly, has not its counterpositiveness existing in the middle term this tree. In reply to this objection, Mathurānātha points out that all the substrata of the negation of the major term, in the fourth definition, should be taken to be undetermined by anything, *i.e.*, only those substrata are to be accepted on which the negation completely extends. Let us see how this device saves the definition from narrowness. The major term, in this inference, is monkey-conjunction. The negation of the major term is the negation of monkey conjunction. The substrata on which the negation of monkey-conjunction completely extends are quality, etc. Negation existing in quality, etc., is that of this tree. The counterpositiveness of this tree exists in the middle term this tree. Hence the definition well applies to this case and, therefore, is not narrow.

But the objection may be raised that, though the definition is not too-narrow, yet it is too-wide, as it applies to the fallacious inference, it is earth, as it has monkey-conjunction (the inference is fallacious, because even water may have the conjunction of monkey), if only the substrata on which the negation of the major term completely extends, are to be accepted. For the substratum on which the negation of the major term, earth-hood, completely extends, is water and in some portion of water there must always be the negation of monkey-conjunction.

Mathurānātha replies to this objection by saying that just as the substrata on which the negation of the major term completely extends, are only relevant, so also the negation which completely extends in these substrata

are to be taken. And in that case the definition does not apply to the above inference. For in water (the substratum on which the negation of the major term, earth-hood, completely extends), the negation which completely extends is certainly not that of monkey-conjunction and in the middle term, monkey-conjunction, there cannot be the counterpositiveness of that which is not monkey-conjunction.

But if the negation, which completely extends in the substrata which have again the complete extension of the negation of the major term, is only to be accepted, then according to the view that the mutual negation or difference of the substratum of partially pervading existence is completely pervading existence, the definition does not apply to the inference, it has the negation of substance-hood, as it has the difference of the substratum of conjunction. Let us see how the definition is inapplicable to this inference.³⁹ The major term here is the negation of substance-hood. The negation of the major term is substance-hood. The substratum of substance-hood is substance. The negation which completely extends in substance may be that of the essence of quality, (guṇatva) as this essence of quality exists in quality and not in substance. But the counterpositiveness of the essence of quality may not exist in the middle term, the difference of the substratum of conjunction, as the substrata different from the substratum of conjunction, are the six categories of quality, action, generic attribute, inherence, etc. Hence the definition is too-narrow being inapplicable to this case.

But this objection, as Mathurānātha points out, does not stand on a sound basis. For the upholders of the doctrine

³⁹. According to the view that the mutual negation of the substratum of partially pervading existence, is completely pervading existence, this inference is correct, but according to others, it is a fallacious inference.

that the mutual negation of the substratum of partially pervading existence, is completely pervading existence, think that the negation of mutual negation is a separate negation and from this standpoint the definition is not inapplicable to the inference in question. Let us clarify this point. The major term, in this inference, is the negation of substance-hood. The negation of the negation of substance-hood is substance-hood. The entire substratum of substance-hood is substance. The negation which completely extends in substance is that of the difference of the substratum of conjunction, as the negation of the mutual negation of the substratum of conjunction is also a negation. The counterpositiveness of the difference of the substratum of conjunction exists in the middle term which is also the difference of the substratum of conjunction. Hence the definition applies to the inference and the charge of its narrowness falls.

But though the definition applies to this case, yet, it may be alleged, that it does not apply to the inference, it has the negation of this jar-hood, as it is the cloth. For what is the definition? It is the negation of the middle term in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term. But the question of all the substrata of the negation of the major term is absurd in the inference just stated, for the simple reason that the substratum of the negation of the major term (negation of this jar-hood) is this jar which is only one.

But this objection, Mathurānātha thinks, rests on the misinterpretation of the word "all" in the definition. All the substrata of the negation of the major term does not mean many such substrata, but the entire substratum without any remainder (aśeṣa). And viewed in this light the definition applies to the inference, it has the negation of this jar-hood, as it is the cloth, as the question of a substratum without any remainder is not irrelevant.

Thus the fourth definition is armed by Mathurānātha with necessary weapons in order that it may be free from the faults of narrowness and superfluity in many cases of non-kevalānvayi inference. If we restate the definition, so armed, then it runs as follows: Invariable concomitance is the existence, in the middle term, of the counterpositiveness, as determined by the relation and essence determining the middle term, of the negation which pervades, without any remainder, the substratum, undetermined by anything, of the negation of the major term which is determined by the relation and essence determining it. Here the substratum of the negation of the major term is taken to be undetermined by anything, in order that the definition may be applicable to the inference, it has the conjunction of monkey, as it is this tree; the major term is considered to be negated being determined by the relation and essence determining it, so that the definition may not be involved in the fallacy of asambhava; the substratum of the negation of the major term is taken entirely, without any remainder, to save the definition from the charge of narrowness, in the case of the inference, it has the negation of this jar-hood, as it is the cloth; and, lastly, the counterpositiveness of the negation, existing in the entire substratum of the negation of the major term, is considered to exist through the relation and essence determining the middle term, because the definition may be extricated from the charge of superfluity in the case of the fallacious inference, it is a substance, as it has existence.

But in spite of all these, the definition, it may be objected to is not absolutely free from being too-narrow and too-wide. For the substratum of the negation of the major term, it has been said, should have pervasion (vyāpakatva) and in the fallacious inference, it is a substance, as it has existence, the general negation of the middle term, existence, exists, as knowability, pervading the substratum of the

non-existence of the major term. Thus the definition is too-wide, as it applies to a fallacious inference.

Secondly, pervasion (vyāpakatva) means the existence of the essence which is not the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the mutual negation which exists in the substratum of the pervaded. Fire, for example, pervades smoke. This can be determined by the definition of pervasion just mentioned. The substratum of smoke is the hill, yard, kitchen, field, etc. In these there is the mutual negation of non-fire. The essence which does not determine non-fire is fire. Hence fire pervades smoke. Now, accepting this meaning of pervasion, it can be shown that the fourth definition does not apply to the correct inference, it is non-smoky, as it is non-fiery. Let us explain this. According to the definition the negation of the middle term must exist pervading the entire substratum of the non-existence of the major term. The definition of pervasion, on the contrary, implies that the pervading must be the non-determinant of the counterpositiveness of the mutual negation existing in the pervaded. Now in the inference, under consideration, the substrata of the non-existence of the major term non-smoky are the hill, yard, field, kitchen, etc. The mutual negation existing in these may be, according to the principle of elimination, one by one, of all (cālāṇī-nyāya), the mutual negation of the yard-fire on the hill, that of the hill-fire on the yard, and so on. The counterpositiveness of these mutual negations exists in the yard-fire, the hill-fire and so on. The non-determinant of these yard-fire, hill-fire, etc., is non-fire. The counterpositiveness of the negation of non-fire does not exist in the middle term non-fiery. Hence the definition fails to characterise a correct inference and, therefore, is narrow.

The reply of Mathurānātha to this objection is two-fold. In the first place, the negation, whose counterpositiveness, as determined by the relation and essence

determining the middle term, exists in the middle term, should exist in the undetermined substratum of the non-existence of the major term, which is determined by the relation and essence determining it, as the determinant of its pervasion. Secondly, pervasion should mean the non-determination of the counterpositiveness of the absolute negation (and not of the mutual negation) which exists in the substratum of the pervaded. And under these two safeguards, the definition does not apply to the fallacious inference, it is a substance, as it has existence and well applies to the correct inference, it is non-smoky, as it is non-fiery. To take the former inference first, the negation of the major term, as determined by the relation and essence determining it, is the negation of substance-hood in the relation of inherence; the substratum-hood of such negation, undetermined by anything, is the substratum-hood of quality, etc.; the absolute negation existing in the substratum of this substratum-hood is the negation of the negation of existence pertaining to quality, etc.; the negation which does not determine the counterpositiveness of such absolute negation is not the negation of the middle term existence. Now as to the second inference, it is non-smoky, as it is non-fiery, the negation of the major term, as determined by the relation and essence determining it, is the negation of the negation of smoke in the relation of selfsameness; the undetermined substratum-hood of such negation is the substratum-hood of the hill, etc.; the absolute negation existing in the substratum of this substratum-hood is the negation of the negation of the non-fire pertaining to the hill, etc.; the negation which does not determine the counterpositiveness of such absolute negation, is the negation of non-fire; the middle term, non-fiery, contains the counterpositiveness of non-fire; and this is what the definition demands.

V

Thus the fourth definition is stretched, by Mathurānātha to its utmost limit to make it applicable to instances to which it is not supposed to be applicable by other commentators. Even Raghunātha thinks that the fourth definition fails in an inference in which the major term or the substratum of its negation is strictly one individual⁴⁰. The same writer further says that the fourth definition does not apply to the correct inference, it is non-smoky, as it is non-fiery. But these defects disappear in the fifth definition and hence, the necessity of the fifth definition lies in the fourth definition being involved in the fallacy of narrowness, being inapplicable to some correct inferences. But we have seen that Mathurānātha apprehends these objections against the fourth definition and replies to them by interpreting the adjective "all" (sakala), in the fourth definition, to be meaning not many, but entirely without any remainder, and by taking the determinant of pervasion (vyāpakatāvachedaka) to be connoting the non-determination of the counterpositiveness of the absolute negation existing in the substratum of the pervaded. Hence Mathurānātha's explanation of the necessity of the fifth definition should have been different from that of Raghunātha. But Mathurānātha does not state definitely the necessity of the fifth definition. Perhaps he has a tacit agreement with Raghunātha, though he goes beyond the latter in his discussions on the fourth definition.

However, let us now explain the fifth definition. Invariable concomitance is the non-existence (in the middle term) as determined by the difference of the substratum of the major term (sādhyaavadanyāvṛttitvam). In other words, when the existence pertaining to the objects, which are different from the substratum of the major term, is negated in the middle term, we get vyāpti. Let us see how this definition applies

⁴⁰. Vide *Yyāpti-pañcaka—dīdhiti*.

to an inference in which the major term is strictly one individual, and secondly, to the inference, it is non-smoky, as it is non-fiery. As an example of the first type of inference, let us take the inference, it has the negation of that colour, as it has the negation of that taste. The major term, in this case, is the negation of that colour. The substratum of the major term is the substratum of the negation of that colour. The difference of the substratum of the major term is the substratum of that colour. The existence pertaining to the substratum of that colour is negated in the middle term, the negation of that taste. Hence the definition applies to the inference.

In the next place, in the inference, it is non-smoky, as it is non-fiery, the major term is non-smoke. The substratum of the major term is the lake, red-hot iron-bar, etc. The difference of the substratum of the major term is the hill, yard, etc. Existence pertaining to the hill, yard, etc., is negated in the middle term non-fire.

Now, as to the significance of terms in the fifth definition, Mathurānātha points out that, as in the first definition, the negation of existence determined by the difference of the substratum of the major term, should be a general negation, if the definition is not to be too-wide. Consider, for example, the fallacious inference, it has smoke, as it has fire. The definition applies to this inference, if the non-existence determined by the difference of the substratum of the major term, be not a general non-existence. For existence pertaining to the lake which is different from the substratum of smoke, is negated in the middle term fire and this is the requirement of the definition. But if the negation of existence determined by the difference of the substratum of the major term, be a general negation, then the existence pertaining to a particular object, different from the substratum of the major term, cannot be logically shown to be negated in the middle term, but the existence of all such

objects should be shown to be negated. But all objects different from the substratum of the major term smoke, have not their existence negated in the middle term fire; the existence of red-hot iron-ball, for example, is not negated in fire. Thus the definition does not apply to a fallacious inference, if the negation of existence determined by the difference of the substratum of the major term is a general negation.

But it may be said that the difference of the substratum of the major term implies all objects different from it and as such the proposition that the negation of existence pertaining to objects different from the substratum of the major term should be a general negation, is a tautology.

But this objection misses its mark, as the definition applies to the fallacious inference, it has smoke, as it has fire, when the non-existence of the difference of the substratum of the major term smoke, and that of another particular thing, say water, i.e., two negations, are shown to be in the middle term fire. But if it is definitely stated that the non-existence of the difference of the substratum of the major term, is a general non-existence, then the question of a dual non-existence does not arise.

Thus the negation of existence pertaining to objects different from the support of the major term, is a general negation in the fifth definition. But what is the precise meaning of the term "difference of the substratum of the major term" in the definition? This means, according to Mathurānātha, a negation whose counterpositiveness is determined by mutual negation and the essence of the substratum of the major term. In other words, the mutual negation of the essence of the substratum of the major term is implied by the expression, "difference of the substratum of the major term." If the expression means only the mutual negation of the substratum of the major term, then the definition turns to be too narrow. Consider, for example,

the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. The substratum of the major term, fire, may be the hill, yard, field, etc. The mutual negation of these may be the propositions, the hill is not the yard, the yard is not the field, the yard is not the hill and so on. The hill, therefore, may be available as the mutual negation or difference of the yard which is also a substratum of fire. Existence pertaining to the hill is not negated in smoke. Hence the definition does not apply to this inference.

But if the counterpositive of the mutual negation of the substratum of the major term is determined by the essence of the substratum of the major term, then we can speak only of the mutual negation of the essence of the substratum of fire and not of the propositions, the hill is not the yard, the yard is not the hill and so on. And the mutual negation of the essence of the substratum of fire exists in the lake the existence determined by which is negated in smoke. Thus the definition applies to the inference and is not narrow.

But just as the counterpositive of the difference of the substratum of the major term is to be determined by the essence of the substratum of the major term, so it is to be determined by mutual negation; for the same counterpositive, undetermined by the latter, leads to the fallacy of narrowness. Let us again take the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. The counterpositive of the difference of the substratum of the major term, as determined by its essence, is the difference of the essence of the substratum of fire. This may be the proposition, "the essence of the substratum of fire does not exist," *i.e.*, the absolute negation of the essence of the substratum of fire.⁴¹ The absolute ne-

⁴¹ Though the proposition, "the substratum of fire does not exist," is an absolute negation, yet it may be a mutual negation or difference, according to the rule that the difference of the difference of

gation of the essence of the substratum of fire may exist on the hill. The existence pertaining to the hill is not negated in smoke. Hence the definition does not apply to the inference and is narrow.

But the definition well applies to the above inference, if the counterpositive of the difference of the substratum of the major term is determined both by the essence of the substratum of the major term and by mutual negation. Let us explain this. The substratum of the major term is the substratum of fire. The difference of the substratum of fire, as determined by its essence and mutual negation, gives the mutual negation of the essence of the substratum of fire, *i.e.*, the proposition, it is not the essence of the substratum of fire. (Here the question of the absolute negation of the essence of the substratum of fire does not come in. For the absolute negation of the essence of the substratum of fire is a mutual negation, according to the rule that the difference of the difference of the self-determined is the self; the absolute negation of the essence of the substratum of fire thus has dual counterpositiveness in this case, one existing on the essence of the substratum of fire and the other on the difference of the self-determined; the former of these counterpositives is determined by the essence of the substratum of the major term, but not by mutual negation, and the latter is determined by mutual negation, but not by the essence of the substratum of the major term.) The mutual negation or difference of the essence of the substratum of fire exists in the lake the existence determined by which is negated in smoke. And this is what the definition demands.

The significance of the difference of the substratum of the major term, in the fifth definition of *vyāpti*, is now

the self-determined (*i.e.*, the self) is the self. The difference of the difference of absolute negation is absolute negation. Hence absolute negation may be mutual negation or difference.

brought out, and the import of the substratum of the major term now remains to be explained. Such a substratum is to be taken, says Mathurānātha, in the relation determining the major term. In the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke, the relation determining the major term is conjunction. If the substratum of the major term fire is taken in any other relation, say, inherence, then the definition does not apply to the inference. For the part of fire is the substratum of fire in the relation of inherence and the difference of the part of fire is also the hill the existence pertaining to which is not negated in smoke. But the substratum of fire, in the relation of conjunction, is the hill, yard, etc., and the difference of the hill, yard, etc., is the lake the existence determined by which is negated in smoke. Hence the relation determining the substratum of the major term should be the same as determines the major term.

We have finished, by this time, our discussions on the five provisional definitions of vyāpti. It is now our task to explain how these five definitions do not apply to the kevalānvayī inference. But before we take up this explanation, let us see what a kevalānvayī inference means.

Kevalānvayī Inference : The term kevalānvayī is defined by Gaṅgeśa⁴² as the non-counterpositiveness of the absolute negation which has existence (Vṛttimadatyantābhāva-pratīyogitvam). This definition means that when an absolute negation is possible, it has a counterpositive; the kevalānvayī is not this counterpositive. In other words, the kevalānvayī term is purely affirmative. If we take the inference, it is nameable, as it is knowable, the term nameable is purely affirmative, because there is nothing that is not nameable.

Let us now see how the definitions are frustrated in this kevalānvayī inference. The first definition states that vyāpti is the negation, in the middle term, of existence of

⁴² *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, part II, P. 572, Calcutta.

objects having a substratum in which the major term is negated. But the major term, in this inference, is universally present. Hence the substratum of the negation of the major term is not available.

The second definition takes *vyāpti* to be the negation of existence-having a substratum which contains such a negation of the major term as exists in a substratum different from that of the major term. But in the inference, it is nameable, as it is knowable, the substratum different from that of the major term is absurd, as the major term is all pervading.

According to the third definition, *vyāpti* is the non-co-existence of the mutual negation, whose counterpositive is the substratum of the major term, with the middle term. But the question of the difference or mutual negation of the substratum of the major term does not arise in the inference, it is nameable, as it is knowable, nameability being completely pervasive.

The fourth definition asserts that *vyāpti* is the counterpositiveness of the negation existing in the entire substratum, without any remainder, of the negation of the major term. But the substratum of the negation of the major term is absurd in an inference whose major term is universally present. Hence the definition does not apply to the inference, it is nameable, as it is knowable.

Lastly, the fifth definition requires the difference of the substratum of the major term and as such does not apply to the inference, it is nameable, as it is knowable.

AN ADVAITIC ACCOUNT OF THE THEORY OF KARMA¹

By H. G. NARAHARI

WORKS there are in Sanskrit literature which deal with specific concepts of religion and philosophy ; but it is only very rarely that we come across a manual whose essential aim is to give an account of the very popular ethical doctrine, the theory of Karma. This indeed is the purpose of the *Prārabdhadbhāntasambhṛti*² of Acyutaśarma Moḍak, the exposition of the doctrine of Karma in which it is the object of this paper to consider.

Acyutaśarma Moḍak is a recent writer, though he has written profusely in philosophy and literature. To him we also owe the *Mahāvākyaṛthamañjarī*,³ the *Advaitajalajāta*⁴, the *Avaidikadbhikṛti* or *Śaktaśāsana*⁵, the *Pūrṇānandendukaumudī*⁶, a commentary on the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* of Vidyāraṇya, and the *Sāhityasāra*⁷ with his own gloss, the *Sarasāmoda*. From his own colophons in some of the works enumerated above,

¹ This paper was prepared by me as Research Fellow in the Sanskrit Department of the Madras University.

² The only known Ms. of this work is in paper and is deposited in the Government, Oriental Library, Mysore, with the shelf-number B. 223. I have described this Ms. at length in the *New Indian Antiquary*, 1942, V. 115 ff. It is this Ms. that I have used in the preparation of this paper.

³ A Ms. of this is deposited in the *Adyar Library*, and this bears the shelf-number XI. D. 14.

⁴ A reference is made to this work in the *Prārabdhadbhāntasambhṛti* see H. G. Narahari, *Adyar Library Bulletin*, 1941, V. 196 f.

⁵ This is also mentioned in the *Prārabdhadbhāntasambhṛti* (Mysore Ms., p. 26) : . . . *upapādītam madīye . . . avaidikadbhikṛtināmake śaktaśāsane* . . .

⁶ This is printed in the *Anandasrama Sanskrit Series* (No. 20), Poona, 1926.

⁷ Printed by the Nirnayasagara Press, Bombay, in 1906.

it is clear that he must have lived sometime between 1775 and 1850 A.D.⁸

In the *Prārabdhadvāntasambhṛti* with which work we are concerned at present, the author imposes on us no personal views of his on this much discussed theory. He bases all his conclusions on the writings of Sarvajñātman, Vidyāranya, Madhusūdanasarasvatī, and on the *Yogavāsīṣṭha*. This is the reason why I have called his exposition "an advaitic account," and have not associated it with his own name. The purpose of the work is not only to give a traditional account, but also to combat the prevailing misconception that the theory of Karma means that all man's deeds, beginning from his birth till the moment of his death, are only pre-determined by his past deeds (*prārabdhakarma*).

All human activity (*vyavahāra*), we are told⁹, can be classified under three heads, into that produced from Karma which has begun to operate (*prārabdhakarma*), that from sub-consciousness (*samskāra*), and lastly that from human volition (*prayatna*). Of these three factors which govern our entire experience in this world, *prārabdha* is that by which we are to understand the aggregate of virtuous and wicked deeds which, under the direction of providence, attain to the stage when they can begin to operate¹⁰. Also, among these deeds, the most powerful virtue, vice, or fear, brings about the next body, and that which is instrumental in determining the kind of birth, the length of life, and the variety of experience of the individual, gets the designation of *prārabdha*¹¹; the kind of birth (*jāti*) may be brāhmaṇa and the

⁸ H. G. Narahari, *Adyar Library Bulletin*, 1941, V. 197.

⁹ *Prārabdhakaraṇakāḥ saṃskāraṇakāḥ prayatnakaraṇakāścāpi niruktavyavahāraḥ* (Mysore Ms., p. 4)

¹⁰ *Prārabdham nāma dehapātāvyavahitottarakṣaṇe paramesvaraprēritāni sarvāṇi sañcitapunyapāpāni phaladānonmukhāni bhavanti* (Mysore Ms., loc. cit.)

¹¹ ...*teṣāṃ madhye yad balavat puṇyam vā pāpam vā bhayaṃ vā tad bhāvi-deham ārabhat jātyāyur bhogadam prārabdhamity ucyate* (Ibid.).

like, if the deeds are a mixture of virtue and vice, low birth if they are purely vicious, and a godly birth if the deeds are purely virtuous. The duration of life (*āyus*) may be one hundred years and so on. The experience (*bhoga*) may, as is well-known, be pleasure or pain, originating respectively through favourable and unfavourable circumstances.¹² The variety in the degree of the enjoyment of happiness or the suffering from pain is due to individual causes. The experience of all men consists in the reaping of the fruits of deeds which are a mixture of virtue and vice.¹³

It has already been stated that our experience consists either of pleasure (*sukha*) or of pain (*duḥkha*). Of these, pleasure is of three kinds¹⁴ : it may be illusory (*prātibhāsika*), or actual (*vyāvahārika*), or else it may first be imaginary and then become actual (*prātibhāsikajanyavyāvahārika*).

•Among these, that which is produced by the abnormal working of the intellect is illusory happiness (*doṣasamsargīkaraṇajanyam*¹⁵ *prātibhāsikam*) that which is not thus produced (*tad ajanyam*),¹⁶ and hence rational is called actual happiness (*vyāvahārika sukha*). This "actual happiness" is of two varieties ; it may either be that produced from the sight of a beautiful (*ramya*) object, or else that produced when one sees what is dear (*priya*) to him. These two kinds of feelings are but the different phases of the mind, manifesting themselves when the observer gets the knowledge of things which are beautiful and so on (*te ca tattad draṣṭṛgrbhītaramyādīnastuwiśayakajñānottarabhāvicittavrttivišeṣatve eva*).¹⁷

The terms *ramyatva* and *priyatva* do not stand in the same relation as *ghaṭatva* and *kalaśatva* stand to each other. To one suffering from fever, sweet rice undoubtedly appears

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 4 ff.

to be beautiful (*ramya*), but as the face of a woman is to an unattached ascetic, so is it undesirable to him. Gold does appear beautiful even to a recluse, but only he does not consider it worth possessing. In the same way, the bitterest medicine is desirable to one afflicted with disease, but the man is never known to enjoy it; and the recluse finds the bundle of rags in the street desirable but not charming. It is therefore evident that, inasmuch as that which is beautiful (*ramya*) need not also be dear (*priya*) to the same person, it is wrong to think that the two are synonymous.

A further subdivision is possible of that which is dear (*priya*) while the same cannot be said of that which is beautiful (*ramya*). It can be ordinary (*priya*), moderate (*moda*) or the highest (*pramoda*), accordingly as the object is seen, obtained and enjoyed (*priyam tu viṣayasya dr̥ṣṭatvalabdhatvabhuktatvaiḥ priyamodapramodanāmakam*)¹⁸. That which is charming to see, that which is acquired on account of its charm, and lastly, that which is enjoyed on account of its charm, constitute thus the three varieties of the dear (*priya*).

None of these distinctions made of actual happiness (*vyāvahārika-sukha*) have been made in the case of illusory (*prātibhāsika*) happiness. This is because the moment we begin to posit there also distinctions accordingly as the object is seen, obtained or enjoyed, the pleasure so derived from an illusory object ceases to be different from that derived from an actual object. We then get the third variety of happiness mentioned already, namely, actual happiness derived from illusion (*prātibhāsikajanyavyāvahārikasukha*).¹⁹

The pleasure derived from an illusory object may, no doubt, be similar to happiness derived from a real object, but still the two are not the same; actual happiness is that

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5 ff.

derived by seeing, obtaining or enjoying an object which is really existent ; but in illusory happiness the object is not there. Its presence is supposed, and the person feels the same amount of joy as if the object were really before him. This is a phenomenon the truth of which cannot be denied. It has the evidence of experience. A man may be excited with thirst, and it is possible that the mere sight of a mirage may quench his thirst. One who has never seen a rose and has a yearning to see one, may be completely but falsely delighted to see an artificial rose made of paper. The man is as happy as if a real rose were in front of him. The pleasure in the two cases does not vary, but the object differs ; while in the case of actual happiness, the pleasure is derived from an actual object, it is an imaginary object that brings happiness in the case of illusory happiness. The effect is the same, but the cause is different. This variety of happiness which, though derived from an imaginary object, does not differ in essence from that derived from an actual object, is designated *actual happiness derived from illusion* (*prātibhāsikajanyāvāhārikasukha*).

It is here the fault of the observer who fails to distinguish between the real and the imagined, between appearance and reality. A person may tread on a rope at dark, and his very imagination that he tramped on a serpent may kill him. The same person would no doubt die if he trod off an actual cobra, but here he is killed by a false imagination that he trod on a cobra when he really trod on a rope. It is not the rope that is responsible for his death, but it is the rope taken for the cobra, the *imaginary cobra*, that took away his life. It is, therefore, quite possible that imaginary objects can bring about effects which are not different in nature from those of actual objects²⁰. If the person himself subsequently realized that he was under an illusion when

²⁰ *Ibid.*, P. 6.

he mistook the rope for the snake, or the paper rose for the real rose, he would neither die in the former case, nor be happy in the latter case. The former case gives no opportunity for the person to correct himself, and in the latter case he is too much beladen with illusion to think of correcting himself. Inasmuch as real effects have come from illusion in both these cases, the experience here belongs to a category which is different both from pure actuality and pure illusion. It has the elements of both, and is hence classified under a separate head.

The three kinds of happiness considered so far, i.e., *prātibhāsika*, *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsikajanyavyāvahārika* are each further three-fold²¹, accordingly as they are manifested (*vyakta*), imperceptible (*avyakta*) and partially manifested (*iśadvyakta*). The first of these varieties has already been explained. Only the last two need explanation.

One experiences imperceptible pleasure (*avyakta sukha*) on cognizing an object which he does not like (even to see) [*avyaktam tu svāniṣṭaviśayaka Jñānadaśāyāmeva*²²]. For instance, though one loses courage on seeing before him a tiger, rendered powerless by magic, the thought that the animal is quite unable to (kill him gives him some pleasure (*yathā mantraugha vaśīkṛtavāgbrāḍijñānād bhītyāditāmasavṛttan vadhyatvādyabhāvāt tatra ānandāmsābhivyaktibhāvena . .*²³). His trepidation at the sight of the tiger may not allow him to express this joy. The existence of such joy does, however, become evident on subjecting the mind of such a person to psycho-analysis. Pleasure exists in him, but only it is not knowable. It is *avyakta*, incapable of perception, though capable of detection.

Further, it is common that, on seeing a tiger, paralysed through magic or imprisoned in a cage, one begins to admire

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

its beauty and feels happy at its charms (*sa eva vyāghraḥ yadi mantrādinā vaśikṛto yadi vā pañjarādiniruddhaścet ramyo' yamiti dhīviśaya iti tādrjñānanyavṛttau iśadvyaktaṁ tat, tadvṛtter-īśatsātvikatvāt*).²⁴ The person is all the while conscious that, if only the tiger were free, he could not, with the same courage stand before it, enjoying the pleasure of its sight. The thought, however, that the tiger, in its present surroundings, is capable of no harm, gives him the courage to employ his aesthetic faculties on seeing the animal. While the man feels happy at the sight of the beautiful animal, he shudders when he remembers the ferocity of the charming beast before him in its wild state. A careful analysis of the mind of such a person shows that it is not pure joy that he is experiencing, but that his is a pleasure that is not untainted with a feeling of terror. His pleasure is, therefore, partial, and here we have an illustration of the third variety of happiness mentioned above, of pleasure that is slightly manifest (*iśadvyakta-sukha*).²⁵

All that has been discussed so far constituted what may be called social pleasure (*laukikakāryasukha*).²⁶ There are also other varieties like religious happiness (*vaidikasukha*), assumed happiness (*ābhāryānanda*), and subconscious happiness (*vāsanānanda*).²⁷ ; religious happiness is, again, fourfold ; it may be happiness produced as a result of the worship of a symbol (*pratīkopāśana*), of concentration on the Ego (*āhamgrahopāśana*), of profound meditation (*nididhyāśana*), or of firm knowledge of the self (*dṛḍhatamātmajñāna*) ; "assumed happiness" may be illustrated by such experiences as 'My son is a veritable desire-yielding gem' (*putro mama cintāmaṇireva*), 'Penance is as good as my wish-yielding tree' (*samādhir mama kalpadruma eva*).²⁸ ; "subconscious happiness"

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 6 ff.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 7 ff.

is the pleasure one feels while unconscious or sound asleep.²⁹ In the words of Vidyāraṇya³⁰, it is that happiness which is reflected in the self (*buddhivṛtti*) when one is in a state of unconsciousness or deep sleep :

मूच्छसिषुष्योर्ध्वं ज्ञानं भाति तत्कारणं धियः ।

कारणे बुद्धिवृत्तौ च स्वानन्दः प्रतिबिम्बति ॥

This pleasure varies in accordance with the sleep the man had. As the *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtikasāra*³¹ would have there are three kinds of sleep, pure (*sātvika*), mixed (*rājasa*) and impure (*tāmasa*), depending on the nature of food taken. This "subconscious happiness" is described³² thus :

* किञ्चित्कालं प्रबुद्धस्य ब्रह्मानन्दस्य वासना ।

अनुगच्छेद्यतस्तूष्णीमास्ते निविषयः सुखी ॥

"The impression of the highest happiness (*brahmānanda*) continues (in the mind of man) for some time, even after he has got up from sleep ; this makes him keep silent and feel happy, even in the absence of the necessary agent (to make him happy)."

Happiness, as such is defined by Mādhavācārya to whom it means only contentment (*ānando nāma trptih*)³³. Desire for an object is an impediment in the way of enjoying happiness in its fullness. And happiness necessarily comes to every individual, the moment he gets into possession of his desired object, though it has to be acknowledged that the degree of happiness depends on the degree of the vanquishment of desire.³⁴

Pain (*duḥkha*) also admits of all the distinctions we have made in the case of happiness (*sukha*)³⁵. One thing need be

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 8. *Anubhūti prakāśa* (Bombay Edn.), p. 14.

³¹ IV. 3. 197-8, p. 832 (Benares Edn.).

³² Bhāratīrthaguru, *yogānanda*, cited in Mysore Ms. B. 223, p.

³³ *Taittirīya Aranyaka*, VIII. 2.

³⁴ Mysore Ms., p. 7.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

noticed in this connection that, so far as the qualities of imperceptibility (*avyakta*) and partial manifestation (*īśadvyakta*) are concerned, they are common to both illusory (*prātibhāsika*) pain and actual (*vyāvahārika*) pain³⁶. Pain becomes manifest (*vyakta*) in an individual when, for instance, a thorn pricks him and he becomes conscious of the prick.³⁷

But if the person, in his zeal for plucking the rose from the thorny bush, does not mind the many pricks he receives in the course of his attempt, we have there an illustration of pain that is partially manifest (*īśadvyaktaduḥkha*)³⁸. It does not mean that the person does not feel the prick of the thorn. He does feel it. Only his enthusiasm in getting the rose, and the final triumph on getting it, do not allow him to remember, after getting the flower, the pain he might have felt by the prick of the thorns in the course of his attempt. The pain of the man is, therefore, only of secondary importance. It is existent but not prominent, noticeable but not notable. It thus remains slightly manifest (*īśadvyakta*), not glaringly palapable.

In illustration of pain that is imperceptible (*avyakta*), the gardener can serve as an illustration³⁹. Let us suppose that he is desirous of having a rose-plant in his garden. This desire spurs him into action, and we see him make the greatest effort to bring a plant and install it in his garden. He may have to buy the plant a dealer, and may be required to pay a very heavy price for it. Or else, he might be required to go a very long and tiresome distance to bring the plant from a friend. But neither the distance nor the cost of the plant, matters anything to the gardener. All that

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

he wants is the rose-plant, and he is prepared to sacrifice anything to get it.

We will suppose that the gardener has succeeded in bringing a plant to his garden, and in planting it there. Still his trouble is not yet over. He is required to keep, day and night, a strict watch over it. An ill-disposed neighbour may steal it, or a wild animal may trample upon it. And, to prevent all that, it is necessary for him to keep strict vigilance. To do that, he may be required even to sacrifice his food and drink, but he does not mind. He is content if his plant is safe.

This is not all. Rearing the plant till it grows big enough to yield him beautiful blossoms, is no easy task. It means a good deal of exertion to the gardener. But he cares for the plant more than he does for himself.

The plant is now capable of yielding blossoms. When the first bud comes, and when that bud develops into a beautiful flower, can we measure the joy of the gardener who is privileged to see the plant which he reared with his own hands, yield a beautiful blossom? His exultation is immeasurable.

But still do we see that he experiences all this joy for nothing? He has paid the highest price to get this happiness. Day and night he has toiled, and today he reaps the benefit of all his exertions. His exertion has brought him a considerable amount of pain. But the sight of the beautiful flower on his own plant makes him forget, at once, all the pain he might have felt before. He is now in transportations of joy, and can forget all his pain. We only see him rejoice, not sorry for all he did to get this happiness. Even if the pain he suffered is there in him not forgotten, it is only ignored. It might be remembered, but it is also subsequently stifled within. Consequently, pain, though existent, remains unnoticed. It is imperceptible (*avyakta*), felt by the person but not shown by him.

Having noticed so far the varieties of happiness (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*), it is now necessary to seek for the cause or causes of these two which together constitute our experience on earth. There are three factors which bring happiness or misery to man⁴⁰. His past karma which has begun to operate (*prārabdhakarma*) determines as stated already, the kind of birth, the length of life and the variety of experience of the individual. But it is also true that a man's subconscious impressions (*samskāra*) sometimes bring him happiness or misery. Besides these two, there is also a third cause which is so instrumental. This is man's own will or effort (*prayatna*).

The pleasure that the individual enjoys when in meditation is due to his *prārabdhakarma*; the bliss that he experiences when in deep sleep comes from his subconscious impressions (*samskāra*); and the joy of the man, on seeing that the *kārīrī* sacrifice he performed has been immediately followed by a shower of rain, proceeds, doubtless, from his own effort (*prayatna*). It would be an error, says Acyutaśarma,⁴¹ to imagine that all happiness proceeds only from a man's *prārabdhakarma*, that like the bliss-in-meditation, sleep is the result of his past deeds, that sacrifices like the *kārīrī* only serve to remove the obstacle in the way of the shower of rain, and that it is *prārabdhakarma* alone that is actually responsible in bringing out the desired shower of rain. It is necessary to remember in this connection that it is only the individual soul (*Jīvopādhi*) that is bound to obey the dictates of the *prārabdhakarma* which determines to some extent its experience (*prārabdhabhogo'pi Jīvopādhikacaitanya-sya vaktavyaḥ*)⁴². We have on the authority of Vidyāranya⁴³

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *op.cit.*, p. 12.

that there is no delimiting adjunct to the supreme-soul in the state of deep sleep :

जीवोपाविलयेऽप्यत्र तद्वीजस्यावशेषतः ।

तदुपाधिक एवास्मिन्नेहेऽन्येद्युः प्रबुध्यते ॥

During this state, when is felt only the state of non-duality, it is also stated that unrestrained desire, sin from deeds, and fear from the result of these deeds are all absent⁴⁴ :

समाजिसुप्तयोरद्वैतं स्वयमेवानुभूयते ।

छन्दः कामः कर्मपापं भयं स्यात्कर्मणः फलम् ।

अनर्थरूपत्रितयमद्वैते वीक्ष्यते न हि ॥

What follows necessarily from this discussion is that, in deep sleep there is no influence of karma (*tāmasasuptau karmaphalābhāvah*)⁴⁵. It would thus be wrong to hold that the bliss one experiences in deep sleep comes only from his *prārabdhakarma*. Similarly it has to be acknowledged that the pleasure owing to rain, which one derives after the performances of sacrifices like the *kārīrī*, is only due to his individual effort (*prayatna*), and that it is wrong to impute it to the influence of past deeds.⁴⁶

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*⁴⁷, it is stated that, when a man dies, his soul does not go alone, but that it carries with it its knowledge, its deeds, and its previous reminiscences (*ibaivāgne tam vidyākarmaṇī samanvārabbhete pūrvaprajñā ca*). To borrow the metaphor from Śaṅkara⁴⁸, the soul is a loaded cart which makes a good amount of noise as it moves, and feeds on knowledge, deeds and reminiscences of the past ; by knowledge (*vidyā*) we are to understand⁴⁹ a man's knowledge of his deeds in his previous life, and this may be true (*pramā*), false (*bhrama*), or dubious (*samśaya*) ;

⁴⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtikasāra*, IV. 3. 264-65.

⁴⁵ Mysore Ms., p. 12.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ IV. 4. 2.

⁴⁸ Śaṅkara's commentary on above.

⁴⁹ *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtikasāra*, IV. 4. 40 ; Mysore Ms., p. 13.

the deeds (*karma*) means⁵⁰ those bodily actions which are either meritorious or vicious ; and the reminiscences of the past (*pūrvaprajñā*), also called *vāsanā* consist of impressions of deeds whose fruits have either been stored up or enjoyed.⁵¹

It is also possible to distinguish a man's deeds in his previous lives, inasmuch as they are moderate (*madhya*), slow (*manda*) and acute (*tīvra*) ; that which has three parts of *sātvika* and one part of *rājasa*, and which is hence predominantly virtuous, belongs to the first of these varieties ; that which is partially *sātvik* and partially *rājasa* and which is an admixture of virtue and vice, belongs to the second group ; and lastly, that which has one part of *sātvika* and three parts of *rājasa* in it, and in which vice is predominant, belongs to the last.⁵²

It is therefore this triad (corresponding to *prārabdha* and *samskāra* in the previous classification) which follows a man from his previous life, that is capable of determining to a certain extent, his happiness or misery⁵³. There is also besides the man's individual volition (*prayatna*), which can bring him happiness or misery. Granted that sacrifices like the *kārīrī* serve only to remove obstacles which impede rainfall, even then the efficacy of human effort cannot be denied. The reason is not far to seek. It is easy to see that, at least in removing the obstacle, the individual effort of man has not been in vain.⁵⁴

• While interpreting the passage from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* Sarvajñātman and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī seem to differ from Vidyāraṇya. According to Vidyāraṇya⁵⁵, *vidyā* and *karma* are each three-fold ; the former may be true (*samyak*), false (*mithyā*), or doubtful (*samśaya*) ; and the latter

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, IV. 4. 41 ; Mysore Ms., *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, IV. 4. 42 ; Mysore Ms., *Ibid.*

⁵² Mysore Ms., p. 14.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 18 ; *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtikasāṣa*, IV. 4. 38-39.

⁵⁴ Mysore Ms., p. 18.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

may be performed by the mind (*manas*), or tongue (*vāk*), or body (*kāya*), and may be of perceivable or imperceivable effect (*dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭārtharūpa*) accordingly as it is ordinary (*laukika*) or scriptural (*sāstrīya*). *Samskāra*, according to him, means impressions of deeds whose fruits have either been enjoyed or stored up (*karma tatphalopabbogayor manoniṣṭhas-samskārah*).

To Sarvajñātman⁵⁶, though three names are mentioned in the Upaniṣadic sentence in question, all must be taken in the sense of *karma* alone, and, like the cause, *karma*, *vidyā* and *karma* are both four-fold.

In the face of the Upaniṣadic statement, *puṇyaḥ puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati, pāpaḥ pāpena*,⁵⁷ which definitely asserts the efficacy of a man's good and bad deeds in determining his future birth, it is difficult to accept, says Madhusūdana Sarasvatī⁵⁸, that *vidyā* and *pūrvaprajñā* also can be so instrumental. It is only *karma* that determines man's existence, and hence all the three conjointly and inseparably form the cause, *vidyā*, *karma* and *pūrvaprajñā*, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī adds, are each fourfold; they are either ordained by scriptures (*sāstravibhita*), or prohibited by scriptures (*sāstrapraṭiṣiddha*), or not enjoined (*vibhita-samu*), or even not prohibited (*niṣiddhasamu*); the first variety of *vidyā* may be illustrated by devotion to God and the like (*devatādyupāsana*), and the second, by the study of wicked literature (*asatsāstraviṣaya*), seeing of the Gaṅgā (*gaṅgādarsana*) belongs to the third group because, though a beneficial act, it has not been enjoined; and looking at a corpse which is terrific (*bībhatsitaśavādiviṣaya*) belongs to the last variety because, though undesirable, it has not been prohibited by scriptural injunction. *Karma* similarly becomes fourfold accordingly as it means a sacrifice (*yāga*), or a murder (*vadha*),

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁵⁷ *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, III. 2. 13.

⁵⁸ Mysore Ms. *loc. cit.*

or (killing of an animal for) food (*ābāra*) or (killing for) sport (*vihāra*). Likewise, reminiscence of the past (*pūrvaprajñā*) admits of four groups like *mūlānubhava* and so on.

There is thus an apparent difference of opinion between Vidyāraṇya on the one hand, and Sarvajñātman and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on the other; to the former the triad beginning with *vidyā* are threefold, while to the latter these are divisible fourfold. But really there is no such difficulty at all. When Vidyāraṇya speaks of three varieties of *vidyā* he only refers to a further classification of *vidyā* already known to be fourfold, accordingly as it is *vihita* and so on. Inasmuch as the latter can be further classified into true (*samyak*), false (*mithyā*) and dubious (*samśaya*), there are in all twelve kinds of knowledge (*vidyā*).⁵⁹

Karma similarly admits of twenty-four varieties⁶⁰; the four varieties propounded by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (viz., *vihita* etc.) become threefold each accordingly as man thinks of it (*mānasika*), talks about it (*vācika*), and performs it (*kāyika*), thus giving us twelve varieties of *karma*; these twelve varieties can be further subdivided into those which are of visible fruit (*dr̥ṣṭārtha*) and those of invisible fruit (*adr̥ṣṭārtha*), so that in all we have twenty-four varieties of *karma*.

Reminiscence of the past (*pūrvaprajñā*), in so far as it means the reminiscient impressions of the twelve varieties of *vidyā*, becomes first twelve-fold. It means also the reminiscient impressions of *karma*. *Karma*, as we have already seen, is twenty-four-fold; but since the impression of *karma* means both of that which has been stored up (*sañcita*) as well as of that whose results have been enjoyed, we have in all forty-eight varieties of *karma* whose reminiscient impressions

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

constitute a part of *pūrvaprajñā*. The past experience of the individual consists, as stated before, of the reminiscent impressions of a man's knowledge (*vidyā*) as well as of his deeds. *Vidyā* is twelve-fold, and *karma* forty-eight-fold. Adding up, *pūrvaprajñā* becomes sixty-fold.⁶¹

There are thus ninety-six elements in the apparatus which bring about the birth of the individual (*janmārambhaka-sāmagrī evaṁ saṅṇavatireva*)⁶².

This apparatus, no doubt, continues to operate till the man is emancipated, but there is ample scope for *Jīvanmukti*. The man's *vidyā*, which brings him his body, is not destroyed till his body also meets its end, his *karma*, no doubt, remains till pleasure and pain are brought to him, and his *pūrvaprajñā* or *vāsanā* continues to exist till he experiences pleasure or pain with his body. Still it has to be admitted that, if the man should have no interest in the results of the deeds, scriptural or profane, performed by him, and should realize, by means of true knowledge (*viveka*), that they are all transient, his *vāsanās* are destroyed and he gets himself installed on the throne of *Jīvanmukti*.⁶³

There need be no doubt whether the statement that *pūrvaprajñā*, also called *vāsanā* or *bhāvanā*, is the cause for the deeds, scriptural or otherwise, which bring pleasure or pain to man, is based on any authority. Even in the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*,⁶⁴ there is the statement :—

स यथाकामो भवति तत्क्रतुर्भवति यत्क्रतुर्भवति यत्कर्म कुरुते यत्कर्म कुरुते तदभि-
सम्पद्यते ॥

True, only *kṛima* and *kratu* are mentioned here as the originators of *karma*, and there is no reference to *vāsanā* or *pūrvaprajñā*. But ancient teachers, it may be noted in this

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁶⁴ IV. 4. 5.

⁶⁵ *Bṛhadāranyakavārtikasāra*, IV. 4. 93-103, 44-45.

context, have equated *kāma* with *pūrvaprajñā* or *vāsanā*. The following verses⁶⁵ of Vidyāranya may be noted in this connection :

वासना कर्म विद्या च त्रयं जन्मप्रयोजवम् ।
 उक्तं तत्र प्रधानत्वं कर्मणः श्रूयते पुनः ॥
 उत्तमाधमदेहाख्यवैषम्यं कर्मणा भवेत् ।
 देहे विद्यावासनाभ्यां भवेद्भोगस्य कौशलम् ॥
 कर्म साध्वेव कर्तव्यमिच्छताभ्युदयं परम् ।
 पापं तु सर्वदा हेयं दुःखेभ्यस्त्रायता भृशम् ॥
 पूर्वकाण्डपरा इत्थं कर्म प्राधान्यमूचिरे ।
 अथ वेदान्तशास्त्रज्ञाः प्राहुः कामप्रधानताम् ॥
 पुमानादौ काममय एव भत्वा तु कर्मकृत् ।
 यतोऽयं कर्मणां हेतुः कामोऽतोऽस्य प्रधानता ॥
 अकामस्य क्रिया काचिद्दृश्यते नेह कस्यचित् ।
 यद्यद्वि कुरुते जन्तुस्तत्तत्कामस्य चेष्टितम् ॥
 इत्येतद्विशदीकृतुं स यथेत्युत्तरा श्रुतिः ।
 कामः क्रतुः कर्म जन्मेत्येषामेष क्रमो भवेत् ॥
 पुंसो या विषयापेक्षा स काम इति भण्यते ।
 स एव वर्षमानः सन् क्रतुत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ॥
 रुचेरतिशयः काम्ये विषये क्रतुरीर्यते ।
 पाक्षिकं कर्म कामे स्यात्करोत्येव क्रतौ सति ॥
 पुण्यपापात्मकं कर्म ह्यपूर्वादृष्टशब्दितम् ।
 उत्तमाधमजन्मास्य फलं प्रोक्तं पुराऽपि च ॥
 लोकेऽपि यादृशः कामस्तादृङ्निश्चयवांस्तथा ।
 कर्म कृत्वा फलं गच्छेत्तच्छुभाशुभयोः समम् ॥
 पूर्वप्रज्ञा तदुद्भूतविद्यायाः कर्मणस्तथा ।
 ताभ्यां च भावनोद्भूतिरित्यन्योज्यस्य हेतुता ॥
 कर्मणो भुज्यमाणस्य परिशेषो हि भावना ।
 मूलं च जायमानस्य प्रधानं तेन भावना ॥

For achieving *Jīvanmukti* what is necessary is, as stated already, vigorous efforts to destroy one's *vāsanā* (*mahāprayatnataḥ śatataṁ vāsanā-kṣayam sampādya*)⁶⁶. There need now be no misgivings about the ability of the individual to coun-

teract the influence of his *prārabdhakarma* and *vāsana*⁶⁷. In the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*⁶⁸, there is a long discourse by Vasiṣṭha where he speaks to Rāma of the supreme power of human volition (*prayatna*) which makes it prevail even over *prārabdha* (the previous deeds of man which have begun to operate in having brought out the body). Not only is individual volition (*prayatna*) able to transcend the influence of *karma* which has begun its operation (*prārabdha*), it also helps the individual to put forth his necessary endeavour to fight Destiny which is no more than the sum total of man's deeds, and even to take up to these practices which are necessary to bring the aspirant final Beatitude.

It is thus clear that man's actions in this world are controlled by three factors, his past actions (*prārabdhakarma*), his subconscious impressions (*samskāra*), and his volition (*prayatna*). It may be that, to a great extent, his happiness or misery proceeds from the first two causes. But the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* would have us remember in this connection that it is wrong to consider them as the only causes and that their power over man is unassailable. It points out that there is still another cause on which human experience in this world is, to a certain extent, dependent, this is his own individual effort (*prayatna*). Of the three causes this last is the most powerful, and has the capacity to withstand the influence of the other two. The *prārabdhakarma* and the *samskāras* may induce the individual to do certain things, but his *prayatna* helps him to resist their influence.⁶⁹

We thus see that, though a man's *prārabdhakarma* and *samskāras* may induce him to do certain things, they cannot compel him to do anything. He has the power of veto in his hands, the freedom to resist their influence or to succumb

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ H. G. Narahari *Adyar Library Bulletin*, February 1946, pp. 35 ff.

⁶⁹ H. G. Narahari, *New Indian Antiquary*, 1942, V. 118.

to it. And if he should not use the power vested in him, no body is to blame. He cannot condemn his *karma* for, while it tempted him, it did not force him, and he was at full liberty to direct himself as he liked. The theory of *karma* is, therefore, neither pessimistic nor fatalistic. Nor does it teach Predeterminism. All that we are to understand by it is that, of the three factors that guide man's destiny in this world, his *prārabdhakarma*, i.e., his deeds in his previous life or lives, is one of the most important.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ H. G. Narahari, *Aryan Path*, 1940, XI. 603 ff.; *New Indian Antiquary*, *loc. cit.*

THE RELATION OF THE GĪTĀ WITH THE ṚGVEDA

By V. B. ATHAVALÉ

IN the May 1946 issue of the 'Prabuddha-Bharata' monthly, I have already proved that the composition of the *Gītā* poem took place in 3016 B.C. In the *Gita* we find references to some proper names of people in the ancient times. In the third chapter there is a quotation by Prajāpati. The words 'पुरोवाच प्रजापतिः' clearly show that Prajāpati was an important personality in the ancient times. G. III. 20, gives the name Janaka. G. IV. 1, gives the names Vivasvān, Manu, Ikṣvāku. The author of the *Gītā* tells in the next two verses that he is tracing the history of the Yoga secret to ancient persons as far back as it was possible. In the tenth chapter, there is a reference to seven great Sages of the past and the four sons of Manu, who succeeded him. The name Bhṛgu is specially mentioned as a prominent personality among the seven sages. There is Viṣṇu of Aditi; Bṛhaspati, chief among the priests; Uśanā of Kavi. Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana, the author of the *Gītā*, must have collected the information from some old literature. There is no doubt that the references are to the ancient Vedic literature. For, the word "वेदाः" is directly mentioned in the *Gītā* many times. G. XV. 18 "वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः" is evidently a reference to the Puruṣa hymn of the *Ṛg-Veda*.

* No one has tried so far to trace the exact source of the references. The aim of this article is to trace the exact source of each proper name and try to arrange the names in geneological family succession, G. X.6, "येषां लोके ईमाः प्रजाः । महर्षयः सप्त, पूर्वोक्तवतारो मनवः तथा ।" clearly states that the history of the people on this earth can be traced only up to the seven great Brāhmaṇa families and the Kṣatriya Rājarsi family of

Vivāsvān. We must establish as to who were the contemporaries in the Brāhmaṇa and Kṣatriya families.

R. 10. 63. 7, येभ्यो होत्रां प्रथमा मा येजे मनुः समिद्धाग्निः मन्त्रसा सप्त होतृभिः। is a ṛc by Gaya Plata. It is addressed to 'Viśvedevās.' It states that Manu was the first to propitiate the gods with seven priests by offering sticks (Samid) in the sacrificial fire. The verse X. 6 in the *Gītā* is clearly a reference to the ṛc mentioned above. This proves that the seven sages were contemporaries of Manu. Bhṛgu was thus a contemporary of Manu. *Gītā* mentions the name prominently because Bhṛgu was the first to invent Araṇi, a machine to produce fire by rubbing two logs of wood. Six Ṛṣis¹ have extolled Bhṛgu for this in eight different ṛcs.

Gaya Plata tells in R. 10. 63. 1, "परावतो ये दिधीषन् आप्यं मनुप्रीतासो जनीमा विवस्वतः। ययातेनद्रिषस्य बर्हिषि विश्वेदेवा आसृते।" that let all the gods take the grass seats offered by Yayāti, a son of Nāhuṣa, whose father was Manu, who was the son of Vivāsvān. This ṛc shows clearly that Gaya is a priest of Yayāti and he is giving the names of the ancestors of Yayāti. In the 7th ṛc of the same hymn, Gaya is arguing that because Manu was the first to praise the gods by offering oblations in the fire, the gods must come in the sacrifice of the grand-son of Manu.

We can even trace the name of the chief of the seven priests in this first sacrifice by Manu. R. 8. 27.1 "अग्निरक्षो पुरोहितो ग्रावाणो बर्हिरश्वरे।" is a ṛc by Manu addressed to "Viśvedevās." He gives the name of his priest to be Agni. This can be verified by a hymn of Agni himself, the name of whose father was Saucika. R. 10. 52. 1, is a ṛc addressed to 'Viśvedevās' by Agni. विश्वेदेवाः शास्तन मा यथेह होतावृत्तो मनवै यन्निषद्यः। I, surrounded by priests, am praising you for Manu.

¹ Nodha R. 1.58.6, and R. 1.60.1. Dirghatamas. R. 1.140.2, and R. 1.143.4. Paruchepa R. 1.127.7 Bharadvāja R. 6.15.2. Vāmadeva R. 4.7.1. Somahūti. R. 2.4.2.

Because the name of the priest should not be confused with Agni, the fire, people called him *Āṅgirā*. Gotama in R. 4. 83. 4, आदगिराः प्रथमं दक्षिणे वयं इद्धाग्निं शम्या ये सुकृत्वया " tells that it was *Āṅgirā* who was the first to put oblations in the sacrificial fire. Parāśara, in R. 1. 71. 2 & 3 " पितरो न उक्थी रश्मिं रुजन् जगिरसो रवेण । दधवृत धनयन्त्रस्य भीतिमादिदयो . . . । tells that it was our ancestor *Āṅgirā*, who cleared the way to heaven and he was the first to establish the sacrificial fire. The opening hymn of *Rg-Veda* " अग्निमीळे पुरोहितं । अगिरः । अग्ने. सूपयनो भव " also calls Agni a priest², and to avoid confusion between Agni the priest, and Agni the fire, puts the words " *Āṅgiraḥ agne* " together.

As we get in the *Rg-Veda*, the hymns directly by Manu and *Āṅgirā*, and they refer to each other in their hymns, it is evident that they were contemporaries. Vivasvān was the father of Manu, and Saucika was the father of Agni. Vivasvān is a son of Aditi. But Aditi is the name of the mother of Vivasvān. For, Manu refers to the name in R. 8.27.5, देव्यदिते सवने पत्स्येमहि । as Devī Aditi. 'We do not know the name of the father of Vivasvān. We cannot extend backward the geneology of Manu beyond Aditi. In the case of *Āṅgirā* of the Brāhmaṇa family, we know only the name of his father. In *Rg-Veda*, we find hymns by Manu, Agni, etc., and their successors. There are no hymns either by Aditi, Vivasvān or Saucika in the *Rg-Veda*. The names of the ancestors are mentioned by Manu and others in their hymns. As Manu was a contemporary of *Āṅgirā*, Vivasvān, the father of Manu must be a contemporary of Saucika, the father of *Āṅgirā*. As there are no hymns by these persons, it is not possible to give the additional verification by cross references. For instance, Brhaspati, a son of *Āṅgirā*, tells in R. 10.72.8 अष्टौ पुत्रासो अदितेः तत आदितेः that Aditi

² R. 1.105.14 ; R. 1.128.1 ; R. 6.16.9 ; R. 6.16.11 ; are the four additional texts where Agni is mentioned to be a *पुरोहित* of Manu.

had eight sons. *Adhvaryu Brā.* gives the names as follows. (1) Viṣṇu, (2) Mitra, (3) Varuṇa, (4) Dhatru, (5) Aryamā, (6) Arṇśa, (7) Bhaga, (8) Vivasvān. This shows that Viṣṇu was the eldest brother of Vivasvān. These names are referred to in their hymns by Manu and others⁸, but there are no hymns by these persons. Viṣṇu is praised in the *R̥g-Veda* by Manu and other⁸ Ṛṣis. Vaśiṣṭha, (R.7.99 & 100); Dīrghatamas, (R.1.154-156); Medhātithi, (R.1.22.16-21); Gotama, (R.1.90.9). The common feature in these praises is that the adjective 'उत्क्रमः' is repeated by every one. It must have been some valourous deed which gave protection to many people. One hymn tells, त्रीणी पदा विचक्रमे विष्णुः गोपा अदाभ्यः । अतो धर्माणि धारयन् विष्णोः कर्माणि पश्यत । विष्णोः किन्तु वीर्याणि प्रबो यः पार्थीवानि विममे रजांसि ।

Now, we shall see how Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana has referred to these hymns about Viṣṇu in the *Gītā*. *Gītā* gives quotations from the Vedic literature by the *Pratīka method*, which Vyāsa has copied from the Brāhmaṇa literature. The method is to choose some significant words from a ṛc and add the words प्राहुः, विदुः, उक्ताः to indicate that it is a quotation. *Gītā* IV. 1-2 gives the succession of names Vivasvān-Manu-Ikṣvāku and ends with words परंपरा प्राप्तं राजर्षयो विदुः. Manu had four sons. (1) Ikṣvāku, (2) Śaryāta, (3) Nābha, and (4) Nahuṣa. Śaryāta had a daughter, while Nābha had no issue. Thus Ikṣvāku and Nahuṣa were the only progenitors of the Manu family. Ikṣvāku being the oldest, he got the title of king-ship (मनुः वैवस्वतो राजा), which Manu had received, because he was the first to perform the fire sacrifice.

Gītā extends the succession backwards from Vivasvān to Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva. Arjuna at once contradicts the statement and shows the impossibility. "How can you, who are recently born, be the teacher of Yoga to Vivasvān, who

⁸ Manu. 8.27.8 ; Prajapati. 3.54.14 ; Vasuśrutā. 5.3.12,

lived in very ancient times ? ” Kṛṣṇa answers that “ I have born many times for the sacred duty of protecting the pious and destroying the wicked. And I remember them all.”

If Vivasvān got the Yoga secret from a certain person, the person must be some elder contemporary and competent enough to teach Vivasvān. We have already seen that Viṣṇu was the elder brother of Vivasvān and was praised for protecting and preserving Dharma in three strides. Thus it was Viṣṇu who must have taught Yoga to Vivasvān. *Gītā* X. 21 आदित्यानां विष्णुः tells exactly the same thing. In the chapter XI, Arjuna has twice addressed Kṛṣṇa as Viṣṇu. *Gītā* XI.18, uses the words ‘ त्वं शाश्वतधर्मगोप्ता सनातनः पुरुषः’ which are congruent with ‘ विष्णुः गोपा अदाम्यः । अतो धर्माणि चारयन् ’. “ *Gītā* IV. 9, uses the words “ जन्म कर्म च मे दिव्यं एव ”. They correspond with विष्णोः कर्माणि पश्यत . . . ।” This proves clearly that Vyāsa is directly quoting from the *Rg-Veda*.

In the tenth chapter of the *Gītā*, Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana is depicting that Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva is a personality who can identify himself with any thing or person in the past, present or future. In the *Rg-Veda* times Vāmadeva was a well-known person, who could identify himself with any thing or person in the past or present. In R.4.27.1, गर्भेनुसन्नेषाम वेदमहं देवानां जनीमानि विद्वा । Vāmadeva tells that he got this power when he was in the womb of his mother. I am quoting below a Jñāna ṛc by Vāmadeva Gautam and a parallelly congruent statement in the *Gītā*.

• Vāmadeva Gautama

अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्चाहं
कक्षीवान् ऋषिरस्मि विप्रः
अहं कुत्समार्जुनेयं नृञ्जे
अहं कविरुशना पश्यताम

Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva

आदित्यानां अहं विष्णुः, ज्योतिषां रविः
मुनीनां अप्यहं व्यासो
पाण्डवानां धनंजयः
कवीनां उशना कविः

If Vāmadeva is identifying himself with Manu in the past, Kṛṣṇa is identifying himself with Viṣṇu. The sun in the sky is identical. Kakṣivān and Ārjuneya Kutsa, are the two contemporaries of Vāmadeva. Vyāsa and Arjuna are

the two contemporaries of Kṛṣṇa. Uśanā Kavi is again, common. This proves conclusively that Vyāsa has directly quoted the ṛc.

Now we shall turn to Prajāpati, whose speech is quoted in the *Gītā* from the second half of III.10, and concluded at the end of the verse 13. For, in the 16th verse, the word 'Pārtha' proves that Kṛṣṇa is addressing Arjuna. In the 15th verse, the verb 'विद्धि' shows that it is Arjuna who is being addressed by Kṛṣṇa. But the 14th and the 15th verse together form one sentence, where Kṛṣṇa is explaining the ' ' cycle started by Prajāpati. The words वः, अवाप्स्यथ, भावयत, etc., indicating second person plural in the 11-13 verses, corroborate that Prajāpati is addressing the people.

First let me quote the ṛc with which the verses are congruent, and then I shall prove that it is by Prajāpati—

Gītā III.10-13.

Rg-Veda X.117.8

अप्रदाय यो भुंक्ते स्तेन एव सः । भुञ्जते ते मोक्षं अन्नं विदते अप्रचेताः सत्यं ब्रवीमि वध
त्वष्टं पापाः यं पञ्चत्यात्मकारणात् । प्रव- इत् स तस्य । नार्यमणं पुष्यति नो
तितं चक्रं नानुवर्तयति इह यः । सः अघायुः सखायं केवलाघो भवति केवलादी ।
मोक्षं स जीवति ।

The congruence of all the important words proves that Vyāsa has written the verses directly from the ṛc. Now let us try to see if we can determine the identity of Prajāpati from the Vedic sources. In the *Rg-Veda*, there are 66 ṛcs by Prajāpati. The name of his father is Viśvāmitra. There is a name Vimada in the Viśvāmitra family, whose father was Prajāpati. Vimada gives his name either as ऐन्द्र विस्वद or प्राजापत्यः विमदः । This shows that Prajāpati was alternatively known as Indra. This can be corroborated from the fact that Indra is one of the Pravaras in the Viśvāmitra family. Vimada refers to Kakṣivān in R. 10.21.5, अयं कक्षीवतो महो वि बोमदे । Kakṣivān refers to Vimada in R. 1.116.1, यावर्भगाय विमदाय जायां । This proves conclusively that Vimada and Kakṣivān were contemporaries. But we know that Vāmadeva was a contemporary of Kakṣivān. We know that Aṅgira

was a contemporary of Manu. Vāmadeva was a son of Gotama, whose father was Rāhugaṇa, who was a son of Aṅgirā. Similarly, Kakṣivān was a son of Dīrghatamas, whose father was Ucathya, who was a son of Aṅgirā. Thus the father of Vimada must be a contemporary of the father of Vāmadeva. We can thus fix the geneological position of Indra.

R.10.48.2 अहं इन्द्रो रोषो...अथर्वण...। त्रिताय गा अज—is a ṛc by Indra. He says that he chastised Atharvan, and helped Trita. This Trita can be proved to be a contemporary of Rāhugaṇa. Because in R.9.38.2, Rāhugaṇa tells that the fingers of Trita are pounding the soma juice. Trita tells in R.1.105.17, that he had fallen in a well and was calling out for help. Bṛhaspati heard it and helped him to get out. This proves that Trita, Prajāpati (Indra), Bṛhaspati were all contemporaries.

Now we shall see how Prajāpati became known as the creator of Yajña. *Tait.* 7.1.1, प्रजापतिः वाव ज्येष्ठः स ज्योतिष्टोमेन अग्रे अयजन् tells that Prajāpati was the first to worship through the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. We are not at present concerned with the exact form of Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. It means that Prajāpati was the first to organize the Yajña as an institution where any work is undertaken for the common welfare of all the people concerned. R.10.130, is a hymn where Yajña is said to be the child of Prajāpati. R. 10. 121, is a hymn, where Prajāpati is called Ka.


Tait. Br. 2.2.10, gives an interesting episode about the way in which Prajāpati got the name Ka. Prajāpati first created only the gods. Indra was created later. The following talk ensued between Indra and Prajāpati.

Prajāpati:—‘Oh, Indra go to the heavens. You rule over the gods who live there.’ Indra went to the gods accordingly. The Gods asked him, ‘Who are You?’. Indra said, ‘My name is Indra, and Prajapāti has sent me to rule over you.’ Gods said, ‘We are older than you.

How can you be our ruler?' 'What benefit can we derive from you?' Indra came back to Prajāpati and narrated what had happened. Indra saw that Prajāpati had a peculiar lustre on him. Indra asked Prajāpati to hand over the lustre to him so that he would rule over the Gods by that power. Then Prajāpati formed a sort of crown out of the lustre, and put it over the head of Indra. Then Indra was able to rule over the gods, and Prajāpati got the name Ka.

The story shows clearly that it was Prajāpati who laid the foundation of cooperative efforts for the common good of people. Food is the primary necessity of the people. The theme in the ṛc quoted is food. *Gītā* also says that it was Prajāpati, who set this wheel of food and efforts in motion first. Bṛhaspati was the chief priest in the Yajña Institution. R. 10.130.4, अनुष्टुभा सोम उक्थैः बृहस्पतेर्वचि... tells that Bṛhaspati sang in Anuṣṭubh meter the Soma song. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* also tells that Aṅgīrā was the first to sing the Sama chant. Then Bṛhaspati took up the work. It is thus clear that the statement in the *Gītā* about Bṛhaspati is based on the information from the *Rg-Veda* literature.

Here is the geneological table established on the evidence of cross references by different persons in the *Rg-Veda* hymns. Viśvasṛja was the organizer of 'सत्र' a variation of Yajña. Ayaśya was the Sāma chanter. The case of त्समद changing his Gotra, gives an interesting confirmation to the correctness of the geneological table.



A CRITICAL SURVEY OF INDIAN AESTHETICS

By H. L. SHARMA

INTRODUCTORY

A constructive and critical study of the works of arts regarded as documents of aesthetic development of an admittedly genial Indian race, revealing the highest spiritual conditions at successive stages, and their interpretation in the light of the recently unearthed forces and factors of our mental life, is the most coveted but colossal task. A work of genuine art is eternally fresh and refreshing, for our appreciation for it grows with our insight into the dynamism of human nature : Our reflective enjoyment of an artistic creation grows by our growing realisation of what it reveals through, and conceals behind, the visible, audible or verbal symbols. Luckily in India, art-speculation has kept pace with art-creation : nay, even both the creative and critical activities have traced the same historiograph, rising and falling together, and, ultimately have met the same destiny. The present essay does not venture to re-construct the whole of the aesthetic life documented in the works of sculpture, architecture and painting and literature. It is, however, ambitious to present the main currents of our aesthetic consciousness, and, more, to rethink them in the light of the new psychological findings, and other speculative developments.

A HISTORICAL CONSPECTUS

A dark pall thickens around the earliest attempts of the sons of the soil at creation and expression according to their own genius and idiom. The Indus Valley Art (3000 B.C. with some cultural affinities with Babylon and Sumeria) breaks forth at a very high level of attainment of aesthetic

expression 'with a strong Dravidian flavour.' Some crudities and flat naturalism aside, the dance-poses of the bronze-girls (from the Mohenjodaro finds) and other coin-carvings fully represent the sensuous and buoyant character of the Indian artistic genius.¹

Nothing survives of the age that succeeded the Indus Valley civilization. But it was the age of the Aryan Contacts and colonization, the age of the vedic bards whose youthful exuberance and buoyancy of spirit, childlike simplicity and naturalism, gave us the lyrics that the Vedas are. It was also the age of the early epics.

The Vedic songs (Sama, Chanson, gesang, Sang, or Zang in languages of the Vedic family) are a masterpiece of lyrical poetry.² They contain the emotional outpourings of a heart deeply touched by the majesty and awe of Nature and her effulgence. The expression, unadorned and direct,

¹ Speaking of the Primitive Art, which is the truest art, Clive Bell gives three characteristics which are also true of India's primitive Art. They are : absence of representation, absence of technical swagger, sublimely impressive form. Ref. "*Art*," by Clive Bell.

'Representation' in Art does not seem to be native to India's soil. It is due to the Hellenic influence which has kept Europe under its sway for centuries. A creative genius does not represent, but *creates* 'significant forms' according to certain 'unknown and mysterious laws.'

² The Vedas are not consciously the works of poetry, though they are the best examples of poetic art. Lyricism in the Vedas does not mean that they are purely 'emotional.' But Indian Art-genius hates, by some necessity of its inherent constitution, the 'abstract emotion' arising from (a mathematical like) contemplation of 'formal beauty.' Formalist Aesthetics in Europe has become encumbered with a mass of mathematical formulae. In India we have kept clear of it. The Indian artist creates 'significant forms' and affords to give 'contemplative joy,' but fills in the 'forms' with 'Rasa,' an untranslatable Aesthetic term. From the start, Indian Aesthetics builds itself on a complete Metaphysics which makes 'bliss' to be the central element of Reality. That is the reason why Indian Arts have strong flavour of transcendentalism. It is also religious (though not sacerdotal) for it possesses 'high seriousness' characteristic of all true Art that is not meant for mere amusement but for serious occupation. This occupation is an 'end-in-itself' for it means 'a state of ecstasy' and a 'moment of gusto.'

is matchless in vigour and clarity. The moods of the songs vary from the frankly erotic to the terrible. The idiom of poetic expression is a prayer, or an apostrophe. There is an attempt at idealisation by overcoming the early naturalism, and there is the vigorous use of metaphor to idealise and comprehend the inner and outer harmonies. There are beautiful examples of filling in the outer with the inner passions and sentiments. Sometimes stirrings of the human soul body forth in vibrating symbols. The symbols, at times, attain such a vigour and vitality that the invisible becomes visible, the inaudible becomes an echoing voice and the intangible produces a feeling of happy contact. Symbolism sometimes rises to mystic heights. The Vedas, in brief, as the records of the first human attempts at creative expression reveal some dynamic elements in our aesthetic consciousness, singularly free as it is from the prepossessions of the later hardened and conventionalized forms, and poetic devices and embellishments. The Vedas are not the primitive patterns of human poetry: they are the ideal to be aimed at, for they did not arise out of the needs of the courtly majesty or for the enjoyment of the paymaster. They satisfy the supreme test of any high class art, namely, that art as the expression of the creative soul is its highest satisfaction.

For instance, the Vedic poetry is the best example of "the strange combination of imaginative autonomy and profound total harmony," "the maximum of independence combined with the most complete and pervasive subordination" which "is characteristic of the movement of creative imagery in its highest form." The Vedic poet was "a master of metaphor" and his "transcendentalism (which is only the name for a prodigious metaphor) was inevitable." There is the amazing "organic unity" born of a 'creative passion.' The medium of expression is not heavy—true to the language of aesthetic experience—each

word and imagery is a ringing symbol echoing some deep and sonorous voice from afar.

There was, however, no, conscious or unconscious, effort to develop an aesthetic theory. The conception of *rasa*, as the central element of beauty experience was there, if any, only in an embryonic stage. 'Rasa' had come to mean (from its original meaning of *soma rasa*), by a process of natural transference, the essence of things. And by the same process of emotional transference, *rasa*, *Ānanda* and *Ātman* (the living reality of all) were identified. "The *rasa* thus stands for 'Supreme Reality of the Universe,' 'self-luminous consciousness' and 'perennial bliss.'

There are, however, a few *Vāk sūktas*, from which some theory of poetic art can be gathered. There are many hints to indicate that there is some meaning, more interesting and important, beyond the visible symbolism of language. This is the Principle of suggestion in germ-form. The word 'Kavi' has been used in the sense of *Krānta-darśī*, which means that he is a person who sees more and beyond the ordinary man's vision. The poet is the seer. This view is not different from that of Kanovitch who regards the artist to be the true metaphysician. The poetic emotion is profound and from its profundity streams forth the cataract of divine songs. The sublime grandeur of Nature is used for emotional effect.

The Epic Age.—"Pathos" and "rhythm" constitute the essence of *Vālmīki Aesthetics*. The *Kraufica* episode reveals the true nature of 'pathos' (so much abused by the later theorists) and also how 'pathos' flows out into the measured movement of symbolic expression. The Will-to-be, says Schopenhaur, is at the heart of the Being; it is the Will-to-power, replies Nietzsche. The first is the logical limit to which the Christian philosophy of sorrow and self-abnegation can go; the second,—if it is granted that the dynamics of the human mind works with contrasts,—is a reaction to the

first and pushes the pendulum to the other extreme—is the unlimited positive self assertion. Both the views are admirable, for both are atheistic and dynamic. But neither of them can give us a clue to the artists' consciousness. Schopenhauer's pessimistic negationism must exhaust itself in some form of nirvāṇa—like state where the passion-to-be is dried up. The second leads to a sadistic (other-destroying, cult, but ultimately turns upon itself—it must become a masochistic (self-annihilating) tendency.

An artists' metaphysic is much different. It is the "*Will-to-Beauty*,"³ he says, which is at the heart of things, the centre from which everything radiates and to which everything returns. The *Will-to-beauty* is an unconscious—surge of pure emotion which moves the whole stream of evolution. It is the sole creative force. Pure emotion, which is the same thing as *Will-to-beauty*, best fulfils itself in the raptures of sex-love between man and woman. For, there is no better example of the "Harmonic movement" of emotion, of the best finished rhythm and rapture, of creation and fruition, than that of its overflow in sex-excitement. Any other content which this emotion may be filled with arises only in a "religio-economic order" of the society. In a completely socialist order of collective life, there is room only for the sex-emotion. The harmonic movement of the sex-emotion is due to the contrast which its needs must create. Man and woman are sharply contrasted and that is the reason why there is so complete harmony between them. But even this harmony, for such is the stern demand of the law of emotion, must create its own contrast. The sex-emotion must touch its climax and then must experience a dead crash. This will be the complete beauty, achievement of the fullest harmony upon which any further improvement will have marring effect.

³ *The Will-to-Beauty*: Kanovitch.

* This is the only key with which we can unlock the mystery of art-consciousness concealed behind the Kraufica story. 'Pathos' reveals a peak of emotional tide in a complete harmony with itself, which is also the complete rhythm and beauty. 'Pathos' are the real emanating source from which gushes forth the fountain of pure poetry. We may not accept the whole of this metaphysics of Kanovitch; it must, however, be conceded that the poetic emotion (the creative intuition of passion of Croce) fills out itself from within with 'pathos' and, following its own law, creates a rhythm and harmony in the midst of contrast.

The *Rāmāyaṇa*, as an example of the highest creative art, offers problems of great Aesthetic interest, viz., what tremendous forces must be at work to lead to such a sublime art-creation? Why art is intensely appealing? The first question cannot be touched upon without entering into mystic regions. The Indian theorists coming after Vālmiki could not take the second question, for they were not initiated into the subliminal forces of human life. An aesthetic based upon Psychoanalysis will have us believe that "situation," is but an infantile play of the censored 'Id', a paranoiac flood of self-delusion, and nothing more. Even 'sublimation' theory will explain its moral and social acceptability. The question, to admit of solution, will require some sounder metapsychology and metaphysics, something like that of Kanovitch.

The Kraufica episode is the "recurrent⁴ symbolic imagery" "which is somewhat analogous to the action of a recurrent theme or 'motif' in a musical fugue of sonata". Everything else leads to this and takes on its aesthetic quality from this. It seems to be the radiating centre of all aesthetic creation and enjoyment.

4 Caroline F.E. Spurgeon—*Shakespearean Criticism*.

Love,⁵ from which springs all life, reaches its climax in Sītā and Rāma. But, love unless it creates its contrast and meets an utter crash, will not bring about harmony, hence no beauty no rhythm. This is how we can understand the source of aesthetic appeal of tragedies⁶, in which alone art reaches its perfection; for the *Rāmāyana* is but a tragedy.⁷ This is also how we can distinguish between the 'artistic and what is merely sensational.'

The Age of Maurya Art and After.—We have no clue to the state of aesthetic development after the age of the Epics, till we come to the Maurya period. It is known as the age

⁵ Metaphysics, based upon the metapsychology of Jung and Freud, does not hesitate now to regard life as an offspring of love, and this is the 'sex-love' in its healthy form. Jung quotes in his *Psychology of the Unconscious*, Miss Miller as unconsciously singing of love and life thus :—

When the eternal first gave love

A myriad hearts sprang into life

Ears filled with music, eyes with light

Pealed forth with hearts with love all rife. All glory to the God of love.

On this metapsychology, the artist bases his metaphysics "Love is at the very heart of things, ever expanding into creation, fruition and fulfilment and pushes on the stream of evolution to create harmony, beauty and rhythm. 'Love is Kāma, Libido, Elan Vital. The Upaniṣads speak of creation springing from Kāma.

* Incidentally we can now re-think the Aristotelian conceptions of Tragedy, 'Pathos' and 'Catharsis.' 'Pathos' as the deepest emotional stirrings, creates a harmony of contrasts by following its inner law, and, thus becomes the source of tragic feeling. 'Catharsis' is only the release of the pent-up emotional energy.

Not the pure will of Kant, or the will of Schopenhauer or that of Nietzsche or the surge of life of Bergson, is the truly creative and fruitifying energy. It is Emotion, says Kanovitch, but it seeks consciousness without which it will be blind. Kanovitch errs, like Bergson, in trying to get mind out of emotion. Mind, life and Emotion are equally fundamental and are irreducible minima.

⁷ The conformist Indian dramatists taking their command from Bharata could not develop the tragedy form of art on which rests the glory of Shakespeare. The *Śakuntalā* of Kālidāsa vibrates with a strong tragic note in spite of its apparent 'Comic' conclusion. It is a mistake to suppose that in tragedy there is pleasure of Catastrophe. This error has created questions yet unsolved. (vide :—Viśvanātha. Bradely on 'Tragic feeling')

of Buddhist art, but save its theme and content, it is basically Indian art. "At this stage the robust, sculpture of earlier stages is made pliable by a penetrating flowing rhythm. The characteristic voluptuous forms of Indian art, through which pulsates the sap of life, make their appearance in the Yakṣī figures of the Bharhut stūpa rails . . . the buoyant, passionate figures of yakṣīs on the Sanchi gate are in the true Indian tradition." The Aryan contribution to this is the symbolic presentation of artistic experience.

A little later, Kuṣāṇa and Andhra art emerges with "increased plastic penetration and greater vitality. Frankly sensuous, but in different way from the nudes of the Greek schools, are the female figures of mathura. Most probably originating from aboriginal symbols, of fertility, these graceful if voluminous nymphs fix, for centuries to come, the round-breasted, narrow-waisted and full-hipped ideal of female beauty for the Indian artist. In South more fluid, mellow and exuberant than in the North, it comes nearest to classic perfection." Greek contacts bring in the Hellenic representationism to Indian art. But it is simply absorbed in the Gandhara school of art.

The Age of Bharata : (First century B. C.) In Bharata we have the first theorist, the founder of the Rasa school of Poetics. Drama is the only form of aesthetic creation and aesthetic delight. Dance, music, poetry are "subordinate and ancillary to histrionics." Without attempting to discover the underlying rock of aesthetic experience, Bharata begins his enumeration of the emotional moods whose representation forms the main-spring of art-delight. "Through harmonious blending and representation of appropriate vibhavas, anubhavas and vyabhicari bhavas, there arises in the audience a certain climax of emotion, invariably accompanied by a thrill or sense of joy, and that is Rasa, or aesthetic pleasure." But Bharata does not explain why the representation of the various emotional moods (whether Lyrical,

Pathetic, Heroic or Horrible) in drama leads to a 'dramatic' delight when these very moods are not always pleasing really. As an aesthetic philosopher, he even fails to answer: what constitutes the organic unity of the vibhāvas (excitants) to make an emotional situation. Does the organic unity of the excitants constituting the 'situation' spring from the unity of creative passion, or, the emotion itself proceeds from a certain "harmonious blending"? But what brings about the harmony of "blending" itself? And, then, the all-important question—what is the fountain-head of aesthetic creative energy?

Art philosophy of Bharata is in a seed-state. But he touches upon all points. Dance has the same aesthetic essence as poetry or music. These are all different forms of abhinaya or symbolic translations of aesthetic emotion. The analysis of 'timbre' into tonal complexes and 'tones', the different varieties of dances and the revealing powers of the bodily movements, the metres contributing to an emotional crescendo, and a host of other discussions relevant to the art and science of Histrionics, speak of a clear conception of "harmony" and "symmetry" in the mind of Bharata. Names occur of masters and authorities in different arts, which evinces that the forms of creative expression must have attained a high degree of perfection.

Classic Art of the Gupta Age and After:—A new content is given to Indian sculpture, painting and creative literature by the Paurāṇic Hinduism. "The latent naturalism of earlier periods is now overcome or harnessed to spiritual representation of superhuman, elementary or cosmical powers. The human figure is only the vehicle of transcendental forces. The boar incarnation of Viṣṇu in Udayagiri is of impressive power, which changes primitive terror to a deep experience of divine force. The iconography of the Hindu Pantheon is developed during this age. During the 7th and 8th centuries, Indian Art reaches its high-water mark. The

surging power of Brāhmanism fills Indian sculpture with unheard of virility.⁸ Sweeping movement becomes an expression of force; the swelling rounded forms of human or animal bodies become signs of pent-up energies." The flower of aesthetic creation reaches its full bloom in the arts of Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti, Bhāsa, Bhartṛhari, to name the chief of the master singers. Art becomes conscious of its capacity and fills itself with vigour and life. It attains to classic perfection. Born of his great creative genius, there is in Kālidāsa that marvel of masterly unity of 'pathos,' metaphor, music and diction which even to this day remains a coveted ideal. There seems to be nothing external in his art. For there every word is a ringing symbol charged with an "emotionally communicative virtue"; every metaphor is so tremendously revealing and aesthetically suggestive that it creates an intense and "intimate sense of things"; and his every 'form' a "storage of aesthetic irradiation," so that it gives a true relish of the Beautiful. Bhavabhūti and Bhāsa are perfect examples of a classic dramatic art. Bhartṛhari produces lifting lyrics, which have

⁸ Brāhmanism of this age seems to have derived its avatāravāda from the Buddhist Jatakas. The morphology of the Buddhist and the Hindu Art is exactly the same. One of the new finds at Rājghāṭa, Benares, depicts the "*Taccba Sūkara Jātaka*" which Mr. Adris Banerjee assigns to the Pre-Gupta age. It is not a zoomorphic representation of a divinity, Vārāhi, but a pictorial depiction of a Buddhist Jātaka. Other finds of the same place indicate the continuation of the same 'form' with a different 'content.' Brāhmanism even depicted Buddha as an incarnation of Viṣṇu. Later Saivism and Śākta followed the same plan in painting and sculpture (Ref. *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol. III Part I, Nov. 1945. *Some sculptures from Rajghat, Benares.*" by Adris Banerjee.) A study of the morphology of Indian Art is interesting from many points of view: (i) It proves that the division of Art into Jaina, Bauddha, Hindu, Śaiva & Śākta, is wrong. (ii) It lends support to Psycho-analytic Symbolism of Art and Religion. (Ref. *Jung and Freud*). (iii) It indicates that the creation of new art-forms, as vehicles of aesthetic charm, requires fertility of a very superior creative genius. The majority only imitates the conventional forms. (iv) The epochs of art-creation synchronise with all-round historical transitions and social revolution.

a parallel only in the Jayadeva of the *Gītagovinda*. From the viewpoint of art-development, it is really the golden age of India.

We can now historically expect the formulation of a complete theory of the Beautiful. There was now naturally a brisk speculative activity to comprehend within the four walls of a formula the complete beauty of creative art. It was also the age of productive speculation in other branches of knowledge and philosophy and Grammar. The Bharata formula was narrow and lop-sided, for it unduly emphasized the role of emotional element therein. Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, and Vāmana advocated the cause of poetic figures, excellencies and diction respectively and gave their own formulae of 'Poetic Beauty.' That they failed was foredoomed for the same old faults of narrowness and rigidity.⁹

•The Dhvanikāra¹⁰ was expected to be born in the middle of the 9th century to evolve the central principle of aesthetic creation from which all elements of poetic beauty flow out and to which they all flow in. The Dhvanikāra gathers up all elements in his pivotal principle of Suggestion. He discovered the Suggestive function of the linguistic symbols over and above the Indicative, Implicative and significative functions. Aesthetic sense cannot be directly conveyed by the primary function of language. That will be dull and without charm of surprise. The author of Dhvani rightly holds that aesthetic enjoyment cannot be passive or receptive state of the mind. Beauty-experience required

⁹ M. Müller is quoted by W. Knight in his "*The Philosophy of the Beautiful*" as holding that the Indians, in spite of their highly speculative acumen, pitifully lacked the sense of the Beautiful. India's paintings, her sculpture and creative literature, considered as works of art, are simply worthless. Even the Sanskrit language, he teaches, does not give any equivalent to "the Beautiful."

¹⁰ The scholars are divided in regard to the actual formulator of Dhvani theory. Some hold that Ananda is both the author of *Kārikās* as well as the *Vṛttis*, while others argue that *Kārikās* and *Vṛttis* indicating two different stages of development, have different authors.

an intense and complex activity of the mind in passing from the expressed to the impressed. Similarly the secondary or implied sense or even the total meaning of the sentence cannot convey the aesthetic suggestion. A work of creative art with its language of symbols fills the mind with flood of aesthetic suggestions. Suggestive power of a symbol, therefore, is the true test of art and the suggested meaning (distinct from any other kinds of meaning) is the true aesthetic essence.

After cutting this new path it was stated that what is suggested can be an emotional mood, a metaphor revealing some imagery and a situation. Suggestive function was tried for the first time. Proper place and definition in the light of the new discovery were assigned to different aspects of poetic art. Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, more than the Dhvanikāra gave a new content to figures, excellencies and diction based upon their psycho-aesthetic significance. It was a new approach to aesthetic theory of poetry.¹¹

What followed after :—The historic cycle of growth moves from creation to perfection through criticism and reactions. Then comes elaboration followed by stagnation and decay and revolt where the wheel completes its circle. The discovery of Dhvani was the high-land-mark. It aroused two reactions: one from Kuntala, and the other from Mahima Bhaṭṭa. But the work of the master was completed by Abhinava. Mammāṭa and Viśvanātha gave finishing-touches

¹¹ The theory of Dhvani does not actually arise from the Sphoṭa of Pāṇini Darśana (grammatical philosophy) though its author sought the authority of a very respectable branch of Indian speculation Vyākaraṇa. We may well remember that Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā and Tātparya functions of language have already been discovered before Dhvani or Vyañjanā through the needs of vedic interpretation. The credit of the Dhvanikāra to enter into the vedic and grammatical speculation of his age and realise the significance of each of the discovered functions for art-enjoyment. He found that they exhaust themselves in grasping some form of primary meaning, the concealed power of art for enjoyment remaining thus uncovered by them.

... their textbooks; the first carrying the message of Ānanda with his emphasis on *rasa*, *alāṅkāra* and *vastu*, the second following Abhinava with his stress on *rasa* alone. There was then nothing new save the brilliant scholastic activity.

Similar was the fate of art-creation.¹² Traditional forms lay like ice on the artists mind. Iconographical demands of the priests and the fastidiousness of art-critics chilled his imagination and creativity, till there was nothing but dull elaboration of decorative details in sculpture, painting and literature. No doubt that there were flashing sparks at times, such as the Rājasthānī painting of *Rāgamālās*, or "pictorial representation of musical moods" or the Moghul art with a delicate Persian touch and technical excellence. No wonder, therefore, that there was suppression of aesthetic activity during the Medieval India, till the period of Indian Renaissance.

Indian Renaissance and its Aesthetic value:—It is only after the Indian artist ceased slavishly to ape the genius and idiom of alien art that the results become appreciable. In the first part of the period of revival, there was intense search after proper themes and forms of creative expression. In Tagore's lyrics, poetic art attains a high degree of maturity with its revival of the soul-stirring mystic notes of the Upaniṣads. The medieval theme of devotion, and, a little later, of courtly eroticism, gave way to the themes of revolution, hope, mystic reading of the future in the language of stars and so on. New forms have been inspired by our Western contact. In paintings, Nand Lal Bose and Ukils, and in Dance, Udayaśaṅkara, are leading the revival. There are so many currents in the present day aesthetic creation that they cannot be boiled down within a limited space. The art of cinema is open to question.

¹² The morphology of Art in Medieval India reveals a decadent conventionalism, created by the dictation of the Āgamas.

No theory of the current art can be formulated, for, yet immaturely engaged in 'trial and error' its dominant marks are not visible. Its emphasis is on the lyrical element as is natural of a romantic revival. A few epics of some merit have been tried in Hindi and Bengali with the old themes. The age has not yet discovered its own epic. The symbolism in lyrics has become clearer, purer and stronger. But sometimes the suggestion is uncertain, and symbols hazy. Naturalistic symbolism of the poets, painters and Dancers strikes a highly mystic note. There is also developing, side by side, a realistic symbolism under the western influence.¹⁸

Art as the creation of Beauty, the highest fulfilment of emotional life, its harmony and music, is the total manifestation of the total human personality of an age. It is so with the politico-economic social order, or the religio-ethical institutions. They too reveal the 'whole man.' But in artistic expression there is more freedom, as Art cannot be 'made to order.' Hence its tremendous revealing power and hence its vital connection with the spiritual life of a whole nation. An artist is thus the whole nation; he is the seer and the profound philosopher. This explains why art contains so many non-aesthetic elements. In fact, religion and morality, politics and

¹⁸ Rahasyavāda of Tagore and Chāyāvāda of other Indian painters seem to be the first natural reactions of the vanquished East to the victor-West. Rahasyavāda, singing of the vision of the Infinite and Eternal Bliss in the midst of the toil and turmoil of the finite mortals, is the victimised East's challenge. In the hands of Tagore, it rose to a rousing music. It was indeed a revival of the dormant genius of India. But Art required new creation of 'forms' and 'themes' as fit vehicles for the aesthetic experience of the Age, more than mere Renaissance. The slavish Hindi imitators of the Bengali Art do not seem to realise that the poetry of revival has now no appeal. Rahasyavāda in their hands has not blossomed. It has only withered. We require another Tagore to lead the Age now to the creation of new art-forms, less mystic and more real, to embody the new 'visions,' hopes and cars.

economics, of a society spin round a nucleus, the aesthetic element, like the electrons of an atom. A study of Aesthetics of a nation should centre round this nucleus by the exclusion of other non-aesthetic elements. A sound metaphysics and metapsychology, visualising the 'whole man' can only illumine this central element of art-experience, Beauty. Art-Philosophy and Psycho-aesthetics are other aids to study it. It is why the study of arts is the proper part of Philosophical speculation.

THE SCHOOLS OF AESTHETIC THEORY

INTRODUCTORY

Emotional life of a nation evolves channels of creation in arts and literature, as her ethical attitude evolves social and political institutions, and her thought-life develops scientific studies. Every passing phase of national life sets its themes for spiritual expression in the light of its experience, its hopes and fears. Thus arts and literature of a country speak of her articulate inner life in successive phases and stages.

Aesthetic speculation in India grew round literature, though its results admit of much wider application. Historically her sculpture, painting and architecture (her music and dance if anything survives of these) as well as her literature have common themes and forms, were fed by the same currents of vitality and emotion, suffered from the same causes and have now awakened to the same new vigour and life. Philosophically arts and creative literature differ in the nature of their language—their medium of expression—but their aesthetic appeal and essence are at bottom the same. As avenues of spiritual creation, one form of art is translatable into another. It is why the schools of Indian Poetics can be taken to represent the different schools of Aesthetic Theory without any violence,

THE RASA SCHOOL

'Emotionalism' of our age is the natural antithesis to the Cartesian rationalism, Newtonian mechanism and the Benthamite utilitarianism, which three 'isms' matured into a grand chaos and discontent on the eve of the last century. It is now felt that Emotion, rather than Reason, can best understand the Spiritual demands for justice, harmony, beauty and peace and, restore, what Reason has destroyed, our sense of rhythm and rhyme of life. Metaphysics, metaphysics, psychology as well as psycho-aesthetics have strongly voiced their claim for Aesthetic Imperative, and have tried to quell the Ethical and Rational Imperatives. To comprehend the nature and significance of Rasa in the context of contemporary thinking, let us begin by expounding the new revolt.

"*The Will-to-Beauty*" is the natural culmination of a line of thought (trying to give an appropriate content to, first, Kant's Ding-an-sich and then to Hegel's *Logos*) which has passed through the metaphysical development of the "The Will to Live," 'The Will-to-power', 'the Will-to-believe' and the conceptions of the Elan Vital, 'Eros' and 'Id'. All these are the fruitions of an attempt to characterise the ultimate Reality wherewith to make 'creation,' 'Life' and 'Rhythmic harmonic movement' intelligible ideas to us, 'Emotion' is at the galactic centre; nay, it is the cosmic essence, out of whose tremendous commotion rise countless nebulae like sparks and form themselves into steller and planetary universes. The same Emotion, through its law of 'harmonic movement,' creates the habitable home, ascends through plant and animal life to the conscious Homo sapiens seeking ever "more complex harmony." Even in the human race, it "lives¹⁴ by the expression of its energy, (not by being quiescent)," and raises terrible revolts when any false religio-economic order of the society tries to sup-

¹⁴ Kanovitch: *The Will-to-Beauty*.

press its harmonic creation, its buoyant art, "laughter, health and abundance." "In order to realise itself in a fitting organism, the Will proceeds from steller harmony to the wonderment of landscape, its colour and sound, its moonlight, its sunrise and sunset, until it finds itself in the human form that will express its emotion."

"Human emotion is the climax of its energy . . . The true nature of woman is sincerity or emotion, to which intellect is subservient . . . Sex passion is nature's central motive by which means it rises to love and to its highest ecstatic beauty. "In art there is the most sincere expression of emotional rapture, its freedom, vigour and buoyancy. 'The artist is the true metaphysician. Beyond cause and effect the mind sees only mystery. The mind ever enquires for a cause, but the mind does not know that its search for a cause is necessitated by the need of contrasted action. The artist, however, is able to see that the contrasts flow into the motive and stop there."

Some such metaphysic underlies the theory of Rasa. But no conscious effort was ever made to base it so securely except through the needs of topical treatment. Abhinava and Viśvanātha, the two staunch advocates of Rasa as the central art-emotion, have only touched the fringe of a metaphysic. Abhinava,¹⁵ for instance, teaches that there is the greatest harmony of our being in an aesthetic sex-emotion while commenting on Ānand who cryptically sums up his position in the Kārikā.¹⁶ The latter even holds that emotion

¹⁵ Abhinava: *Locana*. रतौ हि समस्तदेवतिर्यङ् नरादिजातिष्वविच्छिन्नैव
"वासनास्त इति न कश्चित्तत्र तादृश्यो न हृदयसंवादमयः गतेरपि हि तच्छब्दकरो-
ऽस्त्येव . . . येषां . . . वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यता ते स्वहृदयसंवादभाजः सहृदयाः ।

¹⁶ *Dhvanyāloka* 2.7. शृङ्गार एव मधुरः परः प्रह्लादनो रसः । तन्मयं
काव्यमभित्य माधुर्यं प्रतिष्ठति । Ānandvardhana also clearly indicates
the creative function of the genius in art : अपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरेकः
प्रजापतिः । यथास्मै रोचते विश्वं तथेदं परिवर्तते । शृङ्गारी केतकविः काव्ये जातं

progressively¹⁷ gains in sweetness and energy as it becomes more and more pathetic. Viśvanātha is more lucid: Rasa¹⁸ is to him the self-luminous, effulgent and most absorbing ecstasy, a transcendental emotion of admiration in which a man feels most himself. It is an uninterrupted state of rapture which gives him a feeling of infinity, and in which all limits¹⁹ of individuality melt into a joy. He holds that 'pathos' intensify the art-emotion, but why? he does not answer.

We can, however, construct a better metaphysic for the Aesthetics of Emotion from our philosophical literature in which the use of 'Rasa' abounds and from which alone the whole suggestion seems to have been derived. 'Rasa'²⁰ in the Vedic literature came to mean a highly ecstatic state

रसमयं जगत् । स एव वीतरागश्चेन्नीरसं सर्वमेव तत् । भावानचेतनानपि चेतनवच्चे-
तनानचेतनवत् । व्यवहारयति यथेष्टं सुकविः काव्ये स्वतंत्रतया ।

Man feels bound down to objective Reality at the perceptual level. The artist moves स्वतंत्रतया in the acts of creative imagination. The artist creates an aesthetic order by the acts of his original genius, as the scientist creates rational order in the universe. I lay full and equal emphasis on 'creative' function in thought, emotion and conation, of which the products are Truth, Beauty and Goodness; and 'creation' 'elaboration.'

¹⁷ *Dhvanyāloka* 2. 8. शृङ्गारे विप्रलम्भाख्ये कर्णे च प्रकर्षवत् । माधुर्यमाद्र्तं याति यतस्तत्राधिकं मनः । *Sāhityadarpaṇa*.

¹⁸ सत्त्वोद्रेकादखण्डस्वप्रकाशानन्दचिन्मयः । वेद्यान्तरस्पर्शशून्यो ब्रह्मास्वाद-
सहोदरः ॥ लोकोत्तरचमत्कारप्राणः कैश्चित् प्रमातृभिः । स्वाकारवदभिन्नत्वेनायमास्वाद्यते
रसः ॥ *Sāhityadarpaṇa*.

¹⁹ Viśvanātha quotes his grandfather : पुण्यवन्तः प्रमिष्वन्ति योगिवद्भूत-
सन्ततिम् । स्वादः काव्यार्थसम्भेदात्मानन्दसमुद्भवः ॥ परस्य न परस्येति, ममेति न
ममेति च । तदास्वादो विभावादेः परिच्छेदो न विद्यते ॥ *Ibid*.

²⁰ The whole of the *Taitta. Ara. Valli* is the lucid exposition of a metaphysic which envisages 'emotion' as the central creative Reality. On such a view we can base a consistent art-theory. Ref. *Chndogya* 7.14 where आशा is the basic Reality [आशा वाव स्मराद्भूयसी] आशा is Kāma according to Śaṅkara. Greater than Āśā is only Prāṇa. [प्राणी वा आशाया भूयात्] This is an important vitalistic conception in Upaniṣads. In the same context, the *Up.* speaks of Sukha and identifies it with Infinite (मा) 7. 12, 23, 24.

which is our truest nature, by a process of emotional transference. *Rasa* is reality and *Rasa* is *Ānanda* of which our momentary joys are faint reflections. In *Rasa* one realizes one's highest truth. From *Ānanda* starts the cosmic movement and creation. *Ānanda* fills the entire space, for who could move and have his being without it. *Ānanda* is infinite and incomparable. It is also the most terrible, for it cannot be suppressed. It is the cause of all harmony and rhythm and creation.

Rasa, *Ānanda*, *Sukha*, *Kāma* are all used as synonyms. The *upaniṣads* even frankly compare the *Rasa*-emotion to an erotic²¹ experience. The highest blissful state is likened to the all-engulfing rapture of love-embrace²². *Vātsyāyana*, perhaps taking hint from this, describes sex-joy as *Rasa*-emotion. The Indian Science of Erotics took hint to liken the two, or, the *upaniṣads*, from the former—we cannot easily decide. But it is clear that the later writers in the *Vedānta*²³ gave a central place to *Ānanda* in their systems. The *Nyāya*²⁴ *sūtras* even openly criticized the *Vedāntas* for its hedonic stand. By now *Rasa* or *Ānanda*-emotion, an unfettered experience of an unalloyed joy, is an established philosophical question. But *Ānanda* is one aspect of

²¹ तद् यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया सम्परिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेद नान्तरमेवायं पुरुषः प्रीतिनात्मना सम्परिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेद नान्तरम् । *Brha.* 4-3-21.

²² रसो रतिः प्रीतिर्भावो रागो वेगः समाष्टिरिति रतिपर्यायाः । *Vātsyāyana* describes the climax of sex emotion : “भावासक्ताः कामुकाः कामिनीनामिच्छन्त्यङ्गेष्वम्भसीव प्रवेष्टुम्” ॥ *Kāmasūtra* 2.1.05.

²³ *Pañcadaśī* 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 establishes the doctrine of *Ānanda* Ref. ब्रह्मसूत्र-आनन्दमयाधिकरण-Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja.

²⁴ *Nyāya Sūtra* with *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya* 1.21. The science of Indian Erotics gives a theory of Pleasure : Ref. काम० सू० with जयमंगल-प्रीति-विशेषाः—अभ्यासादिभमानाच्च तथा सम्प्रदायादपि । विषयेभ्यश्च तत्रज्ञाः प्रीति-माहुश्चतुर्विधाम् । This corresponds to Function—Fiction—and Factum Pleasure of Modern Psychology. Ref. Narsworthy : *Psychology of childhood*.

the Reality. It is thus a correction to the extreme view of Kanovitch.

The buoyant and frankly sensuous character of the original Indian Art is in tune with this aesthetic conception of Reality. According to this view, God is intense passion and beauty which embodies itself in the varied creations of art. Art-experience, therefore, is genuine and progressive expression of Reality. This conception reigned over the literary and artistic creations in India, till in Śrīharṣa and his contemporaries and successors it degenerated into vulgar and ornate quibbling in the name of Śṛṅgāra-rasa. In Bhoja we find the systematic attempt to throne eroticism in place of the creative Emotion of true art. The later history of literary expression in India of Rīti age marks the culmination of this degeneration.

The Metaphysic of Emotion, as propounded by Kanovitch and the philosophical traditions of India, is the key to understand such great arts as those of Vālmīki, Kālidāsa, Shakespeare or Goethe. It gives the correct view of Beauty as an intensely satisfying experience of "Contemplative (platonian) order." It explains and establishes the Aesthetic Imperative in the order of things and saves the theory of art from the charges of pseudo satisfaction and paranoiac delusion by psycho-analysis.

Indian Art was but dimly aware of its deeper metaphysical basis. But a metapsychology underlying art was conceived even by Bharata. He spoke of the unconscious emotional disposition and their manifestation in art-creation and art-enjoyment. His successors implicitly accepting his authority could not critically enter into metapsychologic questions with regard to art and exhausted their sharp acumen in scholastic elaboration and wrangling. The Unconscious, as the subliminal rock of our life, the Id and Eros, as "a cauldron of seething excitements" and as one which "knows²⁵

²⁵ Freud : *New Introductory Lectures*.

no value, no good, no evil, no morality but only the economic and quantitative factor of the pleasure-principle", and from which the instinctual cathexes seeking discharge flow in incessant hurry inventing their "surrogates and symbolism,"—all these ideas were not present in their mental horizon. Interpretation of art in terms of deeper experience of the soul was not tried. Metapsychology had not developed into a system to throw light on the springs of art-creation and art-emotion.

Psycho-analytic approach to Art and Religion may itself be neurotic and its answers of knotty Aesthetic problems be unacceptable, yet the questions it has raised are fundamental. For the complete system of Art-philosophy we must now ask: what is the secret behind the creative power of art; what is the source of its universal and intense appeal; is in art a progressive and sublime fulfilment of our innermost being, or is there regression to infantile phantastic thinking? Is it the search after the "mother" in art as Jung would have it, or is it some form of "father-worship" under the fiat of the oedipus complex as Freud teaches us? Do the symbols of art-emotion follow the laws of scientific symbolism or, are they purely erotic? and as vehicles of libidinal fire, are only surrogates?

These questions were not, and could not be, raised by the Indian Aesthetic thinkers. They also confused the art-emotion with our emotional experiences arising in connection with the instincts. By the progressive emphasis on the role of instinctual emotions in poetic art, there was ultimately the apotheosis of sensual and sexual element to the detriment of aesthetic emotion and to the neglect of other art-elements. Dr. Sankaran rightly opines that the principle of Dhvani in the 9th century put some check to the excesses of the emotional theorists. But the art of the later centuries fully answers to the objections that it is an

'escape'²⁶ poetry, a pseudo-fulfilment and at times approaches mental debauchery.

Indeed the question of distinguishing Aesthetic emotion from the instinctual moods is an important one. Bharata, inspite of his analysis of the poetic sentiments and their excitants, ensuants and accessories, was not clearly aware of this distinction. Vāmana, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin use the words 'Saundarya,' 'Mādhurya' 'Ramaṇiyatā,' but their sense is exhausted in the meaning of embellishment only and never comes to signify 'The Beautiful' in Art. Not the Dhvanikāra, but his commentator, Abhinava comes very near defining the Beautiful as the contemplative joy in which the subject is absorbed²⁷ in the object's qualities. He quotes Bhaṭṭanāyaka²⁸ as holding that in art there is neither an ethical imperative nor a scientific attitude, but only an attitude of enjoyment. The object of Art is in rhythmic harmony²⁹ with the self ; its contemplation induces Rasa in the heart which fills in the whole body like fire pervading the dry wood.

Mammaṭa, not more original than a text-book compiler, does not take due cognisance of the vital distinction, and

²⁶ That is the characteristic of recent poetry. Discontent and wistfulness wrought by the modern civilization now find an outlet in the poetry. Not a gust of joy springing at the wonders of the universe, but deep melancholy, dejection and pessimism only reflect their dark shadow in our contemporary art. Of course, there are, at times, brilliant flashes of real art. Ref. 'Yeats' in "*Tendencies in the 20th century Literature.*" By Amiya Cakravarti.

²⁷ *Locana* : वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनम्

²⁸ *Ibid.* काव्ये रसयिता सर्वो, न बोद्धा न नियोगभाक् ।

²⁹ *Ibid* : योऽर्थो हृदयसंवादी तस्य भावो रसोद्भवः । शरीरं व्याप्यते तेन शुष्कं काष्ठमिवाग्निना ॥ The author of बालप्रिया commentary interprets भावः भावना निरन्तररसचर्चणा । रसोद्भवः चर्चणाप्राप्तस्य रसस्याभिव्यक्तिहेतुः । And further : रसचर्चणैवात्मा स्वरूपं यस्य स आनन्दः । Here रसचर्चणा has been rendered as contemplative joy and हृदयसंवाद as emotional rhythmic harmony. Also *Locana* : शब्दसमर्प्यमा संवादसुन्दरविभावानुभाव-समुचितप्राग्विनिविष्ट इत्यादि वासनानुरागसुकुमारस्वसंविदानन्दचर्चणाव्यापार-रसनीयरूपो रसः ।

only elaborates his masters with slight refinements. His invocation³⁰ defines art creation as something brimming with ecstatic joys, illumined by the nine emotional moods and unfettered by the ordinary laws of nature. It is an overpowering emotion which dismisses everything inimical³¹ to it. Mammaṭa, however, in quoting Abhinava,³² with whom he is quite in accord, strikes a full note of an aesthetic philosopher. Art-joy or Rasa, he cites Abhinava, is a generic passion in which all individualising tendencies have been merged, all that is foreign to the aesthetic delight has been ruled out, and which as a powerful revelation through reiterative contemplation fills the whole heart and body with a transcendental emotion of admiration.

Nothing can be more complete and faithful than the above description of aesthetic experience. But it is wonder that Mammaṭa does not ask or answer how an instinctual emotion is transmuted by the artist to become an aesthetic emotion. How, for instance, the pathetic, the disgustful or the horrible, becomes in poetry or in painting a source of deep contemplative joy? While discussing the question of the process of aesthetic enjoyment, he quotes Bhaṭṭa³³

³⁰ *Kāvya-prakāśa* : नियतिकृतनियमरहितां ह्लादकमयीमनन्यपरतंशम् ।
नवरसहचिरां निमित्तिमादधती भारती कवेर्जयति ॥

* ³¹ *Ibid* : सकलप्रयोजनमौलिभूतं, समनन्तरमेव रसास्वादनसमुद्भूतं, विगलिता वेद्यान्तरमानन्दम् ।

* ³² *Ibid*. साधारणोपायबलात् तत्कालविगलितपरिमितप्रभातुभाववशोन्मीलित-
वेद्यान्तरसम्पर्कसून्यपरिमितभवेन प्रमात्रा सकलसहृदयसंवादभाजा साधारण्येन स्वाकार
इवाभिन्नोऽपि गोचरीकृतश्चव्यंमाणतैकप्राणो विभावादिजीवितावधिः पातकरस्तन्वायेन
चर्व्यमानः पुर इव परिस्फुरन् हृदयमिव प्रविशन् सर्वाङ्गीणमिवालिङ्गन्, अन्यत्
सर्वमिव क्षिरोदधत् ब्रह्मास्वादमिवानुभावयन् अलौकिकचमत्कारकारी शृङ्गारादिको
रसः ।

³³ *Ibid*. विभावाविज्ञाधारणीकरवात्मना भावकत्वध्यापारेण भाग्यमानः
स्वायी सत्त्वोद्रेकप्रकाशानन्दमयसंविद् विश्रान्तिमुत्तत्वेन भोगेन भुज्जते इति षट्-
नायकः ॥ Thus Bhaṭṭanāyaka adds two more functions to language-
symbolism भावकत्व and भोजकत्व and dispenses with Dhvani.

nāyaka as teaching that the generalising function of the linguistic symbols causes traffic from the artist to the spectator. Now the generalising function (Bhāvakatva-Vyāpāra) of language is common to all symbols whether they are employed for artistic or non-artistic expression. How is it possible for this function (over and above the Primary function) to generalise an emotional experience (which is felt as absolutely personal) and to open the flood-gate of beauty-emotion? How through the device of generalization (साधारणोपायबलात्) the personal limitations are overthrown (तत्कालविगलितपरिमितप्रमातृभावः)? And, how a generic emotion, if such a term were possible, could be identified with aesthetic experience?

Viśvanātha rose to realise the difficulty which he could not solve. How the 'pathos'⁸⁴ can give us a sense of joy in art? he asks, but replies that connoisseur's experience is the only testimony. Jagannātha⁸⁵ tries to correct the contradiction in Viśvanātha's definition by leaving out 'emotional' element and confining to 'beauty-element' only. He also defines "the beautiful" in art as a contemplative joy. Dr. S. K. De sums up Jagannātha's position which is not different from that of Abhinava in the following words: "A distinction is made between a natural emotion and a poetic sentiment; the former is individual and immediately personal and therefore may be pleasureable or painful, but the latter is generic and disinterested and marked by an

⁸⁴ *Sāhityadarpaṇa*: कथनादावपि रसे जायते यत्परं सुखं सचेतसामनुभवः प्रमाणं तत्र केदलम् ॥ किञ्च तेषु यदा दुःखं न कोऽपि स्यात्तदुन्मुखः ॥ तथा रामायणादीनां भविता दुःखहेतुता ॥ ननु कथं दुःखकारणेभ्यः सुखोत्पत्तिः ?" हेतुत्वं शोकहर्षादिर्गतेभ्यो लोकसंश्रयात्-शोकहर्षादयो लोके जायन्तां नाम लौकिकाः ॥ अलौकिकविभावत्वं प्राप्तेभ्यः ।

⁸⁵ काव्यसंश्रयात् सुखं संजायते तेभ्यः सर्वेभ्योऽपीति का क्षतिः ॥ तेभ्यः सुरते दन्तघातादिभ्य इव सुखमेव जायते ॥ रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादकः शब्द काव्यम्... रमणीयता च लोकोत्तराह्लादजनकगोचरता । लोकोत्तरं चाह्लादगतश्चमत्काराप-रपर्यायोऽनुभवसाक्षिको जातिविशेषः । कारणञ्च तदवच्छिन्नो भावनाविशेषः पुनःपुनरनुसन्धानात्मा ।

impersonal joy. The poetic sentiment in this sense is supernatural (alaukika) and those things which cause disgust, fear, sorrow in ordinary life and those normal emotions which are far from pleasant in actual experience, being conveyed in poetry, become ideal and universal and bring about this supernatural pleasure which is not to be compared to the very mixed pleasure experienced in ordinary life. This pleasure, dissociated from all personal interests, is the essence of the mental condition involved in the enjoyment of Rasa ; it is also the essence of all poetry as conceived by Jagannātha.³⁶

No wonder that deep thinkers become aware of the oddity of the logical conception of a 'a generic,' 'disinterested' 'Supernormal' and 'impersonal joy' in art. An aesthetics basing itself on 'instinctual emotions' and recognizing no other source of 'beauty-experience' must resort to some such absurd phraseology. Bhavabhūti,³⁷ for instance, realised that the aesthetic emotion was essentially one which varies with other varying elements. His conception of 'pathos' was not that of exciting pity. 'Pathos' is at the very fountain-head of our existence. The present is empty and 'slipping underneath our feet,' the past, for ever gone and the dark future staring with mysterious eyes drags us on mercilessly. Whitehead puts it in a more scientific language, "The contrast between the comparative emptiness of Presentational Immediacy and the deep significance disclosed by causal efficacy is at the root of the pathos which haunts the world" (*Symbolism*, p. 55). It seems that he regarded the so-called nine rasas as the various moods of pathos in which the nine associated instinctual emotions are only elements. It might have been also clear to him that the natural emotion must not be overdone to mar the sweet-

³⁶ *Sanskrit Poetics*, Vol. II P. 320.

³⁷ *Uttāracarita* : एको रस कश्च एव निमित्तभेदात् etc. The whole drama is an illustration of 'Pathos' in Whitehead's sense.

ness of beauty-emotion. Ben Johnson advised Shakespeare not to overshoot the mark of poetic beauty by emotional outbursts in the following words, "In the very torrent, tempest and I may say, the whirlwind of passion, you must acquire and beget a temperance that may give sweetness." "Whatever feelings," writes Victor cousin, "art proposes to excite in us, they ought to be restrained and governed by the feeling of beauty. If it produces only pity or terrors beyond a certain limit, above all physical pity or terror, it revolts, it ceases to charm; it misses its proper effect, for an effect which is foreign is vulgar." (Judgment in Literature).

King Bhoja's³⁸ thesis also maintained the unity of aesthetic emotion. The other innate dispositions like Rati, etc., constellate round the *Sṛṅgāratattva* like solar constellation round the sun. *Rasa* is the emotionalization of the soul-energy (रसनीयतयात्मशक्तेः) which creates rhythm and harmony of life (संविदोऽनुभवहेतुः). It is the mind's most joyful occupation. Mere abundance of sex-passion does not constitute *rasa* at all. (इत्यादिभूमनि पुनर्वितथा रसोक्तिः।)

In fine we must ask: What is the conception of *Rasa* which when realised in any form of art transforms the objective world to a new³⁹ vision and invests our perceptions with inexhaustible⁴⁰ charm? Only a metapsychology (such that of Bergson or Freud) can answer the question, which substitutes a vital or emotional approach to Reality in

³⁸ *Sṛṅgāraprakāśa*: अप्रातिकूलिकतया मनसो मुदादेयः संविदोऽनुभवहेतुरिहाभिमानः। ज्ञेयो रसः स रसनीयतयात्मशक्ते इत्यादिभूमनि पुनर्वितथा रसोक्तिः॥ इत्यादयोऽर्धशतमेकविजितानि भावाः पृथग्विविधभावभूतो भवन्ति। शृङ्गारतत्त्वमजितः परिवारयन्तः सप्ताविधं द्युतिचया इव वर्धयन्ति॥ आभावानोदयमनन्यधिया जनेन सम्भाव्यते मनसि भावनया स भावः। यो भावनापथमतीत्य विवर्तमानः साहङ्कृतौ हृदि परं स्वदते रसोऽस्ति॥

³⁹ *Dbvanyāleka* 4.4 दृष्टपूर्वा अपि ह्यर्थाः काव्ये रसपरिग्रहात्। सर्वे नवा इवाभान्ति मधुमास इव द्रुमाः॥

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 4.7 न च तेषां घट्टतेऽवधिः, न च ते दृश्यन्ते कथमपि पुनरुक्ताः। ये विज्ञप्ताः प्रियाणामर्था वा सुकविवाणीनाम्॥ or cf. *Māgha* : क्षणे क्षणे यत्नवतामुपैति तदेव रूपं रमणीयतायाः; Keats' ; A thing of beauty is joy for ever.

place of jejune intellectual outlook. A theory of instinctual emotions (such that of Bharata or McDougall) is inadequate which confuses the latter with aesthetic experience. Emotion which moves the stream of evolution, expands and creates harmony; emotion of which the entire universe with all colour, tone and brilliance, is the artistic expression, is the fountain of creative energy behind art. Enjoyment and creation of art only slightly differ in complexity of mental processes. From this point of view, expression in art is not "an infantile⁴¹ regression" nor "primitive form of phantastic thinking": it is positive growth and progression. Croce⁴² speaks of a creative intuition in art, which is a form of supra-intellectual realisation of emotion. In fact, in art, its expression or enjoyment, there is the effort to transcend the limits which the intellect and our individuality impose upon us. The meaning of aesthetic responsiveness now becomes clear, namely, it consists in making the intellectual processes subservient to emotional creation of harmony and rhythm at a higher level of life.

At a higher level of life! This incidentally explains the nature of the sublime in Art and its moral atmosphere. In and through Art, there is the effort to grow to newer and greater harmony and hence to greater metaphysical truth. Most of the emotional energy has come to attach itself to the procreative function (this being quite important), therefore in most art it centres round the sexual libido or Śṛṅgāratattva. The effort to lift it up (to bring about more harmony through contrast) is to de-sexualise it. This effort produces an intense sense of expansion and growth by the emergence of new values and rhythm of life. Any piece of painting, poetry, sculpture or music which vividly raises before us new visions of emotional harmony, contrast and

⁴¹ Jung: *Psychology of the unconscious.*

⁴² Croce: *Aesthetics.*

pathos⁴³ is sublime to that extent. This helps us to give a true content to otherwise precarious, Śānta⁴³ rasa. Quietism, with which it has been identified, is, at the worst, an escape-feeling of regression to the "mother" and therefore neurotic; at the best, it is a form of 'pathos' originating in the "emptiness of presentational immediacy." The suggestion be hazarded that Śānta Rasa is the sublime of Art. Without such a conception of Śānta Rasa, we have no idea of the sublime in Indian Aesthetics.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SONUS AND SYMBOLISM IN ART

The aesthetic energy has a special mode of expression in all artistic creations. The channels through which it tends to flow may vary with the material of the medium, but its natural idiom, depending upon an inveterate habitus of the creative genius, must follow some universal law. The search of this law began so soon as man began to reflect on the springhead of beauty-emotion. The first poets of the vedic age must have felt a deep thrill, sensation and confusion when they found that something had mysteriously stolen into their heart that attuned their whole being to an unheard of musical harmony. Even Vālmiki was struck in wonder when the poet in him—the tempestuous stirring of aesthetic

⁴³ Bhaṭṭhari's *Vairāgyasataka* contains some best illustrations of Śānta Rasa, sometimes heading towards a pathological quietism, sometimes ringing a pathetic note, and many times rising to the sublime. His poetry makes it clear how the mind flows backward and forward, between the sexual and the de-sexualised state. There is some pity felt in the process of desexualisation. Vide such numerous examples. कान्ताकोमलपल्लवाधररसः पीतो न चन्द्रोदये, तारुण्यं गतमेव निष्कलमहो धूम्रालये दीपवत् ।

The dominant note of the *Mahābhārata* is the Śānta Rasa, but it is not quietism. The poet is constantly creating situations in which the hero makes efforts to sublimate his libido in spite of his failings which only make the sublime more pathetic. The Heroine, Draupadi, round which the story is woven is a sex-symbol and the Pathos and Sublime reach a climax in the suicide march of the five brothers along with her.

energy—ran out into a sonorous song. In fact no artist can discover intellectually the source of his art, nor can he enjoy its charms. His joys are its creation. Only a critic with complete sympathy with poet's genius can discover the natural idiom of art-emotion.

A strange paradox about Art is that it reveals something which it, at the same time, conceals. The Expressionist school errs by overemphasis on the revealing power of Art as does the Impressionist by its exclusive stress on the inexpressible. The truest essence of aesthetic creation and enjoyment is a miraculous confluence of Expression and Impression. The medium of art-creation, therefore, plays the double role. The visible symbol thus leads to the vision of the invisible, the audible makes us hear as inaudible deep symphony.⁴⁴ The unfortunate beings bound to the perceptual level see, but they see not, hear, but they hear not; for the charm reveals itself to some one like to the lover the well clad, passion-stricken lady-love. Contemplation in art-enjoyment, held and heightened by harmony and rhythm, breaks through the veil and ushers into the region of Emotion. That is indeed the metaphysical function of art-contemplation.

The universal idiom of art-emotion, the inflow and outflow of a symbol causing a rapid centripetal and centrifugal movement of attention could not crystallise into a conscious theory without an insight into soul-dynamics.⁴⁵ The Hellenic philosophers could not rise above a theory of Representationism in Art. To Plato, the creations of art were a

⁴⁴ उत त्वः पश्यन्न ददर्श वाचमुत त्वः शृण्वन्न शृणोत्येवाम् । उतो त्वस्मै तत्त्वं वि सन्ने जायेव पत्य उशती सुवासाः *Rgveda*, X. 71. 4.

⁴⁵ Representationism, as a method of approach in Epistemology or Art, is grounded in a naive empirical Realism, which, in its turn, arises from a false notion of cognitive functions. Cognition in all its forms of perception, ideation, intellection or intuition, essentially reveals some phase of Reality. Naive Realism assumes that perpetual consciousness only reveals, and other cognitive functions are only elaborative

tertiary reality, being reproduction—not even replicas—of the visible world, which in its turn was an imperfect shadow—not even a facsimile—of the supra-mundane Idea. Plato's⁴⁶ theory is a gross Naturalism. Unable to recognize any independent art-emotion because of his metaphysical approach, he required the re-representation (that the work of the art is) to be filled in by the moral emotion arising from the excellence of character. Aristotle could not shake off representationism, but he overcame the gross Naturalism by introducing the idea of the Universal. Though he confined to Mimesis in Art, yet he recognized the independence of art-emotion, 'pathos' and emphasized its purgatory value. Addison psychologised the speculation on art, and for the first time in the West, spoke of the Pleasures and Powers of Fancy. But under the Hellenic influence, he assigned to Imagination an elaborative function of idealization of nature. He could not say that the artist uses the outward as a symbol and vitalizes it with an inner passion. Bacon, Lessing and Victor Cousin, could not conceive of Art and Poetry as anything more than 'Feigned History' and Imagination was required to keep close to outer reality, and submit to the authority of Reason. In an atmosphere of Intellectualism in Art Emotion could not be hailed as a great revealing power. Representationism in Art raised the same problem as it did in Epistemology, viz., what is the nature of truth expressed in art! Even to this day, the English

and constructive. Hume's philosophy is thus a *reductio ad absurdum* of his own position. Casual nexus was only a psychological habit of the mind to Hume, and a logical necessity of the apperceiving reason to Kant. To Whitehead causal efficacy is our most primitive consciousness. To none of them, Reason, as revealing relations amongst the relata, is as trustworthy as perceptual consciousness! How can they go to Intuition, bound to a two-dimensional view of Reality as they are!

⁴⁶ We can save Plato's position (given to him by his Western critics) by a shift of emphasis from his Transcendental metaphysics to his Idealist Ethics. Plato conceived moral life as a great harmony and rhythm resulting from an inner and outer organisation through self-restraint. He had an artist's idea of moral life and a moralist's

critics fondly discuss the question of "poetic truth." The position was, however, abandoned when M. Arnold defined poetry as interpretation of life rather than representation of idealized reality. But the symbolic nature of art became clear only by the efforts of the Psycho-analysts. Recently both the developments of Psycho-analysis and Psycho-aesthetics have contributed to the theory of art-symbolism.⁴⁷

of art, in which there is the fusion of the Good, the Beautiful and the True. Reality can be conceived as a great harmony which is equally revealed to emotion, thought and being. Vide the following: "Excellence of thought, and of harmony and of form and of rhythm, is connected with excellence of character, with good nature . . . And defectiveness of form and rhythm and harmony are associated with deficiencies of thought and character while the corresponding artistic excellences are associated with the corresponding moral excellences of self-restraint and goodness; indeed they are directly expressive of them. . . We must look for artists who are able out of goodness of their own natures to trace of beauty and perfection . . ." *Republic*.

"The business of the poet is to tell, not what has happened, but what could happen, and what is possible, either from its possibility or from its necessary connection with what has gone before. . . Poetry deals rather with universal history with the particular." *Poetics*.

"Because the Mind of Man requires something more perfect in matter than what it finds there . . . because the Imagination can fancy to itself things more, great strange or beautiful than the eye ever saw . . on this account it is the part of the poet to humour Imagination in its own Notions, by mending and perfecting Nature." Addison: *Essays*. Addison also speaks of 'Secondary pleasure' derived from fancied objects and 'primary pleasure' of the real objects.

"Poetry is nothing but feigned History . . . The use of this feigned history hath been to give some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it; the world in proportion being inferior to the soul. Therefore because the acts and events of true history have not the magnitude which satisfyeth the mind of man, poetry feigneth acts and events greater and more historical . . It doth raise and erect the mind by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind, whereas reason doth buckle and bolt the mind into the nature of things" Bacon: *Essays*.

"He (the Poet) desires to make the ideas which he arouses in us so vivid that, as they flash through our mind, we believe that we are experiencing the true, the objective impressions produced by the physical originals of these ideas, and in this moment of our illusion, we cease to be conscious of the medium which he employs for this purpose" Laocoon. Lessing reduces Art to pictorial element. His "~~own definition~~" resembles Sāṅkuka's explanation of art-enjoyment as चित्रतुल्यत्वम्.

"बालानां चित्रतुरगे वस्तुपरिच्छेदशून्या तुरगोऽभिप्रेति बुद्धिर्भवति ।

In India, Art and its interpretation started with a different premise, and took no time to seize at the principle of aesthetic expression and enjoyment. In Bharata, Bhāva is the emotional stir created in the mind of the sahrdaya by the power of music, dance, and dramatic disguise; it is the artha illumined by Vibhāva and intensified by Anubhāva. Bhāva also means reiterative contemplation induced by drama and its accompaniment. Not only, Bhāva also implies in Bharata the intense creative energy awakened by beauty-emotion. The Vibhāvas do not mean the stimuli of psychology and bhāva is not a response. The Vibhāvas, the ālambana as well as Uddīpana, constitute a situation, which can be suggested to a contemplative mind. The suggested situation, vivified by dramatic art, fires up the aesthetic imagination, and starts a train of bodily and mental reactions. Charged with an all absorbing beauty-emotion, the experience is quite intense, but it is held in a sustained animation by the train of bodily and mental reactions which it initiated.

Bharata's treatment contains a clear hint, but it was not worked out into a self conscious Principle of suggestion in Art till the time of the Dhvanikāra in the 8th century. He clearly

"We desire to see and feel again the natural beauty, physical and moral, which delights us in the world of reality; and we, therefore, endeavour to reproduce it, not such as it was, but such as our imagination represents it to us. Thence, arises a work original and proper to man, a work of art." At times, Cousin rises to symbolic nature of Art. "The end of art is the expression of moral beauty by the assistance of physical beauty. The latter is for art only a symbol of the former. In nature this symbol is often obscure. . . Art can be more pathetic than nature and pathos is the sign and measure of beauty of the highest class."

(Du Vari, de Beau, Du Bien)

Judgement in Literature—Worsfold and *Introduction to the study of literature*—Hudson. Ref. : Bosanquet : *History of Aesthetic*, and W. Knight : *The Philosophy of the Beautiful*. विभावेनाहृतो योऽर्थस्त्वनुभावेन गम्यते । वागङ्गसत्त्वाभिनयैः स भाव इति संज्ञितः ॥ वागङ्गमुखरागैश्च सत्त्वेनाभिनयेन च । कवेरन्तर्गतं भावं भावयत् भाव उच्यते ॥ *Nāṭyaśāstra*. सरस्वती स्वाहु तदर्थ-वस्तु निःस्यन्दमाना महतां कवीनाम् । अलोकसामान्यमभिव्यनक्ति परिस्फुरन्तं प्रतिभाविशेषम् ॥ *Dhvanyāloka*, I, 6.

distinguishes between the actual, the visible symbol (वाच्यार्थ) and that which goes beyond it. The visible does not exhaust the art; it is the invisible beyond the material symbol which gives the true art-relish, like the charm and beauty of the fair one which are beyond the mere ornaments or the lay-out of her limbs. The principle of Dhvani is the discovery of a new function of language-symbolism, or for the matter of that, of all arts. The powerful suggestion of a word, sentence, its meaning or sometimes even a suffix or prefix, takes the mind away from the actual towards an aesthetic form animating emotion and imagination. This suggestive power which holds the mind in an ecstatic state of contemplation, melts the being in a gusto of pure joy, is characteristic of all art-media. A single touch of melancholy colour in a work of painting, some feeble yellow near the sun-lit belt of evening cloud over the sea, one note of a love-mad melody, or a grimace near lower lip in a statue, may, by its suggestive power, throw the mind in an intensely rapturous state and produce a vivific aesthetic emotion.

The greatness of artist's creative genius lies in his inventing highly suggestive symbols. The Principle of Suggestion explains the *modus operandi* of all artistic creation and enjoyment and art's tremendous revealing power through concealment. Aesthetic responsiveness of the connoisseur means his culture and capacity to receive the suggestions. The several elements in art and its medium only increase the suggestive force of the symbols. Music, metre and the powerful use of a metaphor in Poetry, even the 'situations' tinged with deeply pathetic emotions, all closely follow the suggestion, and rise and fall, run and skip, ring and resound, with the changing aesthetic experience. A work of painting, or sculpture has its own music and metre, its mood and situation, and, by its suggestion unlocks the same emotional rapture.

That the secret of suggestion in art was clearly conceived by Dhvanikara is a patent fact. He spared no efforts and showed no small inventive genius in establishing the suggestive function of language over and above the primary and implicative functions. But the learned atmosphere of the age was rife with speculation in grammatical Philosophy under whose influence the psycho-aesthetic basis of Suggestion could not be discovered. The elaborative mind of the middle ages indulged in the niceties of its countless distinctions and scholastic wrangling.

The recent development in Psycho-aesthetics throws light on the complex nature of suggestion. We look at the mountain and it seems to rise without actually rising. We look at the setting sun, and he appears to be melancholy. We hear a tune and we feel a pathetic stir. The physiological explanation, based upon the economics of nervous energy, does not reveal the psychological significance. Even the geometrical theory of beauty extends the old principle of debit and credit to mental energy. The merit of these explanations is that they emphasize the negative side of aesthetic experience and prove the reality of the Ugly. But these are no positive contributions to the understanding of the Beautiful.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ The view incidentally lends support to the Revised James Lange theory of Emotion. Anubhāvas are the physiological reverberations vivifying the emotion (अनुभावयन्ति-अनुभवविषयीकुर्वन्ति इति अनुभवाः *Kāvya*). But an emotion is never alone: Besides the bodily ensuants, there is a general emotional resonance, an awakening of general emotional energy besides the physiological energy awakened through visceral and glandular action, which together gives to the emotion a sustaining power. It is thus an improvement upon the so-called James-Lange theory. The whole discussion in Bharata is of great psychological interest for a sound theory of Emotion and in many respects is an improvement upon McDougall.

Dr. De and Dr. Sankarana have rendered Dhvani as Suggestion. But the term is burdened with many associations and is commonly abused. A more suggestive rendering of Suggestion can be the principle of Resonance. Another one free from any associations can be the Principle of Sonus. My reason for this new rendering is that Dhvani is based upon an empathic activity. Empathy is a psycho-aesthetic tendency of the mind, not different from mental resonance.

The recent discovery of a new, pervasive function of consciousness *Einfühlung*, *Infeceling* or *Empathy*, has made the process of aesthetic experience intelligible to us. Now *Empathy* is neither the projection of the Ego into the Alter, as the *Metaphysicals* suppose, nor is it primitive sympathy or "inner mimicry" of *McDougall* and others. It has some resemblance with *mimesis* which is said to be at the root of emotional transference, thought induction and imitation. But it is distinct and more fundamental, for without it, perception will remain a jejune congeries of sensations. In perceiving a mountain, a tree or a tower we raise our eyes, adjust muscles and tendons. We fix our gaze and attention. Memories are awakened which arouse expectations, hopes and disappointments. As consciousness, like an electric current of sparks, flows on alternating between moments of tension and relaxation, there is measuring, comparing, reflecting, moving, referring of attention interlaced by instants of passive receptions of sensations. "The present and particular raising and lifting is merely the nucleus to which gravitates our remembrance of all similar acts of raising or rising which we have ever accomplished. And not merely the thought of the present rising but also the thought of future rising. All these risings, done by ourselves or watched in others actually experienced or merely imagined, have long since united in our mind, constituting a sort of composite photograph whence differences are eliminated and wherein all similarities are fused and intensified : the general idea of rising. . . It is this universally applicable notion of rising which is started in our mind by the awareness of the particular present acts of raising involved in our looking at the mountain; and it is this general idea of rising i.e. of upward movement which gets transferred to the mountain along with our particular present activity of rising. . . and which thickens and marks and enriches that poor little thought of a definite raising with the interest, the emotional full-

ness gathered and stored up in its long manifold existence. What we are transferring (owing to that tendency to merge the activities of the perceiving subject with the qualities of the perceived object) from ourselves to the looked at shape of the mountain is not merely the thought of rising, but the thought and emotion which long have been accumulated in our mind. And it is this complex mental process, by which we invest that inert mountain with the stored up and averaged and essential modes of our activity. It is this process whereby we make the mountain raise itself, which is *Einfühlung* or Empathy."

Empathy is thus the most pervasive elementary psychological process in which the merger of the subject's activities in the qualities of the object takes place through an inversion or transference. In form-perception there is an intense interplay of past, present and future on which account there are the feelings of tension and relaxation (Wundt) Lee calls it a "Microscopic psychological drama" or a "drama of the Soul molecules." This indicates an important fact of Psycho aesthetics that satisfaction or dissatisfaction consists in "what are, directly or indirectly, activities of our own."

Prof. Whitehead and Lee are unanimous at the point that the cognizance of a Thing is a primary mental act which does not require a highgrade organism. To withhold mind from Thing and to hold it on to the Form or Shape (Lee) requires further effort and culture of the mind of which artist alone is capable. "There is an aspect, something over and above the quality of the colours (or in a piece of music, of sound) in which that aspect at any particular moment, embodies for your senses something which can be detached from the particular colours or sounds and re-embodied in other colours and sounds, existing meaning in a curious potential schematic condition, in our memory. That something is Shape."

It is the Form⁴⁹ we contemplate in aesthetic experience. As the microscopic psychological drama of Form-contemplation becomes intense an inversion, merger or transference takes place through *Einfühlung*. The artist's business is to use effective symbols to arouse a commotion in the "soul molecules," that is to use those shapes, tunes and words (in their harmonic and rhythmic arrangement so that the debit of nervous energy may not exceed its credit, and yet may be intense) which are keys as it were, to unlock the floodgates of mental activity. This is, indeed the secret of the Principle of Aesthetic Suggestion (*Dhvani*).

There is the primary Law of Attention that its "concentration perseverance and duration" in a constantly flowing mental stream is impossible under unvarying monotony of experience. The mental life requires continual refreshment and constant renewal. In aesthetic contemplation, therefore, each symbol is the active centre of radiation of many thoughts and feelings. The symbol is thus the concentration of condensed emotional experiences, round which the rapid movements of centripetal and centrifugal attention takes place. It is in this way that Suggestion works and holds the mind to a reiterative act of aesthetic contemplation. The principle of *Dhvani* (or the Principle of

⁴⁹ This may lead to extreme Formalism in art which likens art-contemplation to mathematical absorption in abstract relations. Kant established the Ethical Imperative in conduct, Rational Imperative in knowledge, and Aesthetic Imperative in emotional life. But his approach in reconciling the *a priori* and *a posteriori* led to a sharp dualism of matter and Form everywhere.

* The truth of the matter seems to be that we have not to choose between gross Naturalism and pure Formalism, nor to find a half-way house between the two. We have to reject both—a priorism and a posteriorism in Aesthetics as in Ethics and Epistemology. We should bank upon the duality of 'symbol' and its 'meaning.' The outstanding contribution of recent thinking on this problem (Direct Realism) is that the most primordial and pervasive functioning of the human Psyche is 'symbolic' in nature. The mind is constantly creating 'symbols' for 'meanings' and discover 'meanings' for 'symbols' through 'symbolic reference'.

Sonus), based upon the Psychology of *Einfühlung*, explains why "a thing of beauty is joy for ever and its loveliness increases." The beautiful is the inexhaustible reservoir, of joy and charm because the Beautiful is the symbol suggesting and initiating an 'oceanic' feeling and harmonic movement, centripetal and centrifugal, in the current of life—soul and body.

Symbolism, like Empathy is another fundamental fact of mental life. There is in Art, an intensely communicative 'symbolic reference' between the 'symbol' and its 'meaning.' The 'meaning' is the 'immediate perception.' "The sound waves by their causal efficacy may produce in the body a state of pleasurable aesthetic emotion, which is then symbolically transferred to the sense-perception of sounds." Even the ultra violet rays of the sun and the sounds below the limit of audibility have a decided emotional effect and add an emotional tinge to our perception. "This whole question of the symbolic transfer of emotion lies at the base of any theory of the aesthetics of art. For example, it gives the reason for the importance of a rigid suppression of irrelevant detail. For emotions inhibit each other or intensify each other. Harmonious emotion means a complex of emotions mutually intensifying. Each little emotion refuses to accept its status as a detached fact in our consciousness. It insists on its symbolic transfer to the unity of the main effect." (Whitehead).

The Dhvanikāra seems to be fully alive to the aesthetic significance of Symbolism. He details the negative conditions which hamper the complete realisation of a harmonious Rasa in Art. Such conditions are, for instance, as arousing suggestions of an opposite emotion, detailed description of some topic connected with the Rasa in question, cutting down the suggestions before it reaches its climax or its premature manifestations. He continues in this vein till he gives us an idea of a harmony of emotion in which all ele-

ments have been organically fused together. Following this line of his thought, he clearly suggests the Theory of Aesthetic Appropriateness, which was later worked out completely by Kṣemendra in his *Aucityavicārcarā*.

The Dhvanikāra also hints at a form of associationism which is a powerful source to suggestion. The relation between a symbol and its aesthetic meaning is not a natural or normal relation. It is not *autpattiks* but *aupādhika* or conditional. Mostly a symbol in art is enriched in its suggestive force by falling into a context or *prakaraṇa*. For example, a lady informs a certain person frequenting a certain shady bower of trees to do so freely now that a dog that barked there has been killed by a lion in a near cave. The man, unless he is acquainted with the character of the lady, will not catch the suggestion that the place where he frequents is the meeting place of her lover, and that her persuasion really means dissuasion.

Though the Dhvanikāra goes beyond the mechanical Laws of Association (those of contiguity, contrast or similarity) and hints at the Law of continuity of Interest (G. F. Stout), he is not well aware of an unconscious symbolism⁵⁰ established by Psycho-analysis in all Art and Religion. The study of Shakespeare's⁵¹ dramas has revealed the working of such symbolism. For the presentation of the beautiful objects and aspects, all artists employ the symbols of eternal effulgence, as sun, moon, star etc. For each type of mood and climate of the art-emotion, the artist uses symbols of a certain sort, moved as he is by the law of his genius. This native function of the unconscious mind in inventing an art-symbolism was not thought of.

It may be noted, in conclusion, that each symbol, however suggestive wears⁵² out and grows stale by repeated use.

⁵⁰ Jung: *The psychology of the Unconscious*.

⁵¹ Shakespeare: *Criticism*.

⁵² McDougall construes this fact to mean that the activating-energy behind aesthetic appreciation is curiosity-impulse. Half the charm

Our language is full of such suggestive symbols, which once in their hey-day were keys to intense poetic emotions, but now the æsthetic needs of daily life have made them very common and jejune. The exercise of 'neurone-connections ready-to-act in a certain way' is felt as pleasureable when there is constant renewal and increase in complexity. A metaphor once so luminous and emotion-provoking is now felt as cold and contemptible through extreme familiarity. Art, therefore requires a never-ceasing inventiveness and some other æsthetic and non-æsthetic elements to keep it eternally fresh.

OTHER ELEMENTS IN ART

Deceived by otherwise the brilliant metaphor of Kāvya-puruṣa, the Indian theorists tried to arrange everything

of the beautiful, he says, lies in 'newness'. As soon as novelty exhausts, it becomes insipid. This, however, cannot mean that the beautiful is novel or that novelty is beauty. In a complex æsthetic experience, the instinctual emotions enter as important qualifying factors. That is the basis of the division of Rasas in Bharat theory. The अद्भुत is the Rasa in which the feeling of wonder predominates. But रसे सारश्चमत्कारः cannot mean that in all Rasas admiration (for the author artist, McDougall says) is the essential element. Admiration is not चमत्कार which lends novelty to an impression. It appears that McDougall heads towards Naturalism, in spite of himself.

Some form of Naturalism, however, is ultimate. A Naturalism that posits an æsthetic emotion, lying at the heart of our instinctive and emotional life, may not be objectionable.

The Principle of Dhvani (Sonus) involves an Aesthetic Paradox: The material of artistic creation is of necessity symbolic and metaphorical in Nature. Hence artistic expression is through concealment and impression. An open emotion sounds vulgar, voluptuous and shallow. The modus of artistic traffic of an ordinary feeling is essentially a way of hidden and sudden disclosure.

The artist works under this strangely true Paradox. While aiming to create an intense harmony and rhythm of life by his work, he constantly keeps his eyes away from it and looks for vivific symbols of art-emotions. Emotions, Plot, Figure, Symmetry and Form, cadence and crescends, even a gamut and grimace, become in the hand of an artist the vehicles of a deep harmony and rhythm. The reason for this paradox seems to be that, art, in order to affect our total personality, must employ

about it. Consequently, the *alaṅkāras* are regarded as ornaments of the body of Art, the *guṇas* are the excellences like heroism, etc., belonging to the soul, and so on, till every element is appropriately allocated. This explains why we have not developed psycho-aesthetic basis for several art-elements, save in sometimes genial flashes.

Underlying the whole theory of poetic Embellishment, the nature and function of Figures in Art, there is a sound Psycho-aesthetics. Ruyyaka clearly realised that a figure is full of a special type of artistic charm and thrill (*विच्छित्तिविशेष*). Such a figure which is only the true figure, springs from the productive imagination of the artist (*विच्छित्तिश्च कविप्रतिभोल्लास-रूपवत्*). "The Dhvani theorists have either dismissed the poetic figures as mere *वाक् विकल्प* or considered them only as heightening the charm of the unexpressed element in poetry. Kuntala justifies the poetic figures because of some inherent charm of the strikingness (*वैचित्र्य*) in them irrespective of their relation to the unexpressed sense. But he justifies an *alaṅkāra* only when it involves *विच्छित्ति*, *वैचित्र्य* or *वक्रत्व*....It is *विच्छित्ति* due to an act of poetic imagination *कविप्रतिभानिर्वर्तित*. Thus the so-called *alaṅkāras* of orthodox are admissible when they are found on analysis to possess these characteristics of peculiar charm imparted to them by the fertile imagination of the poet." (De)

Kuntala's contribution is important in that he conceives the *modus operandi* of aesthetic imagination to be a deviation from its ordinary working. He gives it an unhappy name *वक्रत्व* borrowed from *Bhāmaha* and *Ānanda*. His point was not to discuss the essence of aesthetic creation or enjoyment, for he took *Rasa* and suggestion to be granted. His was to tell us that *Rasa* or *alaṅkāra* results from a special

a complex and intense process of creation. A direct expression, that which is not hidden and sudden, leaves us cold; and, by reason of its simplicity, it does not touch the deepest springs of our inner life and does not start an intense mental and bodily resonance.

mode of imaginative activity, and it is (negatively)⁵³ not its ordinary course. He touched upon the important point, so grievously overlooked by all, that Rasa does not manifest itself by the working of isolated excitants or ensuants 'but springs from a well developed 'Plot.' The vibhāvas themselves derive their meaning and force from being organically placed in a 'situation.' Rasa, therefore, not an isolated experience, but the harmonious development of an emotion tracing a psychograph through 'crisis,' 'climax' and 'denouncement,' must keep close to the ebb and flow of the 'plot' and, hence may be regarded as प्रबन्धवक्ता. Even in a kind of poetry known as सुक्तक, the Rasa is realised only when, and to the extent to which, there is a 'situation' developing into a full 'plot.'⁵⁴ In fact, the Rasa-theorists missed much in teaching that it is 'emotion' which makes a situation or 'vastu' aesthetically enjoyable. Kuntala, in his doctrine of प्रबन्धवक्ता, hits at the head of the nail in that he holds the 'plot' or 'the situation' to be the source of emotion. A piece of painting or a statue is not a detached or static view of something, but it is brimful of a 'story,' and, by its inherent suggestive power, it extends our vision to the past and the future. The essence of aesthetic emotion is the प्रबन्धवक्ता. Appayya Dīkṣita rightly reduces all figures to simile, or, its more condensed form, metaphor. In this he shows his clear grasp of the function of creative imagination in Art, on which metaphor is based. We define⁵⁵ the indefinable spiritual qualities, deep passions and subtle shades of aesthetic experience in terms of the tangible and concrete, and, thus

⁵³ The theory of vakrokti is negative. Accordingly, all art-elements *alankāra*, *Riti*, *Rasa* and *guṇas*, etc. are different ways in which the artist deviates from the ordinary course of thinking. But Kuntala, aware of his negative approach, adds that the deviation must be full of charm.

⁵⁴ The "whole-making tendency" of the soul, as pointed out by Driesch or by the Gestalt School, not only applies to intellectual, but to emotional life as well.

⁵⁵ J. Middleton Murry—*Metaphor*.

'give to airy nothings a local habitation and name.' Metaphor functions to concretise, to produce an overwhelming sense of reality, and thus intensifies our feeling of the inner and outer experience. Metaphor is thus the primitive and primary fact of our consciousness, and, is as 'ultimate as speech and thought' itself. This is the only means of exploring, 'mapping and chartering the uncharted regions of our spiritual depths'. A creative genius discovers deep-lying similarities and thus articulates our own dumb consciousness. A true metaphor is the discovery of an illuminating truth which finds resonance in all souls.

The artist's genius which creates symbols, ringing with meaning and quick with released sparks of our subliminal fire, must needs work metaphorically. The Alāṅkāra School of Bhāmaha, Kuntala and Ruṣṣaka builds itself on this basic fact. Those—and they are many,—who have regarded the figures as merely decorative devices, and, therefore, quite dispensable, have only superficially understood their function. All symbolic functioning of the mind is reducible to the metaphor or to causation which brings about 'Immediate apprehension.'

There is, however, another function of metaphor, namely, to idealize, and, thus to intensify our sense of things. The process of idealisation (अतिशय) is the process of imagination. Ever since Aesthetic was psychologised (Addison, Bacon etc.) this creative function of imagination in giving us more perfect beauties and harmonies than Nature could produce, has been emphasized. The view is so plausible and it has raised vital issues. We ask for a limit of idealisation and reply that it should not 'overshoot the tangible.' In a subjective treatment of nature the questions of "pathetic fallacy" or (Holmes proposes Sympathetic illusion) and that of "poetic truth" inevitably arise. This Atiśaya (idealisation) theory of metaphor seems to oppose the exploratory function of imagination.

* The 'talisman of creative imagination', it seems, lies in, not creating Atisaya, but filling the symbolic image (explored by imagination) with emotion and, thus awaken it to life and reality. The Atisaya theory of Alaṅkāra labours under Representationism in Art, and, is an artifice to escape from Naturalism to which it leads. Jagannātha sees prophetically that कविप्रतिभा is the 'mother' of metaphor, which is full of चमत्कार⁵⁶ (aesthetic emotion). The source of चमत्कार is not imitation or idealisation of Nature, but the realisation of "the god like mysteries of God's universe" and filling these "mysteries", the concealed aspects and similarities of Nature—with emotional rhythm and harmony. Nature thus contains metaphors as truly as scientific laws and abstract ideas.

Only in Art, the object "passes out of the coldness of the merely notional region into the atmosphere of the life-giving imagination. Vitalised there, the truth shapes itself into living images which kindle passion and affections and stimulate the whole man. This is what has been called the real apprehension of truths, as opposed to the merely notional assent to them."⁵⁷

This view of metaphor can find some meaning in such ideas as "aesthetic mysticism"⁵⁸ "Transcendentalism of Art"⁵⁹ and "the revealing power of poetry", and assigns

⁵⁶ McDougall asks : what is the conative energy subserving the most purely intellectual appreciation of the beautiful object? He replies : The conative root is the impulse of curiosity. Committed to his now exploded theory of emotions, McDougall relates admiration feeling to the instinct of curiosity which provokes fuller exploration. But चमत्कार is not admiration due to intellectual curiosity which explores 'relations.' It is admiration due to emotional curiosity which seeks rhythm and harmony. McDougall cannot conceive 'pure emotion' which is beauty—emotion (चमत्कार).

⁵⁷ Principal Shairp—quoted in "*Judgment in Literature*."

⁵⁸ Aesthetic mysticism of Yeats. "*Modern Tendencies in English Literature*." Amiya Cakravarty.

to "art-emotion" a metaphysical role. We can divide all art-theories into "egocentric" and "Alter. centric". The latter are those which teach that artistic expression begins in mimesis of Imitation. All these theories may be styled as variants of Representationism. The "Ego-centric" theories teach that art-creation flows out into external symbols from the brimful of emotion and imagination. The metaphor is true only in the "Ego-centric" theory. The Rasa-and Dhvani School views the metaphor from this standpoint.

The source of suggestion, symbolic reference and metaphor is the same, namely, Empathy. The "Cubic suggestion" and "Chromatic effect" of a metaphor, for that matter of harmonious total impression or imagery, is only its "Pictorial Quality" चित्र. The Indian theorists have contemptuously called such an Art "pictorial" (चित्रकाव्य) in which the poetic passion has not reduced the rambling images into an organic unity. The characteristic of creative imagery is the "maximum"⁶⁰ independence of each metaphor combined with its complete and pervasive subordination" to form "a great river"⁶¹ of life and beauty". Such an organic unity and movement of art-emotion springs from unity and fullness of imitative act taking its birth in poets passion.⁶² The psychology behind it is the same centripetal and centrifugal action of Einfühlung.

The syncretic tendency soon absorbed the Alankāra School by conceding to metaphor a functional role in

⁶⁰ This is the characteristic of Tagore's Art and that of Mahadevi Verma.

⁶⁰ Ref. J. Middleton Murry—*Metaphor in "Shakespear-Criticism"* 1919-35.

⁶¹ *A History of English Literature*—Legouis and Cazamian Shakespeare.

⁶² "Coleridge: Images, however, beautiful, though faithfully copied from nature and as accurately described in words, do not of themselves characterize the poet. They become proofs of original

Aesthetics. The Guṇa and Riti Schools of Daṇḍin and Vāmana respectively are champions of "craftsmanship" and "design" in Art. Daṇḍin, like W. Morris, lays down that "craftsmanship" is all, and, defines Art as "the beautiful collocation of words and ideas". But like, the moderns, he does not overemphasize the "colour-effect," or the 'mathematics' governing the 'design' 'form' and 'symmetry'. His "conception of Guṇas covers not only lucidity of style, sweetness, the liquid movement and other qualities of expression but also the grandeur, felicity and richness of ideas ." (Sankaran). Very soon, therefore, as the psychological interpretation began in India the Guṇas came to be regarded as different modes of the experience of Rasa-emotion. Their number was reduced to three. In Mādhurya, which is our experience in Vipralambha Śṛṅgāra and in 'Pathos', the heart 'melts'. In the language of modern Psychology, there is a strong rush of large liquid fire from our subterranean life, 'Eros', into the conscious, which produces a thrill of joy by breaking⁶³ all barriers of the 'Censor', the cause of all forms of anxiety. In ojas (vigour), there is Dīpti or Vistāra, it is a feeling of expansion and illumination of the erotic urge fixing tenaciously upon some objects. In prasāda, there is vikāśa or flowering of the heart, as in laughter, wonder, etc. If we interpret Prasāda with our stand on McDougall's theory of Laughter, it means a sort of purging the stream-

genius only in so far as they are modified by a predominant passion, or by associated thoughts and images awakened by that passion, or when they have the effect of reducing multitude to unity, or succession to an instant, or lastly when a human and intelligent life is transferred to them from the poet's own spirit.

⁶³ This is no regression or morbid mentality seen in introversion. In vipralambha, we stand, face to face, as if on the shore of a vast and violent ocean bellowing with libidinal fire. Our Nature's weakness puts a pall of fear and alarm over our own 'oceanic' being and thus causes 'regression' and 'anxiety.' A man, in full mental health, will grow to realise this vastness. Also in 'Pathos' we grow to realise the eternity of Time. There is thus 'progression,' and even 'sublimation.

of conscious life of the tinge of uneasiness, produced by a 'mildly painful situation.

Thus the Guṇas are defined as intensifiers of aesthetic emotion. The Riti School is also dismissed by making Rīṭ (पदसङ्घटना) as subservient to art-emotion. Metre and music, rhythm and harmony, all enter into Art to 'emotionalize' the 'Id' and to make it flow out into symbols with brilliant effusions. 'Śakti⁶⁴ is the energy which the artist wields to stimulate the whole man'.

Luckily the question of the relation of morality and Art did not arise in India. Starting with the Upaniṣadic conception of Rasa and ānanda, Indian Aesthetics avoided the narrowness of its ideal and of ethical virtue⁶⁵. Pure joy is the ideal of Art, and has nothing to do with instinctual satisfaction to which alone moral distinctions apply. Moreover, pure joy of 'platonian and contemplative order' is the lot of man in those rare but treasureable moments when life returns to primal harmony and to its unfettered rhythmic music from a rough-and-tumble existence. The moments of 'tension' in the stream of consciousness consume vital energy which the moments of 'relaxation' replenish. It is in these 'moments of relaxation' that the spring of beauty and comfort filters into the soul. Lee, therefore, rightly says that half of our life is made up by aesthetic experience. This is in tune with the general arrangement of Nature, such as we find in pupillary reflex.

⁶⁴ (?)

⁶⁵ Cf. McDougall's distinction between 'Pleasant' and the 'beautiful'. Perceiving that is adequate and undisturbed is always pleasant; but the beauty of any such simple impression depends upon its setting, upon relations between it and other things which give it significance, meaning and power to interest us, to provoke us to activity, to striving that aims at complete apprehension," *The Energies of men*. P. 168.

The recent psycho-aesthetics has established the independence as well as inter-dependence of art-emotion. In India, it was metaphysics which achieved the same end. In ānanda, there is melting of all individualising factors. Mōrality, depending upon sense of responsibility, is one such factor. Individuality is not primal. The march of civilization proves that man has gradually acquired his individuality. But individuality does not seem to be the fināle of human evolution, for, to reconcile the 'conflict,' the Ego and the Alter have to be fused into a dynamic union. In Ānanda experience, the soul enjoys its pure Emotion, which is "beyond the pleasure pain principle" and the "good-bad order" of things. The development of Indian Aesthetics has consisted in more and more drawing from this metaphysical conception of Ānanda.

This leads us to a view of aesthetic culture. Whatever, in Art and in life, reduces Rasa is Ugly. The fināle of social and politico-economic order is the realisation of ānanda, in its aesthetic sense, unfettered by any irrational barriers and unsuppressed by economic inequalities. The forces that disrupt this harmonic tendency towards ānanda are evil and hateful, therefore, ugly, and are countered by fearful revolutions. The aesthetic explanation of the present-day unrest is that a new vision of Beauty, Harmony and Rhythm of life, has fired up the imagination of the people, fed up as they are of an ugly disharmony. The Theory of Beauty, with its stand on Harmony and Rhythm of Emotion, has to teach all, the philosopher, the politician, the economist and the visionary Artist.

VĀLMĪKI'S ĀŚRAMA LOCATED IN OUDH*

By SARDAR M. V. KIBE

IN Bāla-Kāṇḍa, Sarga 2 and stanzas 3 and 4, it is clearly mentioned that Vālmiki after meeting Nārada :—

जगाम तमसातीरं जान्हव्यास्तु विद्वरतः ॥ 1-2-3

स तु तीरं समासाद्य तमसाया मुनिस्तदा ॥ 1-2-9

The 49th Sarga of the Uttara-Kāṇḍa is designated as वाल्मीक्याश्रमप्रवेशः. The disciples of Vālmiki found Sītā crying, which they reported to him as follows :—

नद्यास्तु तीरे भगवन् वरस्त्री कापि दुःखिता ॥¹

आश्रमस्याविद्वरे च त्वामियं शरणं गता ॥²

In the 65th Sarga of this Kāṇḍa the following occurs—

द्विरात्रमन्तरे शूर उष्य राघवनन्दनः ।

वाल्मिकेराश्रमं पुण्यमगच्छद्वा समुत्तमम् ॥³

This refers to the route taken by Śatrughna to invade Lavaṇāsura who had taken possession of Mathurā. Here, at the Vālmiki Āśrama, Śatrughna stopped after two days of journey from Ayodhyā.

Thus—उवास मासं तु नरेन्द्रपाश्वर्तस्त्वथ प्रयातो रघुवंशवर्धनः ।⁴

So from the vicinity of Rāma, Vālmiki's place was at a distance of two nights or halts. In Sarga 45 of this Kāṇḍa regarding the destination of the exile of Sītā, Rāma says :—

आरुह्य सीतामारोप्य विषयान्ते समुत्सृज ।

गङ्गायास्तु परे पारे वाल्मिकेस्तु महात्मनः ॥⁵

*For the purpose of this article I am using an edition of the *Rāmāyaṇa* published and printed at the Madras Law Journal Press, Madras,

¹ 7-48-4

² 7-48-6

³ 7-64-2

⁴ 7-64-14

⁵ 7-45-17

आश्रमो दिव्यसंकाशस्तमसातीरमाश्रितः ।
तत्रैनां विजने देशे विसृज्य रघुनन्दन ॥⁶

This clearly establishes that the Vālmiki's Āśrama was on the banks of the Tamasā river.

There is more distance between Ayodhyā and this river, besides that indicated by Śatrughna's journey. There is another trace in 1-5-7 where describing the extent of Ayodhyā it is said :—

आयता दश च द्वे च योजनानि महापुरी ।
श्रीमती त्रीणि बिस्तीर्णा सुविभक्तमहापथा ॥⁷

That is to say the महापुरी "Great City" was spread over 48 (or 72) miles and the city was spread over 12 (or 18) miles. The word श्रीमती refers to महापुरी, which was divided by big roads, while the rest of the country, the kingdom, was not सुविभक्त well-partitioned—by महापथ—big roads. Beyond this was desert (7-45-18) (supra).

Considering that in ancient times the kingdoms were more or less centered in big cities, the small extent of Rāma's kingdom is not extra-ordinary.

Another support to the distance shown above is to be found in the description of the route taken by Lakṣmaṇa to reach the Vālmiki Āśrama from Ayodhyā. After leaving Ayodhyā, he halted for the night on the banks of the Gomatī.

ततो वासमुपागम्य गोमतीतीर आश्रमे ।⁸

and next day, he reached Vālmiki's Āśrama which was on the other bank.

प्रभाते पुनरुत्थाय सोमित्रिः मूलमवब्रीत् ।
योजयस्व रथं शीघ्रमद्य भागीरथी जलम् ॥⁹

⁶ 7-45-17

⁷ 1-5-7

⁸ 7-46-19

⁹ 7-46-20

On his return journey, Lakṣmaṇa stopped at the Gomatī for the night.

तत्र तां रजनीमुष्य केशिन्यां रघुनन्दनः ।

प्रभाते पुनस्तथा लक्ष्मणः प्रयायी तदा ॥¹⁰

Here केशिनी appears to be another name for the Gomatī, as is indicated by another reading in the foot-note. From here Ayodhyā was at a distance of half a day's journey.

ततोऽर्धदिवसे प्राप्ते प्रविवेश महारथः ।

अयोध्यां रत्नसम्पूर्णां द्रष्टुं पुष्टजनावृताम् ॥¹¹

In the second Sarga of the Bāla-Kāṇḍa, it is mentioned that the banks of the Tamasā were far away from the Ganges.

जगाम तमसातीरं जान्हव्यास्तु विदूरतः ॥¹²

But in order to suit what is stated in the Uttara-Kāṇḍa, as will be shown later, this, विदूरतः "far away" in some readings, as is stated in the foot-note, has been changed into "जान्हव्यास्त्वविदूरतः" "not far away from the Ganges." But this is quite unacceptable considering the geographical location of the Gomatī and the Tamasā within 14 miles to the west of Ayodhyā.

The Ganges in the following lines must be a general term for any river for Sītā was misled in making her believe that she was being taken to the banks of the Ganges, the holiest of the rivers of India.

• Directing Lakṣmaṇa to exile Sītā, Rāma says:—

गङ्गायास्तु परे पारे वाल्मिकेस्तु महात्मनः ॥¹³

तत्रैनां विजने देशे विसृज्य रघुनन्दन ॥¹⁴

शीघ्रमागच्छ¹⁵ ॥

¹⁰ 7-52-1

¹¹ 7-52-2

¹² I-2-3

¹³ 7-45-17

¹⁴ 7-45-18.

¹⁵ 7-45-19

But this is geographically incompatible with the contiguous statement of Rāma :—

आश्रमो दिव्यसंकाशस्तमसातीरमाश्रितः ॥¹⁶

The first surmise that Sītā was being misled by the mention of the Gaṅgā will be clear from the following: Lakṣmaṇa says to her—

त्वया किलैष नृपतिर्वरं वै याचितः प्रभुः । नृपेण च प्रतिज्ञातमाज्ञप्तश्चाश्रमं प्रति ॥
गङ्गातीरे मया देवि ऋषीणामाश्रमान् शुभान् । शीघ्रं गत्वा तु वैदेहि शासनात् पाषिवस्य नः ॥
अरण्ये मुनिभिर्जुष्टे अपनेया भविष्यसि ॥¹⁷

This pleased her as is clear from the line—

प्रहर्षमतुलं लेभे गमनं चाप्यरोचयत् ॥¹⁸

Further

सीता सौमित्रिणा सार्धं सुर्मन्त्रेण च धीमता ।

आससाद विशालाक्षी गङ्गां पापविनाशिनीम् ॥¹⁹

Being so near the final act of exiling Sītā, which was not known to Sītā, Lakṣmaṇa broke down. What was Sītā's belief is described in the following stanzas :—

जान्द्वीतीरमासाद्य चिराभिलषितं मम ।

हर्षकाले किमर्थं मां विषादयसि लक्ष्मण ॥²⁰

तारयस्व च मां गङ्गां दर्शयस्व च तापसान् ॥²¹

तत्र चैकां निशामुष्य यास्यामस्तां पुरीं पुनः ॥²²

Lakṣmaṇa did not disillusion her, but—

गङ्गां संतारयामास लक्ष्मणस्तां समाहितः ॥²³

It was only when he reached the other bank of the Ganges that he broke the disastrous news to her—

ततस्तीरमुपागम्य भागीरथ्याः स लक्ष्मणः

उवाच मैथिलीं वाक्यं प्राञ्जलिर्वाण्यसंप्लुतः ॥²⁴

¹⁶ 7-45-18

¹⁷ 7-46-7 to 9

¹⁸ 7-46-10

¹⁹ 7-46-23

²⁰ 7-46-26

²¹ 7-46-29

²² 7-46-30

²³ 7-46-34

²⁴ 7-47-3

On his return Journey, as has been shown above, he stopped at the Gomatī but there is no mention of the Ganges (7-41 and 52-31-1 respectively),

It is possible that Gaṅgā and Bhāgīrathī in (7-47-34) and Jānhavī in (7-46-34),

तदेतज्जान्हवीतीरे ब्रह्मर्षीणां तपोवनम् ॥²⁵

अर्धमादाय रुचिरं जान्हवीतीरमागमत् ॥²⁶

the first in the mouth of Lakṣmaṇa and the second in that of Vālmiki, must all refer to the Tamasā, as common nouns, because Lakṣmaṇa says that on the banks of the Jānhavī²⁷ was the abode of Vālmiki. So also after arriving at the banks of the Jānhavī it is said—²⁸

स्वमाश्रमं शिष्यवृत्तः पुनरायान्महातपाः ॥²⁹

Because Rāma's direction to Lakṣmaṇa is clear enough—

आश्रमो दिव्यसंकाशस्तमसातीरमाश्रितः ॥³⁰

It is clear that Vālmiki's hermitage was close to the Tamasā. This is also supported by the quotations from the Bāla-Kāṇḍa.³¹ It may be that the Tamasā was a bigger stream in those days than now.

²⁵ 7-47-15

³⁶ 7-49-9

²⁷ 7-47-15

²⁸ 7-49-9

²⁹ 7-49-24

³⁰ 7-45-18

³¹ Vide 1-2-3 supra.

FULL LIGHT ON THE REAL SITE OF THE BHARADVĀJĀŚRAMA*

(Continued from p. 204)

By R. M. SHASTRI

3. At Śrngaverapura

DR. Katju has observed that Rāma “travels for two days and reaches in the evening of the second day the bank of the Ganges. The description and eulogy of the Ganges by Val-

*Owing to unavoidable circumstances the proofs of the foregone portion could not be shown to the author, who now requests his readers to make the following corrections therein:—

(P. 189) line 10—*comma* after ‘Ghosh’; l. 12—*commas* after ‘C.E.’ and ‘Engineer’; l. 15—substitute ‘in’ for ‘the’; l. 16—‘fathered.’

(P. 190) l. 18—*comma* at the end; l. 27—*comma* before ‘after.’

(P. 191) l. 5—‘gentlemen’; l. 31—‘view-points.’

(P. 192) l. 9—‘All-India’; l. 13—‘)’ before ‘and’; l. 21—*comma* after ‘which’; remove ‘(’; l. 27—‘all sides ¹²) was lodged . . .’; from the text, ll. 27-28, transpose the reference, ‘N.W.R., 104.29; *Vulgate*, 91.29-30.’, to make footnote No. 12 in l. 35; l. 33—‘North-Western’; l. 34—‘Gorresio’s.’

(P. 193) l. 12—*comma* before ‘below’; l. 20—‘V.-R.’

(P. 194) l. 8—‘North-Western’; l. 9—‘V.-R.’ l. 29—‘Paramasiva Iyer’; ll. 33-35—‘speeches of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru and Sri Rajagopalacharya delivered in July, 1939, happening’

(P. 195) l. 30—‘the Qilā (meaning ‘fort’)’; ll. 13 and 34—re-number f.n. 12 as 13; omit f.n. 13 and read its matter in the text, l. 13, as follows: ‘*Bhārata*, September 2, 1945.’

(P. 196) l. 4—‘or that of the’; ll. 21 and 24—‘Confluence’ with a capital C, and so also ll. 4, 13, 17, 20 and 33 of p. 197; l. 26—‘(a stream of)’; l. 28—‘posed ¹⁵. But in what sense could the Āśrama be shifting . . .’; l. 32—‘VI. xiv. 12.’ l. 33—‘15 *Vide*, . . .’; l. 34—*comma* before ‘Vol.’

(P. 197) l. 12—‘Pāṭhaśālā’; l. 16—‘newfangled theory.’

(P. 198) l. 3—insert double inverted commas, “, before ‘according’; l. 10—‘mentioned in the *Vulgate*, II. 31.22 or the N.W.R., 34.16. Or, it may be’; omit footnotes 17 and 18, i.e., ll. 32-33 altogether; ll. 14 and 34—re-number f.n. 19 as 17; l. 29—*comma* before ‘or’; ‘reply, like those quoted . . .’; l. 34—‘*Cf.*,’ with a capital C.

miki at this place is exceedingly beautiful, elevating and captivating. We are not told about the exact spot where Ram Chandrajī halts for the night. It is only stated that he was on his way to Shringverpur. We are not told as to whether this place was on the right or the left bank of the Ganges"—(paragraph 3). And, again, towards the close of his article, the learned doctor has written, "I have said above that the Ramayana does not specifically say where coming from Ayodhya Ram Chandrajī crossed the Ganges. It is only said in passing that he was going towards Shringverpur. According to tradition the modern Singraur,

(P. 199) re-number footnotes 20, 21 and 22 as 18, 19 and 20, and so also the corresponding figures on the textual words in ll. 5, 8 and 9; l. 8—read 'Further' in place of 'Subsequent'; l. 15—omit the figure 23; read l. 21 as follows: 'Daṇḍaka forest,'²¹—(*Ayodhyākāṇḍa*; 92.3),—the reference being to . . . ; l. 30—add '19.53; after 'N.W.R.', l. 31—add '11.27; and '19.11; before '19.23; l. 32—add '26.23; before and '53.17; after '30.39; transpose the last part of f.n. 22 (now 20), viz., 'In the N.W.R., 96.3 = *Vulgate*, 84.12,' to the text, l. 9, before 'Sumantra'; re-number f.n. 23 as 21; omit f.n. 24, the contents of which have already been transposed to the text, l. 21.

(P. 200) l. 1—'a forester,'²² whose'; l. 7—omit 'of'; l. 8—'friend was well acquainted with.'²³ And . . . ; l. 13—insert the figure of 24 on 'nicated'; re-number footnotes 25 and 26 as 22 and 25, as also the corresponding figures on the textual words in ll. 1 and 14; omit f.n. 27; add f.n. 23 as follows: '*Vulgate*, 84.12; N.W.R., 96.3; Gorresio's edition, 92.3; add f.n. 24 as follows: '*Vulgate*, 57.2, and 59.3 = N.W.R., 63.7-8; see also the commentaries on these passages.'; l. 19—'senger, whom Rāma, too, sent back from Śrīngaverapura to Ayodhyā explicitly²⁶ for Kaikeyī to be convinced of his own sojourn in the forest and of Daśaratha's truthfulness, though entirely against the charioteer's own resolve²⁷ to accompany and serve Rāma all along. This is . . . ; add f.n. 26 as follows: '*Vulgate*, 52. 60-62; N.W.R., 55.23-24; add f.n. 27 as follows: '*Vulgate*, 52.38-58; N.W.R., 55.2-21.'

(P. 201) l. 2—'Romapāda,'; l. 20—'Rāma's.'

(P. 202) l. 1.—*comma* between 'were' and 'in'; l. 15—*comma* at the end; ll. 16-22—'queries like '(1) when . . . particular occasion,"; l. 26—'shown the place' (omit 'in').

(P. 203) l. 6—'in the latter (vv. 6 and 29) the boy's blind . . . ; l. 9.—'polymath'; l. 12—transpose the figure of 40 from the head of 'Kālidāsa' to that of 'and'; l. 23—'you'?⁴²; l. 31—add 'and' after ' '; l. 34—'read f.n. 43 as follows: '69. 43-44.'

(P. 204) ll. 7-8—'Ram Chaura,' 'Ram Ghat,' etc.

22 miles north-west of Allahabad, is the site of the ancient Shringverpur. In the first place it cannot definitely be said from the Ramayana that Ram Chandraji ever even reached Shringverpur. Then again the modern Singraur is on the Allahabad side of the Ganges. The Ramayana would make Shringverpur to be on the opposite side of the river. This must be so because it is not stated that after crossing the Ganges Ram Chandraji ever visited Shringverpur. On the contrary the country is referred to as uninhabited dense forest. Be that as it may, the distance between the modern Singraur and the present day Rajapur is about 40 miles more or less. It took Ram Chandraji two days' travelling to reach the confluence from the place where he crossed the Ganges. Thirty to 40 miles would be about that distance. It may be that in the ancient days the Ganges used to flow in the heart of what we call the Doaba tract of the Allahabad district and the river has now changed its course in a northerly direction with the result that the confluence has also shifted by many miles"—(paragraph 13).

Now, it passes all imagination as to how an author who lived at least in the third milennium before us could have told us "about the exact spot" of Rāma's halt in terms intelligible to us to-day and especially when his ideal hero, Rāma, had to pass his 14 years of exile in lonely forests⁴⁴ and to avoid to visit all human habitations, cities, towns and villages, of his times, which, too, have now mostly disappeared. The very fact that, although Rāma has the sight of the Gaṅgā in the *Vulgate*, Canto 50, verse 12, preceding the sublime eulogy of the great river (vv. 13-26), yet the author refers to his landing on the southern bank as late as in Canto 52, vv. 92-93,—all talk of Śrīngaverapura having come in between these limits covering almost 3 cantos

⁴⁴ N.W.R., 19,67; 20,20; 23,25; 26,3; 24; 28,29; 29,23—24, 29, 38; 32,8; 40,2, 5; 51,21-22; 56,16; 58,17; 62,5-8; 64,7-9; 66,11; [90,12,16]; 97,6.

(§1st of the N.W.R.),—proves beyond any shadow of doubt that the town of Śṛṅgaverapura as well as Rāma's halting place (which the tradition comes to our rescue to fix at Rāmācaurā,—an exact spot) were even then as now situated on the left bank or northern side of the Gaṅgā.

Dr. Katju perhaps did not know that Śṛṅgaverapura has been identified with Singraur by the eminent Archaeologist, General Sir Alexander Cunningham,⁴⁵ and that the identification does not rest on bare tradition, which a critic like him may find it convenient to lightly dispose of. As I have already said, it was no business of Rāma to visit any towns, even this capital of his devoted and dear friend, Guha, the chief of the Niṣādas.⁴⁶ When the latter said, "You are welcome. All this land is yours. I am only your servant : you are my master. Govern our kingdom and command us as it pleases you. This city is to be treated as your own capital, Ayodhyā,"⁴⁷ Rāma had to turn down his proposal, saying, "This is not the time for me to accept anything. You ought to know me to be wearing *kusās* and rags or barks, eat fruits and roots, and observe the Dharma as an ascetic living in the forest for 14 years by my father's command,"⁴⁸ and adding, "It does not behove me to stay in a man-haunted forest. I must dwell in a hermitage, the command being to that effect. Therefore, adopting the rule of ascetics for the good of my father, Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa, I will assume the matted hair before I go away."⁴⁹

Moreover, Rāma's visit or no visit to the town in question would be quite immaterial to our discussion, for which it is sufficient that there was a town named Śṛṅgaverapura

⁴⁵ *Archaeological Survey Reports*, vol. XI. p. 62 and vol. XXI. p. 11.

⁴⁶ N.W.R., §1.9 ; §2.3-5 ; §5.7 ; §6.1-3 ; §8.5-7 = *Vulgate*, §0.33 ; §1.4-6 ; §4.6 ; §4.10-13 ; §6.5-7.

⁴⁷ N.W.R., §1. 15-16 and 12 ; *Vulgate*, §0.38-39 and 36.

⁴⁸ N.W.R., §1.21-22 ; *Vulgate*, §0.44-45.

⁴⁹ *Vulgate*, §2.66-68.

which in the absence of a claim from any other place and in view of the tradition strengthened by Cunningham's identification must have been modern Singraur, that as the capital of Guha's kingdom it lay on the north side of the Gaṅgā, and that Guha met Rāma somewhere near it. This is fully borne out by the above-quoted words of Guha, *viz.*, "This city is to be treated [by you] as your own capital, Ayodhyā," and by certain other passages of the *V.-R.* describing—Rāma to have reached Śrīgaverapura⁵⁰ in the evening,—Guha offering his 'own house'⁵¹ to Bharata to stay for the night, the latter having declined to accept the offer,—Bharata asking Śatrughna to send for Guha, of course, from his house in the city, to which he had gone only a few hours back,⁵²—and Guha, after having audience with Bharata, 're-entering'⁵³ his capital and calling out his men (*prati-praviśya nagarīm svajñātīn-idam-abravīt*) to take Bharata and his retinue safely on boats across the Gaṅgā. Except the town, the forester king Guha's territory, bounded on the south by the Gaṅgā and the Vatsa country, consisted entirely of the forest, which he is throughout described to be inhabiting or wandering over.⁵⁴ The existence of a town on the brink of the Gaṅgā and amidst an uninhabited dense forest neither involves a contradiction nor suggests even a remote possibility of its lying to the south of that river.

Dr. Katju has somehow taken to the fancy that the old course of the Gaṅgā lay through the Doaba and the old Confluence or the Bharadvājāśrama was at Rajapur (Dist. Banda), for Rāma spent two days in reaching that Āśrama from

⁵⁰ *N.W.R.*, 50.16.

⁵¹ *N.W.R.*, 96.7; *Vulgate*, 84.16.

⁵² *N.W.R.*, 101.3; *Vulgate*, 89.2; and *N.W.R.*, 100.30 (*Visarjitaścāpi Guhāḥ svam-ālayam jagāma duḥkheṇa sabānujīvitibhiḥ*).

⁵³ *N.W.R.*, 101.14 (*nagarīm*); *Vulgate*, 89.8 (*nagarām*).

⁵⁴ *N.W.R.*, 51.24; 52.6; 96.14; 97.17; 98.8; 102.2; *Vulgate*, 51.7; 85.5; 86.1,8.

Guhā's territory, the time being equal to cover the distance between Śrīgaverapura and Rajapur. For converting his fancy into a fact to be admitted on all hands he has made out a *prima facie* case, which I propose to be examined rather minutely. His assertion that "modern Singraur is on the Allahabad side of the Ganges" (meaning the south bank side) is an open perversion of truth. It is a queer logic to first coin or mutilate facts and then to make use of or apply these self-coined or mutilated facts in favour of one's own contention.

From Allahabad Singraur is 22 miles if one goes *via* Phaphamau and Ram Chaura Road, crossing the Gaṅgā at the northern limit of Allahabad; but if we take to the direct route of the south bank of the said river opposite Singraur and cross it there, the distance is reduced to about 18 miles only. That the latter exactly was the track of Rāma and Bharata in their journeys will be seen from the sequel.

* . * * * *

Next, Dr. Katju writes, "After spending the night on what I may call the Ayodhya side bank of the Ganges, he crossed it by boat the next morning. Here after alighting from the boat Ram Chandraji, Lakshman and Janki had to travel on foot. The poet describes the country as a dense uninhabited forest. He does not mention any habited localities. We are not told of the direction in which the travellers were going. It is only stated that they crossed the river to the south. After a whole day's journey the night fell and the party stopped under a big tree"—(paragraph 4).

Now, that (1) Rāma crossed the Ganges 'the next morning,' that (2) we are 'not told of the direction' in which the travellers were going, and so on (meaning that the poet gives no information whatsoever about the direction of the party's journey beyond the fact of their landing on the 'south bank' after crossing the Gaṅgā in boat), and that (3) after 'a whole day's journey' the night fell, are observations or assertions

entirely opposed to the facts gathered after a search of the V.-R. There would have been no misrepresentation and consequently no occasion for contradiction or criticism if only the faulty expressions, 'next morning,' 'not told,' and 'after a whole day's journey,' were substituted by the accurate ones, 'next day,' 'vaguely told' or 'told in uncertain terms', and 'before they could cover any appreciable distance on that day.' For, in fact, (1) Rāma's crossing of the river, *i.e.*, landing on the southern bank, was preceded by his numerous other activities extending over several hours, and, could have taken place not long before midday, the probable time being about 11 A.M.; (2) there are some implications and positive indications of the direction the travellers were going in, which we can well nigh fix accordingly; and (3) if we mark the details given in the V.-R., it would follow that the party on that day, in the time remaining after their forenoon engagements as also the hunt which the two brothers devoted themselves to in the afternoon, did not, in any case, walk for more than 3 miles or so. It can hardly be called a 'journey,' muchless 'a whole day's journey.' The following detailed deliberation shall establish the truth of these remarks and give a total lie to the above statements of our respected leader, Dr. Katju :—

'Next morning,' according to English usage, should, if used not vaguely but definitely, mean either, in general, the hours of the next day beginning after the zero hour at 12 p.m. (midnight) and ending before the forenoon or, in particular, the 'morning-watch' between 4 and 8 a.m. The expression can hardly or very loosely denote the last *ante meridiem* hour or hours immediately preceding noon, for which the term 'forenoon' is in vogue. Now, according to the V.-R., Rāma went into exile after the lapse of the Śisira⁵⁵ (*i.e.*, during the Vāsanta season, according to

⁵⁵ N.W.R., 60. 7; Vulgate, 56.6.

Govindarāja), in the month of *Caitra*,⁵⁶ on the day when the moon entered the *Puṣya* constellation.⁵⁷ The last detail refers itself to the bright fortnight (*Śukla-pakṣa*). But as regards the bright fortnight of any particular month the North and South Indian calendars have the difference of full one month, the dark fortnight (*Kṛṣṇa-pakṣa*) of the month being identical in both cases. So, *Caitra-Śukla* of the Southerners is really *Phālguna-Śukla* of the North Indians. Thus, Rāma left Ayodhyā in the *Puṣya nakṣatra*, occurring either on the 9th-10th of our North Indian *Caitra-Śukla* or 27 days earlier, if the South Indian Calendar were followed, i.e., about the 13th of our *Phālguna-Śukla*. In the first case the Sun rose 5.43 to 6.6-7 A.M. and in the second at 6 to 6.12 A.M. on the third day of Rāma's leaving Ayodhyā, i.e., on the day Rāma had to cross the Gaṅgā at Śṛṅgavera-pura. Let us take the average time of the Sun-rise to be about 6 A.M. for the rough calculation of the actual hour of Rāma's crossing of the Gaṅgā.

During his journey up to Citrakūṭa, Rāma is seen generally getting up at dawn, saying his prayers at daybreak and leaving his halting place after the Sun-rise.⁵⁸ From his first halt, alone, Rāma had to start in the last part of the night, lest the devoted people of Ayodhyā might further accompany him.⁵⁹ The day broke only on his way, when he performed his *Sandhyā*; and when the Sun had risen (*abhyudite ravan*) he mounted the chariot and set out.⁶⁰ In the third halt under a large *vaṭa* near the lotus-lake named Sudarśanā in the

⁵⁶ N.W.R., 5.4; *Vulgate*, 3.4.

⁵⁷ N.W.R., 5.26; 6.2, 19-20, 31; 9.7; 10.4; 13.39-40; 19.38-40; 29.22-23 = *Vulgate*, 3.40; 4.2, 21-22, 33; 7.11; 8.9; 11.25-29; 18.35-38; 26.22-23; see also Rāma's *Tilaka* on the *Vulgate*, 116.2.

⁵⁸ N.W.R., 53.1-2; 58.1, 37; 59.2; 60.1-4; 98.26-27 = *Vulgate*, 52.1-2; 54.1, 36, 38; 55.1; 56.1-4; 86.23-24.

⁵⁹ N.W.R., 47.1-2; 48.2-8, 11, 15-20, 26-31; 50.1 = *Vulgate*, 45.1-2; 46.2, 10, 13, 17-21, 30-39; 49.1.

⁶⁰ N.W.R., 50.1-2; *Vulgate*, 49.1-2.

forest⁶¹ 'not very far' from Śṛṅgaverapura on their way to the Bharadvājāśrama, the party left their resting place when it was clear sun-shine (*vimale' bhyudite sūrye tasmād vāsāt prasthīre*).⁶² At Śṛṅgaverapura itself, i.e., in the second halt, when the night was over and it was day-break, Rāma addressed Lakṣmaṇa, saying, "It is now the time of the Sun-rise, the goddess Night has gone away" (*Bhāskarodaya-kālo' yam gatā bhagavatī nīṣā*), whereupon the latter called in Guha and Sumantra.⁶³ We find almost the same thing when Bharata with his army goes in quest of Rāma. After passing his night on the left (i.e., north) bank of the Gaṅgā at Śṛṅgaverapura, Bharata got up at dawn and woke up Śatrughna, saying, "O Śatrughna, get up : the night is over : see the Sun rising so as to make the lotuses open : get Guha, the king of Śṛṅgaverapura, fetched soon, and he will take this army across the river."⁶⁴

In case of Rāma's hour of leaving his halting place at Śṛṅgaverapura, further light is thrown by Guha reporting to Bharata that in the morning, when the Sun had risen, he got the matted hair prepared [by Rāma], and thereafter he comfortably took them across to the other bank of the Bhāgīrathī (*prabhāte' bhyudite sūrye kārayitvā jaṭās-tataḥ : asmin Bhāgīrathī-tīre sukham santāritau mayā*).⁶⁵ The *Vulgate*⁶⁶ reads the report as follows : "In the morning, when there was clear sun-shine, I got the matted hair prepared [for the brothers] and took both comfortably across the yonder bank of the Bhāgīrathī (*prabhāte vimale sūrye kārayitvā jaṭā ubhan : asmin . . . mayā*)." These words require no comment and very clearly indicate the time when the preparation of the *jaṭās* could have been commenced.

Taking a stock of all the incidents described by Vālmīki before and after the preparation of the *jaṭās* until the party

⁶¹ N.W.R., 56.30-35.

⁶² N.W.R., 58.1 ; *Vulgate*, 54.1.

⁶³ N.W.R., 53: 1-4 ; *Vulgate*, 52.1-4.

⁶⁴ N.W.R., 101.1-3 ; *Vulgate*, 89. 1-2.

⁶⁵ N.W.R., 98.26-27. ⁶⁶ 86.24.

landed on the southern bank, we may easily fix the probable hour of their river-crossing. The present topic covers 127 verses of Cantos 53-56 of the *N.W.R.* or 102 verses of the unusually big Canto 52 of the *Vulgate*. Thus :—

Just at the Sun-rise time, which we have taken to be about 6 A.M., Rāma sounded Lakṣmaṇa, who called in Guha and Sumantra, the charioteer. Then, Guha asked his minister or men to bring the best boat and it was brought.⁶⁷ It should not be forgotten that the Iṅgudī tree of Rāma's resting place, though according to the *N.W.R.*, 51.5, 'not very far from the river' (*avidūre hyayam nadyāḥ*) must have been beyond the highest flood-mark of the rains; and, therefore, about an hour would be required for Lakṣmaṇa to call in Guha, for the latter to summon his assistants, and, according to *N.W.R.*, 53.6, for them to come, go over to the ferry, take out the boat and bring it to a proper place and return to Guha to inform him that it was ready (*tam niśamya samādeśam sannivṛtya gaṇo mahān : upohya nāvam rucirām Gubāya pratyavedayat*). Thus, it ought to be about 7 A.M. before any other thing could be done.

Then, Guha reported to Rāma that the boat was ready and the two brothers, fixing their quivers and swords on their persons, walked together with Sītā towards the river.⁶⁸ But just when they were starting, Sumantra humbly turned to Rāma⁶⁹ and engaged him in a rather long parting and pathetic discourse (covering 80 verses of Cantos 53-55 of the *N.W.R.* = vv. 12-64 of the *Vulgate*), persisting on to take the latter back to Ayodhyā or himself to accompany the party to the forests.⁷⁰ Then, the contents of Canto 54 of the *N.W.R.*, which is entirely missing from the *Vulgate*, tantamount to Lakṣmaṇa's outburst⁷¹ and Rāma's pacificatory

⁶⁷ 53.5-6 = 52.5-7.

⁶⁸ 53.7-8 = 528-11.

⁶⁹ 53.9 = 52.15.

⁷⁰ 53.10—55.21 = 52.12-58.

⁷¹ Briefly reported by Sumantra at Ayodhyā, in the *Vulgate*, 58. 26-33.

appeal, both serving as their respective messages, would require some additional time. Then, Rāma explained to Sumantra the various reasons for which it was proper for the latter to return to Ayodhyā and not to accompany the former any further.⁷² In its natural course this big conversation would practically require about an hour more; and it means not less than 8 A.M. already so far.

Then, Rāma asked Guha to fetch the banian-gum,⁷³ with which Rāma (a prince having no practice like that of a professional or even an amateur) prepared the matted hair not only for himself but for Lakṣmaṇa as well, and then both assumed the full dress and form of hermits.⁷⁴ Thus, Guha, at about 8 A.M., went to bring the banyan-gum [in sufficient quantity] and should have returned after some time, which coupled with that required for the *jaṭā*-making for the brothers on the part of Rāma and for affixing the matted hair and other things that changed the princes into hermits on their persons should moderately come to about two hours. So it was about 10 A.M. already before they could go to or leave for the actual river bank.

Then, Rāma, exhorting Guha about the state-craft,⁷⁵ went together with Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā to the river, where he found the boat and asked Lakṣmaṇa to get himself and Sītā into it in no hot haste.⁷⁶ He did accordingly and Rāma followed them.⁷⁷ While still on the northern bank in the boat, Rāma made the *japa* of (*i.e.*, repeated, ordinarily not less than 108 times,) some particular Vedic *mantra* or⁷⁸ presumably *mantras*, and all the three, sipping water, offered their obeisance to the sacred river.⁷⁹ Then, Rāma took leave of Sumantra as well as Guha and his ministers, who were all

⁷² 55.22-26 = 52.59-64.

⁷³ 56.1-2 = 52.65-68.

⁷⁴ 56.3-5 = 52.69-71.

⁷⁵ 56.6 = 52.72.

⁷⁶ 56.4-5 and 7-9 = 52.73-75. ⁷⁷ 56.10-11 = 52.76-77.

⁷⁸ According to the commentators, *Sukla Yajurveda-Saṁhitā*, 21.6, but presumably also 21.7. The former is a *triṣṭubh* and the latter a *gāyatrī*, both amounting together to 70 syllables.

⁷⁹ 52.78-79.

left on the northern bank, and asked the boatmen to row.⁸⁰ Reaching in the middle of the stream, Sītā offered her own prayer, promising to worship the sacred river and other deities on the banks after the safe return of Rāma.¹⁸ And no sooner had she finished than did she speedily reach the southern bank.⁸² These last things also mean not less than an hour.

Thus, the party crossed, *i.e.*, alighted on the southern bank of the Gaṅgā almost in the noon, and not before 11 A.M. in any case. It is, therefore, wrong to say that they did so "next morning."

4. From Śrīngaverapura to Prayāga

The princes reaching the south bank left the boat and offered their obeisance to the Gaṅgā with full concentration⁸³. The soil on which Rāma landed just after crossing the Gaṅgā represented a tract of the Vatsa-deśa (*Vatsān*), which the poet describes as prosperous or flourishing (*samṛddhān*), happy (*muditān*) and having successive stretches of fruitful crops (*śubha-sasya-mālinah*)⁸⁴, a clear antithesis of the forth-coming 'uninhabited dense forest.'

But before they should move further, Rāma struck a note of caution and asked Lakṣmaṇa to be vigilant for the safety and protection of the party whether they were in the inhabited or uninhabited country (*sa-jane vi-jane'pi vā*), informing him that Sītā, who that very day was going to enter the rough forest devoid of human beings, fields and groves, would immediately be acquainted with the pain of forest-dwelling⁸⁵. Upon this Lakṣmaṇa led and Rāma followed

⁸⁰ 56.12 = 52.80.

⁸¹ 56.13-20 = 52.81-91.

⁸² 56.21 = 52.92.

⁸³ *Vulgate*, 52.93 and *N.W.R.*, 56.24.

⁸⁴ *Sa loka-pāla-pratīma-prabhāvas-īrtvā mahātmā varado mahā-nadīm : tatab samṛddhāncchubha-sasya-mālinah kṣaṇena Vatsān muditān-upāgamat.*—*Vulgate*, 52.101.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 93-98.

Sitā and thus they went on⁸⁶. Poor Sumantra having fixed his constant gaze at Rāma, who was now on the other (south) bank of the Gaṅgā, with his sight no more helping him on account of the [growing] length of the distance, shed tears in affliction.⁸⁷ There (*i.e.*, while still in the Vatsa country,—so also the commentary ‘*Śiromaṇi*’) the two brothers killed the four large sacrificial animals, and taking their holy part (fit for the evening offering), while themselves being hungry, they rushed in time for their [nocturnal] stay to the large tree⁸⁸ of *nyagrodha* (*i.e.*, *vaṭa* or banyan)⁸⁹ [which from their hunting area situated in the prosperous, happy and rich-in-crops country-side of the Vatsadeśa they must have spotted as an outstanding feature] of the desolate big forest⁹⁰ referred to already by Rāma as being devoid of fields and groves.

Thus, we see that the party were occupied, in the forenoon, with the river-crossing, etc., and, in the after-noon, solely with the hunting business and did not cover much ground in their Prayāga-ward journey for want of time as well as energy, having taken nothing but water⁹¹ for these three days and two nights.

Topographical considerations, too, lead us to the same conclusion. Sumantra standing on the prominent north bank saw the three travellers going a little distance in the Vatsa country ; and just after he became helpless to see them any more the brothers were engaged in hunting. During the hunt, too, they could not have gone far away consequently leaving Sitā alone or behind at some distance from themselves. Thus, their hunting area could not be much more than about a mile or so both from Sumantra in the West-

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 102.

⁸⁹ *Vulgate*, 53.33.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁹¹ N.W.R., 48.8 ; 51.26 ; 99.19-22 ; *Vulgate*, 46.10 ; 50.49 ; 87.18-19 ; cf. also the N.W.R., 56.38.

North as well as the large *vata* tree in the adjoining big forest to the East. Therefore, the whole space covered by the party on the day in question can fairly be measured with the above chain of reasoning to have been two to three miles only. Similarly, we may infer that Rāma did not go into the interior of the Vatsa country further than its border he had unavoidably to pass through in order to penetrate the great forest leading to Prayāga, there being no other way from Śrīngaverapura south ferry. This also proves the futility of the surmise that Prayāga or the sacred Confluence was situated somewhere near Rajapur in the Banda district. For in that case Rāma's whole way from Śrīngaverapura to Prayāga must have lain entirely through the Vatsa country rich in successive fields of crops and happy populace instead of the big rough forest devoid of human beings, fields and groves, as admitted by the narrative of Vālmīki and borne out by Dr. Katju.

It is idle to expect of the party, bound by nature of its mission to travel over and stay at lonely and uninhabited places only, to have come across "any habited (l) localities" or to expect of Vālmīki to describe such localities irrelevantly at any length. We have already seen how Rāma in his meeting with Guha gave clear expression to his' vow of avoiding all associations opposed to strict hermit life. The same spirit is running over to *Vulgate*, 52.98 and 54.24-26, and with a greater emphasis to the latter passage, where Rāma gives his grounds to reject the first offer or proposal from even such a great and holy personage as the Sage Bharadvāja and to give preference to the latter's second suggestion favouring residence in Citrakūṭa. For the same reason Rāma did not go over to Sugrīva's city.⁹² Thus, the travels of Rāma, who so scrupulously observed the rule obtaining among ascetics and avoided to pass through or visit any human habitations, should naturally have led

⁹² *Kiṣkindhā-kāṇḍa*, 26.9-10.

through uninhabited forests and on rather unfrequented pathways. The significant adjectives of the Vatsa-deśa leave no room for the existence or inclusion of any "dense uninhabited forest" in it. Vatsa-deśa had, in later (*i.e.*, post-*Rāmāyaṇa*) times, its capital at Kauśāmbī (modern Kosam). And, from Rāma's landing place on the southern bank of the Gaṅgā at Śṛṅgaverapura right up to Mahewa Ghat on the northern bank of the Yamunā opposite to Rajapur, the whole of the present Doaba to the West of the land between Singraur in the North and Sarai Aqil in the South—comprising the present parganas of Chail, Karari, and Atharban (and perhaps also Kara, which according to an 11th century inscription was under the Kauśāmba-maṇḍala⁹³)—constituted the Vatsa-deśa. From this Consideration it also follows that the party could never have travelled in the southern or south-western direction, in which Rajapur lies from the Śṛṅgaverapura ferry, and so the Confluence could not be situated at or near about Rajapur (District Banda).

Govindarāja, the reputed Rāmānujīya commentator of the *V.-R.*, has incidentally made a wrong statement as follows :—

"The reading *Matsyān* in place of *Vatsān* is due to the scribe's mistake. For the position of the countries is like this. Vatsa-deśa is the province (*pradeśa*) of Prayāga, between the Gaṅgā and Yamunā (*Gaṅgā-Yamunayor-madhye Prayāga-pradeśo Vatsa-deśaḥ*). To its west is Pañcālā. Śūra-sena-deśa is on the south bank of the Yamunā. To its West is the Matsya-deśa⁹⁴.

⁹³ *JRAS*, 1927, p. 694. Besides the Province or Division (*maṇḍala*) of Kauśāmbī, the district (*Pattalā*) of Kauśāmbī, also occurs in another inscription (*JRAS*, 1927, p. 696), recording the building of a temple of Siddheśvara (Mahādeva) by a certain Śrīvāstavya Thakkura in the village of Mevahaḍa (modern Meohad) in the district of Kauśāmbī, at 7 miles from Kosam. The inscription is dated Samvat 1245, *i.e.*, 1188 A.C.

⁹⁴ On the *Vulgate*, 52.101,

“ [They went on seeing the beautiful] parts of the country (*deśān*), *i.e.*, the parts included in the Vatsa-deśa (*Vatsades-āvāntara-deśān*). ”⁹⁵

Govindarāja was a South Indian and as such he has only pleaded his ignorance of the North-Indian Geography of ancient times. In the age of the Rāmāyaṇa (*i.e.*, in the hoary times Vālmīki has portrayed), Prayāga represented no towns, no villages and no cultivated land in the fiscal sense, for which it should have formed part of the Vatsa-deśa or, for a matter of that, of any other political province or state. As will be shown in the following pages, its major part consisted of a great forest. This is also admitted by F.E. Pargiter, who has written as follows :—

“ Prayāga is described in a great forest.⁹⁶

“ It will be seen that, according to the Rāmāyaṇa, sacred Prayāga (Allahabad) was only a clearing in a forest which covered the end of the Ganges and Jumna doab and the tract southward, while north of it was planted a Nishāda Kingdom with its capital at Śringaverapura on the Ganges.⁹⁷

“ He crossed the Ganges at Śringaverapura by boat, and entered the forest on the other side. Journeying through the forest they reached Prayāga next day, and Bharadvāja’s hermitage there. More particulars are given of this part of the country in connection with Bharata’s quest of Rāmā. King Guha ferried Bharata and his troops across in boats. The forest is described as scarcely penetrable, and even scarce of water for a large body of men. It appears to have been called Prayāga Forest.⁹⁸

“ Bharadvāja’s hermitage at Prayāga is described as a clearing in the forest about a “ Krośa ” in extent.⁹⁹ ”

⁹⁵ Do, 54.2-3.

⁹⁶ *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, p. 276.

⁹⁷ JRAS, 1894, *Geography of Rāmā’s Exile*, p. 233.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

" the fact remains clear (p.239) that the hermitage site was but a small cleared spot with the forest all round. From Bharadvāja's hermitage Rāma crossed the Yamunā, and went to Mount Citrakūṭa. To cross that river he used a raft. This is noteworthy, for we have seen there were plenty of boats at Śringaverapura, and it offers a further indication how completely Prayāga must have been shut off by forest from the common resources of civilization¹⁰⁰.

"About a Krośa across the Yamunā Rāma entered a forest which appears to be called "Nīla."¹⁰¹

"The forest of Citra-kūṭa does not appear to have been isolated. The narrative suggests that the Nīla forest joined the forest on this hill, and the short distance indicates that there could have been no large tract of inhabited country there. We have found that a real forest existed in the doab between Śringaverapura and Prayāga, where also there was no room for much cultivated land . . . These facts may justly be placed together, and they show that forests practically continuous extended from Citra-kūṭa, across the Jumna, over and around the south end of the doab, and crossing the Ganges ended in a forest that divided the realms of Ayodhyā and Kāśī (Benares)."¹⁰²

Thus, it will be clear that, besides the land between the Confluence and the Bharadvājāśrama and between the latter and the vast Prayāga Forest, Prayāga comprised mainly the last-named part known as Prayāga-vana¹⁰³, which, as will be seen in the sequel, was a penance-grove (*tapo-vana*). There is a clear mention in the V.-R. of the extent of the land coming under Prayāga or Bharadvāja's recluse juris-

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 241.

¹⁰³ N.W.R., 58.5-8 to be read with 22-23; 63.3; 101.27; 102.4-6, 14, 18-23; 104.50; *Vulgate*, 54. 52-8 and 22 to be read with 32, 34; 59.3; 89.21; 91.48.

diction. The poet, in course of describing the entertainment of Bharata and his army by Bharadvāja, says that the land all around extending up to 5 *yojanas* (i.e., 20 *krośas* or about 45 miles) turned into a sodded level¹⁰⁴ resembling a vast gemmed pavement (*babbūva hi samā bhūmih samantāt pañca-yojanā : sādvalair-babubhis-channā nīla-vaidūrya-sannibhaiḥ*). The N.W.R. reads *su-samā* and *pañca-yojanam* in place of *hi samā* and *pañca-yojanā* of the *Vulgate*, meaning that for 5 *yojanas* all around the land became well-levelled and covered with innumerable turfs resembling the bluish green *Vaidūrya* gems. But there is no difference between these versions on the point of the extent of 5 *yojanas* all around. And this is in perfect agreement with what we find in the *Purāṇas*, viz., that the *Prayāga Maṇḍala* extends over 5 *yojanas* (*Pañca-yojana-vistīrṇam Prayāgasya tu maṇḍalam*).¹⁰⁵ Over this vast area the human habitations, if any, were represented only by the inmates of the penance-grove (*tapovana*), who shared it in common (*vanam sādharmaṇam bīdam tapovana-nivāsinām*).¹⁰⁶ This great forest of *Prayāga*, too, is called by the poet as an *āśrama-pada*¹⁰⁷, which Principal V. S. Apte in his *Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary* has translated as 'a hermitage (including the surrounding grounds), a penance forest.' And as such it has been distinguished from the *āśrama* (hermitage) proper of the great Sage Bharadvāja extending over a *krośa* only.¹⁰⁸ It was this whole vast area of 5 *yojanas* between the *Gaṅgā* and *Yamunā* which the *Purāṇic* accounts have called the Altar of *Prajāpati* (*Vedīr-eṣā Prajāpateḥ*), the Field of *Prajāpati* (*Prajāpateḥ Kṣetram*) and the Land of the Divine Sacrifice (*Devāmāṇi*

¹⁰⁴ *Vulgate*, 91.29; N.W.R., 104.29.

¹⁰⁵ *Matsya*, 108.9 and 111.8; *Padma*, *Ādikhaṇḍa*, 45.8 and 48.10.

¹⁰⁶ N.W.R., 58.23.

¹⁰⁷ N.W.R., 102.18-19.

¹⁰⁸ N.W.R., 102.22-23.

yajana-bhūmiḥ),¹⁰⁹ as was meant by the word "Prayāga," i.e., the vast area of the primal sacrifice, now reduced to its easternmost extremity.

Politically, however, bounded though as it was by the three ancient kingdoms of Ayodhyā in the North, Kāśī in the East, and Vatsa in the West, the whole vast area of "Prayāga" was practically a "No-Man's Land." The *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* furnish us with the proof of its being associated with the first-named two states rather than the last one. The kings of Mithilā, Kāśī, Kekaya, Aṅga, Kośala and Magadha, who were either related to or on friendly terms with the house of Ayodhyā, as well as the dependent Eastern, Northern, Western, Southern, Mleccha, Yavana, Śaka and Hill-Frontier kings find their mention in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. But any king of Vatsa is not similarly mentioned in it. On the other hand, the *Mahābhārata*¹¹⁰ describes how Vītahavya, the Haihaya king of Vatsa-deśa became a Brahmarṣi, seeking refuge in the Bhārgavāśrama that belonged to Bhṛgu and his descendants. Divodāsa, the king of Kāśī, fled after sustaining a crushing defeat from the Haihayas of Vatsa and sought shelter at the hermitage of Bharadvāja. Bharadvāja performed the *Putreṣṭi* sacrifice for Divodāsa, who, as its result, had a wonderful son, Pratardana. Already equipped with the Veda, Science of Archery, and Yoga by the special favour of Bharadvāja, Pratardana killed all the royal descendants of the Vatsa king, Vītahavya, who fled to the Bhārgavāśrama, embraced Brāhmaṇahood and became a Brahmarṣi. Bharadvāja, accompanying his preceptor Vālmīki to the bank of the river Tamasā, the scene of the lamentable death of the Krauñca bird, is also associated with the origin of the *Rāmā-*

¹⁰⁹ *Matsya-purāṇa*, 104.5 ; 108.9 ; 110.4-8 ; *Padma-p.*, *Adikhaṇḍa*, 41.4-5. 45.8 ; 47.4-8 ; *Mahābhārata*, *Vanaparvan*, 83.73-82.

¹¹⁰ *Anuśāsanaparvan*, ch. 8.

yaṇa.¹¹¹ Bharadvāja's great interest in the Ayodhyā house, which was on excellent terms with the Kāśī house, the enemy of the Vatsa kings, to whose relation with the former house the *Rāmāyaṇa* bears to testimony, need not be recounted here. If we compare and connect together the accounts of the origin of the Medical Science as found in the Caraka¹¹² and Suśruta traditions, we may find a further connection between the royal house of Kāśī and Bharadvāja. So Kāśī and Vatsa were protégés of the Bharadvājāśrama and the Bhārgavāśrama respectively, and the two *Āśramas* had a sort of rivalry on account of their divided sympathies with the two royal houses. Thus, the Bharadvājāśrama could have nothing in common with the Vatsa-deśa, and the whole country, land or forest of Prayāga connected with Bharadvāja must have been independent of and separate from the Vatsadeśa.

Therefore, Vatsa-deśa as a political unit must have had its hands off the spiritual jurisdiction of Bharadvāja over the whole of ancient Prayāga, the vast area of primal sacrifice, lying between the 'renowned sacred Confluence'¹¹³ of the Gaṅgā and Yamunā in the East and the westernmost point of the great penance forest¹¹⁴ of Prayāga extending up to the vicinity of Śṛṅgaverapura and touching on the small strip of the Vatsadeśa in the West.

In the beginning of the present section I have summarised the last portion of Canto 52 of the *Vulgate* version of the *V.-R.*, Ayodhyākāṇḍa. We have also referred to the end of Canto 53 in connection with the large *nyagrodha* (*vaṭa*) tree in the solitary big forest under which the party had to spend their third night from Ayodhyā on their way from Śṛṅga-

¹¹¹ *Bālakāṇḍa*, Canto 2.

¹¹² *Sūtra-sbhāṇa*, chapter 1,00 4-40; *Bhāṇaparakāśa*, Prakaraṇa 1, vv. 35-54.

¹¹³ *N.W.R.*, 58.22; *Vulgate*, 54.22.

¹¹⁴ *N.W.R.*, 58.23; 101.27; 102.4, 6, 18—22.

verapura to the Bharadvājāśrama. The first verse of that Canto (*i.e.*, 53) records that reaching that tree [in time, as we know from 52.102] Rāma performed his *Sandhyā* and thereafter he conversed with Lakṣmaṇa. The conversation (vv.2—32) was about their present night being the first one outside human abode and about the reaction of his exile on himself and his kith and kin at Ayodhyā. Thereafter they went to sleep. This marks the end of the 53rd Canto as well as their third day activities. Thus, the *Vulgate* does not suggest any journey worth the name on their part on the day they crossed the Gaṅgā.

In the corresponding Canto 56 of the N.W.R., however, we have some more interesting and informing matter which is missing from the *Vulgate*. When the boat had started from the northern bank, Guha and the charioteer (Sumantra) who were standing there burst into tears at the sight of the two brothers, Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa (v. 22). The boat, pushed on by force of the wind and urged by power of the [boatmen's] arms, taking both the princes, came to the other side (*i.e.*, southern bank). Reaching the bank the two heroes, best of men, left the boat and with full concentration or devotion prostrated themselves before the Gaṅgā (23-24). Thereafter, Rāma, accompanied by his wife and Lakṣmaṇa, started. Just then, the wise and long-armed Rāma, determined for the forest-abode, said to Lakṣmaṇa, "O son of Sumitrā, go ahead [of us], let Sītā follow thee, [and] I will follow from behind, protecting thee as well as Sītā. Today, for the first time, Sītā will experience the pain of forest-dwelling and have to face the roar of lions, tigers and boars" (25-28). This matter is the same as of the *Vulgate*, 52.93-97.

Hereafter the N.W.R. is less reticent and more lucid than the *Vulgate* and suggests the direction in which they were to travel by mentioning the other direction as follows: "Both of them bow in hand *went on*, along with Sītā,

to that forest, avoiding to look (or, not looking) in the direction in which Sumantra stood.”¹¹⁵ Guha and Sumantra, knowing the brother princes to have gone out of sight, returned full of [pathetic] affection.¹¹⁶ [Thereafter] both [the princes] plunged into that forest rendered resonant by various [types of] birds and abounding in numerous blossoming tree.¹¹⁷

The two brothers had not gone far (*adūram-atba gatvā*) when they halted under a banyan tree abounding in hundreds of rooting branches. There, sitting at ease, they saw, not very far (*nā'tidūre*), a lotus lake (or tank or pond), ‘Sudarśanā’ by name, full of lotuses, covered over by swans and ducks, and adorned with ruddy geese.¹¹⁸ Showing it to Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa, Rāma selected this place for the party to stay for the night; and all the three, after the last three days, subsisted on lotus stalks and passed the night under the banyan tree.¹¹⁹ Then, Sumantra together with Guha, ‘seeing Rāma going on constantly, had his sight blocked by the increasing length of the distance’ and shed tears, with his soul distressed heavily.¹²⁰

The next Canto (*i.e.*, 57), like the 53rd of the *Vulgate*, reports that coming to that banyan tree Rāma performed his evening *Sandhyā* and conversed, with Lakṣmaṇa on their present night to be the first one like that of strict hermits cut off from their kinsmen and friends, and, with Sītā as well on the twofold reaction of his banishment. Thus, Canto 57 and the third day activities of the party come to a close.

¹¹⁵ N.W.R., 56. 28-29.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 29-30.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 30-31.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 31-33.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 34-38.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 39.

From this version¹²¹ it is clearer still that the forest was not very far from the place whence Sumantra and Guha were looking at the party going on. Similarly, they reached the banyan tree in that forest 'without going far' (*adūram-atha gatvā*), and the lake 'Sudarśanā,' too, was situated therein 'not very far' (*nā'ti-dūre*) from the said tree. In fact, the lake was so very near the tree that Lakṣmaṇa is described to have soon descended down the former and plucked off and presented to Sītā lotuses with their stalks.¹²²

Thus, it is now an established fact that, the party made practically no or very little Prayāga-ward journey on the Gaṅgā-crossing day, and that its major part was to be made on the following day.

We have already shown why "the direction in which the travellers were going" from Śrīngaverapura south bank could not possibly be the South or South-west. But this, it may be argued, is merely a negative conclusion and so Dr. Katju's observation, viz., "We are not told of the direction," etc., remains uncontradicted. To this we may reply that our inference yields a positive conclusion as well. Moreover, the V.-R. furnishes us with very definite and valuable information throwing a flood of light on this point. And lastly, the indication of the direction in which they were travelling, though given somewhat vaguely in that great work, is not wanting altogether as supposed by Dr. Katju.

• Now, in order to know the exact direction in which the travellers were going, if we pay a little attention to the mention of the other 'direction' in the passage quoted above,¹²³ we must at once dismiss the North from which they had already come and crossed the Gaṅgā so that they arrived

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 28-30.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 36-37.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 28-29.

at the southern bank¹²⁴ of that river. We have already eliminated the South or South-west. That direction would be irrelevant also because it would be just opposite to the 'direction' or spot of Sumantra who would see the brothers going on their way with their backs turned upon himself. There would be no necessity for the poet to say that "they went on, avoiding to look in the direction in which Sumantra stood," as Sumantra would not be automatically or by any stretch coming in the range of their sight, which they are meant to have strenuously avoided to cast at him. And, of course, Rāma's exalted character and exclusive devotion to his present mission or singleness of purpose with which he had already left his all other nears and dears, which fact the poet seems to be specially emphasising would absolutely leave no room for the alternative of their repeatedly, or even once, turning back and looking behind, to obviate which the poet might be said to have used the words quoted above. The West, too, is out of question, as it would lead them towards the present Kara-Manikpur and never towards Prayāga or the Confluence, even if the latter were at Rajapur (which is to the South-Southwest of Singraur), more especially because no bend or change of direction in course of their Prayāgaward journey is ever suggested by the poet. Therefore, the only remaining and possible direction is the East, almost parallel to the course of the Gaṅgā for a considerable distance from Śrīgaverapura to the Bharadvājāśrama or the Confluence at Allahabad.

The direction is covertly pointed out once again.¹²⁵ When Rāma was [still seen] on the south bank, Guha, being severely afflicted with pain, talked with Sumantra for a long time (*i.e.*, — as long as it took Rāma to go out of the range of his

¹²⁴ *Vulgate*, 52. 92-93; *N.W.R.*, 56. 21-22.

¹²⁵ *N.W.R.*, Cantos 61-63 = *Vulgate*, Cantos 57-59.

sight—according to the commentaries) and went home (when Rāma, of course, throughout going on along the southern bank, could not be seen any more).¹²⁶ The party's going to and staying with or reception by Bharadvāja at Prayāga up to their leaving for the mountain, *i.e.*, Citrakūṭa, was observed [and communicated to their king, Guha] by those [*i.e.*, spies] who dwelt there *i.e.*, at Śṛṅgaverapura [and had closely followed Rāma up to the hermitage of Bharadvāja].¹²⁷ Then, taking leave [of Guha and] yoking his horses to the car, Sumantra, having a deeply sad heart, went back to the city of Ayodhyā itself.¹²⁸ The distressed charioteer reached Ayodhyā, when the day was over,¹²⁹ or, according to Rāma's *Tilaka*, in the evening on the second day [after his return from Śṛṅgaverapura], or, according to Govindarāja's *Bhūṣaṇa*, in the evening on the third day [explained also as 'in the evening forming the third part of the day'].¹³⁰ He communicated to King Daśaratha the exact message of Rāma.¹³¹

At the bidding of the King, Sumantra further told him, "Both the heroes, O King, fastening *jaṭās* [to their heads] and wearing rags and barks of trees, have, after crossing the Gaṅgā, gone 'facing' [*i.e.*, in the direction of] Prayāga. Lakṣmaṇa goes in front, Janaka's daughter in the middle, and Rāma, guarding [both] goes in the rear. Seeing them going in that manner, I have had to return helplessly (*i.e.*, owing to their having gone out of my sight). Then, when I was returning, my horses, full of tears, constantly gazed at Rāma, kept neighing and cried out loudly. Then, O King,

¹²⁶ *Vulgate*, 57.1.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹²⁹ N.W.R., 61.4.

¹³⁰ *Vulgate*, 57.5.

¹³¹ N.W.R., 61.24; *Vulgate*, 57.25.

having folded my hands to both the princes, I hastened to you, realising the graveness of your situation. And I stayed there (*i.e.*, at Śrīṅgaverapura) for a whole day (*Vulgate*, 'for a number of days,') with Guha, in the hope that Rāma might probably call me again [through Guha's emissaries]¹³².

According to the above account in the poet's own words, Rāma was still on the 'southern bank' when Guha and Sumantra went back to Śrīṅgaverapura. Was Rāma, then, standing or sitting at the very place where he alighted from the boat? No. We have been already told that the princes after alighting on the southern bank, at once commenced marching on foot towards the forest lying on their way that led to Prayāga, not looking in the direction of Sumantra who stood in the same place as long as his eyes did not fail him in having even the last glimpse of them. So the return of Guha and Sumantra could possibly take place only when the party were still on the southern bank, marching along it all the time, until they reached a point where Sumantra's eyes could not see them at all. This description unmistakably shows that Rāma (with his brother and wife), after crossing the Gaṅgā, went on along the southern bank, of course, definitely from west to east, the opposite direction having been already eliminated as irrelevant in our discussion.

Again, when Sumantra says, "Both the heroes, O king, fastening *jaṭās* and wearing rags and tree-barks, have, after crossing the Gaṅgā, gone towards Prayāga," he means a sudden change in the direction of the Party's journey, which so far lay from the North to the South-West. Dr. Katju's Prayāga at Rajapur lying on their straight way from Ayodhyā to the Daṇḍaka forests *via* Śrīṅgaverapura would require a continuity of their journey in the same direction.

¹³² N.W.R., 63.1-8; *Vulgate*, 59.1-3.

In such a context the specific mention of their taking to the "Prayāgaward" course in "*Gangām-uttīrya tau vīrau Prayāgā-bhīmukhaṁ gatau*"¹³³ cannot but involve some incongruity or irrelevancy. It can be prevented only if an unexpected swerving from the previous direction be meant. Surely, this piece of information must have reacted on both the fond as well as the same aspects of the King's mind.

Then, again, how could Sumantra's horses, in course of returning to Śṛṅgaverapura, which lay, very near, on their way to Ayodhyā, fix their "constant gaze at, or, have in their continuous purview, Rāma," who was going along with Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa, all facing the direction of Prayāga, if the horses and the heroes were going not in almost parallel but opposite directions (as Dr. Katju means to say) and if Prayāga were not situated in a suddenly changed direction, almost due east of the place where Rāma had landed from the boat?

• There is yet another reference to the 'direction' in the V.-R. After the party had to resume their journey from the place of their third halt under the 'banyan tree near the 'Sudarśanā' lake in the big forest, it says, "Staying for that night under that *nyagrodha* tree they started from that halt after the Sun had clearly risen (*vimala'bhya-dite sūrye*), having thereafter penetrated into the exceedingly dense forest, 'towards the direction' (*tām diśam-uddiśya*) where the sacred Bhāgīrathī embraces the Yamunā."¹³⁴

Again, further light is shed upon this point as well as our main subject, the actual position of the Bharadvājaśrama and its distance from Śṛṅgaverapura, by Canto 102 of the N.W.R. describing Bharata's journey to the said Āśrama which, we know, was made in close pursuance of Rāma's footprints. Unfortunately this fine supplement to Rāma's travel between Śṛṅgaverapura South ferry and the Bharadvājaśrama has been abruptly omitted by the

¹³³ N.W.R., 63.3.

¹³⁴ N.W.R., 58.1-2.

Vulgate consulted by Dr. Katju and the majority of his supporters and critics. It describes, in the words of Guha, the pathway Bharata was to adopt,¹³⁵ and, in the poet's own words, "the actual journey of Bharata over the same."¹³⁶ It is, however, retained also in [canto 98 of] Gorresio's edition (representing the Bengal recension), that was used by Pargiter as is clear from the latter's references to and translations from the same given on pp. 237-38 of his nice article, *Geography of Rāma's Exile*, referred to above. Let us search out this part of the *Vālmikiya-Rāmāyaṇa*.

We are already told that Bharata got up at early dawn from his bed [at Śrīgaverapura north bank] and at Sunrise woke up Śatrughna to send for Guha, the Chief of Śrīgaverapura [who for the night had gone home¹³⁷ along with his men], in order that the latter should ferry the army across the Gaṅgā¹³⁸; and that ultimately that whole army, after, having been ferried by boatmen at (or, with the closing of) the *Maitra mubūrta* (i.e., the 3rd of the 15 *mubūrtas* of two *ghaṭikās*' or 48 minutes' duration each, after the Sunrise), went away to the Prayāga-vana (Forest of Prayāga)¹³⁹. On the days when Bharata, 35 days after Rāma¹⁴⁰ left Ayodhyā, crossed the Gaṅgā, the Sun rose between 5.21 and 5.48 A.M. By adding the time of the first 3 *mubūrtas*, viz., 6 *ghaṭikās* or 144 minutes to it we get 7.45 to 8.12 A.M., when the said incident took place. Bharata crossed the river at so early an hour as compared with Rāma because unlike the latter he had no other engagements and also because he had to travel during a hotter day, about a month later, than his elder brother.

¹³⁵ vv. 4—13.

¹³⁶ vv. 14—24.

¹³⁷ N.W.R., 100.30.

¹³⁸ N.W.R. 101. 2-3.

¹³⁹ N.W.R., 101.27; *Vulgate*, 89.20 or 21.

¹⁴⁰ N.W.R., 67.16; 69.3; 70.68; 74.16; 77.16; 89.26; 90.1 and 4; 93.14; 94.1; *Vulgate*, 62.17; 63.4; 64.78; 68.21; 71.18; 77.1 and 4; 79.1; 82.32; 83.1.

Coming to the canto in question we find that Bharata having crossed the Gaṅgā together with his army and ministers said at the instance of his priest (Vasiṣṭha) to Guha (verse 1), "Through which country should we go to where Rāma is? O Guha, tell us the way: you always live in forests" (v. 2). Guha who knew the country where Rāma was then staying replied (v. 3), "O Kākutṣtha, hence you ought to go to the best forest of Prayāga, full of various birds and reservoirs of water having lotuses, etc. O best of men, the forest of Prayāga extends over a *pra-krośa*, i.e., an excessive or big *krośa*¹⁴¹ [in length]" (vv. 4-6). The reading in the printed edition is *prakrośa-mātram*. But if it be not treated as a printer's devil or scribe's mistake for *pra-krośa*, a word formed by adding *pra* before *krośa*, like *pra-dvāra*¹⁴², *prācārya* (the well-known instance of the *prādi-samāsa* in Sanskrit Grammar), etc., *pra-krośa* would be quite meaningless. *krośamātra* is a familiar expression in the *V.-R.*¹⁴³ To it the addition of *pru* gives the sense of 'intensity' or 'excess.' In translating vv. 4-6 and 18-20 or 14-22 here I am accepting the construction as understood by Pargiter. They are, however, open to be construed in another way as well, as I will show later on.

Guha continues to say, "Resting there you ought to go to the hermitage of Bharadvāja (6). O Prince, going there, offer your obeisance to that sage, conversant with *Dharma*, perfect in asceticism and well-known all over the three worlds (7). Having obtained his blessings and heard his 'thrilling' or 'agreeable' words (containing information regarding what you wish to know, *viz.*, Rāma's whereabouts), you, being thrilled with joy, shall go to see your elder

¹⁴¹ *Krośa* originally means "the range of the voice in calling or hallooing." As a measure of distance it is equivalent to about 2 miles and a quarter. A *Pra-krośa* may cover 3 miles or a little more.

¹⁴² *N.W.R.*, 29.5.

¹⁴³ *N.W.R.*, 59.7, 19; 102.22; *Vulgate*, 55.8, 32; etc.

brother (8), after you have stayed there for the night and been entertained by him with rich reception; for as an affectionate host he, after seeing you, will detain you (*lit.*, will not let you go) for one night (9)." Telling this to and getting all praise from Bharata, Guha paid his respects to Bharata and his preceptor and returned with his kinsmen to his boat (vv. 10-14).

Bharata, too, went to the Prayāga Forest together with his army, appointing Sumantra to be their guide, enjoying the sight of fruitful trees and flowers and the sweet sounds of sylvan birds, and giving expression to the merits of Rāma, Sitā and Lakṣmaṇa and demerits of his own mother, Kaikeyī (14-17). Going a *yojana*¹⁴⁴ and a half he saw the great forest reputed as Prayāga (*i.e.*, the area of the primal sacrifice) [charming] like the Caitraratha (*i.e.*, Kubera's grove) (18). Entering that hermitage (or, penance forest), which yielded all the desired fruits (or, fulfilled all the desires or human aims) and which looked charming with lotus tracts or lakes, and in this way approaching that best abode of gods (or, best temple), Prayāga, Bharata circumambulated and worshipped the same (19-20). Then, all his mothers, Śatrugṇa and others also circumambulated it (21). Offering their obeisance and then coming out of that forest they saw the hermitage of the great sage of the Bharadvāja family, where the trees formed a thicket in a *krośa*'s extent (22-23). Having seen the hermitage, Bharata was exceedingly delighted (23). Comforting his army and stopping it outside, Bharata made up his mind to go to see the great Sage Bharadvāja (24).

The next canto (N.W.R., 103) contains the information that Bharata keeping his army at a distance (*Vulgate*, at a *krośa*) went on foot in silken garments to the Bharadvājāśrama together with his ministers headed by the Preceptor

¹⁴⁴ *Yojana* originally means "a stage or distance gone in one harnessing or without unyoking." As a measure it is equal to 4 *Krośas* or 9 miles.

(vv. 1-2). It had nice secondary gates, was neat and clean, had the beauteous plantain groves, abounded in tame reptiles and beasts, was embellished with groups of sacrificial altars or platforms, looked as an open door to heaven, and was shining with the sylvan beauty (3-4). Going not very far (*nā'ti-dūram tato gatvā*) he saw that [particular] *āśrama* (4). Entering that hermitage, Bharata accompanied by his priest saw that exceedingly magnanimous sage having firelike glow (5).

The *Vulgate*¹⁴⁵ tells us only that Bharata, crossing the Gaṅgā, at the *muhūrta* No. 3, went to the Prayāga Forest. The *Bhūṣaṇa* of Govindarāja takes the time indication to mean *either* that the army crossed the river during the third *muhūrta* whereafter it went to the Prayāga-vana, *i.e.*, crossing of the river—was an accomplished fact within the first 6 *ghaṭikās* (144 minutes) after the sunrise, *or* that it went to the Prayāga-vana at [the commencement of] the third *muhūrta*. The latter interpretation is adopted by the *Śiromaṇi*, which adds, "This indicates that the Gaṅgā-crossing was finished within the two *muhūrtas* (*i.e.*, 96 minutes) after the sun-rise.

The expression 'went to' (*pra-yayau*), however, is not very clear. It may mean either (1) departed from or left the Śṛṅgaverapura ferry and moved on towards the Prayāga-vana, or (2) proceeded to, *i.e.*, was already going on the way to the Prayāga-vana, or (3) 'reached' the first point in the Prayāga-vana. The ambiguity of expression, instead of being resolved or reduced, is further enhanced by the deplorable reticence of the *Vulgate*, which, in the very next stanza, as if in a jump, brings Bharata, who, just a moment back, has been at Śṛṅgaverapura, at once to the door of the Bharadvājāśrama.

¹⁴⁵ 89.21 (Govindarāja's text, 89.20).

We are further¹⁴⁶ told that at the sight of the Bharadvājāśrama Bhārata stopped his whole army at the distance of a *krośa* and went with his priest to see the Sage. It¹⁴⁷ also records that Bharata, approaching the hermitage of the high-souled Brāhmaṇa (*i.e.*, Bharadvāja), the priest of the gods, saw the charming big forest of that best Brāhmaṇa, which had, beautiful huts surrounded by clusters of trees. Govindarāja remarks that the adjective 'big,' (*mabat*) as applied to the Sage's hermitage forest signifies its great capacity to afford sufficient space for the whole army of Bharata to encamp.

The above account of the *Vulgate* does not, however, help us much in fixing the direction or distance from Śṛṅgaverapura of the Bharadvājāśrama, or of the Prayāga-vana, the only milestone between these two places. If we accept the view of the *Śiromaṇi* and the second interpretation of the *Bhūṣaṇa* and take 'went' to mean 'reached,' the distance between Śṛṅgaverapura and the Prayāga-vana can be no more than what may be covered within a *muhūrta* or 48 minutes, say about 3 miles more or less. But the *Vulgate* as well as the *N.W.R.* have clearly pointed out that the Bharadvājāśrama, instead of being particularly a small spot containing some building or buildings as we find it now-a-days, extended, in those times, over a 'big' forest, in a *krośa* (about $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles) in length, and abounded in huts surrounded by clustering trees.

Now, if we knit together the threads 'supplied also by the *N.W.R.* and Gorresio's edition, we find that Bharata's army, after going for a *yojana* and a half ($13\frac{1}{2}$ miles) from the ferry of Śṛṅgaverapura, entered the forest of Prayāga proper, which extended over a *pra-krośa* (3 miles or so).

¹⁴⁶ *Vulgate*, 89. 21 or 22; and 90.1.

¹⁴⁷ 89.22 or 23.

Coming out of that (Prayāga) forest they saw the Bharadvājāśrama occupying a *krośa* ($2\frac{1}{2}$ miles) in length; and leaving his army behind at the same distance (at a *krośa*), i.e., at the place where the Prayāga-vana ended and Bharadvāja's great forest (*mahad vanam*) containing his huts commenced, Bharata with his ministers went to see the Sage in his hermitage. Thus, the total distance that Bharata and his people had to cover from Śrīngaverapura right up to the Bharadvājāśrama was $13\frac{1}{2} + 3 + 2\frac{1}{2} = 18\frac{3}{4}$ miles. And this wonderfully tallies with the actual distance between Singraur and Allahabad if one takes to the direct route on the South of the Gaṅgā as Rāma and Bhārata did.

As already said, in construing certain passages of the N.W.R., I have not differed materially from Pargiter; but they may be better interpreted, as follows:—

Verses 4-5 and first half of the 6th form one sentence with *gamyatām* as the finite verb, and the concluding words, '*vanam prakrośa-mātram ca Prayāgasya naraṛṣabha*,' have to be taken only as a repetition in sense, of '*(itaḥ) Prayāgam Kākutstha (gamyatām) vanam-uttamam*,' made simply for adding up the particular detail of the distance of the said Prayāga Forest from the south bank of the Gaṅgā opposite Śrīngaverapura, as it was not feasible in the body of the latter, i.e., the first half of verse 4. In '*Prayāgasya vanam itaḥ prakrośa-mātram*' the distance is denoted by the same idiom as in '*tri-yojanam itas-tāta girir-yatra nivatsyasi . . . Citrakūṭa iti khyāto Gandhamādāna-sannibbha*,'¹⁴⁸ which I will discuss in the last section. The sentence thus means, "O descendant of Kakutstha, you ought to go to the excellent Prayāga Forest,—from here, the forest of Prayāga, O best of men, lying at an excessive or big *krośa* (about 3 miles or just a little more) only,—full of the flocks of various kinds of birds, and endowed with

¹⁴⁸ N.W.R., 58. 29-31.

reservoirs of water that resemble their [own] series of lotuses, have good descents [into water] and little mud, are disturbed by birds' feet and are full [of water] and blocked by the dark-green mosses (4-6). Resting therein you ought to go 'towards' (*i.e.*, in the direction of) the Bharadvājāsrama (6).” This account reminds us of the surroundings of Rāma's third day halt near the lake ‘Sudarśanā’ in the big forest.

The translation of the further passages is now to be as follows :—

(7-14 *supra*, pp. 461-462).

“Bharata with his army went over to the Prayāga Forest (14) . . . (15-17, *supra*, p. 462). Going through the great forest for a *yojana* and a half he entered the hermitage area or penance grove (*āśrama-padaṁ*) like Čaitraratha [the divine grove of Kubera] and saw the beautiful or sacred place of pilgrimage (*su-tīrtham*) known as “Prayāga,” which grants the fruits of all [human] desires and looks charming with lotus-tracts (*paṅkaja-vanaḥ*) having abundant lotuses (18-19).¹⁴⁹ Approaching that excellent abode of gods, or, that best temple (*lit.*, Divine Place), Prayāga (*abhiḡamyā Prayāgaṁ tad deva-sthānam-anuttamam*),¹⁵⁰ Bharata circumambulated it and bowed down before it (20). All those mothers of him as well as Śatrughna went to, and with great devotion (*apramattāḥ*) circumambulated, that, *i.e.*, the ‘Divine Place’, Prayāga (21). Bowing down and coming out of that forest, immediately, or, adjacent to it (*anantaram*), they saw the

¹⁴⁹ सुमहद् वनम् अर्घ्यार्थं योजनं गत्वा, यथा चैत्ररथ तथा तद् आश्रमपदं प्रविश्य, सर्वकामफलप्रदं बहुपुष्करैः पङ्कजवनैः शोभितं प्रयागम् इति विख्यातं सुतीर्थं ददर्श— (इत्यन्वयः) ।

¹⁵⁰ Compare the expression ‘*anuttamam deva-sthānam*’ used for the extensive Prayāga-vana here in the Rāmāyaṇa with ‘*abhisamskṛtā devānām yajana-bhūmiḥ*’ and ‘*Prayāpateḥ vediḥ*’ or ‘*keśetram*’ in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas*, denoting the whole *maṇḍala* of Prayāga covering 5 *yojanas*. cf. *supra*, footnote 109.

Āśrama of His Holiness (*bhāvitātmanah*), the great Sage of the Bharadvāja family, in the extent of a *krośa* having clustering trees" (22-23).

• This construction, too, results in giving the same total mileage, though with a little inverted order of its items, viz., 1 *pra-krośa* (3 miles) + *adhyardha* (i.e., $1\frac{1}{2}$) *yojana* ($13\frac{1}{2}$ miles) + 1 *krośa* ($2\frac{1}{4}$ miles) = $18\frac{3}{4}$ miles. Its particular import, however, presents the difference on two points, i.e. (1) *pra-krośa* or 3 miles representing the distance between Śṛṅgaverapura South Ferry and the commencing point of the great forest, called the Prayāga-vana, as also borne out by the fact of 48 minutes spent in covering it according to the commentaries, *Śiromaṇi* and *Bhūṣaṇa*, on the *Vulgate*, and not the extent of that Prayāga-vana, which Pargiter understands to have stood after $1\frac{1}{2}$ *yojanas* from Śṛṅgaverapura and just before the one *krośa* extent of the Bharadvājāśrama, and the mileage of which he has omitted to mention, and (2) "Prayāga" being also the name of a particular sacred *tīrtha* having a "Divine Place," which like a temple could be easily circumambulated, and which was situated at the eastern fag-end of the Prayāga-vana, coming out of which one had to enter the hermitage proper of the Sage Bharadvāja. Thus, according to the present interpretation, the country was open for about 3 miles east of Śṛṅgaverapura, and between this open country and the Bharadvājāśrama, which according to all the versions extended in a *krośa* ($2\frac{1}{4}$ miles), there stood a very big forest, called the Prayāga Forest or "the Forest," serving the purpose of a 'penance forest' and extending over a *yojana* and a half ($13\frac{1}{2}$ miles). It might have required about a *krośa* ($2\frac{1}{4}$ miles) more to reach the summer Confluence from the Bharadvājāśrama in those days.

Thus, both Rāma's party and Bharata's army travelled eastward from Śṛṅgaverapura to reach the Bharadvājāśrama near the Confluence for about 18-19 miles; and the distance

between Guhā's city and the shifting Confluence was about 20-21 miles and in no case exceeded 22 miles. The "No-Man's Land," where recluses practised penance as well as students acquired knowledge, both living under the holy charge of Bharadvāja, extended from East to West as far as the westernmost extremity of the great forest after which lay the prosperous tracts of the Vatsadśa, and covered about $(22 - 3) = 19$ miles lengthwise. All this holy land comes under the "Prayāga Maṇḍala" of the Purāṇic lore and represents the Divine Land of Sacrifice par excellence, as is meant by the word "Prayāga."

Now it will be quite clear that the direction in question could never be South-west nor the distance between Śrīṅgaverapura and Old Prayāga or the Bharadvājāśrama or the Confluence "about 40 miles more or less," as our honourable leader, Dr. Katju, would expect us to acquiesce in. "The direction in which the Gaṅgā met the Yamunā" in those days has always been the same, *i.e.*, the East from Śrīṅgaverapura or from the large banyan tree in the big uninhabited forest. The distance is the same today as it was then according to links found in the *V.-Rāmāyaṇa*. Old Śrīṅgaverapura, whose identity seems to have been only reluctantly accepted by Dr. Katju and has been disputed by Mr. Mittal, was not different from the modern Singraur. Nor have the rivers materially changed their course. Nor has the Confluence shifted from Rajapur to Allahabad. Nor was the site of the Bharadvājāśrama in old Prayāga very different from that at modern Allahabad.

Reverting to Rāma's journey from the vast *nyagrodha* tree near the lotus lake, 'Sudarśanā,' at the commencement of a big uninhabited forest, we find that the party after passing the night under that *nyagrodha* tree left that place when it was clear Sun-rise (*vimale'bhyudite Sūrye*),¹⁵¹ of course,

¹⁵¹ N.W.R., §8.1; *Vulgate*, §4.1

of a post-winter¹⁵² or pre-summer morning, *i.e.*, about or just a little before 8 A.M. Having penetrated into a rather big or dense forest, they went on 'towards that *deśa* (country or place, *i.e.*, Prayāga), in which the Yamunā proceeds in face of (*i.e.*, turns to meet) the Bhāgīrathī Gaṅgā,¹⁵³ or 'aiming at the "direction" (*tām diśam-uddiśya*) wherein the holy Bhāgīrathī (Gaṅgā) approaches the Yamunā.¹⁵⁴ Adopting a safe path,¹⁵⁵ or,¹⁵⁶ carefully so as to remain safe,¹⁵⁷ or, 'comfortably,' because they entertained no thought of meeting any people and had not the least doubt or fear, and 'safely' (meaning, so as to keep intact their stock of physical energy), *i.e.*, resting and upstanding in slow degrees at will,¹⁵⁸ they went on, seeing various tracts of land and beautiful places (*deśān*) which they had never seen before and which were full of flowers of various colours: then, just at the sun-set, *i.e.*, about 6 P.M., Rāma said to Lakṣmaṇa (vv. 3-4). "See the smoke uprising in front of Prayāga. It being a mark of the Sacred Fire, I hope the Sage is near at hand, or, is at home (v. 5). We have surely arrived at the auspicious Confluence of the Gaṅgā and Yamunā, as we hear the high sound born of the collision of the waters (v. 6). Firewood is lying cut or torn by those who dwell in the forest and subsist on [the products of] trees; and we see these trees of various kinds in Bharadvāja's hermitage" (v. 7). Having thus gradually or leisurely walked, they or those two archers, at sun-down, reached the abode (*i.e.*, the area lying near the hermitage)

¹⁵² N.W.R., 60.7; *Vulgate*, 56.6—'Śisīrātyaya' denotes the close or end of the cold or dewy season, which comprises the two months of Māgha and Phālguna.

¹⁵³ *Vulgate*, 54.2

¹⁵⁴ N.W.R., 58.2.

¹⁵⁵ 'Panthānam Kṣemamāsādyā.'—N.W.R., 58.4.

¹⁵⁶ 'Yathā-Kṣema na.'—*Vulgate*, 54.4.

¹⁵⁷ 'Kṣema-betu-avadhānam-anatikramya.'—Govindarāja's *Bhāṣa na*.

¹⁵⁸ *Yathā* (= 'Yathā-sukham, janānāmāna-sankā-bhāvāt'), *kṣema na* (= *upaviśy-ottthāya ca, sanaiḥ sanaiḥ svecchā'nurodbena*).—Rāma's *Tilaka*.

of the Sage, at the Confluence of¹⁵⁹, or, in the *Antarvedi-dēśa* (the land included in the [vast Divine] sacrificial Altar) between¹⁶⁰, the Gaṅgā and Yamunā (v. 8). Rāma, on his part, entering the [forest lying near the] *Āsrama*, causing terror [merely on account of his form of an archer, etc.,] to the beasts and birds, and going on the way for a *muhūrta* (*i.e.*, the way which he could cover in a *muhūrta* or 48 minutes),¹⁶¹ reached [in the neighbourhood of] Bharadvāja.¹⁶²

The last reference furnishes an additional proof of the fact that the hermitage proper of Bharadvāja occupied an area of more than two miles ; because after entering its precincts, Rāma, together with Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa had to walk for more than three quarters of an hour before he could reach in the vicinity of the residential quarters of the Sage. Hereby it is also clear that the Sage, though practically in charge of not only the hermitage extending over more than 2 miles but also the whole penance forest called Prayāgāvana which stretched up to the Vatsadeśa in the immediate neighbourhood of Guha's kingdom, had his headquarters at the easternmost corner of the said hermitage. And that was exactly the same place as is even today occupied by the several temples and is called Jogiānā in Colonelganj. It included even the southern part of the Ananda Bhavana and the high ground under the tamarind trees to its south, besides the present Bharadvāja Park and all the high ground East of the present Indian Press inclusive, because it was all in one and the same level before the construction of the channels carrying foul water and the roads dividing these tracts apart. After coming so far with me, my generous readers will be fully convinced with the truth of my remarks made on pp. 192-3 above.

¹⁵⁹ 'Sandhan' = *Saṅgame varīamānam*.—*Bhūṣaṇa*.

¹⁶⁰ 'Sandhan' = *Antar-vedi-dēśa*.—*Tilaka*.

¹⁶¹ 'Muhūrtam' = *muhūrta-gamyam*.—*Bhūṣaṇa*.

¹⁶² *Vulgate*, 54.9.

As compared to Bharata's march described above, the above account of Rāma's journey to Prayāga, though representing an amalgamation of the various versions, is very meagre. Nevertheless, it is rather undoubtedly obvious that Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā travelled quite leisurely, often resting at places and seeing the sights, and covered, on the fourth day, a distance of about 15-16 miles within 10 hours to reach the exact spot where Bharadvāja sat surrounded by his disciples¹⁶³ and ascetics¹⁶⁴, and that on the previous day they could not walk more than about 3 miles in any case. In view of these hard facts projecting in high relief from the perfect workmanship of Valmīki which only a minute research thereof made after a thorough clearing off of the sticking rubbish has revealed, the hollowness, futility and exaggerated nature of the following fantastical, funny and amusing observations of certain learned writers ought to stand fully exposed:—

“After a whole day's journey the night fell and the party stopped under a big tree. The next morning they resumed their journey and by dusk sighted the vicinity of the Bharadvāja Ashram nearby.”¹⁶⁵

“This party was walking not like gods but definitely as human beings, a party of youthful people.”¹⁶⁶

“It took Ram Chandrajī two days' travelling to reach the confluence from the place where he crossed the Ganges. Thirty to 40 miles would be about that distance.”¹⁶⁷

“Normally a person walking with a lady would not cover more than 10 or 12 miles a day.”¹⁶⁸

¹⁶³ *Vulgate*, 54.11.

¹⁶⁴ *N.W.R.*, 58.13.

¹⁶⁵ *Dr. Katju's English article*, paragraphs 4-5.

¹⁶⁶ *Loc. cit.*, para. 8.

¹⁶⁷ *Loc. cit.*, par. 13.

¹⁶⁸ *A. B. Patrika*, Oct. 4, 1945.—Pandit Shivanath Katju's summary of Dr. K. N. Katju's view-point.

“ Singraur (in the Allahabad District) is now considered to be ancient Śhringvirpur. This claim seems to be without foundation. The ancient Shringvirpur must have been about 50 miles away from modern Allahabad while Singraur is only 22 miles.”¹⁶⁹

“ Therefore, the theory can very well now be proved that the Ashram of Bharadwaj Muni was somewhere near Rajapur at the Sangam, which was about 32 miles from Shringvirpur, where he left his chariot. This distance was quite practicable for Shri Ram, specially with Sita, to travel on foot in two days time.”¹⁷⁰

Pargiter, too, partly misconstruing the *Rāmāyaṇa*, miscalculated the daily journey and misjudged as follows :—

“ Journeying through the forest, they reached Prayāga next day.”¹⁷¹

“ A yojana-and-a-half, therefore, meant about nine miles, and for that space only beyond Śrīgaverapura was the country open. Beyond that, again, and down to Prayāga, about 13 miles, forest covered the doab It may be noticed that the two days’ journey over these 22 miles, would make the day’s journey 11 or 12 miles, quite as much as Sītā could have travelled on foot.”¹⁷²

Mr. T. Paramasiva Iyer, however, seems to be nearer the truth when he writes on ‘ *The Length of the Daily March (in Rāma’s Itinerary) beyond Singraur* ’ as follows :—

“ From the south bank of the Ganges, Sītā walks with Rāma right down to Pañchavati, and the daily march ends by sun-down, Rāma fixing a resting place for the night in advance. The daily march was thus limited to about eighteen miles though Sītā fed on flesh, and was bubbling with the energy of an adolescent girl.”¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ *A. B. Patrika*, Sept. 2, 1945.— Mr. Mittal’s article, parag. 12.

¹⁷⁰ *Loc. cit.*, par. 17.

¹⁷¹ *JRAS*, 1894, p. 237.

¹⁷² *Loc. cit.*, p. 238.

¹⁷³ *Rāmāyaṇa and Lanka*, Part I, chap. XIV., p. 99.

The whole reasoning of Dr. Katju is fictitious and not at all factual so as to be convincing. I have given a long quotation from his article (paragraph 13) in the beginning of section 3. The readers have seen how its contents, too, like his other observations, are unable to stand reason based on facts. His arguments drawing as they do upon speculation, though making a great display of vigour, are life-less and lacking in reality. Such purely conjectural arguments might be effective in entirely philosophical disquisitions. But surely they can have no place in a discussion on historical problems. Mere conjecture proves nothing. Had Dr. Katju made out a case, giving ancient literary, geological and other tangible grounds to establish that the Gaṅgā flowed for forty miles from Singraur on a south-westerly course and made the confluence with the Yamunā at Rajapur, we would have weighed the same against the information I have furnished above from the V.-R. itself; and thus his present hypothesis would have assumed the dignity of a theory to hold some ground. But his observations based on the misinterpretation of a single, imperfect, unreliable version of the V.-R. and fantastic surmises meant to serve as arguments have only resulted in misleading numerous casual or habitual readers of the Allahabad dailies. Instead of these had he thought it advisable to appeal to the researchers in the field of Indian Archaeology, who alone would be the competent persons to give a sound verdict, he would have surely done a yeoman's service to the cause of the reconstruction and reclamation of our ancient past. If, however, he has been in only "to invite discussion on this most important topic," we have had enough of it; and it is now opportune to compare and exchange notes and come to a settlement.

Now to recapitulate, the following facts have so far emerged from our discussion to weigh against the statements of Dr. Katju and his supporters:—

The royal car, passing through the land of Rama's
 * F. 30.

maternal uncle, took the party over to the suburb of Śṛṅgaverapurā, beyond which they had to walk on foot. For the first three days they lived on water only. Consequently, down to the *nyagrodha* tree on their way to Prayāga they made little progress in their journey, as was also due to their devoting major part of the day to the various activities ending in the crossing of the Gaṅgā and to the hunting affair.

Partly regaining some energy by taking lotus stalks on the third night, the three travellers were enabled to cover the major part of the distance between Singraur and the present Bharadvājāśrama in about 10 hours of the fourth day, repeatedly taking the requisite amount of rest on their 'lonely' way. Their way led almost through the forest, proverbially too dense at places, without any 'open' country as such except the whole small strip of the Vatsadeśa for about 3 miles lying in between Śṛṅgaverapura and the banyan tree on their Prayāgaward way. One *yojana* and a half ($1\frac{1}{2}$ miles) is rather the whole distance of the great Prayāga-vana, that lay after 3 miles east of Śṛṅgaverapura and before the Bharadvājāśrama and contained at its fag-end a "Divine Place" (*deva-sthāna*) like a holy temple which Bharata and others circumambulated before coming out of that forest and entering the precincts of the Bharadvājāśrama, than the 'open country' between Śṛṅgaverapura and the Prayāga-vana as understood by Pargiter. The Bharadvājāśrama occupied an area in more than 2 miles' length, which Rāma with his wife and brother traversed in more than 3 quarters of an hour in order to reach Bharadvāja with his residential quarters at the eastern-most corner of the table-land between the two rivers, the present Bharadvājāśrama pointing to the same. The Confluence was at another 2 or 3 miles during the summer but not so far during the rains when both the rivers drew together at the foot of Bharadvāja's residence. Prayāga included the whole land between the two rivers to the east of the Vatsadeśa.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

ĀTMAN IN PRE-UPANIṢADIC VEDIC LITERATURE. By H. G. Narahari, M.A., M.Litt., Research Fellow, Madras University. pp. xlv + 278. Published by Adyar Library, 1944. Price Rs. 8.

The book under review is the thesis approved by the Madras University for the Degree of Master of Letters. It contains 12 small chapters dealing with the Existence of Ātman known to the Ṛgvedic Seers ; Ātman or the Individual Self as distinct from Brahman ; The conception of immortality in the Veda ; The Vedic doctrine of the worlds above ; Devayāna and Pitryāna ; Theism of the Ṛgveda ; Sūktabhājah and Havirbhājah ; Prayers and their rewards in the Veda ; Ṛgveda, the source of Upaniṣadic Philosophy ; Transmigration traced to the Ṛgveda ; Sin and hell as understood in the Veda ; and Conclusion.

The subject is very interesting. Though great scholars of the West have done good deal of pioneer work in the field of Vedic literature, yet it is difficult to say that there is hardly any work to be done now. Our studies of the literature show that there is a vast field to do original work and also to examine the conclusions of the western scholars from the orthodox point of view. Hardly much has been done in the true spirit of Indian thought.

Mr. Narahari has taken great pains to study the problems from different angles of vision and has given the views of almost all the Vedic scholars. The work deserves careful study and the author is to be congratulated for having taken great pains for maintaining the standard of high scholarship.

EPIGRAPHICAL ECHOES OF KĀLIDĀSA. By C. Sivaramamurti, M.A., Curator, Archaeological Section, Government Museum, Madras. With a Foreword by the late R. B. K. N. Dikshit. Published by Thompson and Co., Ltd., 33, Broadway, Madras. 1944. pp. xvi + 104. Price Rs. 3-8-0.

The book under review is the first number of the *Memoirs of the Archaeological Society of South India series*. The present volume deals with the discussion of such expressions and passages in epigraphical literature as can be traced to have been borrowed or influenced by Sanskrit literature. The title of the work though refers to Kālidāsa, yet the author has made references to Vālmīki, Bhāravi, Bāṇa and Daṇḍin as well. The author has further enlivened the book by reproducing the actual forms of the letters in which the thoughts forming the echoes from Kālidāsa and other poets are embodied, so that the reader may become interested in the interesting world of epigraphy. He has searched the wide range of Indian inscriptions from the 2nd century A.D. to the 12th for the illustrations of this book. He has illustrated it profusely.

Mr. Sivaramamurti has done a great service by drawing the attention of scholars towards the influence of Sanskrit Literature over inscriptions which will help us to fix chronology with much more certainty. The author deserves every encouragement and congratulations of scholars.

PĀTIMOKKHA AND DHAMMASANGAṆI. The former is edited by R. D. Vadekar, Esq., M.A., University teacher in Pali, Fergusson College, Poona, while the latter by P. V. Bapat, Esq., M.A., Ph.D., and R. D. Vadekar, Esq., M.A. Both have appeared in the *Bhandarkar Oriental Series* as Nos. 1 and 2. The former can be had for Re. 1-0-0.

ATTHASĀLINĪ. Edited by Dr. Vapat and Mr. R. D. Vadekar. This is the third book of the *Bhandarkar Oriental Series*.

• The Pāli *Pātimokkha* contains rules of discipline for the Buddhists monks and nuns. It is one of the oldest of the Vinaya texts and is very important from the Buddhist point of view. The editor has taken great pains to compare the texts with the Ceylonese and the Burmese editions and also with that of Oldenberg. It has been very carefully edited. The author has promised to bring out its second part containing translation and useful notes.

Dhammasaṅgaṇi belongs to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and deals with the enumeration of the Dhammas by way of questions and answers. The book is divided into four sections, each of which has got a table of contents called Mātikā. Mrs. Rhys Davids has translated this work and calls it—‘*A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*.’ It is a very interesting book and is meant for the use of advanced monks.

Aṭṭhasālinī is a commentary on the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. This is for the first time that these books have been published in the Devanāgarī script with the help of Sinhalese, Burmese and Siamese texts, found in mss. These are some of the more important texts of Buddhism which were not published in Devanāgarī script before. The editors have spared no pains to make the editions up to date and critical. All possible material has been utilised to make the edition complete.

Both the editors who are experts in Pali and the *Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* deserve our hearty congratulations for bringing out such fine and useful editions of Pali texts.

MITHILĀ-BHĀṢĀ-VIDYOTANA. By Mahāvaiyākaraṇa Paṇḍita Shri 'Dinabandhu Jhā, Published by the Maithilī-Sāhitya-Pariṣad, Darbhanga. pp. 13 + 300. Price Rs. 5. (Rs. 4 for the members of the Pariṣad). *

Mahāvaiyākaraṇa Pandit Sri Dinabandhu Jha's *Mithilā-bhāṣā-Vidyotana* (published by the *Maithilī Sāhitya Pariṣad* Darbhanga, 1946) is a remarkable book in many ways. It is the fullest and most complete grammar of the Maithilī language that has been ever published in Maithilī, and it seeks to marshall all the rather complicated facts of this language, which is current among a population of considerably over ten millions of people. I have found it conceived in a spirit of frank appreciation of the special character of Maithilī as contrasted with Sanskrit, although the author has paid his homage to Sanskrit by compiling his rules in *Sūtra*-form in Maithilī. The author probably did this as a *tour de force*, and this certainly indicates his great scholarship and his critical acumen in the selection of the essentials, but I would have liked him to employ it with greater advantage (as I think) for Maithilī grammar in giving us a larger selections of facts arranged and treated in the ordinary way. The pronoun—incorporating nature of the verb in present-day Maithilī has been analysed carefully, and the various paradigms for both noun declension and verb conjugation are very usefully and conveniently tabulated. I only wish the various tense-forms of the Maithilī verb were given with a little more fullness. But that does not detract from the great value of the book: faults of omission like this do not detract much from its importance and usefulness. The grammar appears to be the work of a scholar of the type who understands (although he, as is only natural, sees through the window of Sanskrit so to say) the mechanism of his mother-tongue, and sets about conscientiously to explain it. I think the ideal grammar of a New Indo-Aryan language

is to be based on the finding of historical comparative linguistics ; but it will be long before really good work in this line will be done. But the works like the present one are also invaluable, and both the author and the learned body which has published it deserve the best thanks of all persons interested in the study of New Indo-Aryan.

Suniti Kumar Chatterji (Calcutta University).

CATALOGUE OF THE ANUP SANSKRIT LIBRARY. Fasciculus II. Prepared by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja and K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M. O. L. Published by Authority, Bikaner.

The Anup Sanskrit Library is doing admirable service to the cause of Sanskrit learning. The Bikaner State has got quite a large number of valuable Sanskrit Mss. which remained unknown to the scholars outside for a long time. But now through the efforts of Dr. Raja and Shri K. Madhava Krishna Sarma both the Catalogue of the Mss. and the rare works in print are being brought out for the benefit of scholars. The first fasciculus of the Catalogue was published long before and this is the second of the series. It contains the list of Mss. on the *Gītā* and the *Dharmaśāstra*. The Curator hopes that the subsequent parts will follow at an early date. It is very essential that a full comprehensive and scientific catalogue of Mss. and rare works should be published wherever possible. The compilers of this catalogue deserve our congratulations.

THE MUDRA-RAKSHASA-KATHA of Mahadeva—Edited by Dr. V. Raghavan M.A., Ph.D., Saraswati Mahal Series No. 1. Published by the Administrative Committee of the Maharajah Serfoji's Saraswati Mahal Library, Tanjore. Pages viii + 92 + 40 + xlii. 1946. Price Rs. 2-8-0.

The Maharaja Serfoji's Saraswati Mahal Library at Tanjore contains a unique collection of rare manuscripts in Sanskrit, Telugu, etc. It is to be congratulated that an attempt has been made towards a systematic publication of the rare finds in the library and the book under review is the 1st of the series to be published as the *Saraswati Mahal Series*. The work under review is a Sanskrit prose work in 40 pages and contains a clear and succinct summary of the famous Sanskrit drama *Mudrā-Rākṣasa* by Viśākhadatta. Baffling literary critics in its absence of Śṛṅgāra, *Mudrā-Rākṣasa* will stand as the unique political drama of Sanskrit Literature and its characters have a permanent appeal. As the plot is intricate such a publication, as the present one, is welcome. Its prose is simple, elegant and grand.

Dr. Raghavan is to be congratulated for the way in which he has edited the work and has translated it with notes, and useful appendices. All this has added to the utility of the work. It will prove very useful if the students go through this book before studying the drama in original.

OUR RELATION TO THE ABSOLUTE—A STUDY IN TRUE PSYCHOLOGY. By Swami Abhedananda. Published by the Calcutta Ramakrishna Vedanta Math, 19B, Raja Rajakrishna Street, Calcutta. Pages xxvi + 208. Price Rs. 6.

The book under review contains the nine lectures with an appended chapter on questions and answers systematically delivered by Swami Abhedananda in America in 1920 and is now offered as No. 2 of the *Abhedananda Memorial Series*. The work is a study in true psychology and is named after the title of the 9th lecture in the book "*Our Relation to the Absolute*."

The book is written in simple and direct style and has a powerful appeal. The racy fluency is preserved throughout the work in explaining difficult psychological and philosophical Vedantic truths even to laymen.

The Swami states that though the word psychology has been derived from the term *psyche* or soul, it is now used in the west in the sense of the physiological origin and ordering of the mind. He takes us elaborately in several lectures through the meaning of consciousness, powers of the mind and power of concentration. The other chapters are on individuality and personality and on the three states of existence of the mind. He has established in these lectures that there is an अत्मा, the soul, behind the physical mind.

In the last chapter he has clearly shown that all relations could be classified under three heads. In the first stage we think that we are servants of the Lord and in the second that we are part of the One stupendous whole, in the third and last stage when we feel our real Ātman we think that we are one with the Infinite Ocean of existence, intelligence, bliss and love.

The *Calcutta Ramakrishna Vedanta Matha* is to be congratulated on this memorial production along with useful footnotes and a learned preface of 14 pages setting out the various views of the Absolute in western Philosophy. The book is useful for general readers of Vedanta.

CRITICAL WORD-INDEX TO THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ. By Rao Bahadur P. C. Divanji, M.A., LL.M., Retired Judge, Advocate. (O. S.) with a Foreword by Dr. S. M. Katre, Poona. Published by New Book and Co., Ltd., 188, 190, Hornby Road, Bombay, 1946.

The *Bhagavadgītā* is one of the most popular books in Indian Literature. It is the source of inspiration to persons

*F. 31.

of all shades of opinion. It gives us in brief the Sublime teachings of the Upaniṣads and makes clear that Action combined with Knowledge alone leads a true devotee to the realisation of the highest aim of life, religion and philosophy. Though the book is so very important, yet not much scientific work has been done on it. Rao Bahadur P. C. Divanji deserves our congratulation for making an attempt towards this direction by preparing a word-Index of it on a novel plan. He has separately dealt with the various recensions of the book. A brief meaning of each word is also given. The task of Indexing is very dull and uninteresting, but at the same time it is very important and difficult too. We congratulate the Rao Bahadur for this hard task even in his old age. The book is indeed a useful addition to the literature of the *Gītā*.

THE ANCIENT WISDOM OF WALES. By D. Jeffrey Williams.

Published by the Adyar Library Madras. Pages 54.

1945. Price Rs. 1-4-0.

The *Theosophical Society* at Adyar is interested in collecting the ancient wisdom of the east and of the west and hence has published the book under review. The first half of the book contains extracts from 'Barddas' which are the fragments of the Drvidical wisdom of Wales. The real question is as to how this ancient wisdom had been preserved all along until it was published by the *Welsh Manuscripts Society* in 1862. There is a strong opinion that the text is the forgery of Tolo Morganweg and the dispute still goes on in Welsh literary and academic circles. Nevertheless, the wisdom is given here in English for the benefit of scholars. The matter given is certainly interesting. The second half of the book contains papers by D. Jeffrey Williams based on a study of the ancient wisdom of Wales.

The book affords ample matter for the historian of the world's philosophy.

THE IDEAL OF EDUCATION. By Swami Abhedananda. pp. xiv + 91. Published by the Ramakrishna Vedanta Math, 19B, Raja Rajkrishna street, Calcutta, 1945. Price Re. 1-0-0.

The book contains 4 lectures of the Swami delivered in India and America. The lectures are intended to spread the real ideal of education among the people. In lecture I occupying one half of the book, the Swami traces briefly and accurately the greatness of the Hindu ideal of education and explains how the ancient Hindus were great in every department including mathematics and other sciences. The second lecture is on practical education and it lays special emphasis on the necessity of learning the Sanskrit language which is shown to be perfect. In the 3rd lecture on female education, the author shows that the nation which produced Gārgī, Maitreyī and others in the past could not lag behind in the education of "women who are the representatives of the Divine Mother, the Śakti, the Mother of the universe-Jaganmātā." The 4th lecture is an address to an educational-conference in America. Here the author emphasises that the essential characteristics of each cultural civilisation should be placed before the west for their study. Students will find the book quite useful and interesting.

THE BEYOND DEATH.—A CRITICAL STUDY IN THE MYSTERY OF PSYCHE AND SPIRITUALISM. By Swami Abhedananda. pp. 15 + 292. Published by Ramakrishna Vedanta Math, 19B, Raja Rajkrishna Street, Calcutta. 1944. Price Rs. 6-8-0.

Swami Abhedananda delivered from time to time a number of lectures on Spiritualism in response to the invita-

tions from well known institutions of culture during his stay in America. These lectures have now been brought together and published in this book under the name of 'Life beyond death' as the first contribution to the *Abhedananda Memorial Series*.

The book under review contains in a brief compass what all has been said on the subject from the earliest times of the dawn of religion up to modern times in all the Religions of the world and by almost all the important philosophers of the various countries including the votaries of modern spiritualistic societies and the society of Psychical Research in America and England.

As a great Indian philosopher put it, throughout the vast length and breadth of the universe there never was, there is not and there never will be, even one sentient and thinking being in whose mind the great question of the *Kāthopaniṣad*—अस्तीत्येके नायमस्तीत्येके (some hold that there is Ātman after death while others deny it)—has never arisen and the enquirer has never clamantly insisted on an answer. The book under review shows how the great problem has been answered by the religions and philosophies—ancient, medieval and modern.

One of the best chapters of the book is chap. XI—'Spiritualism and Vedānta' where the author clearly points out that modern spiritualistic societies endeavour to communicate with the dead and that the truths obtained from them cannot be perfect or absolute. The Vedānta has clearly established that those spirits are in the Pitr-loka and vain should be the result of the spiritualists who expect to know the absolute truth from earthbound spirits. The realisation of the absolute truth or the attainment of God-consciousness can come only from Vedānta and not from the fathers or ancestors who are dwelling in the Pitr-loka. It is Vedānta alone which shows the way by which we can reach the ultimate goal of all religions, manifest Divinity in

the actions of our daily life, and becoming free from selfishness and being independent of physical and mental conditions we may live as a living God. The book concludes that the wise ones will never be afraid of death but always remember that there is an eternal life for every body and no soul will be lost ; and those who have attained the highest spiritual realisation will eventually come face to face with the Infinite and attain that peace and happiness which have been attained by Śrī Kṛṣṇa, Buddha, Christ, Ramakrishna, and by all the other saviours of the world. The book is written in easy, elegant and interesting style. It deserves careful reading.

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